South Azerbaijan

Iranian Foreign Minister: %40 of the Iranians speak Turkish

2012-01-22T19:42:00.000-08:00

Ok Mr Minister! so why those %40 (which is a minimum number) of the Iranians do not have any language right?

The Impact of Vowel Harmony on Loanwords in the Dialects of Azerbaijani Turkish in Iran

2011-12-05T19:49:00.001-08:00

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of vowel harmony (VH) on the loanwords in the dialects of Azerbaijan Turkish in Iran. It is clear that this phonological rule (VH) is one of the main characteristics of Azerbaijan Turkish. The results of the study showed that vowel harmony affects loanwords and changes them phonetically in different degrees. Consequently, in some cases a complete harmony between the vowels of a loanword is created and in some others we observe a partial harmony between the vowels of a loanword. Consequently, it can be claimed that vowel harmony as a main phonological rule in these dialects is so active that it affects not only the native words but the loanwords as well.

KEY WORDS

Vowel harmony, loanwords, Southern dialects of Azerbaijan Turkish.

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IRAN’S TWIN DILEMMA: THE JUGGERNAUT OF PERSIAN NATIONALISM AND THE PROBLEMATIC OF UNITY IN DIVERSITY

2011-11-12T13:15:00.001-08:00

Dr. Alireza Asgharzadeh

As the struggle for democracy and humane living conditions in Iran continues, irreparable cracks begin to appear in the once seemingly unbreakable and undisturbed panorama of the Islamic Republic. The events leading to the tenth presidential election (12 June, 2009) and its aftermath, from the revelatory TV debates down to the mass demonstrations on the streets of Tehran, Shiraz and Isfahan, coupled with antiracist struggle of diverse ethnic groups and nationalities in Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Baluchistan, Khuzistan, Turkmensahra and elsewhere, strip bare the realities of a country in the throes of political, economic, environmental and moral collapse. Amidst government brutality, the people’s struggle has unleashed refreshing debates and scrutinizing discussions hitherto unprecedented in the thirty-years-plus history of the Islamic Republic. Among other things, this resurgent oppositional discourse has transparently demonstrated the Islamic regime’s metamorphosis from theocracy to plutocracy, from the rule of ‘the jurisprudence’ to that of a dictator.
For the first time, the majority of people in Iran, in the Middle East and the world are able to clearly see that the Islamic regime is not the heavenly image of piety, godliness and religious justice it falsely has been projecting of itself; they can now see this regime for what it is: a bricolage of power-hungry mullahs mixed with brutal security forces and greedy technocrats willing to commit any crime to maintain their positions of supremacy and privilege. Like a pack of hungry wolves, the core elements of the regime have now turned on each other: the supreme leader on his hand-picked president; the powerful Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (once considered as the second pillar of the Islamic Republic) against the supreme leader and his president; the Revolutionary Guards Corps (who now controls huge segments of the economy) against everyone else, and so forth. Regardless of how one may view the widening antagonism between the core elements of the regime, the fact remains that the people’s struggle is driving a wedge into the heart of Iran’s theocratic pantheon. Meanwhile, a democratic grassroots movement is emerging around gender equality, freedom of expression, secularism, antiracism, environmentalism and universal human rights.

Since the June 12, 2009 elections, the Islamic regime has been displaying the sheer cruelty and savagery of a brute force by which it rules the country. In hyperbole after hyperbole, the leaders of the regime have been pulling up the famous weapons of ‘national security’ and ‘territorial integrity’ to legitimize their gross violations of the basic human rights of Iran’s diverse populations. These are the most frequently used weapons in the arsenal of Iranian nationalism: to label the demonstrators as ‘agents of foreign governments’ and as ‘traitors to Iran’s territorial integrity.’ Since the post-election unrest, the official Iranian media have been showcasing various scenes of recanting and repenting on the part of supposedly captured members of the opposition. These ‘repenters’ confess colourful tales of how they were seduced and influenced by ‘the satanic west and its corrupt media’ to stage a ‘velvet revolution’ in Iran. In the current Islamic Republic of Iran, just as in the previous Pahlavi regime, notions such as ‘national security’ and ‘territorial integrity’ are used in conjunction with a ‘foreign influence’ discourse to silence the voice of dissent. These are always used as inseparable components of a discourse of Iranian nationalism not only by various government apparatuses but also by many Iranian nationalist scholars and intellectuals. They have been using these slogans to silence, criminalize and further marginalize two groups in particular: the traditional left and the human rights activists of non-Persian communities. In fact, the post-9/11 environment has greatly emboldened the dominant oppressive groups in many Muslim-majority societies to silence the voice of the other under the pretext of fighting terrorism on some occasions, and maintaining national security, territorial integrity, national identity,’ ‘national culture,’ official religion and official language, on others. In current Iranian cases, however, in addition to regular victims (the left and the non-Persians), the targets are also some members of the ruling elite who themselves have had their fair share of silencing others with these same fascistic weapons. In effect, they are now getting a taste of their own medicine.

NECROPHILIA versus BIOPHILIA

On June 20, 2009 a young woman named Neda Aqa Soltan was shot dead by the government forces. The scene of her tragic death was captured on camera and broadcast to the entire world. For millions of people throughout the world, young Neda’s death symbolized the fight between the Islamic regime’s necrophilia and the people’s desire for biophilia, for life, democracy and happiness. Neda’s tragic death soon came to symbolize the struggle of two important segments of Iranian population against theocracy: the youth and the female sex. Iranian youths and females have both been utterly oppressed by the regime ever since its inception in 1979. The regime’s infatuation with eschatology, with a culture of death, mourning, mortification, torture and necrophilia has found its logical expression in crippling and incapacitating signs and symptoms of growth, rejuvenation, happiness and joy—youth and youthfulness.

Having had one of the youngest populations in the world, Iran of the ayatollahs is increasingly becoming incapable of meeting the demands of its young and diverse citizens. As a result, it resorts to medieval forms of punishment and segregation to suppress, discipline and regulate the desire to life of its vibrant population. Therefore, it is no wonder to see women and the youth at the forefront of this struggle against theocracy. To this end, they have chosen a discourse of democracy and human rights vis-à-vis Khomeinism and fundamentalism. At its current embryonic stage, this discourse is fraught with limitations of all sorts. First and foremost, this discourse of biophilia needs to liberate itself from the narrow definitions of Iranian nationalism and be inclusive of not only progressive rights of women and sexual minorities, but also of Iran’s diverse multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-religious and multi-cultural character. To this end, the dominant discourse and praxis of Iranian/Persian nationalism ought to be deconstructed, so that new spaces are opened for fresh articulations of democracy and human rights for all Iranians—not just for members of the Persian community.

THE GREENS versus the GOVERNMENT: MUTATIS MUTANDIS?

There are many oxymoronic aspects to Iran’s ‘Islamic Republic.’ How can there be a modern, 21st century ‘Republic’ ruled by an absolute mullah with absolute powers? What kind of political rights and freedoms do the citizens of this so-called ‘Republic’ have if they cannot choose their own leaders? What kind of a republic is this where people have no say in choosing their own mode of dress, mode of speech, method of friendship, intimacy and sexual relations? Ayatollah Khomeini managed to silence many critics of his theocracy through his hotchpotch theory of ‘Velayat-e Faqih’ (the rule of an absolute Faqih/Ayatollah), where a supreme Ayatollah would preside over an Islamic Republic in which people presumably had the power to elect the president and members of the parliament—that is, after their candidacy and legitimacy were approved by what is referred to as ‘the Assembly of Experts,’ a bunch of mullahs handpicked by the supreme mullah! After Khomeini’s death in 1989, the mishmash and contradictory aspects of his theocracy turned into a source of struggle for power among powerful mullahs and various branches of the cleric establishment. On June 4th, 1989, Ali Khamenei became the supreme leader, replacing Khomeini. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and others were left with the leftover: the executive, judiciary and legislative branches of the polity. Having enjoyed his absolute power for over two decades, it has been speculated that Khamenei may be geared towards dismantling the Republican dimension of Iranian theocracy in its entirety: first, by getting rid of the presidency apparatus; second, by preparing perhaps the scene for his eldest son, Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei, to take over after him. Hashemi Rafsanjani and his camp, on the other hand, are on the side of Republicanism. This camp also includes many elements of the now famous Green Movement.

Despite the increasing animosity between the two camps, many analysts do not see much difference amongst their constituent parts. To begin with, many elements of both camps consider themselves as devout followers of ‘Imam Khomeini,’ the founder of the Islamic Republic after the 1978-79 revolution. They both firmly believe in Khomeinism: a fundamentalist interpretation of Shi’ism mixed with Persian nationalism. They also share a disdain for secularism while believing in the maintenance of the Islamic Republic and its core principles such as the rule of jurisprudence, a militaristic sense of nationalism, and the privileged status of Persian identity as Iran’s only authentic national identity. In this respect, to many Iranians--and the non-Persian majority in particular-- the choice between the two camps is a choice between Scylla and Charybdis.

PERSIAN NATIONALISM: AN OBSTACLE TO UNITY

While the phenomenon of Iranian nationalism has received some attention in recent years, its interpretation has been limited to two main areas: 1) the issue of ‘nuclear energy’ and how it has become a matter of ‘national pride’ for Iranians and their leaders; 2) the rhetoric of ‘foreign interference’ and ‘foreign involvement’ conspiracy theory used by the government to tarnish its opposition’s image. There can be no question that these are important aspects of Iranian nationalism. There, however, is a third dimension to this nationalism that is entirely absent from the current discourse: the dominant hegemonic discourse of Persian nationalism and its role in regulating politics and practices of identity in Iran.

Persian nationalism is an aggressive ethnic nationalism that masquerades under the general rubric of ‘Iranian nationalism.’ This so-called ‘Iranian nationalism’ is deeply engrained with identity politics. Ever since the establishment of modern Iranian nation-state in the mid-1920s, the identity of Persian ethnic group, comprising about 37% of the total population of Iran, has been adopted by successive Iranian governments as the only authentic and legitimate identity of an extremely multi-ethnic, multi-racial and multi-cultural Iran. The aggressive implementation of ‘Persian nationalism’ in multi-national Iran goes back to early 1920s, when an army trooper named Reza Khan staged a coup d'état against the ruling Qajar Dynasty, and having overthrown it, came to consolidate his rule in accordance with the ideology of Persian nationalism: the officialization of ‘Persian language,’ Persian culture and Persian identity on one hand, and foreignization/monsterization of all other languages, cultures and narratives, on the other. These ‘Othererd’ communities comprise over 70% of Iran’s population.

Much of the scholarship focusing on democracy and human rights in Iran fails to provide a comprehensive analysis on these topics for one main reason: neglecting the oppressive role of Persian nationalism. Persian nationalism normally masquerades under ‘Iranian nationalism’ and includes at least three different, and at times seemingly oppositional, strata: 1) the intelligentsia linked to the ruling government; 2) the intelligentsia (and intellectuals) linked to groups in opposition to the ruling regime; 3) the so-called ‘independent/impartial’ intellectuals.

PERSIAN NATIONALISM’S ‘GOVERNING INTELLIGENTSIA’

In the context of Iranian/Persian nationalism, the Governing Intelligentsia refers to all custodians and maintainers of ‘official knowledge,’ ‘official culture,’ ‘official history,’ ‘official language,’ and ‘official identity.’ This stratum includes all or most individuals and the intelligentsia working in various ideological state apparatuses, e.g., the education system, the national/official media and press, ministries of culture, national heritage, and their numerous offshoots. While there may exist some degree of differences of opinion among different individuals in these institutions, when it comes to human rights issues and the rights of Iran’s marginalized communities, there is striking similarity between their approach and that of the ruling regime of which they are a part.

In effect, they all form what Louis Althusser has called ‘ideological apparatuses’ of the ruling group. These ideological apparatuses view human rights demands of racialized and marginalized communities as suspicious and help to suppress them under the pretext of maintaining ‘the national security’ and ‘territorial integrity’ of the country. Suppression of ethnic-based demands takes place under the pretext of fighting the so-called ‘foreign elements’ seeking to break up Iran. In short, the minority rights activists are seen as spies and agents of foreign governments. As a matter of fact, the official branch of Persian nationalism has time and again clarified that issues pertaining to ethnic diversity and human rights concerns of the non-Persian communities are not normal socio-political and cultural issues open to debate; they are a matter of Iran’s national security that have always been dealt through the security organs of the Islamic republic.

A clear example of resorting to ‘foreign elements’ factor to suppress human rights demands of the marginalized communities was manifested in the way the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei interpreted the Azerbaijani anti-racist resistance in the wake of events following the publication of racist cartoons in May 2006. In an address to Iran’s parliament on May 28, 2006, instead of addressing the grievances and demands of a subaltern community whose members were depicted as cockroaches in an official newspaper, the supreme leader labelled the victims of this racism as ‘agents of foreign governments.’ The labelling of minority rights activists as foreign elements is an old notion that has been used by the dominant group for the past 80 years in Iran. Not only the officials and government authorities have consistently used this and similar labels, many individuals, writers, and intellectuals outside the governing circles have also been using such labels to discredit the legitimate demands for racial, ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious equality in the country.

PERSIAN NATIONALISM’S ‘OPPOSITIONAL INTELLIGENTSIA’

In an Iranian context, the ‘Oppositional Intelligentsia’ includes the majority of political organizations, groups and individuals who are openly opposed to the current Islamic government and seek to replace it with their desired political system. Interestingly enough, when it comes to issues of diversity and ethnic/linguistic equality in the country, the majority of these groups and organizations not only take stances similar to those of the ruling regime but some of them even exhibit racist and undemocratic tendencies much more repressive and reactionary than those of the current government.

For instance, when back in 2003 some government officials entertained the possibility of decentralizing the design of school curriculum in the country so that it would reflect some aspects of non-Persian local cultures and environments, many nationalist oppositional groups and intellectuals found such an initiative treacherous and identified the officials involved as ‘traitors to Iran’s territorial integrity.’ A glaring case in point was the position of a well-established political organization named Iran’s National Front (Jebhe-ye Melli-ye Iran). By way of an open letter, this organization warned the authorities that such a decision “can be interpreted as an attack on Iran’s territorial integrity and on the roots of the existence of the great Iranian nation” (Asgharzadeh, 2007, p. 145).

PERSIAN NATIONALISM’S ‘INDEPENDENT INTELLIGENTSIA’

The so-called ‘Independent Intelligentsia’ includes elites and intellectuals who may not support any particular political group but who have strong sense of allegiance to ‘the nation,’ ‘the homeland,’ its culture, identity, etc. Using a notion of ‘methodological nationalism,’ they contribute to silencing and misrepresentation of the subaltern stratum, and in so doing commit epistemic violence against marginalized and oppressed communities. For instance, an academic and writer named Javad Sheikhol-islami may be considered a representative of such intelligentsia. During the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988), this gentleman kept reminding the government authorities that under no condition should the regime refrain from supplanting the languages of non-Persian communities by Farsi. In fact, he considered the Iran-Iraq war as a positive occurrence in that the war had provided Persians with ample opportunity to take in homeless Arabic-speaking Khuzistani children and teach them “proper Farsi” (Asgharzadeh, 2007, p. 147).

Another clear example of this kind of so-called ‘impartial’ Iranian intellectuals and their animosity with human rights demands of the non-Persian communities was illustrated in an open letter to Ayatollah Mehdi Karroubi, one of the presidential candidates in June 2009 elections, published on June 9th, 2009. In response to the flexibility shown on the part of Mr Karroubi to the human rights demands of non-Persian communities, over one-hundred scholars and elites of Iranian universities showered him with derogatory labels such as “extremely irresponsible,” “ill-informed about the authentic identity of Iranian nation,” “against Iran’s national interest and national security,” paying attention to “reactionary and deviant tribal issues” and so on and so forth (Bayaaniyye-ye E’terazi, 2010).

Paralleling the suppression of non-Persian communities inside Iran, the Persian nationalists abroad use every opportunity to misrepresent the identity, language, culture, even the size and number of non-Persian communities in Iran. For instance, “Ethnologue: Languages of the World” is an international resource pertaining to world’s languages. Its publishers have been under intense pressure by Iranian nationalists to reduce the size of Iran’s non-Persian communities to the advantage of the Persian ethnic group. In a recent Open Letter to the site’s manager, many scholars and human rights activists from non-Persian communities complained about this issue and expressed their hope “that the editors and researchers of Ethnologue will not cave in to various ultranationalist bullying, and will not allow Ethnologue’s scholarly reputation to be tarnished by ideologically motivated hyperboles”.

The letter warned the Ethnologue editors that:

“Care must be taken that in estimating the number of each ethnic community, the views of local community leaders, scholars, and human rights activists are taken into full account. In particular, an objective researcher must be cognizant to the fact that, due to lack of respect for human rights and the rights of minorities in Iran, both ruling governments and many scholars of the dominant group have always presented a distorted view regarding the size and status of minoritized communities in the country.” (Azerbaijani Scholars’ Letter, 2009).

These so-called ‘impartial’ nationalist intellectuals continue to defend and safeguard a host of what Michel Foucault has called “the regimes of truth.” In a Foucauldian sense, these are discursive constructs about the supposed ‘truth’ that discipline and regulate individuals’ behaviour in various societies and environments. In an Iranian context, these ‘regimes of truth’ include aspects such as:

·‘Persio-centrism’: an unwavering defence of the supremacy and ‘superiority’ of Persian ethnic group throughout Iran;

· Demonization of the Non-Persian Other: a firm commitment to erase, demonize and monsterize histories, identities, languages and even size and numbers of non-Persian ethnic groups in Iran;

· Invisibilization of Persian nationalism and its pervasive hegemony: stubbornly insisting that there is not and there has never been such a thing as ‘Persian nation,’ Persian nationalism, ‘Persian ethnic group’ and even ‘Persian ethnicity’ in Iran. We are all Iranians; have always been and will always be!

This former case is a reminiscence of the invisibility of whiteness in Euro-western contexts: whereas all non-whites are identified as ‘people of colour;’ it is only the whites who do not seem to possess any colour. Being rooted in histories of privilege and injustice, the white skin colour has gained the status of colourlessness/invisibility. Critical gay/lesbian/queer studies have shed similar light on heterosexuality and homosexuality binarism. Whereas heterosexuality is taken to be the norm and hence needless of definition and identification; homosexuality is seen as a visible identity, and an ‘abnormal’ one at that. Similarly, Fars/Persian identity has masqueraded itself under the generic term Iranian, a category which is defined based on Persian language and identity but at the same time one that renders ‘Persian identity’ invisible. These nationalist scholars working from both inside Iran and abroad use various outlets such as Iranian/Middle Eastern studies journals, newspapers, the satellite TV and the internet to propagate their ideology.

In addition to above factors, Persian nationalism utilizes the services of a host of colonialist/Orientalist facilities abroad. The colonial and imperialist forces have supported the oppressive Persian nationalism in at least two distinct areas: discursive/ideological and physical/practical. Physical and practical legacy of imperialism can be manifested through such acts as the bloody suppression and overthrow of autonomous governments of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in 1946; and also through the infamous coup against the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953.

Discursive/ideological legacy of imperialism is translated into acts of racism and exclusion based on an interpretation of ‘Iran as the land of Aryans;’ rendition of narratives in support of the ‘superiority of Aryan race’ thesis; equation of Persian ethnic group with ‘Aryan race;’ identification of Persian language as an Aryan and hence superior language; doxological ideas about ‘Cyrus the Great’ and a supposedly marvellous pre-Islamic ancient civilization of Iran; propagation and teaching of Orientalist historiography where Iranian is used synonymously with Persian and where Afro-Asiatic, Semitic and other non-Indo-European traits of Iran’s history are erased.

THE CUL-DE-SAC: UNITY IN DIVERSITY

Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of Iran’s 1978-79 Islamic revolution, successfully managed to bring diverse communities of difference under the rallying cry of ‘one Islamic community’ –an umma- unified against the real or imagined enemies of Islam and Iran. Hence his all too often repeated catchphrase in a uniquely Persian accent: “Hamah baa ham/All-Together.” What this Islamic panacea meant was that ‘we are all the same and should constitute a unified community as the Iranian nation.’ While Iran’s communities of difference, for the most part, bought into this rhetoric of unity, the practical aspect of solidarity found its expression in every community’s submission to demands and requirements of Persian nationalism. That kind of Khomeinist call for unity was inimical to difference. It was also very different than the all too familiar notion of ‘one for all, all for one’, in that, in Khomeini’s version of unity and solidarity everyone was for Persian nationalism and Persian nationalism was for no one! Khomeini’s notion of unity, however, has outlived its usefulness. Commitment to this kind of superficial unity showed that a blind dedication to solidarity can easily subsume difference and suffocate diversity under a single group’s national-fascism. Learning from this experience, Iran’s non-Persian communities have now reached a degree of political maturity to pose their collective demands from the standpoint of their own human rights and to make their participation in any kind of solidarity with the dominant Persian group conditional to this group’s acknowledgement of the basic human rights of non-Persian communities: e.g., condemnation of Persian/Aryanist racism; acknowledgment of linguistic, cultural and spiritual freedom for non-Persian communities; commitment to social justice in such areas as cultural and historical representation, linguistic and religious equality, equality in allocation of economic resources and opportunities for different regions of the country, and so forth.

In Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism, Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson (2005) show the degree to which Michel Foucault was deceived by the initial gestures of Khomeini’s Shiism, erroneously thinking that political Islam would offer better conditions for marginalized groups in general, and the sexual minorities in particular. How naïve this Foucauldian assumption was, is self-explanatory. Just as a much more mature Foucault came to regret his naive assumptions about ‘the political Islam,’ so too have Iran’s diverse racialized and marginalized communities. The emergent antagonism between and amongst various social forces in Iran has tarnished the sacred mantra of the Islamic rule and is shifting the pendulum of public opinion against theocracy and in favour of democracy.

What is needed is a commitment to diversity, transsectionality, intersectionality, and an understanding of the interlocking nature of systems of oppression. Sites such as race/ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, language, religion, geography, citizenship, and so forth have been working with and through each other to produce and reproduce oppression. Those Iranian/Persian intellectuals who studiously avoid discussions of difference and diversity can hardly touch the surface of oppressive and exclusionary power relationships in contemporary Iran. They are likely to offer at best partial, at worst misleading contributions to the struggle for democracy. Their constant talk of democracy and human rights are nothing more than ideological slogans serving as a façade for power and privilege. Iran’s Islamic regime has been the archetype that has influenced all subsequent fundamentalisms. A dismantling of such archetypical fundamentalism would strike a crushing blow to all fundamentalist movements and fascistic tendencies. The conundrum, thus far unanswered, is to see why the non-Persian communities are not willing to join the dominant Persian group in putting an end to Iran’s theocracy. This is the cul-de-sac all the paths end into: unity in diversity. The challenge is to see how this unity can be achieved without subsuming difference and suffocating diversity.

Bibliography:

Asgharzadeh, A. (2007). Iran and the challenge of diversity: Aryanist racism, Islamic fundamentalism, and democratic struggles. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bayaaniyye-ye E’terazi Fa’alan (September 20, 2010).

بیانیه اعتراضی فعالان اجتماعی و فرهنگی به اختلاف افکنی ستاد شیخ مهدی کروبی در میان اقوام ایرانی

دوشنبه ، 29 شهریور 1389 http://www.aminteryan.com/index.php/out-from-history/61-bayane-karrubi.html

Azerbaijani Scholars’ Letter to Ethnologue (October 25, 2009).

http://www.achiq.org/olaylar10/xeber34.htm

Afary, J. and K.B. Anderson. (2005). Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism. University of Chicago Press.

Source: http://pensouthazerbaijan.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=79%3Airans-twin-dilemma-&catid=38%3Aarticles&Itemid=1

Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity

2011-11-10T16:45:00.000-08:00

Interview With Farzin Farzad Azerbaijani Iranian-American Youth Activist

Pen South Azerbaijan (Iran)

2011-11-06T13:56:00.000-08:00

http://pensouthazerbaijan.info/

Azerbaijanis protesters rally for autonomy in Iran - Tabriz 1980

2011-11-06T13:53:00.000-08:00

Tens of thousands of people held a march in Tabriz to call for autonomy for the Azerbaijan region of Iran.

During the Iran hostage crisis, violence against the Iranian government spread. Demonstrators for Ayatollah Shariat Madari and Ayatolla Khomeini stagedviolent RIOTS in TABRIZ beginning on January 4, 1980. They got worse on January 12th shown in this NBC News after the execution of 11 members of the Republican Party of the Muslim People. Khomeini's Revoluitionary Guards were blamed. NBC News correspondent Ike Seamans and crew were arrested along with other journalists for covering the violence but were able to smuggled the video out of the city. After this incident foreign journalists were banned from Tabriz. A month later all foreign journalists were kicked out of Iran.

Mount Savalan: Hike for Equal rights for Azerbaijanis in Iran

2011-09-25T21:46:00.000-07:00

Freedom Fighter & National Hero Sattar Khan's Memorial day

2011-09-25T21:25:00.000-07:00

In the early 20th century the Constitutional Revolution took place in Iran in August 1906. The system of constitutional monarchy was created by the decree of Mozzafar-al-Din Shah as a result of the Revolution.

After his death, his eldest son Mohammad Ali, an opponent of constitutional government, became the Shah. He carried a coup d'état and dissolved the National Assembly in 1908. Some deputies were killed and others were seized in Tehran. But Tehran is not the whole of Iran; and a civil war broke out as revolutionaries stood up in defense of the revolution in Tabriz. Sattar Khan and Bagher Khan, two main figures of the revolutionary movement, led the people of Tabriz to endure two sieges in defense of the Iranian Constitution of 1906, resisting against the royalist forces. The movement spread to other parts of Iran. Finally, the civil war was over when the rebel armies reached Tehran, and the second National Assembly was declared in 1909.6 Iran's ethnic populations, and especially the Azerbaijanis, played an active role in the reestablishment of the Constitutional Assembly.

Iran: South Azerbaijanis and Anti-Racism Demonstrations - May 2006

2011-09-25T21:03:00.000-07:00

On May 12, 2006, "Iran", a state-run newspaper published a cartoon insulting Azerbaijanis. It depicted an Azeri-speaking cockroach and suggested people deny it food until it learned to speak Persian.

Azerbaijani university students held demonstrations protesting the cartoon and demanded a formal government apology. In the first days of the demonstrations, no official response from the government condemning the cartoon materialized. The demonstrations spread to other cities in the predominantly Azerbaijani region of Iran. On May 22, Tabriz was home to the greatest anti-state demonstration since the founding of the Islamic Revolution. The protestors went out to the streets and called on Tehran to respect ethnic rights, and demanded that Azerbaijani Turkish be an official state language in Iran. The Azerbaijanis peaceful demonstrations were met with force. The security forces fired on people, reportedly killing at least 20 and arrested hundreds of protestors. Similar demonstrations shook most of the Azerbaijani cities. Naghadeh (Sulduz), Urmia, and Meshghinsherhr (Khiyav) hosted bloody demonstrations with at least 10 people killed.

In response to the vast demonstrations, the government quickly removed the editor-in-chief of the newspaper and the caricaturist, but no official apology was released. The Iranian media did not adequately report the events that occurred during the demonstrations despite their unprecedented size and duration and the events went largely unnoticed in foreign media outlets as well. Azerbaijanis found themselves completely alone in the struggle for their rights in Iran. The opposition in Iran, the so called reformist camp, also did not support the rightful protests of the Azerbaijanis. The demonstrations were not only a backlash against the cartoon, but represented a wider uprising against the tens of years of discrimination and oppression in Iran toward the Azerbaijanis.

Iranian Azerbaijan: Babek Castle Gathering

2011-09-25T20:41:00.000-07:00

Every year in early July the Azeri town of Kaleyber becomes a colorful landscape of anti-colonial resistance against internal colonialism and oppression in Iran.

People come from all over Azerbaijan in their hundreds of thousands to a place at the heart of which lies the famous Fortress of Bezz, a sacred sanctuary that sheltered a local resistance movement centuries ago. They gather in the town of Kaleyber to pay homage to their ancient hero, Babek Khorramdin, who over twelve centuries ago put up a fierce resistance against the invading Islamic/Arabic forces. Men, women, students, workers, peasants and farmers come to celebrate the birthday of Babek, this legendary figure who has now turned into the living soul of a people’s history of resistance and struggle. They pitch their tents around the Fortress of Bezz, the stronghold of Babek and his fighters for 23 years; they explore the Qala/Fortress from dawn to dusk; they gather around bonfires at night; they sing, dance, exchange ideas and read poetry.

This magnificent festival is not just about dance and poetry, though. There is more to it than meets the eye. People come here with their musical instruments, songs, dances, and poems to redefine themselves by means of their own culture, their own language, on their own terms. This is about the survival and resistance of an entire people in defiance of an internal colonial force determined to annihilate its very existence. By annihilating their means of communication, their language, their culture, and their historical rootedness the government seeks to annihilate the Azeri people’s authentic means of self-definition and self-expression.

The Petition: Save Lake Urmia and Release its Environmental Protesters

2011-08-20T01:25:00.000-07:00

22 April 2011

Over the years, Lake Urmia is led toward a slow death subsequent due to their incompetence. It seems that the relevant authorities are not minded to prevent this catastrophe. Under the circumstances, it has fallen to the caring nation of (Southern) Azerbaijan to undo this unfolding catastrophe.

Noble-minded individuals of our (Southern) Azerbaijan took the initiative of family protest for the first time on 2 March 2011 at the location of the Bridge crossing Lake Urmu. This was orchestrated to show the resolute protests in relation to the emergence of this environmental catastrophe. However, the agents of the Iranian authorities resorted to violence by scattering the protesting individuals, many were treated harshly and various groups were rounded up and detained. Some of these protesters were passed with arbitrary sentences, who are still imprisoned. Still there are others yet to be tried in the coming days. This will take place under the circumstances that the first initiative is reiterated after one both in Azerbaijan Square in Tebriz and Eller Baghi in the city of Urmu and again the same story, the participants were rounded up and detained.

The undersigned individuals of this statement demand the slow and dreadful death of Lake Urmu must be prevented. We also demand that the detainees must be released immediately and unconditionally. We appeal to other caring individuals to undersign this statement with their real names.

1. Abdullahi, Elirza
2. Abdullahi, Zaman
3. Ahengeri, Eynullah
4. Akson, Babek
5. Ayrimlu, Jamal
6. Azerdokht, Eqil
7. Behjet, Sehend
8. Bekhtaver, Jahanbekhsh
9. Beraderi, Hesen
10. Berazish, Settar
11. Berzger, Hashim (Guneyli, Yashar)
12. Binezir, Ekber
13. Danishjuyi, Reshid
14. Demirchi, Hesen
15. Deshti, Ibrahim
16. Dovletkhah, Mustafa
17. Ehmedi, Kazim
18. Endelibian, Dariyush
19. Erhemjani, Jelil
20. Erk, Hesen
21. Esedullahi, Ekrem (Sevil)
22. Esedzade, Eli
23. Ezizi, Mehuchehr
24. Ezizi, Sejjad
25 Fayizpur, Eli
26 Ferdi, Emir
27 Ferdi, Solmaz
28 Ferid, Feranek
29 Fershi, Elirza
30 Feyyaz, Mehemmed
31 Fezli, Mahmud
32 Hergli, Huseyn
33 Herisi-nejad, Musa
34 Heseni, Letif
35 Heseni, Shahin
36 Heseni, Yaqub
37 Hesenzade, Eli
38 Heyderi, Huseyn
39 Hojjeti, Eli
40 Huseyni, Hemid
41 Huseynzade, Eli
42 Huseynzade, Elirza
43 Ibrahimi, Qafar
44 Imani, Siddiqe
45 Javadiay-Sekha, Hale
46 Jeferi, Husheng
47 Keyvan-chehr, Sefer
48 Khalitabadi, Eli
49 Khelili, Ashiq Jabrayil
50 Khiyavi, Nigar
51 Kudrulu, Jelal
52 Lek, Qehreman
53 Lisani, Abbas
54 Lutfi, Ekber
55 Lutfi, Ismayil
56 Lutfi, Sadiq
57 Mededi, Hadi
58 Mehemmedi, Dehqan
59 Mehemmedi, kerim
60 Mehemmedi, Seyyad
61 Mehemmedian, Naghi
62 Mehemmedian, Seyyad
63 Mehrelibeylu, Ayet
64 Menafi-Azer, Hebib
65 Menafi-Azer, Rza
66 Muheddis, Ehmed
67 Neimi, Seid
68 Nikrevan, Abbas
69 Nurefken, Huseyn
70 Nuri, Mehdi (Elman)
71 Ojaqli, Mahmud
72 Qehremani,
73 Quluzade, Behbud
74 Qurbani, Ekber
75 Qurbani, Fatime
76 Rashidi, Hesen
77 Rengrezi, Mahmud
78 Reshidi, Ibrahim (Savalan)
79 Rzayi, Eli
80 Rzayi, Yasir
81 Sadiqi, Aydin
82 Sani, Mehemmed
83 Semedi, Behram
84 Serrafi, Elirza
85 Settarian, Yunis
86 Shafeyi, Hemid
87 Shefii, Khelil
88 Sheykhbeylu, Vehid
89 Sheykhi, Sirus
90 Shiri, Sirus
91 Subhi, Shayan
92 Sudber, Javad
93 Teqevi, Mehemmed
94 Valayi, Ehmed
95 Vusali, Ebulfezl
96 Zulqederi, Abbas

http://www.petitiononline.com/UrmuLake/petition.html

Khomeini Delegation Rebuffed By Rebels

2011-08-05T18:12:00.000-07:00

Article from December of 1979 discussing clashes between ethnic Azeris in Iran and forces loyal to Khomeini.

By Maureen Johnson - Associated Press Writer

Tehran, Iran (AP)- Ethnic Turkish rebels controlling Tabriz rebulted a peace delegation sent by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's regime today after a day of hard fighting in which khomeini's supporters recaptured the radio station and governor's mansion in the northwest city but couldn't hold it.

A spokesman for the main political organization in Tabriz, the moslem peopl's Party, said party officials would not meet with the peace delegats.

Meanwhile, the situation of the U.S. hostages in the American Embassy in Tehran remained unchanged on their 37th day in captivity. But a U.N. spokesman said Secretary - General Kurt Waldheim was sending the foreign minister of Sri Lanka to visit the hostages, and the United States was to present its case against Iran to the international Court of Justice in The Hague. Iran was boycotting the court session.

Khomeini's Revolutionary Court sent Finance Minister Abdolhassan Bani-Sadr and two other officials to Tabriz to try to end the five-day-old rebellion by the Turkish Azeris, the fourth of Iran's ethnic minorities to take armed action in support of their demands for autonomous home rule.

The Turks seized the local radio station, the governor's mansion and the airport Thursday. Local army units were reported siding with the rebels.

Early Sunday revolutionary guards recaptured the governor's mansion, and some 4.000 khomeini supporters prayed at the university next door, then rushed and seized it from 20 to 30 armed Turks.

Hundreds of Turks shouting "Death to Khomeini!" marched on the station, and the khomeini forces opened fire. Tens of thousands of Turks and local army units joined the march, rushed the hilitop station and retook it.

Rebel leaders said three of their people were killed, 60 were wounded and six of khomeini's revolutionary guards were taken prisoner.

The Turks also retook the governor's mansion, seized a police station and apparently retained control of the airport throughout the day's violence. They erected roadblocks around Tabriz and searched vehicles to bar Khomeini's supporters from reaching the city of 600,000 Iran's third largest .

Khomeini said in a Tehran Radio broadcast that the Tabriz rebellion was the work of "plotters who receive their orders from American and elsewhere." and his regime issued an arrest warrant for the Turks governor general-designate in East Azerbaijan, Rahmatola Moghadam Maraghaie.

The Tabriz rebellion broke out after supporters of khomeini killed two Turks and wounded eight others who were guarding the home of their spiritual leader, Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariat-Madari. in Qum, the holy city 100 miles south of Tehran where khomeini also makes his headquarters.

Shariat-Madari and the Turkish Azeris are shiite Moslems like Khomeini and Iran's Persian majority while the other sizable ethnic minorities demanding autonomy the Kurds, Arabs, Turkmans and Baluchis are Sunnis, the dominant branch of Islam everywhere else in the Moslem world.

The mob in Qum attacked Shariat-Madari's home because he critized Iran's new Islamic constitution for concentrating too much power in Khomeini's hands and for failing to satisfy the ethnic minorities demands for autonomy.

The Dispatch - Google News Archive Search

http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=yDIgAAAAIBAJ&sjid=oVEEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6854%2C3065657&dq=iran+ethnic+minorities&hl=en

UK Border Agency: Azerbaijani Turks Human Rights issues in Iran (14 May to 21 June 2011)

2011-07-22T23:06:00.000-07:00

AZERBAIJANI (AZERI) TURKS IN IRAN

The USSD Report 2010 stated that:
"Ethnic Azeris comprised approximately one-quarter of the country’s population, were well integrated into government and society, and included the supreme leader among their numbers. Non etheless, Azeris complained that the government discriminated against them, banning the Azerbaijani language in schools, harassing Azeri activists or organizers, and changing Azeri geographic names. Azeri groups also claimed a number of Azeri political prisoners had been jailed for advocating cultural and language rights for Azerbaijanis. The government charged several of them with ‘revolting against the Islamic state.’" [4f] (Section 6)

The Iranian Minorities Human Rights Organisation (IMHRO) reported on 21 August 2010 that:
"Azeri is the largest ethnic group in Iran with around 30 million people. Azeri’s [sic] who speak Turkish is [sic] banned from studying in their mother tongue and many of their cultural activists are in prison.

"Azeri is [sic] heavily suppressed by the Iranian security service. Azeri political parties’ [sic] are banned and political activists are tortured in prison. Many Azeri political activists are killed under torture." [47a]

The FIDH/LDDHI report published in October 2010 observed that:
"The main problems that the Iranian Azeri Turks face concern cultural discrimination.
Many people believe that languages other than Persian should be promoted in Iran and their speakers be allowed access to education in their own language.

"Azeris have also complained of disrespect for their culture and language. Some controversial cartoons in the government newspaper, daily Iran, depicted cockroaches speaking Azeri Turkic in May 2006, and caused uproar in many cities of the northwestern Iranian provinces and parts of Tehran. Scores of demonstrators were arrested, some were injured and four were said to have died in Naqadeh, a city in the West Azerbaijan province of Iran.

"Since then, the Iranian Azeri cultural activists commemorate what is known as the ‘cartoons anniversary’ every year, which the authorities try to contain through a policy of detainment; 31 activists were arrested in May 2010." [56c] (p15)

The same report continued:
"Azeri cultural activists have faced problems for writing about or celebrating the Mother Tongue Day, and demanding education in their mother tongue. In June 2010, the appeal court of Azerbaijan sentenced Mr. Alireza Farshi and his wife Sima Didar to six months imprisonment for taking part in a demonstration in May 2009 in the Il Guli [People’s Lake] Park of Tabriz, where ‘Education in Turkish’ was one of the slogans.

"Detentions also occur frequently in July every year, when thousands of Iranian Azeris gather at Fort Babak (Qaleh Babak) near the town of Kalibar in East Azerbaijan province to mark the birthday of an Historical leader by the name of Babak, who rebelled against the Arab Islamic rulers 1,200 years ago. In May 2010, according to Iranian Azeri sources, a court in Kalibar tried Ayat Mohammad Jafari and sentenced him to 91 days imprisonment for ‘disrupting public order’ by taking part in the 2004 celebrations at Fort Babak.

"The same sources allege that some military personnel have been expelled from the armed forces for taking part in Azeri Turkic cultural activities or celebrations in recent years. Firooz Yousefi, a non-commissioned officer, was said to have been expelled from the Army for pan-Turkism in March 2010 and later detained in June." [56c] (p15)

http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/coi/iran/report-0611.pdf?view=Binary

Discrimination Against Qashqai Turks in Iran

2011-07-22T20:49:00.000-07:00

UK Border Agency: The Qashqai website, accessed on 1 December 2009, noted that the Qashqai are also known as the Qashqaai, Qashqa’i or Ghashghai. Information on the website stated:

"The Qashqai compose a community of settled, semi-settled, and pastoral nomadic households who reside mainly in the Fars region of southern Iran. They speak Qashqai Turki (Turkish). Most of them also speak, at least, Persian (Farsi). They are Shia Muslims… Since the 1960s the general trend has beed a sharp increase in sedentarization of Qashqai nomads and involvement in non-pastoral and non traditional economic activities. Presently the Qashqai form mainly settled and semi-settled households. Qashqai population of today is estimated between one and one and a half million." [37a]

The Advisory Panel on Country Information (APCI) review of the COI Service’s Iran COI Report of August 2008, undertaken by Dr Reza Molavi and Dr Mohammad M Hedayati- Kakhki of the Centre for Iranian Studies at Durham University, dated 23 September 2008, (APCI Report 2008) stated that:

"In addition to established ethnic minorities, a number of nomadic groups and tribes are targeted for discrimination, for instance the Gheshghay [another version of Qashqai]… The population of the group is estimated as 2% of the Iranian population, living mainly in Fars Province in Southern Iran. Shiraz is known as the biggest centre of the group’s activities, whilst a part of the group continue to be nomadic. Notably, after the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, Khosrow Khan Qashqai, the Ghashghayi leader, returned to Iran from Germany, was arrested and subsequently publicly executed for advocating for the group’s rights and autonomy. This has caused long-standing suspicion by the government of this ethnic group, considering it a potentially volatile one.

"Moreover, the religious practices of the group are not entirely in line with those of the mainstream Islamic regime and therefore give rise to suspicions and discrimination against them, as described in the account below:

"Following the Islamic Revolution, various Qashqa’i customs, such as public dancing, the playing of traditional music on oboes and skin drums, and stickfighting games performed to music, were declared immoral and anti-Islamic by the new government. The extent of continuous discrimination is not known. However, various laws still deem certain Qashqa’i practices to be anti-Islamic, despite the fact that the group is Shia Muslim.

"In light of the above information, whilst those of the Ghashghayi ethnicity would not be prosecuted on basis of ethnicity alone, they may indeed be targeted on basis of ethnicity for dispossession of property, employment, education as well as other discrimination. Lastly, the account below suggests a possible rationale for such efforts by the government in relation to the Ghashghayi:

"In 2005, Miloon Kothari, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, condemned the recent confiscation of land owned by minority groups such as the Qashqa’i. Tehran’s objective with these policies, according to human rights activists, was to implement ‘ethnic restructuring’ by forced migration out of the oil and sugar-rich Khuzestan province. In addition to land confiscation, the Qashqa’is also had to deal with traditional pastures being sold to the private sector." [6a] (p51-52)

http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/coi/iran/report-0611.pdf?view=Binary

For The Sake of Language Justice in Iran

2011-07-18T18:28:00.000-07:00

This poster designed by a native of South Azerbaijan (North West of Iran) for the sake of language justice. Iran is a multi-ethnic country, but has only one official language (Persian / Farsi). The government puts the non-Persian ethnics under the assimilation pressure.

The Azerbaijani people have been divided between Iran and the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan for more than 150 years, yet they have retained their ethnic identity.(1)

Assaults on the language of the Azeris, characterize a ‘Persianifcation’ drive that has seen the government proscribing traditional festivals, destroying historic monuments and seeking seemingly to erase the mental and physical landscape of those in the north. But Tehran has begun to reap the whirlwind. After years of endurance, a struggle over language has brought about the awakening of a people long associated with silent acquiescence, if they were indeed acknowledged at all.(2)

Iran’s ethnic Azerbaijani community is seldom in the news, but is gradually becoming an increasingly important factor in the domestic politics of Iran as well as in the regional politics of the so-called Northern Tier of the Middle East, where Iran meets the South Caucasus and Turkey. Both domestic political developments in the Islamic Republic and the larger environment surrounding the region are contributing to making the Azerbaijani community in Iran a potential hotspot.

The developments in Iranian Azerbaijan are regularly overshadowed by other, more acute, developments in the region. Yet the processes taking place there do not bode well for the future. The Iranian government is pursuing policies that exacerbate tensions between itself and the Azerbaijani community. Given the volatility of the wider region, the risk of conflict in Iranian Azerbaijan cannot be discounted, although it is by no means unavoidable. While there is time, it is important for the international community to seek to defuse tensions in Iranian Azerbaijan.

The possibility exists that the issue of Iranian Azerbaijan will one day be a much more prominent item in the news than it is today.(3)

References:
1- Svante Cornell, Iranian Azerbaijan: A Brewing Hotspot Presentation to Symposium on “Human Rights and Ethnicity in Iran”, November 22, 2004, organized by the Moderate (conservative) party, Swedish Parliament, Stockholm.
2- Brenda Shaffer, Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, July 2002.
3- http://southaz.blogspot.com/2008/03/persecution-tension-and-awakening-in.html
4- http://www.ethnologue.com/show_language.asp?code=azb
5- http://www.adapp.info/
6- http://www.oyrenci.com/
7- http://www.azadtribun.net/

LANGUAGES MATTER! A UNESCO poster competition
http://www.design21sdn.com/competitions/17/entries/4375/gallery

An interview with Bernardo Atxaga: 'A Basque writer leaps into translation'

2011-07-01T00:41:00.000-07:00

UNESCO Courier April 01, 2000 Kuntz, Lucia Iglesias

"Euskera, ialgi adi kanpora" ("Basque language, step forward!"). Bernard Atxaga [*] couldn't agree more with these words from a 16th-century Basque song.

Euskera--the Basque language--is spoken by some 600,000 people in the Spanish Basque country and Navarra, and another 80,000 in the Pyrenees Orientales department of southwestern France. Its origins are unknown, but it has probably existed for over 4,000 years.

Euskera's development was severely stunted during Spain's 40-year Franco dictatorship. Then came a major recovery. Euskera became a shared literary language, won recognition in 1979 as a joint official language with Spanish, and has been promoted through teaching.

Basque literature has also been flowering in the hands of a group of dedicated writers. One of them, Bernardo Atxaga, 48, who won the Spanish National Fiction Prize in 1989 for Obabakoak, is the first writer in the Basque language to achieve an international reputation.

Q: Did the crackdown on Euskera during the Franco era really happen, or is it a myth?
A: It definitely happened, but it’s also true that Euskera wasn’t doing so well before the Civil War. Only a society that can afford to have doctors on call on Sundays, as it were, can afford to be concerned about saving its language. Before the war, the Basque country was confronted with terrible economic problems. Saving the language was a miracle only intellectuals and priests could have performed. My own case is typical, in a way. My grandfather and great-grandfather were carpenters. They had plenty of other things to worry about than preserving the language. I had a different kind of education from theirs, and it led me to ask why I was losing the use of a language that I had inherited. Political repression was fierce when I was a child. My brothers and I were beaten at school if we were caught speaking Euskera, the language we spoke at home. We knew we risked punishment if we spoke Basque in public.

Q: With the coming of democracy, Basque autonomy and laws covering language, the situation changed totally within a few years. Today Basque is a compulsory school subject. What do you think about this?
A: English is compulsory too. This is a very complex issue. How far does a state have the right to lay down the law in education? At present, all states do so. The education ministry plays a very important role in all countries, and the area of freedom in this sphere is very small. That being said, people who live in the Basque country and don’t want to know anything about our language and culture aren’t worthy of respect.

Q: Do you think Euskera is used too much as a political pawn?
A: I really don’t think so. I don’t see how half a million people can cause much mischief for 35 million Spanish-speakers. On the contrary, I think there’s been a lot of unfairness on the part of the majority group. National newspapers never print anything positive about our language. I think that’s unjust.

Q: The unification of Euskera around an agreed version of the language continues to provoke controversy. Do you think standardization was necessary to enable Euskera to survive?
A: No language in the world can develop if it is fundamentally divided. All languages spin off variants, but at the same time they seek the common basis without which no language can perform its higher functions. You can’t write books about architecture in pidgin, you have to use standard English, which is better qualified to express what you want to say. Among English-speakers, each community develops its own accent, its own way of using the language. You can be for or against this but, as a language teacher I know used to tell his Chicano students: “You can speak Spanglish if you like, but if you want to study law, you’ll have to write in English.” All languages that develop tend towards simplification. The same friend told me that language is nowhere more complex than in a village. In Chicago or New York, English is a lot simpler than it is in a remote village in Ireland.

Q: You’re completely bilingual. Why do you always write first in Euskera?
A: In literary terms, I’m used to thinking in Euskera. My stories or poems come to me in Euskera. It’s my personal language, the one I use to jot down ideas in my notebooks, whether I’m in Stockholm or Madrid. I’ve become used to doing that. It’s not much to do with ideology, it’s just the way I work. Some writers need to go into a monastery and stay there for a few months without setting foot outside. My writing ritual involves writing first in Basque. I’ve come to the conclusion that it isn’t very important. I might just as well write in some other language.

Q: But you insist on translating your own work.
A: Some languages are quite close to each other, they’re like tracings that match when you put one on top of another. This is the case with Catalan and Spanish. I see translation as a physical leap, and the jump from Catalan to Spanish is like stepping off the pavement onto the road. With Basque, the leap is enormous. And leaving it to a translator is a risky business. My translations are usually the work of several hands. Close friends of mine produce a rough draft and I extract a final version from it. It’s very hard to explain what it’s like being a bilingual writer. Sitting down to translate one’s own work is a mind-bending experience. Every time I do it, the gap between the two texts seems to widen.

Q: Yet your books are translated into other languages from Spanish. Isn’t that a bit of a cop-out?
A: Not at all, because I believe that language is always part of a person’s way of life, and for me Spanish is also a first language. There are two first languages in my life and luckily I can express myself just as well in both.

Q: Do you consider yourself a nationalist?
A: I rather like Spain. I’m not in favour of political independence. I don’t think Spain’s a bad society or a bad country. You can be part of it and have a critical eye.

Azerbaijan Speaks

2011-06-30T18:00:00.000-07:00

Esteemed People of Iran,
Endeared Fellow Countrymen:

Ever since the dawn of the Great Constitutional Revolution the justice and freedom loving forces of our country have been trying to restore freedom and justice in our society, and provide each and every citizen access to all individual and collective human rights.

Our nation has been witnessing the tyranny of many autocratic shahs, who did not refrain from any brutality for maintaining their rule. However, human experience provides abundant evidence, that brutality will not last.

The anti-monarchy revolution of 1979 was an example of such an experience for erecting the republican government and democracy.

Although a quarter of a century has passed since that glorious historical event, a fundamental question is whether the national desires of the Iranians have been actually fulfilled.

An anlysis of the mistakes and the weaknesses of the past will no doubt provide a guiding light for the new democratic movement of the Iranian People.

Lack of a precise definition of democracy and the ways of demanding it as a social institution, failure to take the objective pre-requisites of democracy in forming mass-scale social, economical, cultural, ethnic and religious attitudes into consideration seem to have been the main causes of our failure in erecting a democratic government.

Under these circumstances, providing a clear view of the necessities of democracy and the attributes of the republican government can help the democratic and freedom loving forces develop a better mutual understanding, and guarantee the unification and collaboration of these forces to achieve the government structure desired by the majorities.

We, the undersigned, representing the writers, poets, academics and students, journalists and political activists of Azarbaijan, supported by other fellow countrymen in building a comprehensive front for demand of democracy express our opinions on the basic outlines of the freedom loving movement of the Iranian nation as follow:

1 – The first and foremost condition for realising the national desires is transition to a democratic system based on the recognised principles of the republican government, in the light of which the individual and social rights depicted in the International Declaration of Human Rights and its attachments can be guaranteed.

2 – In respect of the geographical vastness and ethnic multiplicity and historical backgrounds of our country, a transition to the federal system is inevitable. In the recent century the very existence of such well-known institutions as The Provincial Councils and The Islamic Councils in the constitutions of the mashruta revolution and that of the Islamic Republic indicate the inevitability of the federal system in Iran, which has been further illustrated by the idea of deviding the country into 10 provincial sectors in the last 2 years.

3 – A definition of the cultural, economical and political rights of the citizens and their equality in all respects within the framework of law is a guarantee of the healthy structure and surviving capacity of the republic. Thus, assignment to a certain ideology, thought, race and religion should not lead to any superiority or legitimation. We believe that being elected by the majority through a democratic election process is the sole mandate for legitimation.

4 – In respect of the fact that Iran is a country with multiple nationalities, and various recognised, mass-scale and independent languages such as Turkish, Farsi, Arabic, Kurdish, Turkmen and Baloutchi have been in use in its vast geography throughout the history, quick acceptance and transparent fulfillment of the obvious principle of education in the mother language in all levels of education is an essential fact.

5 – In respect of the fact that all languages and dialects and also all cultural heritage belong to the spiritual wealth of the nation, creating appropriate conditions for survival and flourishing of all active languages and dialects of Iran, and protecting and restoring all the cultural memorials without discrimination is our demand.

6 – As homage to the human rank of women in the society comprising half of the population, adherence to The Anti-discrimination Convention and its attachments is essential.

7 – Steady scientific, cultural, economical and social development throughout the country is inevitable in order to safeguard democracy and guarantee its continuation. We demand extention of security, education, public media, health, employment, housing and other means of welfare to each and every individual on an equal basis.

8 – Environment and ecological multiplicity as well as genetical resources of Iran belong to our most valuble national assets. We demand that extensive damage brought upon the environment in the last decades be compensated and these valuble resources be safeguarded.

9 – We believe that, in the foreign policy defending the national interests and maintaining harmonical relationship in the internationa arena in the interest of the friendship of nations and in the interest of developing the world peace and security are essential for our security, progress and national tranquility.

We believe in formulating the demands through peaceful ways. We consider that various methods of civil resistance such as sit-ins, gatherings, parades, strikes and request of plebiscite are the essential rights of the nation for achieving its demands.

It is our conviction that eliminating or neglecting any of the afore mentioned cases leads to undermining the confidence of wide masses of people, and possibly to their confrontation and finally to the wasting of resources and postponing the social development of the country.

We hope that all forces honestly endeavouring to play a role in the development and progress of the society will pave the way for the movement of the Iranian people through a realistic analysis of the characteristics and difficulties of the Iranian society and of the course of developments in the region, and finally through submitting solutions for peaceful realisation of the objectives described above.

May we succeed in laying the foundations of a progressive and graceful country, with free and equal citizens, by holding a clear view of democracy and by developing a sound understanding of the difficulties of our society.

June 28, 2003

The Milwaukee Journal - May 20, 1946: Tabriz Reports ‘Bloody’ Battle in Azerbaijan

2011-06-22T20:22:00.000-07:00

Rebellious Iran Province Is Being Attacked by Teheran Forces, London Dispatches Say

London, England. (AP) Radio reports from Tabriz, capital of Azerbaijan province, indicated Monday that civil strife “fratricide and bloody battle”- had broken out in Iran between troops of the province and the Iranian central government.

The Tabriz radio, as quoted by BBC and Reuters, said that Iranian central government troops had attacked Azerbaijan. Reuters quoted the broadcast as saying the attack came from Kurdistan, west of Tabriz.

Martial law was proclaimed in Tabriz, BBC quoted the broadcast as saying, and Reuters said the broadcast announced an 11 p.m. curfew and proclaimed the death penalty for violators.

Broadcast Interrupts

BBC said the Tabriz station interrupted a transmission of recorded music at 6:30 p.m. London time (11:30 a.m. CST) Sunday to announce the alleged attack.

Then, according to BBC, the Tabriz announcer added: “Azerbaijan supporters have received orders to defend themselves. We shall defend freedom and democracy.

“After the clearing of the political horizon, Iran wants to obscure it again with the blood of Azerbaijan youth. Shame to the treacherous hands which are dragging us into fratricide and bloody battle!

“Each supporter must put up a stiff resistance. Everyone must make sacrifices. Let the world know in whose hands the destiny of suffering of the Iranian nation lies. We shall defend freedom to the last breath and the last Azerbaijani.

“Assault Has Begun”

“It is not known on whose orders the Teheran (capital of Iran) forces have launched their attack. Assault and savagery have begun.”

[NBC in New York quoted BBC as saying that the Tabriz radio reported that casualties had been inflicted on an unspecified number of central government forces, and that 40 central government soldiers had been taken prisoner.]

Reuters in a Tehran dispatch
Turn to IRAN, page 2, col. 6

Source: The Milwaukee Journal - May 20, 1946

Additional picture:

Prof. Dr. M. T. Zehtabi

2011-05-25T21:46:00.001-07:00

He opened eye to the world in Shabistar in 1923. When he was just 5-6 years old wish to go to school and after a long time of begging and insistence his mother let he go to school with is sisters which had been at their home street. The teacher was a woman called Zehra Beyim who had a class for teaching Koran for boys and girls altogether and Zehtabi finally had got her approval for studying there. He had learned alphabet for a while and soon he had started reading very popular novels in his mother language, Turkish, like Asli and Karam love story, Khavarnameh, Alparslan, and Hosein Kürd Shbisteri epics, etc.

Prof. Zehtabi himself explained the later years as follow:
Then I went to Mirza Ibrahim's school and Golshaneh Raaz primary state school in Shabistar and began to learn Farsi and forgot all about learning my mother language. Later I went Tabriz and studied at intermediate school and then at collage and together with Farsi I learned French and Arabic but I never even thought about studying my own mother language and I perceived it as natural. This was because all social condition and air and state organizations were directed against it and children who dared to speak in mother language were hardly punished and fined.

In the year of 1945 Riza shah's dictatorship ended and again the Azerbaijan newspaper restarted publishing. Becoming familiar with this paper tied Zehtabi's life with mother language forever. From the time on my struggle to study my mother language at universities and colleges came to nothing and all gates were blocked.
He then escaped in USSR just for studying mother language at Baku. But instead he was sent to court and jailed and exiled to Siberia's labor camps. Two years later he had been sent to Dushanbe (Tajikistan).

Zehtabi explained this period as follow:
I studied there for a year at an evening school and got a diploma and sent it with a written application to University of Baku. Two weeks later I got an approval letter and packed my books and went Baku to study my mother language and settled in a hostel.

One day head of hostel came to me and after asking my name said," President of University (the great chemist and academia inventor Yusuf Memmed Aliyev from Nakhchivan) wants to see you. Go to him and see what is he wants to tell you."
Yusuf Memmed Aliyev asked my name and my home town and then asked me," what course do you want to study?"
"Azerbaijani Language and Literature", I answered. When he heard this mentioned to my diploma on his table and said," you have good marks and want study language?! Do study chemistry!"
"But sir my nation now is in need of this," I answered.
He startled and got up and came to me took my hand warmly and shake," I hope you succeed." he said sent me.
After a five year study he began to teach Arabic literature in Baku University Orient Studies Faculty and from then he thought about the way to send mother language knowledge to his nation because his nation was in need of it.
Prof. Zehtabi was in struggle to get Iraq in the time of Abdul Karim Qasem for more than 12 years and going to Moscow and back to Baku all the time to get in Iraq and seeking for becoming refugee. Finally e succeeded and went Iraq in 1971 and settled at Baghdad and taught Farsi and Ancient Turkish languages at the University of Baghdad.

After 1979 Revolution a week later he came to transient government to get permission to come back to his motherland and 5 months after approval he got back to Tabriz and began to teach Turkish and Arabic at Tabriz University. After a long 30 years of departure being among his people he made acquaintance of hundreds of young girls and boys and as a result he found the great enthusiasm among people to learn and safe guard their mother language and found that his great book of teaching mother language (Iranian Turkish Language Conjugation) printed in foreign country is too complex for them.

At this time universities got closed up but Zehtabi went on working at Tabriz University and wrote his valuable book, Lexicology of Contemporary Literary Azeri Language and together with it e wrote a simplified book containing Phonetics and Conjugation of mother language.

In 1989 Tabriz Radio Officials came to him and proposed him to teach literary language to reporters broadcasting programs for foreign countries. He was more than willing to make use of this little chance of teaching mother language to some of his people even if they were to give service to and unwanted government. Through this program he wrote the book, Contemporary Literary Azeri Language (Phonetics and Conjugation).

Prof. Zehtabi went on his educational activities to revive his mother language to the end. He revived our mother language and history in his classes with what we can call it an alternative educational university of language and history and culture in country in which racism policy had forbidden and falsified everything you can think of. He led and revived a nation whose moralities had been declared as discussing and had been ruined by chauvinism and he brought up an awakening, civil and nonviolent movement of acknowledging movement.

Prof. Zehtabi's life ended to a suspicious death by IRI security forces took place in dark years of 1987-1995, years of massacring Iranian enlighteners.

His published books:
1) Old History of Iranian Turks (2 volums)
2) Falcon in Chain (Poem), Tabriz
3) Contemporary Literary Azeri Language
4) Lexicology, Tabriz
5) Syntax of Azerbaijani Turkish
6) My memories with Ali Agha Vahid
7) Life of Butterfly (Poem), Baghdad
8) Baghban, The son of Nation (Poem), Tabriz
9) The Myth of Commando, Baghdad
10) From Bez Castle, Berlin
11) The Luck in Sleep, Baghdad
12) Wind's Existence, Baghdad
13) Contemporary Literary Azeri Language Phonology and Grammar rule
14) Lets it be 10- short stories, Tabriz
15) Qavad-al-Farsiyeh (Arabic)
16) Crimes of Kings through 2500 Years
17) If Farsi Is Superior to Other International Languages?, Baghdad
18) Ark (weekly Journal), Berlin
19) Way of Unity (monthly journal), Baghdad

Works that are not published yet:
1) Youthfulness and Wreath
2) Poetry of Mirza Mojiz Shabistarli (5 volums)

By Gholamreza Poorbagher
Translated by: Araz Bilgin

Source: Sorgulamazamani.com

Dr. Samad Sardarinia

2011-05-25T21:40:00.000-07:00

Dr. Samad Sardarinia was born in Amire Giz district of Tabriz in May, 1947. He studied history in Tabriz University, and graduated in 1971 when he started his job in Iranian National Radio. In 1978, he received his second university degree in Law from Tehran University.

Due to his intensive research and studies on the history of Azerbaijan, he was nominated by the State University of Azerbaijan for an honorary PhD degree. He is well known for publishing a lot of articles and books about the history of Azerbaijan.

After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, he became an active author and member of editorial board of Varlig – a Turkish-Persian journal. Simultaneously, he cooperated with Azerbaijan Cultural Association, Dilmac Journal, and other organizations and continued to inform especially young people of their identity and historical background. His continuous struggles and efforts to explore the uncharted aspects of the history of contemporary Azerbaijan ended with his death in April, 2008.

Some of Dr. Sardarinia's works:
1. Tebriz Mehd-i Senet-i Çap der İran (Tabriz the cradle of printing industry in Iran)
2. Tebriz Şehr-i Evvelinha (Tabriz the city of initiations)
3. Tarixçéy-i Téatr-i Tebriz (The history of theatre in Tabriz)
4. Molla Nesreddin der Tebriz (Molla Nasraddin in Tabriz)
5. Neqş-i Merkez-i Qéybi Tebriz der Enqélab-i Meşrutiyet (The role of secret center (Markaz-e-Gheybi) in Constituion (Mashrooteh) Revolution)
6. Eli Misyo: Rehberé Merkez-i Qéybi-yi Tebriz (Ali Missiyo: the leader of secret center (Markaz-e-Gheybi) in Tabriz)
7. Baqir Xan Salar-i Milli (National leader (salar)Bagher Khan)
8. Darulfunun-i Tebriz Dovvomin Merkez-i Amuzeş-i Ali (Darulfunun-e-Tabriz: the second center for higher education)
9. Séyri der Tarix-i Azerbaycan (A glance at the history of Azerbaijan)
10. Tarix-i Ruznamé ve Mecellehay-i Azerbaycan (The history of newspapers and magazines in Azerbaijan)
11. Meşahir-i Azerbaycan (Famous figures of Azerbaijan)
12. Azerbaycan Pişgam-i Came-i Medeni (Azerbaijan the pionner of civil society)
13. İrevan Yék Vélayet-i Moselman Néşin Bud (Yerevan was a Muslim-populated province)
14. Qarabağ der Gozergahé Tarix (Garabagh in the passage of time)
15. Ceng-i Qarabağ (Garabagh war)
16. Qetl-i Am-i Moselmanan der Do Suy-i Eres (The genocide of Muslims on the two side of Araz)
17. Baku Şehr-i Neft ve Musiqi (Baku, oil and music city)
Prepared by: Artum Dinc
Translated by: Davud Kuhi

Sorgulama Zamani: http://www.sorgulamazamani.com/bir_insan.php?id=10

Language and Colonialism: The Language of African Literature

2011-05-01T22:27:00.000-07:00

Ngugi wa Thiongo in his essay “Language of African Literature”, exhorts to resurrect all African languages in order to reclaim native cultures that belong to the peasant and working class as a strategy against the cultural imperialism of Europe and America. For this he asks the African writers who use English, French and other European languages as their media of expression, to renounce this tradition and displace it with the kaleidoscopic cultures of native languages.

Though a powerful and urgent proposition there are certain drawbacks in it, one of them being his total un-observance of gender inequality both with in a pre–colonial culture/language and in the context of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Another drawback in his proposition is that he doesn’t find it necessary to represent Africa in English once Africa is free from neo-colonialism and attains self-sufficiency in it s economic, political, social and cultural realms. He refuses to see that even if Africa attains political and economical freedom, Europe and America can continue to represent Africa in lines of “geniuses of racism” as a Rider Haggard or a Nicholas Monsarrat .There for an absolute of his proposition will take away from Africa the vantage point from which it could “confront the racist bigotry of Europe” in its own languages.

Ngugi begins his argument by questioning the conceptualization of African writers who use English as their medium, specifically of those, who had gathered for ‘A Conference of African Writers of English Expression’ at Marekere University College, Kampala, Uganda. He asks, how writings produced in the language of the colonizer can be considered as African literature. He terms this category as ‘Afro-European literature’- that is, the literature written by Africans in European languages, in the era of imperialism. Therefore, he finds it necessary to produce writings in African languages alone.

Further, he elaborates the need to reconnect the African with ‘his’ mother tongue. It arises from the fact that imperialism severed the link between the African and his native language. He illustrates the process of “colonial alienation”, from his own experience as a colonized Kenyan child.

In 1952 after the declaration of the state of emergency over Kenya the colonial regime took over all the schools run by the patriotic nationalists and imposed English as the language of formal education. This displaced Gikuyu, a Kenyan native language and severe punishment was given to students who spoke Gikuyu, their language. The Kenyan children underwent a traumatic experience due to this atrocity unleashed by the colonial regime:

Thus one of the most humiliating experiences was to be caught speaking Gikuyu in the vicinity of the school. The culprit was given given corporal punishment – three to five strokes of the cane on bare buttocks – or was made to carry a metal plate around the neck with inscriptions such as I AM STUPID or I AM DONKEY. Sometimes the culprits were fined money they could hardly afford.

This resulted in alienating Kenyan children from their language and their culture, and they were forced to identify themselves with that of an alien language. Ngugi also points out that learning for a colonial child became a cerebral activity and not an emotionally felt experience. Here he might run the risk of equating native language with emotion and colonizer’s language with intellect (similar to the equation drawn by Raja Rao in his forward to Kanthapura). But this is the way a colonised subject felt when the colonizer’s language (that had no connection with his immediate reality community, home etc…) was suddenly imposed upon her/him. The harmony between the language at home and its extended community, and the language at school was broken with the imposition of the colonizer’s language. Thus the qualification of one’s mother tongue as emotional is to point out how crucial was their language to their lived realities. Ngugi defines the colonizer’s logic of imposing their language:

In my view language was the most important vehicle through which that power fascinated and held the soul prisoner. …Language was the means of the spiritual subjugation.

Note the tying up of “power” with transcendental notions like “soul” and “spiritual”. However his argument is lucid when he refers to this “spiritual subjugation” as a “psychological violence”, it is clearly an attack on the mind, the intellect. Colonialism equated English with knowledge and native language was associated with negative qualities of backwardness, under development, humiliation and punishment. Here he enunciates those double facets of discourse: power and knowledge.

Another case for reviving native languages is that African writers who wrote in English where unable to communicate their message (though of African content like “sharp critique of European Bourgeois civilization”) by the very choice of their language. The representation of African culture created through such writing remains inaccessible to sections of peasantry and the working class, because they are in European languages. Though this retaliatory representation has acted as counter –discourses of imperialism, Ngugi sees them as literature that “added confidence to the petty-bourgeoisie class”. Because fruits of Africa’s independence were predominantly enjoyed by this class which in politics, business and education was assuming leadership of the countries newly emergent from colonialism. He notes that initially (in the post war era of anti imperial upheaval) their literature drew its stamina from the peasantry: Their oral heritage had brilliant representation. The reluctance of African writers to write in African languages is symptomatic of the gradual exclusion of peasantry and working class from political and economical activities.

Ngugi also analyzes the distinct approaches of working class and peasantry and, the comprador bourgeoisie in restructuring European languages. He identifies that the former Africanised the language of the master, without any respect for its ancestry shown by Senghor and Achebe, so totally as to have created new African languages, like Krio in Sierra Leone or Pidgin in Nigeria, that owed their identities to the syntax and rhythms of African languages.

These are the valid points of his argument that make his resolution a promising one. However, as stated earlier his proposal is flawed because of two reasons- (i) his construction of a glorious African language/culture that fails to include gender discrimination within its fold. (ii) his proposition for the complete removal of European languages from Africa, thereby causing a handicap in its international politics of all kinds.

He continues with the conceptual frame work of nation as woman ,the native tongue as mother and he refers to the colonized child as “he”. Above all, the capacity of language to misrepresent, silence and erase the gendered other is not addressed. (Such a language is inappropriate for gendered subjects unless it is radically reworked. Thus in his proposal to reclaim a culture through the revival of a language, he has actually wiped out half of its humanity.)This is in part due to his Marxist conceptualization of language as the relations people enter into with one another in the labour process. The understanding of the “relations” among people is not a nuanced one, it basically revolves around the theme of “production”. He does not perceive language as primarily an epistemology. It is not that he is oblivious to language’s capability to produce culture, with its moral, ethical and aesthetic values. But his analysis seems to present the cultural aspect as a separate category.

Another reason for his configuration of an unproblematic heritage is the necessity for a counter discourse in his confrontation with imperialism (whose epistemological violence on Africa produced a grotesque history and culture).And the foregrounding of “production” in the evolution of language is a reflection of his pro-proletariat stance which in turn is a double-edged sword that targets the economic,political and social policies of imperialism(especially in its neo-colonialist presence) and comprador nationalism.

Source: Fantasies Blog

Safar Khan, a Man of Resistance and Extraordinary Endurance

2011-04-24T11:31:00.000-07:00

In the midst of the freed political prisoners stood an old, dignified man called Safar Qahramani from Azerbaijan, who was regarded as the world's longest-serving political prisoner. He had been in prison for 30 years, 15 of which he had spent in the terrifying Burazjan prison. When he was freed in Tehran he did not know even one street. He had asked his fellow prisoners, "What does an 'apartment' look like?" He was interviewed by a newspaper reporter in his sister's house in Tabriz. Replying to questions, he said, "After 30 years of imprisonment, this freedom was unexpected. I owe my freedom to the people. If it were not for the right struggle of the people I would have stayed in prison until the end of my life. I regard this freedom dearly, because many faced bullets and lost their lives.

"Thirty years ago, after being active in the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan for five years, which had successes and failures, I was arrested and imprisoned. My activities were against the rule of the feudals but, knowing this, they still sentenced me to life imprisonment. Two years ago they took me and 60 other political prisoners to Evin prison and wanted me to write to the Shah and ask to be pardoned. I refused. For this reason they kept me in the worst conditions of Evin prison. The prison warden told me, 'You'll stay here until you disintegrate.' I laughed and said, 'I am imperishable. The people are behind the prison's walls'.
"Because of my continual protests against the prison authorities I was sent to the 'green cell' in Evin. This is a place where one cannot tell night from day. Air is pumped into the cell. Besides this more recent experience, the terrifying Burazjan prison has swallowed 15 years of my life. I had been without a visitor for years. Don't be surprised if I do not know the city and any street. Still, every second, I think with my whole being about those who remain political prisoners. All of my life is hidden in my past. I still live in prison because the rest of the children are in prison. I have seen young people, who had not yet grown hair on their faces, imprisoned for merely reading a book. All of my being is full of memories. I have left some prisoners behind with whom I have spent 25 years. What can I say about my own freedom?

"I cannot appreciate the beautiful word of freedom at the moment. . . I beg you to tell this to the people of Iran: We have been freed by the struggle of the people. Using the word 'amnesty' for our freedom is not fair. The people freed us and will free the rest of the political prisoners. We believed in this and still believe. Even when our friends were taken for torture and we could only hear their protesting agony, still we did not lose our hope of the people. My chest is a book, written in blood, 30 years of my memories. . .'

Many political prisoners had met Safar Qahramani and were inspired by his strong personality and dignity. He was a symbol of resistance against the Shah's dictatorship. The Shah's regime could not break him. He had created the legend of "No" against the regime.

Safar Khan in a poem called "The Man" - Ahmad Shamlu:

I am writing about the man,
The man who has stayed thirty
Springs of his life in a city
Without even seeing that city, even for a day.
He is a village man.
In the city of restless people
He is the bearer of troubles and patience. This man with broad shoulders,
With strong stature and broad chest,
With the strong arms of dignity,
He is an everlasting man.
In patience he is a very Job of the time,
His broad forehead is a mirror to all
The sufferings of the prison.
In frozen and hard days
Safar Khan is warm and resilient.
This man from Azerbaijan
With olive-coloured face,
And eyes like black-velveted angels,
He is a man without a mask.
He is equal to the sun
In this permanent winter.

Thirty springs have passed,
But he is still upright and content
Like a tall cypress standing in winter.
In the summer of love,
Safar Khan has the secret of understanding.
This sun which can move at night,
Without showing dismay on his face,
Stood on firm for thirty years of deprivation
Still hoping to see the rebirth of spring.

He has roots in the heart of earth,
He has opened his arms to the universe,
He has sheltered many imprisoned tigers.
A world of dignity resides in his heart,
In this dark house he is in love with light.
In front of Ahriman [Satanic power]
He is like fresh verses of Ahura [divine power].
Without fear from the horror of storm
Safar Khan is a man of eternity.

At the age of 81, Safar Khan is finally laid to rest. Safar Ghahremanian was a symbol of resistance and endurance. Because of his resistance and struggle against injustice, tyranny and colonialism, he spent 32 years of his life in the Shah’s prisons.

Safar Khan was born in 1921 in the village of Shishvan in West-Azerbaijan, north west of Iran. Early on from a young age he joined the Azerbaijan Democratic Front and actively participated in the struggle against large landowners and feudals. He achieved the rank of a Captain in the Azerbaijan Democratic Army.

Following the bloody attacks of the Iran’s Royal Army, suppressing the national movement of Azerbaijan (a province in Iran) and the brutal massacre of its people - Safar Khan along with other freedom fighters escaped across the border into Iraq but was soon arrested and imprisoned. Two years later he fled from Iraq and returned to Iran. In March 1948 he was rearrested and put into solitary confinement in the city of Urmia. He was court marshalled in 1950 and sentenced to death for participating in an armed revolt against the Shah’s regime.

When Dr. Mossadegh came into power, Safar Khan’s verdict came under review but after the coup of 1953 his sentence was only reduced to life imprisonment.

During the 32 years of his incarceration Safar Khan remained committed to his beliefs, resisted his torturers pressure and didn’t plead guilty or ask clemency from the Shah. He became a symbol of people’s resistance against Shah’s despotic rule.

In solidarity with the people’s uprising and protest against the shah regime in the summer of 1978, Safar Khan was one of the prisoners who went on hunger strike. Finally with the victory of 1979 revolution the people broke into the prisons and Safar Khan along with other political prisoners were freed.

Safar Khan’s name and his struggle will be forever recorded in the chronicles of Azerbaijan and Iran’s struggle for freedom.

Amnesty International: Iranian Azerbaijanis are leading the struggle for language rights

2011-04-11T22:43:00.000-07:00

For years, some of Iran’s ethnic minorities – Arabs, Azerbaijanis, Baluch, Kurds and Turkmen – have not been permitted to study in their own languages in public schools and universities, where only Persian is allowed, or to establish their own schools. Iranian Azerbaijanis, Iran’s largest minority, are leading the struggle for the right to educate children in their mother tongue. Many activists have been detained, imprisoned, tortured and harassed by the Iranian government. Here are the stories of Iranian Azerbaijanis, in their own words.

YASHAR EYNALI, an Iranian Azerbaijani living abroad

“I feel my school education has scarred me for life. I feel spiritually orphaned. This orphanage has everything to do with the loss of my mother tongue. My teacher spoke in Persian during teaching times. [I was unable] to communicate with the teacher and [cried] whenever the teacher talked to me.”

Taken from a communication to Amnesty International, 2011

ABBAS DJAVADI, writer and broadcaster

“In Iran, nobody forbids us from speaking [Azerbaijani Turkic] at home or on the street. Even in the mosques of Azeri-populated Iranian provinces (Eastern and Western Azerbaijan, Ardabil, Zanjan), mullahs pray in [Azeribaijani Turkic]. “But Iran’s ethnic [Azerbaijanis] can barely read or write in [Azerbaijani Turkic] because there’s no education in their own mother tongue. “There is not one [Azerbaijani Turkic] school in the whole country, university institute, or a course teaching the language. An [Azerbaijani Turkic]-speaking citizen talks in his native tongue to his family and friends, but writes letters to the same people in Persian because he or she doesn’t know how to write in standard [Azerbaijani Turkic]. “[Aerbaijani Turkic] is gradually becoming socially irrelevant… it has been infiltrated by local and societal dialects and slang and Persian’s overwhelming vocabulary and sentence structure.”

Taken from www.rferl.org/content/ Restricting_Irans_Second_Mother_Tongue/ 1497983.html

HABIB AZARSINA, journalist

“For Persian-speaking children, learning was much easier than for Azerbaijani children, who back then heard Persian for the first time in the classroom. “Ditching school was routine [for Azerbaijani children]. Parents would bring their kids back in tears. Failing school was the norm. Many kids, and their parents for that matter, would give up at the end of the sixth year. Graduating from elementary school was considered an accomplishment.”

Taken from www.gozaar.org/english/articlesen/Education-in-Mother-Tongue-for-Children-of-Ir anian-Azerbaijan.html

SALEH KAMRANI, lawyer and former prisoner of conscience. He was detained in 2006 and 2007 for his human rights work. A refugee, he now lives in exile.

“My family are summoned to the Intelligence Department every year before theBabak Castle gathering [A day at the beginning of July when Azerbaijanis gather at the castle of Babak Khorramdin, an Azerbaijani hero]. They arrest either me or one of my brothers. Recently when my brothers were arrested, the Ahar prosecutor threatened me with decades of imprisonment and then they kidnapped me. Our telephone conversations, correspondence and contacts are under surveillance.”

From a letter to Amnesty International, 2006

MOSTAFA EVEZPOOR, human rights defender, was arrested with his brothers in 2006 after calling for a boycott of the ﬁrst day the new academic year and advocating the right of Iranian Azerbaijani children to be educated in their own language. He was released in October 2006.

“Most of the ordeal took place in the detention facilities of the Ministry of Information, including tormenting us both physically and mentally, as well as beating us up, [and] where I also resorted to hunger strike.

“Both me and my youngest brother were detained for 22 days and [our] middle [brother] for six days, but there was no permission for meeting with our parents. We were beaten for four days.”

“They have not proven any charge against us. They were just telling us that ‘you wanted to take part in the protest for your mother tongue’.” Taken from an interview with Voice of America Azerbaijani Service, 18 October 2006

FAKHTEH ZAMANI, founder Association for the Defence of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran.

“This kid of a friend of ours – he saved up his allowance, gave it to the teacher and said: ‘This is like 20 words of Azerbaijani ... and I’m paying you [the fines] in advance so I can speak it.’”

See http://adapp.info/en

ALIZERA ASGHARZADEH, academic

“When I see that millions of children belonging to Azerbaijani, Kurdish, Baluchi, Turkmen, Arab, Lur, Bakhtyari, Gilani and other communities have schools in their own languages, that will be a good sign towards the creation of an Iran without racism.”

Taken from http://southaz.blogspot.com/2009/08/ proﬁle-dr-alireza-asgharzadeh.html

NASRIN BABAEI, wife of activist Oxtay (Mehdi) Babaei Ajabshir. In 2006, Oxtay was sentenced to six months in prison for his activism. He was released in March 2007.

“The accusations against my husband are: publicity against the regime, being an element of the unrest, undermining the peace and security in the country, and communicating with foreign separatists outside the country. My question is this: is it a crime to campaign to educate our children in our mother tongue, Azerbaijani Turkic? If it is, why do the authorities avoid trying my husband? And to whom should I refer regarding my sufferings? I keep receiving threatening calls from security agents… ordering me not to talk to anyone. Else, I would be arrested.” Nasrin Babaei’s letter was published online in 2006. The Iranian authorities have since blocked access to the websites it appeared on.

WHAT DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW SAY?

People belonging to minorities have the right to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without discrimination. They have the right to establish and run schools that provide education in their own language, as long as these schools comply with the minimum educational standards decided on by the state.

The state has to act to ensure that people belonging to minorities have adequate opportunities to study in their mother tongue. Schools should allow students the opportunity to learn their language and provide necessary materials and teachers. Iranian Azerbaijanis make up 25-30 per cent of the total population of about 70 million; they live mainly in the north and northwest of the country and inTehran.

ACT NOW

Sign and send the postcard in our insert calling for the immediate and unconditional release of Sa’id Metinpour, who is serving an eight-year prison sentence for peacefully campaigning for the rights of the Azerbaijani community in Iran.

http://tiny.cc/en5jz

http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE13/011/2011/en/af05dc03-92eb-4705-9639-ce2e36933df5/mde130112011en.pdf

http://www.amnesty.org/sites/impact.amnesty.org/files/Wire_FebMar_web.pdf

An Open Letter to Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada

2011-04-11T22:21:00.000-07:00

The Right Hon. Stephen Joseph Harper, P.C., M.P.

Prime Minister of Canada

80 Wellington Street

Ottawa ON K1A 0A6

March 28, 2011

Re: Greetings from the Prime Minister, on the Occasion of Nowruz

Dear Prime Minster, Thank you very much for your message of congratulation (March 20, 2011) on the occasion of Nowruz, the first day of spring and a day that marks the New Year for thousands of Canadians-including us, the Azerbaijani-Canadians. In the spirit of strengthening our Canadian multiculturalism and celebrating the diversity of communities and traditions both within and outside Canada, we would like to humbly remind you that:

1. While in its current usage the term Nowruz is a Persian/Farsi word, the rich ritual, tradition and celebration signified by this term is in no way limited to the Persian ethnic group but include a wide variety of ethnicities, cultures and communities from the Middle East to Central Asia, Caucasia, Indian Subcontinent and the Turkic world. The historical roots of Nowruz festivities are safely traced back to the ancient Sumerians who celebrated the coming of spring as the beginning of their new year at least 2000 years prior to the arrival of Persian groups to current Iran. Thus it is historically inaccurate to situate Nowruz within “the Persian Empire;” just as it is wrong to identify it as “the Persian New Year.” The Persians are only one of at least a hundred groups and communities who celebrate Nowruz.

2. Despite various Orientalist misrepresentations, the Persians are but one ethnic group within an extremely multicultural and multiethnic Iran. In addition to the Persians, there are Azerbaijani-Turks, Kurds, Baluchies, Arabs, Turkmens, Lors and other major ethnic groups, living in Iran who, combined together, constitute the numerical majority of Iran’s population. Not surprisingly, all these ethnic groups have strong presence and vibrant diasporic communities in Canada. All these communities (and many others such as the Zoroastrians, Baha’is, Ismailis and so on) celebrate Nowruz as their New Year. Defining Nowruz exclusively as “the Persian New Year” inflicts spiritual injuries on these communities and does epistemic violence to their sense of history, culture, tradition and peoplehood.

3. In line with the spirit of our rich Canadian multiculturalism, we expect that the honourable representatives of our federal (as well as provincial) governments take into full account the multiple meanings and practices of Nowruz and avoid any act of appropriation and expropriation of this important cultural event to the advantage of any single community. Mr. Prime Minister, thank you so much for your kind attention to this issue. We look forward to hearing from you and certainly welcome further discussion around this and similar issues.

Respectfully,

Cultural and Linguistic Association of Iranian Azerbaijan – Canada

Iranian Azerbaijanis and Green Movement

2011-04-03T23:55:00.000-07:00

Ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran give mostly passive support to anti-government protests, they will give stronger support, if the opposition pays attention to the problems of ethnic groups.

Ethnic Azerbaijanis make up a substantial minority of the population of Iran. Many of the Azerbaijanis live in northwestern Iran in the provinces of Ardabil, Zanjan, East Azerbaijan and West Azerbaijan. These areas are often dubbed Southern Azerbaijan, while the Azerbaijan Republic constitutes Northern Azerbaijan.

The leaders of the Iranian opposition do not demand that the rights of non-Persian ethnic groups be defended. The population of Southern Azerbaijan will join the protests only if the Iranian opposition talks directly about the violation of the rights of Iranian Azerbaijanis.

The population of South Azerbaijan, which different estimates put at between twenty and thirty million people, gave just passive support to the current protests in Iran. It is time to raise awareness about the problems of the Azerbaijani population of Iran. There is a need to bring the truth about the situation of the rights of Iranian Turks in Southern Azerbaijan, to raise this problem at the international level.

Our Mother Language and the Iranian Government Policy

2011-04-03T12:52:00.000-07:00

Sardar Asadi

When somebody asks me about my mother language, and what my mother language is, instead of answering I remember the pain, the pain from my childhood, the pain from the school hours and the pain from living in such a system, assimilation and replacement system , I sigh and answer, my mother language is Turkish. If I tell the truth, it seems like a tragedy but I am sure the word tragedy cannot explain the pain and the situation.

I was born in South Azerbaijan, the Internal Colonized land by so-called Iran, with the population over thirty million located in North-West of Iran. Iran, the land in where the human right is never respected. In this land all the non-Farsi speaker nations are obliged to forget about their mother language and replace with Farsi. Farsi, the language of another ethnic group that the government is running by at the moment. Other nations are not allowed to learn their mother languages at schools. And the government use any kind of method to keep these nations far from their mother language. What this sistem does, kills the non-Persian languages and it means totally linguistic genocide. And the result totally means killing the identity. I am one of the examples , South Azerbaijani Turk, I have been kept far from my mother language at school, University and in the system since I was born. My parents had the same situation and I am sure that you have the same situation.

But all of us are wondering WHY?
Is there any wrong with my mother language?
What is wrong with the government and the system?

For sure sharing the ideas about will help us to find the way to overcome this terrible situation. It is common in colonized lands that the new comer government uses it’s own colonial power in any way to replace it’s own language with the mother language of the natives. The question arises here is why mother language must be put on the table. Mother language is the live and strong reason for people’s identity. And as far as the people have their own identity and concern about, the colonial government cannot dictate it’s own rules, such as language, culture, traditions and so on. This is exactly what we see in South Azerbaijan these days. Although the whole system , the education system from the primary school till university, the media such as TV, the radio, the newspaper and colonial power force the people to forget their mother language, they still keep their own language because they are aware of the situation and they try to save their mother language at any price. So, inside South Azerbaijan this replacement and assimilation policy cannot guarantee what the government want.

The other point is that the economic system in South Azerbaijan is kept weak and fragile by the government. There are a lot of people who are jobless and they are obliged to move to Farsi speaker areas looking for job and this is exactly what the government wants. The economic system in Farsi speaker areas is unbelievably stronger than South Azerbaijan and this process has started since the colonial government wanted to perform the policy of one country, one nation and one language. The most disgusting idea that the world has ever experienced. The children in these families are not so safe in front of the replacement and assimilation system. In this case I must say that the government seems to be the winner. But I have to add that some families still resist to let their children change to this terrible system. The people continue fighting against this dirty policy.

All the time one choice is on the table for the racist government. Dehumanizing South Azerbaijani Turks every where in the society on media and considering our people as second degree citizens is a psychological and systematic war that our people face with all the time and this is what our people specially the children must overcom. This matter is really serious when they live in Farsi speaker areas. Unfortunately sometime they hide their own background to be safe in Farsi speaker society and they are digested in Persian government system.

During the history, we experienced a lot of ways to treat and make the situation better but they didn’t work. So as we see, still the assimilation sistem going on. We cannot stand for this situation any more and let the government bury our identity and humanity. That is why these days, Azerbaijanis make the voice louder and louder. That is why we shout every day and every moment, LONG LIVE TO AZERBAYJAN. IRAN IS NOT JUST PERSIA AND WE ARE NOT PERSIAN. .

A documentary about Iranian Azerbaijani political refugees in Turkey

2011-02-26T12:08:00.000-08:00

Boğanak/Boğanaq/Sultry is a documentary directed by Vahid Azarnavid. The documentary film's issue is Azerbaijani Turks in Iran who had to escape from Iran and temporary live in Turkey under United Nations refugee status who are out of having education in their own language(mother tongue) as their basic rights which is issued in Iranian constitution.

The movie is presented to Human Rights Watch and other international organisations.

Watch it: http://vimeo.com/20139875

Farstoxication: A Colorful Charming Snake

2011-02-04T15:09:00.000-08:00

Dr.Alirıza Asgharzadeh

The kind of terminologies and concepts employed by marginalized writers, intellectuals and activists have central bearing in defining and articulating anti-colonial and anti-oppression struggles. While the use of a plethora of slogans and mottos at the grassroots level helps to identify the nature and direction of a people’s struggle, the choice of terms, concepts, words, signs and symbols to describe a movement is extremely important in the way others receive the movement and make sense of its objectives. In the majority of cases, usually terms and concepts developed and used at the beginning stages of grassroots movements are adopted or coined hastily and are nowhere near describing the true spirit of these movements. However, as the struggle progresses, the employed concepts and terminologies also mature to present more authentic and thorough image of the struggle.

The struggle of Azerbaijani people in Iran, like that of other oppressed nationalities such as the Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs, and Turkmans, is a democratic struggle rooted in modern conceptions of human rights, socio-cultural freedoms, and the right for self-determination. Nevertheless, the Azerbaijani movement is yet to articulate this struggle through concepts and terminologies in line with the spirit of its anti-oppression character. At the grassroots level, the signs and symbols used are often outdated undemocratic gestures and signals such as wolf and grey-wolfism that serve to project negative images of the struggle to the outside world. Against the backdrop of such an endemic poverty of democratic conceptualization, Hojjat-ul-islam Abduleziz Ezimi Qedim’s conception of Farstoxication (Fars-zadegi/Farsa-vurulmaq) is a breath of fresh air that could not have come at a more opportune moment. Farstoxication is a new term coined by this enlightened Azerbaijani ecclesiastic that helps articulate the ongoing struggle of non-Persian communities for social justice and equality in Iran.

Hojjat-ul-islam Ezimi Qedim is a cleric from the city of Ardabil who, in his recent writing, has clearly outlined the ongoing linguistic hegemony of the dominant Farsi-speaking group in Iran. In an article titled “Fars-Stricken-ness: a Colorful Charming Snake (Fars-zadegi: Mari Khosh Khatt-o Khal), he explains the degree to which non-Persian peoples’ languages, histories, even creativities and imagination are colonized by the Persian minority in current Iran:

Ever since we have opened our eyes in Iran, they have told us that we should have one official language. We thought that all countries in the world were run through one (official) language; that only a single language was taught and learned in their schools. We were so mentally stagnated that we thought the purpose of education was learning Farsi. The more they smeared us in Farsi, the more we became suspicious of our own mother tongue… We learned science in Farsi and slang in Turki. They kept us away from education in Turkish…to the extent that we became infatuated with Farsi and disgusted by our own mother tongue… But when we traveled to the Farsi-speaking cities of the country, we saw a completely different picture and realized that essentially our language was condemned to annihilation. We realized that an illiterate Farsi-speaking shepherd expressed himself more comfortably than our Turkic-speaking person with a bachelor’s degree. And I as a Turk, because of my Turkic accent, with a thousand of shame and embarrassments, am only able to approve whatever the Farsi-speaking shepherd says. If we speak with a Turkic accent they tell us, “You better go and correct your accent first.” We thus realized that we are condemned to annihilation.

The sentiments expressed by Hojjatul-islam Ezimi Qedim are not new and have been expressed before. What makes his observation new, though, is the fact that it comes from a member of the ruling clergy, that is, from someone wearing the official clergy uniform and acting as a revered member of the ulama community. Ever since the establishment of clerical rule in Iran, the ulama and members of the clergy have become the focus of alluring employment opportunities and glamorous official positions. It is in competing for these high status positions that the clergy from non-Farsi speaking regions come to feel the sting of language-based discrimination. They have realized that the most prestigious positions go to those who are fluent in Farsi or speak it without an accent—Tehrani accent being the standard.

The non-Persian ulama and members of the clergy realize that when it comes to patriotism, they are as patriotic as the Farsi-speaking clergy-if not more so; and when it comes to education, they are as qualified as the ulama from Farsi-speaking areas. Likewise, when it comes to devotion to Islam and Shiism, they are as devoted a Muslim as the next person-if not more so. Irrespective of all the right qualifications, however, they are discriminated against when it comes to allocation of prestigious jobs with high paying salaries. Why? It is at this point that the reality of language-based racism begins to sink in. The ulama from non-Persian regions come to realize that they can never obtain those glamorous positions because the mastery of Farsi is a determining factor in getting those positions. And since they have not been brought up in a Farsi speaking environment, they can never speak it like a native speaker. A new language is not something that one may master overnight. It takes a lifetime for one to master a different language. And since the Azerbaijani ulama traditionally have not been schooled in Farsi, it is almost impossible for them to speak it like someone from Tehran, Isfahan, Mashhad, Kerman, or Yazd. Hence, the bitter realization of exclusion, discrimination and racism that are direct results of monolingualism and linguistic domination of one group over others. Awareness, of course, propels action. And the aware ulama, like Ezimi Qedim, are brave and decent enough to take action and resist acts of internal colonialism and oppression.

Hojjat-ul-islam Ezimi Qedim goes on to further elaborate on meanings and ramifications of Farstoxication:

…knowledge is not limited to one language. Education in the mother tongue is not only possible but also preferable. By teaching Farsi to your child, your child will not be related to Tehranis, for s/he is your child. Whether s/he is good or bad, s/he is a Turk and belongs to Turks. However, [by forgetting his/her identity] s/he becomes a Persianized Turk, or in my terminology, Farstoxicated. Farstoxication is not a simple problem; it is a crisis. Farstoxication is a cultural aggression against the Turk and Kurd and Baluch… Farstoxication is like a dew of disgrace that tightens the circle of our entrapment with every passing day. Once it was the Pahlavi regime who was forcing us into Farstoxication; but today, in the height of indignity, we ourselves run after Farstoxication… The People of various nationalities must wake up from their deep sleep and free their children from the clutches of this dangerous snake. For, tomorrow will be too late and the task will become more difficult.

Fars-zadegi is twin notion of what Jalal Al-e Ahmad had called in the 1960s Gharb-zadegi, which meant ‘plagued by the West,’ ‘West-stricken-ness,’ or Westoxication. In Al-e Ahmad’s view, Gharb-zadegi was a cultural illness that had stricken many Eastern societies, and Iran in particular. Al-e Ahmad adopted the term from Ahmad Fardid’s lexicon. Fardid was an oral scholar of controversial ideas and character who derived the term Gharb-zadegi from his interpretation of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s (1889-1976) critique of modern technology and the ways in which it was employed. In an essay titled "The Question Concerning Technology," Heidegger envisioned that

The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence. The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.

The decadence of the world had already begun in the West, maintained Heidegger, and through Western technology and culture was fast spreading to the East. This was the idea that Fardid borrowed from Heidegger and coined from it his own notion of Gharb-zadegi or West-stricken-ness. The Western notions of liberalism, democracy, and technology were in opposition to Eastern notions of spirituality and unity of the realm of spirit with that of nature. The West had dominated nature and environment technologically. It was also in the process of dominating the East culturally, through the imposition of its understanding of technology, ethics, and humanity on the East. It was from these ideas of Fardid that Al-e Ahmad built up his own notion of Gharb-zadegi or Westoxication. In his usage, the term signified a sense of (toxic) contamination as well as a sense of intoxication, where it functioned as sweet, lethal poison.

A west-stricken man who is a member of the ruling establishment of the country has no place to stand. He is like a dust particle floating in space, or a straw floating on water. He has severed his ties with the essence of society, culture, and custom. He is not a bond between antiquity and modernity. He is not a dividing line between the old and the new. He is something unrelated to the past and someone with no understanding of the future. He is not a point on a line, but an imaginary point on a plane or in space—just like that dust particle .

Al-e Ahmad’s emphasis is thus on the Westoxicated creature’s disinterest in his/her own culture, society, and community. Such a creature is not entirely uprooted from his/her community; s/he is not separated from her/his means of communication and language. S/he is just infatuated and fascinated by an alien culture and society. The more pronounced this infatuation becomes, the more s/he becomes, in Al-e Ahmad’s view, alienated from her/his own community. The Iran of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi era serves as a model for Al-e Ahmad based on which to conceptualize his notion of Westoxication. In this era, the West was looked upon by the ruling elite as a superior civilization which had to be emulated. The underlying explanation for this admiration and emulation was a racist notion of supposedly a common Aryan ancestry between Europe’s white race and the Persian race in Iran. Following in the footsteps of Europe’s 19th and 20th century racist theorists, the dominant Persian group was advertising Iran as the origin and birthplace of the European constructed Aryan race. This supposedly superior race’s offspring had made marvelous progress in the West. And yet, the presumed ancestral home of this supposedly superior race was in shambles. It was a disastrously backward society economically, socially, politically, and industrially.

According to the dominant ruling elite, the main reason for Iran’s dismal state of backwardness was none other than the introduction of Islam to the country in the 7th century, which had resulted, among other things, in more than a thousand years of Arab and Turkic rule over the supposedly Aryan inhabitants of Iran. The Arabs and Turks had kept the country away from the certain advancement and progress that were to be the destiny of Iran’s presumably superior Aryan race. The only way to overcome this backwardness was to emulate the West and become Westernized ‘from the tip of the toe to the top of the head’ (Malcolm, 1914/1973, Taqizadeh, 1920/1978). As far as the ruling elite was concerned, becoming Westernized meant the blind mimicry and emulation of the West, on one hand, and the purging of such un-Iranic (anirani) elements as the Arabs and Turks from Iran’s history, on the other. Al-e Ahmad was not able to fully grasp and articulate the underlying racist and supremacist components of politics of Persianization and Westernization at the time. As a result, his work mainly focused on individual tendencies towards the West as reflected in superficialities such as mode of dress, behavior, and so on.

The west-stricken man chooses the easiest path. He is always ready to “seize the opportunity,” and appreciate the moment… He never troubles himself about anything. He can easily shrug off any problem… He is jack of all trades and master of none… The west-stricken man has no personality. He is a creature lacking in originality… The west-stricken man is a gigolo. …[He] is the most faithful consumer of western manufactured products… The west-stricken man never takes his eyes off the West. He does not care what happens in his cozy little part of the world, in this corner of the East. If by chance he is interested in politics, he is aware of the slightest shift to the right or left on the part of the English Labour Party and he knows the names of American Senators better than he knows the names of ministers in his own country’s government. He knows more about the commentators in Time and the News Chronicle than he does about his cousin far away in Khorasan…

It is this notion of mimicry that Al-e Ahmad cites as the main defining feature of a Westoxicated person. This, however, is not a Bhabhaian notion of mimicry with potential for rupture and disturbance of the colonized order. This is a Fanonian notion of "nauseating mimicry." It is the mimicry of a person blindly imitating whatever s/he thinks is confirmed and approved by the West. So Al-e Ahmad emphasizes on such superficial values as mode of dress, behavior, eating habit, fashion, etc. It would, of course, have been a different picture had Al-e Ahmad’s creature been forced to abandon his/her language for that of the West. However, this had not happened in an Iranian context. So Al-e Ahmad had to focus on superficialities rather than on real defining values such as language and religion.

What would happen if Al-e Ahmad’s Westoxicated person abandoned his/her language in favor of a dominant Western language such as English, French, Spanish and Portuguese? Of course, this would give a whole new meaning to the notion of Westoxication. And herein lies the difference between Al-e Ahmad’s notion of Westoxication and Hojjat-ul-islam Azimi Qadim’s conception of Farstoxication. Farstoxication takes place in an environment where non-Farsi languages are not allowed to be studies, learned, and used as normal languages of learning and education. The governing apparatus in society sees to it that Farsi receives all the support it needs to supplant other languages. The government’s absolute power is undividedly behind the processes that lead to Farstoxication. It is only by mastering Farsi that a non-Persian individual can secure a good government employment; it is through speaking Farsi that one can have any claim to knowledge and literacy; it is through the mastery of Farsi that one can be able to express oneself creatively, artistically, and scientifically. The mastery of Farsi is the key to all privileges in the country, from economic to social to cultural to scientific to psychological. It is in such an environment that the Farstoxicated creature comes into being. S/he comes into being first by learning Farsi, then by replacing it with his/her own mother tongue, and at a later stage by vilifying his/her own language.

In Al-e Ahmad’s Westoxication, language plays very little-if at all-role. The Westoxicated individual may aspire to learn a Western language, but it does not mean that s/he has to abandon her/his own language. The West exerts its hegemony through cultural, technological, and economic means, but it is not actually there to enforce them physically (at least in Iranian case). Farstoxication, on the other hand, is enforced by the government and the ruling elite. The non-Farsi speaking individual in Iran has no choice but to learn Farsi and try to speak it better than his/her own mother tongue. This process is characterized by sheer force, necessity and coercion; whereas Al-e Ahmad’s Westoxicated person enjoys a great degree of exercise of choice, arbitrariness, and flexibility in decision.

While the Persianization politics of Pahlavi era produced a number of notoriously Farstoxicated individuals such as Ahmad Kasravi, Taqi Arani, Rezazadeh Shafaq, Naseh Nateq, among others, it is important to note that Farstoxication has not been limited to the Pahlavi era. Nor has it been limited to the borders of current Iran. In recent years there have been some salient cases of Farstoxication that make one wonder how far can a person go in denying his/her language and identity, in order to prove that s/he is Persian—hence: Aryan. A glaring case in point is the recent publication of a supposedly ‘academic’ work entitled A Grammar of Iranian Azari, including comparisons with Persian. The book is written by Yavar Dehghani, who has completed it as a PhD dissertation in linguistics at La Trobe University in Melbourne in 1999.

In the beginning of the book, Dehghani makes several statements regarding the Azerbaijani language each of which is enough to send shock waves through the body of anyone with slightest familiarity with the language academically known as Azerbaijani, Azeri, or Azeri-Turkic. Dehghani starts off his discussions by identifying the name of the language currently spoken in Azerbaijan. Without any academic, methodological, or ethical considerations, he arbitrarily and single-handedly identifies the name of the language as “Azari.” On first sight, one gets the impression that perhaps by “Azari” the author means to refer to “Azeri” which is currently acknowledged in international literature as an authentic designation to refer to ‘Azerbaijani Turks’ and their language, Azeri-Turkic. However, in subsequent discussions the author exposes his personal and political agenda by distinguishing between ‘Azari’ and ‘Azarbaijani.’

In Dehghani’s view, ‘Azari’ and ‘Azerbaijani’ is not the one and same language whose close to forty-million speakers in Northern and Southern Azerbaijan believe that it is. According to him, ‘Azari’ is a language independent than ‘Azerbaijani.’ As he puts it,

…one of the languages closely related to Azari is Azebaijani which is spoken in the Republic of Azerbaijan… In fact, currently, the difference between these two languages is so great that it is difficult for their speakers to understand each other, or at least to communicate effectively.

To prove this absurd assertion, Dehghani quotes a passage from a text produced in Northern Azerbaijan. He then arbitrarily translates it into what he calls Azari, which is supposed to be the language of millions of people in Southern Azerbaijan. Since Dehghani considers himself a supreme authority in Azerbaijani language, he does not see a need to justify his absurd translation of a passage from a literary text into his invented ‘Azari’ language. The idea does not even occur to him to compare a literary text produced in Northern Azerbaijan with a similar text produced in Southern Azerbaijan. As an ‘expert’ in Azeri language, he surely should know that there are thousands of comparable texts produced in Southern Azerbaijan particularly after the Islamic Revolution. All he had to do was to glance through a journal such as Varliq and select a passage of his choosing for comparison. However, since Dehghani is after his own personal/political agenda, he does not carry his ‘academic research’ based on objective academic research methodologies. The crux of his personal and political agenda is to say that “the language of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Iranian Azari are two distinct languages.”

Dehghani’s amateurish assertion begs the question: Why is he trying so hard to prove that the Azeri language spoken by Azerbaijanis on the northern banks of the Araz River is completely different than the Azeri spoken by the same Azerbaijanis on the southern banks of the same river? After all, all one has to do is to pay a short visit to one of many Azerbaijani pal-talk rooms on the internet and see whether Azeris from north and south speak the same language or two different languages. All you have to do is check the archival material of one of many Azerbaijani email discussion groups and see whether Azeris are using the same language or two different languages to communicate with each other. Dehghani, understandably, does not bother doing any sensible research. He only relies on his own ‘expertise’ as an Azeri along with those of his “informants.” The result is a distorted (mis)representation of both the Azerbaijani people and their language. He embarks upon such a dishonest misrepresentation in order to show that the Azeri language spoken in Iran is almost identical with Farsi.

…Persian has influenced Azari in every aspect except in case markings and verbs. A large number of Persian words constitute a considerable part of the Azari speakers’ vocabulary. In some cases, the only criteria to distinguish between Persian and Azari sentences uttered by those speakers who have had at least a primary education can be Azari verbs and postpositions and certain phonological properties. For example, in the Azari sentence:

mən bayəd həmisə bəraye kişvər müfid olam … ‘I should always be useful for the country.’ Only the verb /olam/ is an Azari word, and other elements are borrowed from Persian.

Thus, Dehghani goes so far as fabricating an entirely ridiculous sentence only to show that Azeri is almost the same language as Persian. In fact, what he does is to write a sentence in Farsi, remove the verb at the end of the sentence and replace it with an Azeri verb, then present the entire charade as an authentic Azeri sentence. Here too we can see a shameful act of Farstoxication in action. This individual seems to be infatuated with Farsi to the extent that he is willing to present an entirely distorted picture of his own mother tongue in order to prove that his mother tongue is Persian. Throughout his book, not even once does he mention the fact that Farsi has been elevated to the status of ‘the national tongue’ in Iran by force and coercion; that it has become the only language of education and instruction because of the assimilationist agenda of the dominant group and the ruling elite in society. Nor does he mention the fact that Azeri has been a demonized, criminalized, and banned language for the past 80 years; that if Azerbaijanis speak Farsi it is not because ‘they love Persian’ but because their own mother tongue has been proscribed and Farsi has been imposed upon them as the only language of instruction, education, literacy, and correspondence.

Farstoxication thus becomes a process through which one’s own identity and language are denied so that one may easily associate oneself with the language and identity of the dominant group. It is a colonial act that entails the complicity and open participation of the colonized within the colonization processes. Allured by the economic and social advantages of self-denial, the Frastoxicated creature gnaws at the roots of his/her language, culture, and history as if s/he were the only person on earth with exclusive and absolute authority on that language, culture, and history. S/he is able to do this only because s/he immensely enjoys the political, economic, and coercive support of the dominant group. S/he knows perfectly well that the colonized language has no means of defending itself, that the individuals speaking that language are coerced into silence and are themselves at a point of extinction as a people. The realization of this bitter fact emboldens the Farstoxicated creature to attack the marginalized language and identity evermore fiercely, confident that the dominant group is ready to reward his/her acts of betrayal accordingly.

That is why Hojjatul-islam Ezimi Qedim’s initiative to identify this group of accomplices is a bold act of resistance against the colonial enterprise in its entirety. For, the dominant group always uses these collaborators to justify its act of annihilating minoritized languages, cultures, histories, and identities. The dominant group says that it is not we the dominant who want non-Farsi languages destroyed; it is the educated scholars and intellectuals from within these communities themselves who believe that such languages are dangerous to Iran’s territorial integrity and therefore must be destroyed. ‘Don’t you believe us?’ they ask. ‘Then look at Ahmad Kasravi, Taqi Arani, Rezazadeh Shafaq, Naseh Nateq… Aren’t these honorable individuals the most knowledgeable, the most educated and talented within these communities? Well, it’s they who believe that Farsi should become the only language throughout the country. Who are we to reject the patriotic demand of the honorable leaders of non-Persian communities?’

By exposing the central place of collaborators in the processes of colonization and assimilation, Hojjatul-isalm Ezimi Qedim exposes one of the deadliest weapons used by the dominant. His articulation of Farstoxication makes it clear that the colonized too bears responsibility in the way acts of colonization and assimilation are carried out. It also signals a warning to collaborators that their complicity in the act of colonization and assimilation does not go unnoticed by the marginalized.

Our problem is with the Farstoxicated segment of our population who sees civilization and progress as exclusive province of Persian language. They are oblivious to the fact that their home[land] is plundered, the names of their cities and villages are changed to Farsi, and little by little the language of most of their cities is changing from Turki to Farsi. Today, it is Qazvin, Hamadan and Saveh [that we have lost], tomorrow it will be Zanjan and Miyaneh, and it won’t be long that Tabriz and Ardabil will also lose before this colorful charming snake [Farstoxication]. When that day comes, we are already dead and someone must bury our rotten corpses. Today is our last opportunity to understand that just as being Muslim is not synonymous to being Arab, so too being Iranian should not be synonymous with being Persian. We are Turkic Muslims, we are Turkic Iranians, and so are our children. And we must defend our being Turk and Kurd, just as the people from Yazd (Yazdiha) defend their being Fars. We are Turks and we are Kurds; and we won’t submit Iran to the Farsi-speaking group, for Iran belongs to all the ethnic groups living in it.

As expected, Hojjatul-islam Ezimi Qedim’s resistance against politics of assimilation and Farstoxication has come with a price. Because of writing the above words and resisting against the dominant group’s colonialist advances, he was put on trial in the city of Tabriz and in August 24, 2004, was sentenced for two years of internal exile form Azerbaijan to Farsi-speaking regions (http://ebduleziz-ezimi.blogspot.com/). The struggle of this enlightened cleric has breathed new life into the anti-colonial resistance movement in Azerbaijan. The presence of ecclesiastic clerics and ulama like him indicates that the ruling theocrats do not see eye to eye when it comes to Iranian nationalism and Fars-centered politics of assimilation. In fairness, from the very beginning, the local ulama and clergy have been staunchest supporters of the education in local languages. During the Pahlavi era, when writing in Azerbaijani language was prohibited, it was the ulama and members of the clergy who conducted their sermons in Azeri language. In fact, the Pahlavi period witnessed an enormous output of Azerbaijani eulogy literature that was read in mosques and places of warship in the holy months of Moharram, Ramadan, and on other occasions.

Azeri-Turkic is the language of instruction even today in all seminaries and religious schools in Azerbaijan. Since the ulama have not completed their education in centralized so-called ‘modern’ schooling system, they are not so well-versed in Farsi. After the Islamic revolution, the government required of all imams leading Friday Prayers to read at least one of the two sermons in Farsi. The Azerbaijani imams reluctantly accepted to read one of the sermons in Farsi from a previously prepared text. Even then, their Turkic accent became the butt of jokes throughout Azerbaijan and Iran. A former imam of Tabriz, Ayatollah Moslem Malakuti, is still remembered for frequently uttering the phrase, “I say this in Farsi so that the Americans will understand what I say!” Implicit in this anecdote is a view of Farsi as a foreign language in Azerbaijan, i.e., a language which is comprehensible to the Americans but not to the local people. In religious schools, the main texts are in Arabic, and the language of instruction is the local language. As such, it is not surprising to see the Azerbaijani clerics persistently resisting the politics of Persianization. The extent of their resistance and the degree of their involvement in the anti-racist struggle will, no doubt, play a decisive role in the future outcome of Azerbaijani resistance movement.

December 31, Solidarity Day of World Azerbaijanis

2011-01-06T18:56:00.000-08:00

A Struggle of Azerbaijanis for unification!

Everyone in the Western societies has heard about the famous quote by the US president Ronald Regan on June 12, 1987 next to the Berlin Wall: “Mr. Garbachev Tear Down this Wall!” But not many are aware of another wall of separation erected by the Soviet to divide Azerbaijani nation. The border fence built between borders of the Soviet Union and Iran had separated many families for 70 years. The fence was demolished by Azerbaijani activists on December 31, 1989, two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Since then, December 31st is celebrated by Azerbaijanis across the world as the day of solidarity. This radio program by Odlar Yurdu Azerbaijani Radio dedicated to World Solidarity Day of Azerbaijanis. Our guest is Ph.D. candidate at University of British Columbia, Sevinj Asgarova.

SIMILAR TO GERMANY, BORDER FENCE BUILT BY THE SOVIETS DIVIDED AZERBAIJANIS FOR MANY DECADES.
Azerbaijan was divided into two in 19th centry. Following the two Persio-Russian Wars, two treaties Turkmenchay and Gulustan has divided the nation. Many years, they lived in separation. Many families were split. Close relatives were no longer to see each other. Azerbaijanis lived in their motherland had not an opportunity to meet with their compatriots and to create the relations with them. Prohibitions of the Soviet Period created an obstacle between the relatives. Currently, more than 30 million ethnic Azerbaijanis live in Iran.

INSPIRED BY THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL, IN 1989 AZERBAIJANIS DEMOLISHED BORDER FENCE.
The foundation of the Solidarity Day of the World Azerbaijanis was laid in Nakhchivan on December 31, 1989, when USSR-Iran borders were knocked down. Despite serious pressures of two totalitarian states, Azerbaijanis living on both banks of the Araz River broke down installation along the then Soviet-Iranian border (between Northern and Southern Azerbaijan) to reunite with compatriots who lives in Iran and for weeks voiced slogans calling for unity, this once more demonstrated the might of the Azerbaijanis as a nation.

On December 16, 1991, the Supreme Assembly of the Nakchivan Autonomous Republic taking into consideration the importance of solidarity of Azerbaijanis, declared 31st of December as a holiday of solidarity and unity of Azerbaijanis of the world. Thus being so near to all the Azerbaijanis, the 31st of December is celebrated as the Solidarity Day of the World Azerbaijanis.

The Day was marked officially for the first time during the government of Abulfaz Elchibey (he also was an initiator of breaking the USSR-Iran borders) in 1992.

Later under the decree issued by Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev in 1993, December 31 was officially declared a state holiday – Solidarity Day of the World Azerbaijanis. Since then the Azerbaijanis have been marking December 31 – Solidarity Day of the World Azerbaijanis as an important holiday.

THIS DAY HAS A SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO ALL AZERBAIJANIS.
At the heart of unity and solidarity of the World Azerbaijanis – the urgent task of historical self-determination of our people – lay the ideas of Azerbaijani and Azerbaijan statehood. Today the problem of national unity and solidarity of the World Azerbaijanis is treated in Azerbaijan as a state policy, the issues of forming the abroad-residing Azerbaijanis as a Diaspora, establishment and strengthening of the connections of the World Azerbaijanis with each other and with their Motherland are the main parts of the agenda. The independent Azerbaijan state is a mighty factor for solidarity of Azerbaijanis of the world, a reliable buttress for their organizing and their admission to the world communities. It is the day when Azerbaijani Diaspora organizations, cultural groups and community organizations are encouraged to get together, celebrate their culture and engage in joint initiatives. Organizing of the abroad-residing Azerbaijanis, movement of their Diaspora will, certainly promote interests, national moral values, rights, and ideas of Azerbaijani on the international level.

January 1, 2011.

By Eyyub Hajiyev

//Radio Odlar Yurdu Azerbaijan//

South Azerbaijani Student's Open Letter to Secretary-General of United Nations

2010-12-30T21:39:00.000-08:00

His Excellency,
The General Secretary of United Nations, According to several statistics, more than thirty million Turks live in Iran. They are one of the native and most ancient inhabitants of this country and we can see them almost in all provinces of Iran. Most of these Turks live in South Azerbaijan, located into six provinces, including West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, Ardabil, Zanjan, Qazvin and Hamadan.

Beginning from the reign of Riza Pahlavi (1922) cultural assimilation has been the main policy of Iran governments. Melancholia of “one nation, one culture” and “superior race” made him to choose this policy. Many dependant historians began to write fictious history about Turks of Azerbaijan. They wrote that these Turks are Aryans whose language changed through Mongols invasion.

Now Turks considered as second degree citizens. After the Iran Revolution in 1979, despite a series of changes in the structure of government, the policy of assimilation and contempt of Non-Persian races continued. Turks of Azerbaijan were in the centre of these attacks. This unfair policy put them in the process of unwished assimilation and acculturation.

This policy runs now. Iran is on the threshold of a cultural tragedy. Dying of different cultures and languages will be the result of Aryanist Racism.

Persecution and arresting of Azerbaijan cultural actives have intensified these days. Azerbaijani students, as a part of Azerbaijan cultural actives, persistently ask United Nations for pay attention to the violation of ethnic groups rights in Iran.

Regards,
Azerbaijani Students
December, 2002

Azerbaijan People's Government (Dec. 1945 - Dec. 1946)

2010-12-19T03:21:00.000-08:00

Since the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty, racism in Iran has hurt significantly the economic and social well being of Azerbaijani Turks. Following the end of the World War II in 1945 when the representatives of Azerbaijani Turks from various groups and classes were gathered in Tabriz, the “Azerbaijan People's Government” was established in South Azerbaijan (Iranian Azerbaijan) and took power from the central government.

Turkish (Türki) became the official language in Azerbaijan, taught in university, schools, and adult education centers, replacing Farsi. For the first time in Iran, women gained the right to elect as well as to be elected and many democratic laws in favor of gender equality were passed. Roads were built and many economic reforms carried out, the magnitude and speed of implementation of which compared even to today was astonishing.

It also marked the first time universal suffrage was introduced to Muslim Middle East. Women gained the right to elect as well as to be elected. It announced that private property would be respected but that the government would distribute to the landless farmers the state-owned lands as well as the lands of property owners who fled Azerbaijan. The first provincial university in Iran was also built in Tabriz, with thousands of schools built in small towns and villages where compulsory education for children began age six.

The Azerbaijan’s People’s Government lasted only one year and was overthrown when the central army, with the Soviet Union and other great powers’ blessing, invaded in December 1946.

An American jurist, William O. Douglas, who was traveling in Azerbaijan shortly after thedemocratic movement, in his books Strange Lands and Friendly People notes:

When the Persian Army returned to Azerbaijan, it came with a roar. Soldiers ran riot, looting and plundering, taking what they wanted. The Russian Army had been on its best behaviour. The Persian Army--the army of emancipation--was a savage army of occupation. It left a brutal mark on the people. The beards of peasants were burned, their wives and daughters raped. Houses were plundered; livestock was stolen. The Army was out of control. Its mission had been liberation, but it preyed on the civilians, leaving death and destruction behind. (Douglas, 1951, p. 45)

http://www.amazon.com/Strange-Friendly-People-William-Douglas/dp/1406772046
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_O._DouglasIdea@s Magazine (Arts & science community of the University of Toronto):

“In the mid-1940s, when the autonomous government in Iran was overthrown, Turkish was banned and Persian was instated as the official language. I was 11 and my family was living in Tabriz at the time,” recalls Reza Baraheni. “I wrote a school paper in Azeri, a Turkish dialect that was the mother tongue of the local population, after it was forbidden. When I put it up on the board, the prefect tore it down, grabbed me by the neck and forced me to lick it. The other pupils started laughing. I would come to realize that the repression of writing and language—of the tongue passed down by women—could turn language naturally into a hidden fount wielding enormous power.

http://www.ideasmag.artsci.utoronto.ca/issue2_1/idea_s02-profile-baraheni.pdf

South Azerbaijan (December 1945 - December 1946)
Big size: http://oi52.tinypic.com/b7euz4.jpg

Mir Ja'far Pishevari (Prime Minister of Azerbaijan People's Government)

Firidun Ibrahimi (Attorney General of Azerbaijan People's Government)

Mammed Amin Azadveten (Member of the National Assembly of Azerbaijan, Leader of The Democratic Party of Azerbaijan in Urmia)

For more information:

Iran and the Challenge of Diversity: Islamic Fundamentalism, Aryanist Racism, and Democratic Struggles (Dr. Alireza Asgharzadeh)
http://www.amazon.com/Iran-Challenge-Diversity-Fundamentalism-Democratic/dp/1403980802
Strange Lands And Friendly People (William O. Douglas)
http://www.amazon.com/Strange-Friendly-People-William-Douglas/dp/1406772046
At the Dawn of the Cold War: The Soviet-American Crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan, 1941D1946 - Harvard Cold War Studies Books (Dr. Jamil Hasanli)
http://www.amazon.com/Dawn-Cold-War-Soviet-American-Azerbaijan/dp/0742540553/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1292027907&sr=1-1

The Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan (1945-1946)
Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a3xSyWS6sR0

World's second largest salt lake faces risk of drying out

2010-11-18T15:12:00.000-08:00

Lake Urmia in South Azerbaijan, Iran which is the largest lake in the Middle East and the second largest salt water lake on earth faces the risk of drying out. While the 60 percent of the lake water has already dried the experts warns that if necessary precautions are not taken the lake will dry out completely in a couple of years.

In terms of salt reserves the Lake Urmia is the second biggest lake after Great Salt Lake in the USA. If the lake continues drying like this it will no longer be counted among the lakes and will turn into a peace of salty land in upcoming years.

60 percent has already dried

The Urmia Environmental Protection Agency reported that the 60 percent of the lake water has dried. While stressing that the salt rate has already exceeded the normal rate the agency stated that it also threatens the life around the lake. The drying lake is also affects the livelihood of the population in the area.

The dams built more and more on the rivers are shown as the main reason for the drying. It is also reported that industrial waste reaching the lake it also another threat for the lake.

A research conducted by the University of Urmia in May 2008 indicated that the lake will turn into a salty land with a surface of 4 thousand kilometre square in 7 seven years. Lake Urmia with a surface area of approximately 5,200 km² contains 37 billion meter cube water. The lake is 135 km long and between 18 or 55 km wide. Its maximum depth is 16 meters.

The experts state that the situation has been critical for almost 10 years. For the last 15 years the level of water is steadily decreasing and drought of the last two years threatens the ecosystem in the area.

One of the biggest mineral stratum of the world

In 1976 the UNESCO has classified the shores of Lake Urmia as biosphere reserve. Beyond its natural beauty with its 8 billion meter cube mineral the lake is one of the biggest mineral stratums of the world.

According to the Environmental Protection Agency as of 2008, 120 thousand hectare of a total 520 thousand body has dried up. Sine 1995 the water level has dropped another 6 meters and it is getting worse year by year.

Flora and Fauna are under risk of extinction

As the water rate lowers the salt rate per a litre reaches 330 grams. This rate in Dead Sea is only 275 grams per a litre. The salty areas also constitute threat for the migratory birds. Artemias also cannot reproduce in the lake. Whole flora and fauna are under risk of extinction. Lake Urmia hosts several different kinds of migratory birds including Flamencos, pelicans, ibis, storks, recurvirostra avosetta and gulls. The environmentalist also warns that deer and some other wild animals may also leave the area.

Hundreds villages may be evacuated

The situation also threats the agriculture and tourism in the region as a result of which hundreds of villages may be evacuated. Some ports can already not be used as the water has withdrawn.

The reasons are clear but no solution

In order to save the lake a national will is a must. However, the government is watching the lake to dry out. Although the reasons for the drying out are known the officials are not producing any solutions against it.

Iranian education minister: 70 percent of Iranian students are bilingual

2010-11-15T20:22:00.000-08:00

Fars news agency: Education minister said: 70 percent of students throughout country are bilingual and their mother language doesn't convert to Persian after entering to first year of school and passing one year. How can such students compete with students those educate in Tehran? Haj-babayi, education minister, states: the students those faced this decline of education, couldn’t always succeed.

Just a year ago (on December 15, 2009) the Iranian minister of education, Mr. Hamidreza Haji-Babayi, revealed that 70% of Iranian students are bilingual. What this means is that Farsi/Persian is the natural mother tongue to only 30% of Iranian students. In other words, 70% of Iranian's population is non-Persian and they are forced to start their education with non-mother language. Despite this fact, the Iranian government along with the majority of Persian intellectuals, scholars and even opposition activists continue to disregard the country's rich ethnic and linguistic diversity. Iran has one of the widest varieties of ethnic groups in the world, and none of ethnic groups form the vast majority of the population but since 1925, Persian governors deny being of non-Persian peoples and they have executed many injustice plans for what they called the unifying of Iran. These plans included denying of non-Persian ethnic groups, banning of use of non-Persian languages, insulting to non-Persian cultures, changing of non-Persian geographical names to Persian, disintegrating of historical autonomous states, for example historical Azerbaijan has disintegrated to several provinces, and other assimilating plans.

Azerbaijani Turks along with Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs, Turkmens, Gilaks, Mazandaranis, Lors and other small minorities constitute this 70 percent of population of Iran. None of those ethnic groups are allowed learning their languages. Azerbaijani Turks and Persians are almost equals in population number but Iranian tyrannous system has banned such primary rights of non-Persian peoples and unfortunately, attitude of opposition groups of Iranian government about this unfair education system is very undemocratic, as Islamic government's is. Azerbaijani activists, as Supporters of bilingual instruction, believe that students should gain confidence in using their native language before being introduced to the Persian curriculum.

Bilingual education, application of specialized educational techniques to enhance the learning opportunities of students whose native language differs from the predominant language of instruction, is popular system that non-Persian activists want to be implemented in Iran. Defenders of education of mother language believe that competency in one’s native language provides important cognitive and social foundations for second language learning and academic learning in general.

Translated Farsi to English by: Yashar Bugun

IRANIAN AZERBAIJAN: THE BREWING HOTSPOT OF FUTURE SEPARATISM?

2010-11-15T19:54:00.000-08:00

By Emil Souleimanov

Conventional wisdom has it that Azerbaijanis, the largest ethnic minority in Iran, have historically tended to identify themselves with the idea of Iranian statehood and Shiite religion rather than ethnic nationalism. Yet recent years have shown a growth of their Azerbaijani Turkic self-consciousness which has not least manifested itself in the form of “sport nationalism”. The numerous fans of the Tabriz-based Tractor Sazi football club have become advocates of the ethno-linguistic emancipation of Iranian Azerbaijanis, an emancipation sometimes bordering on separatism and irredentism.

BACKGROUND: Last July 27, following expressive racial insults, the Tractor’s Azerbaijani fans engaged in violent clashes with the ethnic Persian fans of the Tehran-based Persepolis football team and Iranian police. During the clashes, dozens of fans got injured and dozens of predominantly Azerbaijani fans were jailed by police.

Iranian Azerbaijanis are known for being well-integrated into Iranian society as disproportionally high numbers of them are part of the political, economic, military and cultural elite of Iran. For instance, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic ayatollah Ali Khamenei and last year’s key reformist presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi are both of Azerbaijani origin.

Yet education in Azerbaijani Turkish is prohibited and only a limited number of media outlets print in Azerbaijani while there is de facto no TV broadcasting in this language. The roots of this attitude date back to the shah regime, which in an effort to secure the unity of this multi-ethnic nation subjected Azerbaijanis to intense assimilatory policies. Discrimination of their ethno-linguistic rights, as well as denial of their distinct identity was commonplace. Azerbaijanis were considered “Turkified Aryans”, Iranians by origin, and a sense of cultural and racial inferiority of the Turks as descendants of nomadic barbarians vis-à-vis the ancient cultivated Persians was raised by the authorities. It was in the Pahlavi period that the derogatory image of “a stupid Turk” (“Turkish donkey”) was cultivated to be applied predominantly to Iranian Azerbaijanis. As a result, millions of Azerbaijanis, especially those that had moved to Teheran and other urban areas of central Iran since the 1960s-70s, tended to distance themselves from their Turkishness, assimilating into the Persian socio-linguistic mainstream. Provided they did so, they faced virtually no obstacles in reaching high positions in the state. The shah’s chauvinist policy was generally halted following the Islamic revolution of 1979 with the notion of supra-ethnic Shiite Islam obtaining the status of state ideology.

Yet the situation has changed since the 1990s, the establishment of the independent Azerbaijani Republic playing only a partial role in this. Many thousands of Iranian Azerbaijanis have frequently traveled to Turkey for both work and recreation, coming to be affected by the strength of Turkish nationalism with its developed sense of pan-Turkic solidarity with both Azerbaijanis and representatives of other Turkic ethnicities. They have also experienced that Turkey is, in comparison to Iran, a much more modern, free and developed state. Turkish satellite broadcasting with its rich menu of entertaining programs has also entered the homes of ordinary Iranian Azerbaijanis, contributing to the improvement of their ethno-linguistic self-perception. Many Azerbaijanis started to regard Turkishness as by no means inferior to Persianness, since Persia, as they found out, had been ruled predominantly by Turkic dynasties for a millennium and as they embraced key personalities of Iranian history of Azerbaijani descent,such as Shah Ismail I and Shah Abbas the Great.

Since the end of the 1990s, Iranian Azerbaijanis have become increasingly vocal in their demands for education in their native tongue and recognition of their Turkic identity. Aside from this, there is a lack of consensus over what should be achieved, whether autonomy within Iran, independence, unification with Turkey and/or Azerbaijan, or just the right to education in Azerbaijani. Nevertheless, the emancipation movement of Iranian Azerbaijanis have brought about increasing reprisals from state authorities which have culminated during the so-called “cartoon crisis” [see the 06/14/2006 issue of the CACI Analyst] of May and June 2006 that cost the lives of dozens of Azerbaijani protesters.

IMPLICATIONS: As a result of the imposed restrictions on any politicized expression of Azerbaijani identity, the focus of Azerbaijanis has since then shifted to the realm of sports. The Tabriz-based Tractor Sazi football club has earned massive support of ethnic Azerbaijanis across Iran, breaking all nationwide attendance records. Dozens of thousands of Azerbaijani fans accompany the Tractor football team during its matches, occasionally waving Turkish flags, carrying pan-Turanist symbols and shouting politically-flavored slogans ranging from rather moderate demands to establish school teaching in Azerbaijani Turkic to ones emphasizing their distinctiveness from the Persians (“Hey, look out, I am Turkish”, “Azerbaijan is ours, Afghanistan is yours”) to explicitly supporting Azerbaijani separatism (“Long live Azerbaijan and down with those who dislike us”, “Tabriz, Baku, Ankara, our path is different than that of the Persians”). This, in turn, has contributed to growing tensions with the Persian fans whose racist slurs (“Turkish donkey”) being returned by Azerbaijani fans (“Persian dogs” or “Persian monkeys”) which often results in violent clashes, especially during the Tractor’s matches with the Teheran-based teams, Persepolis and Esteghlal.

Likewise, the situation of Iranian Azerbaijan has changed dramatically over recent years, which is facilitated by the overall atmosphere of détente in Iranian society. While most Azerbaijanis preferred to speak Persian even in the streets of Azerbaijani-dominated Tabriz two decades ago, Azerbaijani Turkish has now become commonplace, displacing Persian in most of the predominantly Azerbaijani areas of northwestern Iran. Ordinary Azerbaijanis in Teheran and elsewhere do not hesitate to speak in their native tongue, showing pride of their ethnic identity. Importantly, demonstrations for ethno-linguistic rights have become periodical in Iranian Azerbaijan. Although crushed down violently by police forces with the demonstrators routinely subjected to torture and imprisonment, they still persist. Separatist flags of Southern Azerbaijan are occasionally displayed visibly overnight in Tabriz and other cities of Iran’s Azerbaijani northwest, just as posters advocating Azerbaijanis’ right to education in their native tongue.

Any sign of nationalism and separatism among its largest ethnic minority accompanied with loyalty to outside nations are of outmost concern for Iranian authorities as they might endanger the unity of the state, especially in light of Iran’s internal problems with its Sunni (Kurdish, Baluchi) and to some extent also Arab minorities and uneasy relationship with the U.S. and Israel. Although it is too early to envisage catastrophic scenarios for Iran, the ongoing tendency is not without its potential dangers, and generational factors are leading among them.

In a country where around two thirds of the population are made up of people below the age of 30, the younger generations of Iranians, especially inhabiting urban areas, generally tend to have pro-reformist attitudes, willing to live in a freer country, as they showed during last year’s protests over the results of presidential elections and subsequent violent reprisals. In fact, the theocratic regime has alienated many young Iranians who are now eager to identify themselves not primarily with Shiite Islam but with alternative ideologies. For young Persians, it is Persian nationalism with emphasis on its pre-Islamic roots, while for many Azerbaijanis, it is increasingly Azerbaijani nationalism with its pan-Turkic overtones.

CONCLUSIONS: The ongoing split in Iranian society along social and ethnic lines is paralleled by the split within the Azerbaijani community itself. In this split, rural, less educated, deeply religious and usually older Azerbaijanis, supportive of the conservatives, still link Shiite religion, the main layer of their self-identification, with Iran and stick to the centuries-old tradition of referring to the Sunni Turks as heretics. For them, those who in their opinion seek the dismemberment of their Iranian homeland are traitors and “agents of Israel”. However, as the ethnic polarization in Iran deepens, they too are affected negatively by the increasingly anti-Turkic sentiments of their Persian compatriots and are thus becoming increasingly aware of their ethnic roots. On the other hand, pro-reformist, relatively educated Azerbaijani youth of urban areas generally incline toward ethnic nationalism, increasingly dissociating themselves from the Persians and associating with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Whether the current emancipation stage of Azerbaijani nationalism results in separatist efforts over time or not now depends on the ability of Teheran to further secure the favor of its loyal Azerbaijani population while keeping Azerbaijani nationalists low profile, possibly meeting their basic ethno-linguistic and cultural demands. In any case, the genie of Azerbaijani nationalism is already out of the bottle.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Emil Souleimanov is assistant professor at the Department of Russian and East European Studies, Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic. He is the author of “An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective“ (Peter Lang, 2007).

http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5432

Tractor sazi football club and Racism in Iran

2010-11-15T01:06:00.000-08:00

Yashar Bugun

Maybe when chiefs of tractor Manufacturing Co. (ITMCO) decided to establish a football club in Tabriz city in 1970, they didn’t think that this football club will be converted to tribune of Azerbaijani people and it will be more than football club. Tractor Football Club (Persian: تراکتور, Azerbaijani: تراختور) is an Iranian football club based in Tabriz. Red wolves play in Iran's Pro League. Average number of spectators at home games in Sahand stadium (Yadegar-e-Emam , this name is governmental name, but popular and current name for this stadium is Sahand) is more than 60,000. Even, nearly the number of tractor fans in games external like in Tehran is equal with the number of fans of home's teams. For example, the number of all fans at the games of tractor with Esteghlal and Persepolis teams was 80000 in last year, which half of them were tractor fans. One of their slogans in stadiums, which emphasise necessity of implementation of fifteenth article of Iran's constitution, is call for education of mother language (Türk dilində mədrəsə--olmlıdır hər kəsə) and another slogan relating to environmental disaster of Urmiyeh (Urmu) lake ask for saving of this lake from drying out."gəlin gedax ağlıyax—urmu gölün doldurax" that means : Let's go and cry--- fill lake up with our tears. Other slogans, for example, "viva the Azerbaijan" (Yaşasın azərbaycan), "long live Azerbaijan -- shame on enemies of Azerbaijan" (azərbaycan var olsun--istəmiyən kör olsun) and "Azerbaijan is our land—tractor is our red wolf"(Azərbaycan yurdumuz—tiraxtur boz qurdumuz) which have national meaning for Azerbaijani Turks. But this team and its fans have faced with harsh and ruthless actions of security forces in this two year.

Repressive and closed social conditions of today's Iran along with open atmosphere of football stadiums has caused that football fields is converted to the protesting meeting of Azerbaijani Turks. Recently tractor fans are pointing to ruthless actions such as violence, attacking with baton, illegal arrest and imprisonment, prevention and delaying behind the doors and other violent acts by security forces. At the present tens of tractor fans have been imprisoned and their crime is adoration to Azerbaijan and Tiraxtur.

One of the most important features of these enthusiastic fans is high activity in internet. Many fans of tractor don’t believe governmental media and they follow news of Azerbaijan and tractor from independent media. But totalitarian system in Iran doesn't allow that this media to form a centralized place to flow news freely. Tractor fans have a lot of websites and every day many of them are filtered and closed. Most well-know websites of these enthusiastic fans were www.tractorfans.com and www.trakhtorfans.com that closed by security forces because their basic server located in Iran and managers and owners of this website are in prison. In addition to these obstructions, the fans of red wolves have a further problem that related to new military management of tractor sazi football club. Tractor sazi football club is sponsored by tractor manufacturing company and great amount of company's stock belong to governmental organisations, as a result, members of guardian's military of Islamic republic are assigned to management council and presidency posts by security organisations. According to the rules of FIFA, governments cannot interfere in affairs of football federations and clubs but there is no obstacle in front of security organisations in Iran. Unfortunately executives of FIFA don’t know about current affairs that happen in Iran.

One of the issues that relates directly to FIFA is racist slogans that spectators of competitors are using in stadiums and television channels broadcast this slogans. As it is stated above, tractor FC has been related to the national consciousness of Azerbaijani Turks in Iran and racist slogans of fans of competitors has targeted ethnicity of Turks. For example television cameras in cities of Kerman, Isfahan and Bushehr were witnessed to offensive and racist slogans pointing Turks. Unfortunately, disciplinary committee of Iranian Pro League didn't make its duties and finally in game with Persepolis in Tehran, that Persepolis was host team, thousands of host fans insult to Turks and these slogans were broadcasted in live program from channel 3. After those happenings, spectators of tractorsazi start to protest the silence of referee and football federation. After that, tractor's fans start to fire seats of stadium and security forces attacked them violently.

Disciplinary committee, that hadn’t punished opponent's fans due to their racist slogans by that time, sentenced tractorsazi to two games without spectators and financial punishments. Subsequently, fans of tractor readied a petition and demanded from executives of FIFA to oversee these injustices and racist atmosphere in Iran.

Racism in Iran's Football Stadiums

2010-11-13T07:11:00.000-08:00

Mr Joseph S. BlatterPresident, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)

Dear Mr Blatter,
As a number of Azerbaijani and Iranian scholars, journalists, professionals and human rights activists, we would like to submit this letter to you as a formal complaint in regard to a series of blatant acts of racism that have been taking place in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s football stadiums against the Azerbaijani team of Tractor-Sazi (Tiraxtur) and its supporters-- and by a qualifying extension, against Iran’s more than twenty million Turkic citizens. We hope that you will recognize the urgency of this matter and will take necessary action as stipulated in FIFA’s anti-racist policies, particularly Article 26 pertaining to Safety Regulations and Article 58 pertaining to FIFA Disciplinary Code. The following constitutes the basis of our complaint and will provide you some crucial information regarding the above mentioned acts of racism as well as the context within which they have taken place.

Tiraxtur: The Azerbaijani Team
The Azerbaijani football team of Tractor-Sazi, better known as Tiraxtur, was founded in 1970 through the sponsorship of famous Tabriz Tractor-making industrial unit. From the very beginning Tiraxtur demonstrated exceptional sportsmanship and professionalism that placed it amongst the most favoured football teams in Iran. In a short period of time, the team was able to win the hearts and minds of the people of Tabriz, and when in recent months it excelled to the level of Iran’s super league teams, Tiraxtur captivated the entire Azerbaijan and the vast majority of Iran’s Turkic community. As such, tens of thousands of enthusiastic Tiraxtur supporters fill up the stadiums whenever there is a match between Tiraxtur and other teams. Understandably, the Tiraxtur supporters come from all over Azerbaijan and other Turkic populated areas of Iran who speak Azeri-Turkic as their natural mother language. Consequently, Azeri-Turkic becomes the dominant language of support and encouragement in these stadiums. It is the language that most intimately expresses Tiraxtur supporters’ feelings of joy, happiness and spiritual elation. And this poses a major challenge to the practice of official racism in Iran where Farsi (the language of Persian ethnic group) is the hegemonic official and national language of an extremely diverse population. The use of Azeri-Turkic in stadiums challenges the official status of Farsi as the dominant language of the country. As an officially unacknowledged and banned language, the Azeri-Turkic destabilizes Iran’s entire racist establishment which functions on a variety of official, cultural, collective and individual levels. The use of Azerbaijan’s stigmatized ‘unofficial’ language in football stadiums defies Persian racism and invokes retaliatory responses from both the government and members of the dominant Persian group. This begs several questions: Is it contrary to FIFA procedures to support one’s team in one’s own natural mother language? Where does it say that the ban imposed on Azeri language in schools and government offices ought to be extended to football stadiums? Shouldn’t FIFA take a transparent stance against this despicable act of linguistic racism?

Racism against Tiraxtur and Its Supporters
Azerbaijani Turks have been targets of racist attacks in Iranian cities of Boushehr, Isfahan, Kerman, and in the capital city of Tehran during the football matches that took place in these cities over the past few months. In the football stadiums of these major cities, racist slogans were shouted incessantly against Tiraxtur and its Azerbaijani/Turkic supporters. These slogans depicted Azerbaijani-Turks as subhuman “donkeys” who were not equal to Persians but constituted a category below ‘normal human beings.’ In these racist attacks, the use of the term ‘donkey’ serves to dehumanize the Azerbaijani-Turks, violate their dignity and break their spirit.

A most appalling display of racism was manifested throughout the match between TiraxturPirouzi (formerly Persepolis) that was played at Tehran Azadi stadium on July 27th, 2010. The official Iranian state television (Chanel 3) aired the entire show for about an hour. Among the racist slogans that were chanted against Azerbaijanis the following could be heard clearly and powerfully: and

إشک برو گم شو!
Donkey, get lost!
إشک برو گم شو!
Donkey, get lost!
And when the Tiraxtur supporters fell silent after hearing this horrifying racist slogan, the Pirouzi/Persepolis supporters chanted:
صدای عرعر نمی آد!
There is no braying from the donkeys!
ترکه صداش در نمی آد!
The Turkish donkeys are silent!

In a rhythmic and unusually well-organized manner, half of the Pirouzi/Persepolis supporters from one end of the stadium chanted: “There is no braying from the donkeys!” To this, the other half from the other end of the stadium replied: “The Turkish donkeys are silent!” And the whole event was carefully aired on the Iranian state television! (Videos and other supporting documents are easily accessible online and will be made available upon request).

Was this highly harmonious and well-ordered display of racism a whimsical individualistic and collective behaviour, or was it planned and orchestrated by Iran’s football authorities and the government of Mr Ahmadinejad? Ever since the rule of Pahlavis from the mid-1920s, the degrading and dehumanizing analogy with “donkey” has been used by successive Iranian governments and through the hegemonic discourse to silence, humiliate and marginalize Iran’s Azerbaijani and Turkic population. It is high time that this blatant act of racism and shameful bigotry is condemned by FIFA and other international bodies.

In various UN documents and numerous academic sources racism is defined as a negative, dehumanizing, and oppressive view, attitude, behaviour and action towards members of another group. Ranging from a variety of social, scientific, biological, institutional, linguistic and cultural kinds, contemporary racism(s) are a conflation of ethnicity, class, language, religion and broad cultural and geographical concerns and definitions. Racism is a situation in which individuals, groups, communities, or institutions exercise abusive power over other human beings based on their real or perceived physiological differences (e.g., skin color, hair texture, facial features, racial heritage); cultural differences ( e.g., language, customs, behaviour, clothing and mode of dress, eating habits); ideological differences (e.g., religion, political affiliation, belief); geographical differences or differences in the place of birth (e.g., Asian, African, Latino, Irish, Afghani), and so on and so forth. Clearly, the Iranian government and many members of the dominant group assume the Persian ethnic/racial group to be ‘superior’ to Azerbaijani-Turks and others on the basis of their ethnicity, language, ancestry and culture. Based on such perceived notions of ‘superiority,’ they seek to humiliate and suppress the Azerbaijani language, identity, culture and history. While this aggressive racism has been going on at various governmental, institutional and educational levels for over 80 years, recently it has begun showing its ugly face in football stadiums. And that is why FIFA has an institutional as well as a moral responsibility to take a stance against this racism.

Urgent Action Needed
Based on FIFA procedure, Tiraxtur and its supporters have submitted formal complaints to Iran’s Football Federation. However, this organization has not taken any stance against blatant racism committed in football stadiums. Far from it, Iran’s Football Federation has punished the victim. Tiraxtur was penalized to play two games in the absence of its passionate supporters, whereas the host team (Pirouzi/Persepolis) was asked to play only one game without supporters! Moreover, Tiraxtur’s punishment was extended to another Azerbaijani team, Sahrdari, which was made to play one game in Tabriz without its Azerbaijani supporters. In effect, the Azerbaijanis were prevented from supporting their teams in three matches that took place in their hometown of Tabriz.

Dear Mr Blatter,
In a recent document issued on Friday, August 27, 2010, U.N. urged Iran to tackle racism against such non-Persian ethnic groups as Azeri-Turks, Kurds, Baluchs, Arabs, Turkmens as well as religious minorities such as the Baha’is. We urge FIFA to join the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and condemn all manifestations of Persian racism taking place in Iran’s football stadiums. FIFA’s reputation as an anti-racist international body is quite well-known. We expect FIFA to take a proactive anti-racist stance against Persian racism, and the government of infamous Holocaust denier, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, that wholeheartedly supports this racism.

Respectfully,
(Names are arranged in alphabetical order)
Sedigheh AdalatiPh. D.; Sociologist, Hamburg- Germany.

Mohammad Reza Al Ardabili: Managing Editor, Achiq söz.org, Stockholm- Sweden.

Ahmad Alizadeh Chairperson, South Azerbaijan Academic Society.

Hossein Anvar Hagigi: National rights activist, Köln- Germany.

Alireza Ardabili, Journalist & Publisher, Stockholm- Sweden.

Soudabeh Ardavan, Artist & human rights activist, Sweden.

Dr. Alireza Asgharzadeh Sociologist, York University, Toronto- Canada.

Teymor Avshar, National rights activist, Stockholm- Sweden.

Mehemmed Azadgar, Writer & National rights activist, Köln- Germany.

Said Azizi, National rights activist, Stockholm- Sweden.
Yousef Azizi Banitorof, Member of Iranian Writers Association; Human rights activist, London- England.

Professor Reza Baraheni
Iranian novelist and poet; A former president of PEN Canada and retired professor of Comparative Literature, Toronto- Canada
Salamat Dashti National rights activist, Stockholm- Sweden

Naser Ebyat, Artist & cultural activist

Rahima Gadirova, Human rights activist, Stockholm- Sweden

Dr. Ajub Ghane, National rights activist, Hovover- Germany

Dr.Ali Gharajelou, Political Scientist, national rights activist, Toronto- Canada

Seyfeddin Hatamlooy, Writer & publisher, Bonn- Germany
Sadegh Isabeyli, National rights activist, Finland
Alirza Javanbakht
Writer & journalist, human rights activist, former political prisoner, Vancouver- Canada
Mojgan Javid, Human rights activist, Stockholm- Sweden

Khalil Kaabi Writer, Civil rights activist

Saleh Kamrani, Human Rights Attorney, Sweden

Dr. Elham Latifi, Women’s rights activist

Dr. Akbar Mahmudi, Psychotherapist & writer, Essen- Germany

Farid Marshidi, Writer & civil rights activist
Leila Mojtahedi
Journalist; President of the Cultural and Linguistic
Association of Iranian Azerbaijan in Canada, Toronto- Canada
Ali Mullazadeh, National rights activist, Stockholm- Sweden

Bahman Nabizade Civil rights activist, Stockholm- Sweden

Kadije Nazari Civil rights activist, Stockholm- Sweden
Ahmad Obali
Journalist, National rights activist; Founder & Director of South Azerbaijan Television, Chicago- USA
Boyuk Rasulvand, Human rights activist
Dr. Mashalla Razmi
Writer & journalist, Paris- France

Professor Gholam Reza Sabri-Tabrizi
Edinburgh University, London- UK

Dr. Zia Sadr al Ashrafi
Sociologist; Azerbaijani member of Congress of Nationalities for Federal Iran, Ottawa- Canada
Sattar Sevigin President of Azerbaijani Federation in Sweden, Stockholm- Sweden

Ahmad Shahabi Civil rights activist, Stockholm- Sweden

Dr. Akbar Shakiba Civil rights activist, Köln- Germany

Asgar Shakiba Civil rights activist, Köln- Germany

Yunes Shameli, Writer & Civil rights activist, Stockholm- Sweden

Sadiq Shukurov Civil rights activist, Stockholm- Sweden

Dr. Hamdollah Soleymani MD, Hanover- Germany

Hedayet Soltanzadeh Lawyer, writer & Civil rights activist, London- England
Dr. Asad Taghizadeh
MD, Civil rights activist, Oslo- Norway

Iranian Democracy and Green Movement

2010-11-12T21:12:00.000-08:00

Yashar Bugun

Democracy (Greek demos,”the people”; kratein, “to rule”), political system in which the people of a country rule through any form of government they choose to establish. But the major features of modern democracy include individual freedom, which entitles citizens to the liberty and responsibility of shaping their own careers and conducting their own affairs; equality before the law; and universal suffrage and education. Such features have been proclaimed in great historic documents, for example, the U.S. Declaration of Independence, which asserted the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which affirmed the principles of civil liberty and of equality before the law. This principle of democracy in my country Iran isn't comprehensive between Iranian government and even between Iranian opposition groups. My purpose in this writing isn’t to challenge Iranian government because we all know about that. As an Iranian citizen that suffers Islamic dictatorial government, I can see undemocratic manners and behaviors of opposition groups of Iranian government. I think Iranian opposition groups, they claim to bring democracy for Iran, should begin to reform in their conception from democracy and freedom. Undemocratic atmosphere have caused for shaping of undemocratic reactions in Iran.

Fundamental bases of Iranian autocracy back to harsh and cruel history of Middle East. Like other Middle Eastern countries, Iran has been crossroads of migrations, spreading of religions and wars. These factors along with foreign interferences, specially engineered policies in political and religious parts of Iran by Britannia in nineteenth and twentieth century, have strengthen Iranian individual autocracy. Every Iranian person should ask it that: Why Iranian opposition is dispersed so much? Why can't those groups come together? Do have this group any in common purpose that they agree about it?

My response for this questions is:
This so much division between opposition groups has social reasons that originate in history of Iran and Middle East. Nearly 2500 years monarchical background that monarchs (shah) and clerics (sheikh) with each other was ruling people and each other guarantees other's legality and this long time dictatorial environment has caused that Iranian people tended to individualism and with this psychical feature in each member of society and the resulting lack of belief pluralism, dispersion of Iranian opposition groups will inevitable. I think only in common purpose that causing these groups come together, is necessity of changing of Iran's government. But if opposition groups want to reform or change Islamic republic of Iran, they should initially reform themselves. They should accept that their conception from democracy is very restricted. For example each group sees world with unique eyeglasses and they bear democracy until their benefits isn’t endangered. But in global and standard definition of democracy, the rights of individuals and groups have been guaranteed until it doesn't threaten other's rights. Unfortunately this selfish definition of democracy among Iranian opposition, that recently is called green movement, is much districted and like Islamic government, green movement's attitude about non Persian ethnicities and nations is very dictatorial and tyrannical. For the reason that many activists and leaders of green movement deny the existence of non Persian nations and their rights, they don’t accept the national rights and even primary rights for example education of mother language of non Persian ethnicities. Unfortunately many leaders of green movement especially reformists and Diasporas have bad background in denying of non Persian's cultures and language. Belief to Arian theory is popular between leaders of green movement and this theory is principal reference of politicians to eliminate of other cultures and languages. There is an interesting fact that the education minister of Iran pronounced in last year. He pronounced the details of a survey established between students of schools and the results of study showed that the mother tongue of only 30% of Iranian student is Persian. This results point up a cultural genocide in Iran that has been started since 85 years ago that Pahlavi monarch government launched assimilation policy of non Persian. Azerbaijani Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchs, Turkmens, Lors, Bakhtiyaris, Gilaks, Mazandaranis and other small ethnicities, consisting of 70% of Iran's population, were deprived from their rights and but our claimants of democracy like green movement's leader don’t want to accept existence of this nations and ethnicities. Totalitarian attitude of this claimants don’t allows them to deal with according to of standard democracy.

Persian Carpet: Another theft of Azerbaijani Heritage and Art by totalitarians

2010-11-12T20:49:00.000-08:00

Azerbaijani art in the world are forging in the name of the Persian Carpet Introducing of Azerbaijani carpets as Persian Carpet is art theft

Many western and Oriental scholars think that Iranian people are Persian and therefore they use Persian country, Persian art, Persian history, Persian religion, Persian people, Persian culture and Persian carpet. This consideration of today's Iranian people as Persian goes back to time of Achaemenid Empire that Greece source described those Pars or pers. But today Pars or Fars is the name of one of the ethnic groups and provinces in Iran.

The true beauty of carpets derives from the people who weave carpets. When we talk about the Persian or Iranian people we are not speaking of one broad ethnic group we are talking about many. While most Persians are Indo European a significant portion are Altaic/Turkic, Dravidian, and Afro-Asiatic. Currently the people of Iran speak 79 different languages and countless dialects. Iran’s population is made up of numerous ethnic groups. The largest ethnic groups of Iran include :Persians(34%), Azerbaijani Turks(34%), Kurds(7%), Arabs(4%), Baluchs(2%) , Gilakis (3%), Mazandaranis(5%) , Lurs(4%) ,Turkmens(3%) and small communities of Armenians, Assyrians, khalajs, Georgians, Pashtuns and etc. Azerbaijani Turks (Azeris) settle in northwestern Iran that is named south Azerbaijan that consists West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, Ardabil, Zanjan, Qazvin, Hamadan Provinces and some counties in Kordestan, Gilan, Kermanshah, Qum and Markazi provinces. Since the early 1900s and with organized migration policy, more than 50 percent of Azeris have been migrating to most large cities in Iran, especially Tehran and Karaj

The Azerbaijani women are skilful Rug makers using Turkish knots. In contrast to other parts of Iran the Turkish knot is used in the provinces of south Azerbaijan and Hamadan.
As is shown in below, In the Turkish knot the yarn is taken twice around two adjacent warp threads and the ends are drawn out between these two threads.

http://www.jacobsenrugs.com/knots.htm
In the Persian (or Sinneh) Knot, the wool thread forms a single turn about the warp thread. One end comes out over this thread and the other over the next warp thread.

Major Weaving Centers in south Azerbaijan: Ardebil, Bijar, Hamadan, Qom, Shiraz (qashqaii), Tabriz, Tehran, Zanjan, Urmiya ,Ahar, Farahan, Firouzabad, Garavan, Ghotlog, Heris, Kaboudar, Ahang, Koliai Khamseh, Khoie, Makou, Malayer, Mahabad, Moghan, Mianeh, Nahavand, Qashqaie, Qazvin, Roudbar, , Sarouk, Shahsavan, Tousirkan, Tafresh, Astara, Kaleybar, Sarab, Abiyak, Bahar, Bonab, Maragheh,Qom, etc.
Major Weaving Centers in north Azerbaijan (Republic of Azerbaijan):
Guba, Shirvan , Baku, Ganja, Gazakh , Garabakh, Shusha , Jabrail, Lankaran

In spite of this clear difference in pattern and knot type between Persian and Azerbaijani (Turkish) carpet, Iranian government and Persian trader are introducing and advertising the Azerbaijani carpet in the fake name of Persian carpet in markets. Unfortunately, nonIranian customers don’t know about this art and cultural robbery that happen in Iran. NonPersian communities are pointing to totalitarian policies of Persian domination and in addition to culture and art, other heritages of these communities for example language, history, tradition, music, dance and etc are denied.

Yashar Bugun.

Drying of the Urmia Lake and scorched earth policy in South Azerbaijan

2010-11-12T20:38:00.000-08:00

Yashar Bugun

A scorched earth policy is a military strategy or operational method which involves destroying anything that might be useful to the enemy while advancing through or withdrawing from an area. Although initially referring to the practice of burning crops to deny the enemy food sources, in its modern usage the term includes the destruction of infrastructure such as shelter, transportation, communications and industrial resources. The practice may be carried out by an army in enemy territory, or its own home territory. It is done for purely strategic/political reasons rather than strategic/operational reasons.

Urmia Lake (Turkish Urmu Gölü; Persian daryacheh Urmiyeh) in South Azerbaijan, northwestern Iran, is the largest salty lake inside Iran and the second biggest salty lake in the world. In the Turkic languages of the area the lake’s name, Urmu, referring to Sumerian word "Ur" that means city and there is a historical city with Urmu in western coastline of lake. A body of water with no outlet, the lake is fed by twelve large and small rivers, the jighati chay (Turkish and historical name is Cığati çay and persianazed name is Zarrinehrood) and Tatao chay (Turkish and historical name is Tatao çay and persianazed name is Siminenehrood) rivers from the south are largest and important source of inlet water. The rivers have been heavily diverted for crop irrigation and industrial and drinking uses during the past several decades, reducing the size of the lake by more than 25 percent since 1970. The resulting environmental changes pose a serious threat to the local ecology and human health. As a result, advancing salt winds and storms of salt and a large area of fertile agricultural lands will be destroyed. Also more than twenty cities and tens of thousands of villages around the cities and lake will be empty. In addition, in such a situation many diseases and cancers will prevalence and many social and economic problems will be created for Azerbaijan.

Draining of the Urmia Lake in Iran which is one of the ancient cradles of Azerbaijan has been demographic and political results. According to the native people, the sad destiny of the Aral Sea and those problems which appeared in Central Asia are now threatening the Urmia Lake in South Azerbaijan. The draining of the lake has already turned into an ecological problem and is a threat for the population of the region. The main reason of the catastrophic decline in the level of water has become not only the decline in precipitation in the region but also incorrect irrigation policy held by the Iranian authorities. According to the Azerbaijani activist, central government of Iran has planned policies to changing demographic composition of region since changing of political power from Turkish Qajar dynasty to Persian Pahlavi dynasty in 1925. Reza Shah Pahlavi had ambitious plans for what he called the unifying of Iran and demographic changing is one of those plans. Resettlement of Zabolian people, originally from south east Iran, to Turkmen region, Turkmen sahra, in north eastern Iran and resettlement of Bakhtiyari and Lori people from neighbor provinces to Arabian region, Ahvaz, Mahmareh (Persianzed name is Khorramshahr), Abadan and other Arabian areas is obvious examples of this governmental policy. According to state ministry of Iran, half the Azerbaijani populations migrate to nonazerbaijani provinces like Tehran and Karaj. Official statistics confirms that Azerbaijani provinces always have had highest level in unemployment and migration among provinces of Iran. This huge size of migration from fertile geopolitical region to central regions was resulted by scorched earth policy in 85 years. Ali Akbar Velayati, ex- foreign Minister, have famous statement about economical investment in Azerbaijani areas that clearly shows Tehran's attitude about future of south Azerbaijan and its problems. According to ex-governor of Zanjan, in session with governors of north western provinces, Velayati had stated that Tehran shouldn’t investigate in Azerbaijani provinces because those areas sooner or later will be separated. The bureaucratic structure, appointment of non-native administrators and governors, security attitude to south Azerbaijan, interference of military managers and lack of investment are important factors in Azerbaijan's crises like draining of Urmia Lake. According to Persian politicians, presence of Azerbaijani Turks adjoined to Turkey's borders is considered a threat to Iran's unity and scorched earth policy for population evacuation is carrying on in south Azerbaijan.

Fortunately, Azerbaijani people have started an awakening movement that consists of cultural activities, tendency to Azerbaijani identity, showing close attention to ecological and historical resources. Along with academic criticism, general public of Azerbaijan protest tragic situation of Urmia Lake and for example protesting meeting of Azerbaijanis was performed in coastline of lake in 2th April that were faced with harsh reaction of security forces. Most important protestors of crisis of Urmia Lake are fans of Tractor sazi football club those exhibit their protest in stadiums. Their slogan about drying of the Urmia Lake is: "gəlin gedax ağlıyax—urmu gölün doldurax" that means: Let's go and cry--- fill lake up with our tears.

UN anti-racism panel calls on Iran to counter hatred

2010-08-30T20:51:00.000-07:00

GENEVA (AFP) – The UN anti-racism panel Friday called on Iran to counter racism and ethnic discrimination, including incitement to hatred by officials and "double discrimination suffered by women from minorities.

The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed concern at the exclusion of Arab, Azeri, Balochi, Kurdish and Bahai communities in areas such as housing, education, health, jobs and "from public life".

It also noted the hurdles ethnic minorities faced despite the country's economic growth.

Committee member Dilip Lahiri told journalists the panel felt discrimination against the Bahai community was "quite rampant", despite a debate over whether the issue was a religious one and thus out of the panel's remit.

The panel's 18 experts said they were concerned at "the reports of discrimination in everyday life and statements of racial discrimination and incitement to hatred by government officials."

"While commending efforts undertaken by the state party to empower women, the committee is concerned that women of minority origin may be at risk of facing double discrimination," they also noted.

"The committee recommends that (Iran) take appropriate steps to combat manifestations in the media, as well as in everyday life, of racial prejudice that could lead to discrimination."

Azeri communities were notably subjected to "stereotyped and demeaning" portrayals in the media, while ethnic or religious minorities faced "limited enjoyment of political, economic, social and cultural rights."

Lahiri, a former Indian diplomat, noted that Iran had signed up to the international anti-racism convention before the revolution that turned it into an Islamic republic

"It does face a challenge in reconciling its Islamic constitution with a secular convention, which is what we have," he remarked.

The panel's conclusions on Friday followed a regular review of Iran's application of international standards in a hearing earlier this month.

Iran had vaunted its cultural and ethnic diversity and told the committee that all citizens were regarded as equals, underlining its attempts to tackle poverty, especially in rural areas, and foster dialogue.

Iranian officials also highlighted laws against social discrimination during the hearing and a lack of complaints.

While the committee welcomed legislative changes five years ago promoting citizenry rights, it cautioned that the absence of complaints "is not proof" of the absence of discrimination.

It "may be the result of the victims' lack of awareness of their rights, the lack of confidence on the part of indviduals in the police or judicial authorities, or the authorities' lack of attention or sensitivity to cases of racial discrimination," the UN rights panel argued.

Iran was asked to report back in 2013 on measures taken to redress the situation.

Iran : The UN Committee on Racial Discrimination condemnspervasive discrimination against minorities

2010-08-30T20:42:00.000-07:00

On 27 August 2010, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), a UN body composed of independent experts, issued its concluding observations regarding the implementation of the UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Committee has notably urged the Iranian authorities to bring domestic laws into compliance with the provisions of the Convention on racial discrimination, notably by reviewing its definition of racial discrimination contained in the Constitution.

FIDH and its Iranian member organizations, as stated in their alternative report submitted to the Committee, consider that both legislation and practices must change in Iran in order to ensure equal rights for ethnic and religious minorities in Iran.

The UN experts expressed also concern at “the limited enjoyment of political, economic, social and cultural rights by, inter alia, Arab, Azeri, Baluchi, Kurdish communities and some communities of non-citizens, in particular with regard to housing, education, freedom of expression and religion, health and employment, despite the economic growth in Iran [the State party]”. They also stressed the “lack of sufficient measures to enable persons belonging to minorities to have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue and to have it used as a medium of instruction”. They censured the low level of participation of persons from ethnic and religious minorities in public life, and discrimination in the field of employment of state officials and employees. The UN body expressed further concern that language barriers create an obstacle in access to justice for ethnic minorities.

“The CERD is supposed to examine to which extent the States who ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination respect and promote it. This exercise appears to have been particularly difficult regarding Iran because of the lack of information provided by the authorities on the de facto situation of minorities in the country”, declared Karim Lahidji, Vice-president of FIDH and President of LDDHI. The CERD deplored in particular the absence of any statistics on the ethnic composition of the population, the lack of economic and social indicators on the Iranian population disaggregated by ethnicity, as well as the absence of statistical information on complaints lodged, prosecutions launched and penalties imposed in cases of offences relating to racial or ethnic discrimination. “How can the Iranian authorities pretend to fight discrimination if there is not even an effort to collect factual information on the current situation?”, questioned Dr. Lahidji.

FIDH and LDDHI call upon the Iranian authorities to implement fully the CERD recommendations and will issue in the coming weeks a full report on the situation of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran, which will be available on FIDH website.

http://www.fidh.org/Iran-The-UN-Committee-on-Racial-Discrimination

- Alternative Report submitted by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH); The Iranian League for the Defence of Human Rights (LDDHI); and Defenders of Human Rights Center (DHRC) for the 77th session of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,

available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c8622f72.html

Iran: What Would Real Democracy Look Like?

2010-07-27T23:55:00.000-07:00

Fakhteh Zamani's Speech in Italian Parliament

I would like to thank the UNPO and the Nonviolent Radical Party for organizing such a wonderful and needed conference. It has been my great pleasure and honor to listen to all the esteemed speakers—even those with whom I may not completely share the same views.

Our panel has been tasked with the tricky responsibility of sharing strategies for change and outlining the role of the international community in fostering democratic movements in Iran and its Diaspora. In this short address, I shall discuss the organization I represent, the challenges we face in the Iranian society, why the support of the international community is essential, and conclude with solutions for a better Iran.

As the founding president of the Canada-based Association for the Defence of the Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran, I represent Azerbaijani activists who have been marginalized and victimized solely on the basis of their ethnicity, language, and religion. Rising to the challenge, Azerbaijani activists have embraced the responsibility of defending not just Azerbaijani rights but of other unrepresented groups. Dr. Reza Baraheni, acclaimed political activist has passionately shared that “little is more traumatic than the suppression of one’s mother tongue.” I agree and also believe this is something all humans, not just Iranian minorities, can understand. Inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, our organization hopes to serve as a tool to create awareness regarding the exclusion of minorities, and become a catalyst for positive change in Iran. Thus the Association was born, out of a sociopolitical climate that refuses to recognize the violation of minority rights.

The suppression of minorities lies at the core of the Iranian government’s attempt to alienate their history and assimilate them into the dominant Persian culture. The effects of such tactics also limit these communities from developing economically, socially, and politically. This is not a recent development, but something that has its origins in the first Pahlavi era that started in 1925. The demand for cultural, linguistic, religious, and political rights is a legitimate right of all. Unfortunately, it is not a recognized right in Iran today. For example, in an attempt to demand these rights and seek democratic participation from the government, Azerbaijani Turks have organized peaceful protests similar to that of the “Green Movement” and have suffered violent reprisals from government and other groups. These efforts have largely remained unnoticed in the dominant Persian media. Moreover, bringing this to the attention of influential leaders and authorities is to risk being labeled a separatist, pan-Turk, foreign agent and traitor to the country. I, personally, have found this rather puzzling as Azerbaijanis largely seek equality and inclusion in the official fabric of Iranian affairs. So, my dear friends, you see that the challenge of unrepresented groups are twofold—hostility from the government through imprisonment, torture, or death; and from the opposition groups through indifference and suppression.

However, there is hope, and being a part of this conference inspires me as it offers the opportunity to rewrite negative narratives and forge a constructive path to an inclusive Iran. We need the help of our esteemed hosts and the international community in creating awareness of the challenges faced by unrepresented groups in Iran. We commend you for the incredible courage and support you have lent the “Green Movement” and request that the same type of support be given to other ethnic groups. For example, we do need the international media to cover such news worthy stories like the protest of May 2006, where, according to an Amnesty International estimate, thousands may have been arrested and scores killed. In this way the international community can be essential in acknowledging those excluded through racism and oppression.

I would also like to argue that the most sustainable role for the international community is to encourage a platform that addresses issues facing not only the Iranian government but the whole society with its ethnic linguistic and social injustice issues. Iran is a multicultural society where most than half the population belongs to a non-Persian ethnic. For a sustainable democracy, we need the international community to hold Iranian leaders accountable for the preservation and protection of minority rights. Much can and will be gained when a government seeks to take care of all its people.

Having mentioned the challenges within the Iranian society and highlighted the important role the international community can play, I will share what steps Iran and the stakeholder groups should undertake to bring about the change desperately needed.

A necessary step is that all must recognize and acknowledge the disregard for diversity, misrepresentation of non-Persian groups, and racist policies by the government and the larger society. This has created an economic and sociopolitical inequality in the country. Such an approach to unity or nationhood always produces disillusionment within minority groups against the dominant group thus giving way to conflict, and war—which is unsustainable for any state. It is similar to a virus that could destroy us from within. For real change, the Iranian society must fully embrace the diversity of the entire people. This means that as the movements in Iran fight for progress, we must discuss the diversity of needs that face our society. As stakeholders in this struggle, we must fight to work in tandem to discuss the issues that face each and every group in Iran and develop ways in which to address their needs.

The only movement or ideology that can produce significant change in the Iranian society, is the one which will acknowledge and grant full rights to all minorities—not just Azerbaijanis, but Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, Turkmens, and more—and fully commit to combating racist elements in our Iranian society. I believe this ideology and approach will be the critical element to fostering democracy and human rights in Iran.

The invaluable support of the international community will also offer a political bullhorn that places these human rights violations in the world’s consciousness, creating transparency and placing onus of responsibility on those perpetuating the marginalization of minorities.

As I conclude, allow me to leave you with a quote you all know so well: “injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.” This was argued by the iconic Martin Luther King jr. in his quest for civil rights of Black Americans. The injustice of minorities in Iran is truly a threat to all—Iranians and their friends in the international community—as true democracy will never be realized if we do not address these challenges on our way to progress.
Thank you for your kind attention.

http://www.unpo.org/images/2010_Iran_Conference/Speeches/speech_zamani.pdf

Movements for Democracy and Recent Obstacles: The Case of Iran

2010-07-27T23:28:00.000-07:00

Dr. Alireza Asgharzadeh

Speech at the Italian Parliament, Sponsored by UNPO, Rome, June 29, 2010

Ladies and Gentlemen!

Allow me to express my sincere gratitude and heartfelt thanks to all the organizers and sponsors of this important event, and also to each and everyone of you kind-hearted folks here. It is indeed an honour to be here today to discuss various issues facing Iran’s democratization processes.

I have been asked to briefly discuss the current state of democratic movements and tendencies in Iran vis-à-vis the Green Movement and to highlight some challenges as well as shortcomings of the Green Movement particularly in its relationship with other movements such as those of Iran’s non-Persian nationalities, women, workers, students, youth and so forth. Let me clarify from the outset that I speak to you as an Azeri-Turk who was born in Iran and lived there for 20 years, having gone through my primary education under the previous Pahlavi regime, and my secondary one under the current Islamic government. Since 1987 I have called Canada my home. As an academic, author, and human rights activist, I have been vigorously observing political and social developments in Iran particularly since the 1978 popular revolution.

In my recent book titled Iran and the Challenge of Diversity1 I have explored in greater detail major areas of exclusion and oppression in Iranian society and have highlighted their significance for resistance and their importance as potential sites of social movements. These include race/ethnicity, class, gender/sexuality, language, and religion, among others. Today I like to reemphasize the importance of these sites, to show their centrality for any viable major transformation in Iranian society, and also to underline some shortcoming and failures of the current Green Movement in properly acknowledging and integrating these sites of exclusion and resistance. I will start with the secularist movement.

Religion and Secularism
In current Iran the movement for secularism is one of the most important sites of resistance against the fundamentalism of the government in power. Secularism has become a site of resistance mainly as a reaction to Shi’ism and Khomeinism, a governing ideology that denies the individuals’ equal access to resources based on gender, ethnicity, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, and so forth. I like to emphasize that secularism in this context is not defined as anti-religionism but as having equal rights in practicing any religion, any form of spirituality, or no religion at all.

Secularism can provide a democratic space where difference and diversity are acknowledged as basic features of contemporary societies. For instance, it is only in a secular space that students of different religious backgrounds and spiritual persuasions can be provided a safe environment where they can feel comfortable about their religious identity and their spirituality. Understood this way, secularism cannot be interpreted as anti-religionism or atheism. Rather, it is a praxis which does not favour any particular religious belief over others. According to this perspective, not only all religious communities should enjoy equal access to resources, but also the non-believers and those believing in different forms of spirituality should be provided opportunities equal with those of the dominant religious group.

Obviously, such promotion should not entail a romanticized approach to secularism, as secularism, in and of itself, cannot be equated with democracy and progressivism. Iran under the Pahlavis, Iraq under Saddam, Egypt under Nasser, and Indonesia under Suharto, to name but a few, were clearly secular, but neither democratic nor progressive. 2

Secularism, thus, need not mean hostility to religion in all its manifestations. Crimes and atrocities of unimaginable proportion have been committed historically in the name of both religion and secularism. While religion has caused much suffering through such infamous disasters as the inquisition, the crusades, and various religiously motivated sectarianisms, conflicts, and fundamentalism, secularism is also associated with such experiences as Nazism, Stalinism, etc.. As such, care must be taken so that secularism is not romanticized as an ideal that always stands for democracy, human rights, peace and progressivism.

Evidently, there is a secularist movement in contemporary Iranian society. The perimeters of this movement are defined in terms of diversity, pluralism, social justice and equal access to resources. Why a person of Baha’i faith should be denied equal access to educational and occupational opportunities because of her/his religion? Why a socialist teacher or university professor should be dismissed from their job because of their worldviews? Why a Sunni Muslim or a Jewish student should not have equal access to educational resources, such as a place of worship, curricular and extracurricular activities that a Shia student enjoys? Why women and sexual minorities should be discriminated against based on their gender and sexual orientation?

It is in response to these and other similarly concrete questions that many Iranians are turning to secularism as a viable alternative to religious fundamentalism. Unfortunately, however, many of the spokespersons for the current Green Movement have failed to grasp these defining principles behind Iranians’ secular movement: i.e., the principles of diversity, equity, equality, social justice, and inclusivity. Influential individuals such as Dr Abdol-Karim Soroush and Ayatollah Mohsen Kadivar who are associated with the Green Movement have misguided and erroneous understanding of secularism. These individuals’ definition of secularism does not include issues of social justice, diversity, multiculturalism and human rights. As a result, many secularist individuals and groups are becoming increasingly disillusioned with the Green Movement and its leadership.

At the same time one must acknowledge that Iran’s secularist movement is not a singular, monolithic and unified entity but intersects with other markers of difference such as gender, race/ethnicity, language, age, and so forth.

Gender

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, gender is a most salient site of exclusion that has inevitably become a major site of resistance and empowerment. Shortly after the establishment of an Islamic government in Iran, the new rulers dismantled the ‘Family Protection Act;’ made veiling compulsory; reduced the minimum age for marriage from 18 to 13, and while maintaining polygamy, took away the automatic right for divorce of a wife on the grounds of her husband's remarriage. "The law of the four wives is a very progressive law," asserted Ayatollah Khomeini,

and was written for the good of women, since there are more women than men. More women are born than men and more men are killed in war than women. A woman needs a man, so what can we do, since there are more women than men in the world? Would you rather prefer that the excess number of women became whores, or that they married a man with other wives? 3

Based on the Islamic ‘Law of Qisas’ or the ‘Bill of Retribution,’ the dieh or 'blood-money' to be paid for a female victim of murder is only half of that paid for a male victim. Under this Bill, women's testimony in court is only half the value of men's testimony. Since Islamic law requires two women to testify for every one man, a woman can, therefore, not participate in the legal profession. Since a woman’s right to form judgment is not fully recognized, it is rarely possible for her to become a lawyer or a judge. Since a woman's testimony alone does not carry any legal weight, proof of any kind of abuse, mistreatment and crime against her is almost impossible (see for example Articles 5, 6, 33, 46, 91, and 92 in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Penal Code).

"The prisons of the Islamic regime," an Iranian writer has observed, are full of women who have been subjected to the most degrading and inhumane forms of torture. Rape is one of the commonest, yet horrific, forms of torture. The rape of virgin women before their execution is performed as a religious ritual in all Iranian jails, carried out in the belief that these women are not worthy of the divine place allocated to virgins by Islam and the prophet. 4

Thus, a review of the past thirty years of Islamic rule indicates the absolute deterioration of women's human, legal, economic and socio-political rights in Iran. The politics of sexual apartheid and forceful segregation have been vigorously implemented in all imaginable public places such as universities, schools, factories, beaches, restaurants, and even buses and trains. Those who have dared to challenge the rigid fundamentalist regulations have been subjected to torture chambers, secret dungeons, fire squads, hangings, and stonings.

Is it any wonder then, that we see women at the forefront of any progressive movement for gender equality, secularism, human rights and social justice? It is no secret that Iranian women have been staunch supporters of the current Green Movement. The spokespeople for the green Movement, however, have thus far failed to produce a transparent literature regarding the gross violations of the women’s rights in the Islamic republic and how such rights would be restored and respected should the Greens come to power. Similar to their lack of transparency regarding the secularist movement, their lack of transparency regarding gender inequality is alienating many progressive women from the Greens, in general, and their leadership in particular. Mr. Mir Hussein Mousavi, the presumed leader of the Green Movement, continues to cling to “charismatic leadership of Imam Khomeini” and a supposedly flawless, golden and just Khomeini era, failing to acknowledge that all of the violations of the rights of women took place in the golden era of “the Imam” and under his direct supervision.

Finally, we should also note that gender-based struggle intersects with other sites of oppression such as class, language, religion, and race/ethnicity. For instance, an Azerbaijani, Arab, Baluchi or a Kurdish woman does not experience oppression the same way as a Persian woman does. The non-Persian woman, in addition to being oppressed based on her gender, is also oppressed based on her language, culture and ethnic identity. While being victimized by a masculinist culture, the non-Persian woman has to additionally suffer the indignity of a banned language, a stigmatized ethnicity and a racialized community; whereas a Persian woman does not experience any form of language and ethnicity-based oppression.

Class
Similar to gender, class is another site of exclusion-and hence of resistance- in the Islamic republic. Since its inception, the Islamic Republic has functioned based on cronyism and favouritism where employment and occupational opportunities are offered to those within the inner circle of the regime and those showing extreme forms of ideological affinity with Shi’ism and Khomeinism. As a result, in today’s Iran a super rich class of regime’s core elements and devotees are juxtaposed against an increasingly disenfranchised and pauperized majority.

The widening gap between the rich and the poor is reinforced by an equally widening gap between the mainly Persian populated central regions of the country and the non-Persian margins—i.e., the regions of Baluchistan, Kurdistan, Turkmensahra, Azerbaijan and the Arab-populated areas of Kuzistan. Here, the intersections of class, poverty and regional inequality with race, ethnicity, language and religion are evident.

Based on various estimations, the Iranian unemployment rate has increased by 5.1 percent since last year and may rise up to 23 percent by the end of this year. The youth and newly graduated students are most affected by this trend, the unemployment among whom is estimated to be over 20 percent. Among the unemployed, the educated and highly educated women suffer from the highest rate of unemployment. It has been maintained that Iran has the highest unemployment rate in the Middle East, while being number 17 in the world. In the capital city of Tehran alone, it is estimated that there are 800,000 unemployed individuals.

Like many Third world countries, in Iran the government is the biggest employer. A large number of Iranian workers are employed by the government, working for the ministry of education, health care, agriculture industry, oil industry, the military as well as ideological/repressive organs such as the Revolutionary Guards Corps, Jihad for Reconstruction, the Basij militia organization, among others. This being the case, it is not difficult to see the almost impossibility of workers’ unionization, solidarity and progressive activism while employed by an ideological government. This, however, does not mean that the struggle for social and economic justice is absent among the workers; it is just highly disorganized and sporadic.

For the workers and government employees it is very difficult to mobilize and to forge solidarity. And this is where the Green Movement could have taken the initiative to champion the cause of working people and the issues of impoverished regions. The Greens, however, have failed to do this. As a result, they have not been able to tap into the resources and creative energies of this vast population—i.e., the underemployed, the unemployed, seasonal workers and internal migrant labourers, those who come in their millions from the impoverished non-Persian regions of the country to work in Persian populated areas of the center.

Clearly, any sensible analysis of class oppression and class struggle in Iranian society ought to take into account the intersections of class with race, ethnicity, language, and the place or region of birth. And this brings me to a brief discussion of ethnicity, race and language-based oppression in Iran.

Race/Ethnicity and Language

It is important to note that ethnic pluralism, difference and diversity have always been defining features of what is today called ‘Iran.’ Peoples of various ethnic origins, such as the ancestors of contemporary Azeri-Turks, Kurds, Baluchs, Turkmans, Arabs, Lurs, Gilaks, Mazandaranis, Persians and others have lived in Iran for centuries. The history of civilization in what is known today as Iran goes back over six-thousand years. The available archaeological/linguistic record indicates that from the very beginning the region was characterized with extreme forms of ethnic, linguistic, and cultural diversity.

Up until 1925, the country had been run in accordance with what one may call a traditional confederative system within which all ethnic groups enjoyed the freedom to use and develop their languages, customs, cultures, and identities. With the beginning of the Pahlavi regime in 1925, the natural trend of ethnic and linguistic plurality was abruptly stopped, and a process of monoculturalism and monolingualism started, which continues to date. The aim of this process has been to present the language, history, culture, and identity of the Persian minority as the only authentic language, history, culture, and identity of all Iranians. Needless to say, Western notions of Aryanism, Orientalism and the Orientalist historiography of the region have contributed immensely to this process of misrepresentation and epistemic violence.

Notwithstanding that Orientalist historiography has equated Iran with Persia and Iranian with Persian, no single ethnic group has ever constituted a definite numerical majority in the country; neither historically nor currently. The continuous practice of Persian nationalistic ideology has prevented a social-scientific conduct of a country-wide national census in which questions of nationality, ethnicity, and more importantly language, are addressed. In spite of being one of the most ethnically, culturally and linguistically diverse countries of the world, there are no academic departments in Iran’s universities and centers of higher learning to focus on ethnic/racial relations, multicultural studies, multi-lingualism and inter-cultural communications in the country. In fact, the former president Mohammad Khatami’s notion of ‘dialogue between civilizations’ has been repeatedly criticized by members of non-Persian communities, who have stated that, instead of initiating an international dialogue, Mr Khatami should have initiated a dialogue between and among Iran’s diverse ethnic groups.

Thus, masquerading under such generic terms as Iran, Iranian-ness and Iranian nationalism, the dominant Persian nationalistic ideology has openly divided the country into two camps: the Persians and the non-Persian Others. The result has indeed been catastrophic, with devastating ramifications for human rights, democracy, pluralism and diversity in the country.

Just a few months ago (on December 15, 2009) the Iranian minister of education, Mr. Hamidreza Haji-Babayi, revealed that 70% of Iranian students were bilingual. What this means is that Farsi/Persian is the natural mother tongue to only 30% of Iranian students. In other words, 70% of Iran’s population is non-Persian. Despite this fact, the Iranian government along with the majority of Persian intellectuals, scholars and even activists continue to disregard the country’s rich ethnic, racial and linguistic diversity. This total disregard to diversity, unfortunately, applies to the Green Movement as well. Except for some lip service on “respect for different tribes and ethnicities,” the discourse of the Greens contains no sensible mention of Iran’s multi-national, multi-cultural and multi-lingual character. Is it any wonder then, that the major non-Persian nationalities of the country have accompanied the Greens with a deafening silence? And why shouldn’t they? Why should an Azeri-Turk, a Kurd, a Turkmen, a Baluch or an Ahwazi Arab sacrifice his/her life so that one exclusionary and racist leadership, or regime for that matter, is replaced by another? If the Green Movement cannot transparently discuss such vital issues as federalism, multiculturalism and multilingualism now, what guarantees are there that they will do so after coming to power?

Four General Areas of Oppression

In order to provide a fuller picture of various social movements and sites of resistance in Iran, it is necessary to have a fuller picture of social inequality in Iranian society. To this end, I like to underline four general areas of oppression that are central to any progressive analysis of human rights and social justice in an Iranian context: 1) class and gender-based oppression; 2) race/ethnicity/culture/religion and language-based oppression; 3) oppression based on sexual orientation, dis/ability, age, body-size and other markers of difference; 4) the matrix of domination and interlocking nature of systems of oppressions.. Understandably, each of these categories constitutes vast areas of knowledge, and lumping them together in this fashion may not seem appropriate. However, it is important to note that my purpose here is not to provide an ontological analysis pertaining to the nature and functioning of each category such as class or gender. My aim here is to show how and why these categories are taken up, or discarded as the case may be, in the dominant literature on social inequality in Iran, including the discourse of the Green Movement.

Seen this way, it makes a good sense to put class and gender together in that a discursive exploration of these sites of oppression does not pose what is perceived to be a danger to ‘Iran’s national security’ or ‘territorial integrity,’-- the two important conceptual yardsticks employed by ‘Persian nationalism’ in regulating the discourse on social justice and human rights in Iran.

Notwithstanding that the progressive and internationalist left in general has had its fair share of treatment to labelling such as ‘traitors’ and ‘foreigners,’ explorations of class exploitation and class based oppression have become much more relaxed and less risky in recent years, particularly after the cold war period. Class and gender, while constituting two significant sites of oppression and exclusion in contemporary Iran, are not seen as antagonistic to the practice of ‘Persian nationalism’ which has been at work in Iran since the early 1920s. The nationalist methodology guiding social-scientific analyses of Iran’s dominant intelligentsia and intellectuals does not view discussions of class and gender as fundamental challenges to imaginary constructs of ‘nation,’ homeland,’ the nation-state and its boundaries; whereas any discussion of Iran’s diverse nationalities and ethnic/cultural/linguistic communities are immediately perceived to be extremely risky to the nation-state and hence inappropriate, unnecessary and taboo topics of exploration.

Whereas class and gender-based oppression has received considerable attention particularly in recent years, oppression based on race/ethnicity and language not only has not received the deserved attention but still remains a taboo subject for many human rights activists, intellectuals and scholars. Despite the growing social and political activism on the part of ethnic/linguistic communities throughout Iran, the dominant literature continues to label the human rights activists of these communities as traitors, aliens, agents of Israel, the United States, and other foreign countries.

Meanwhile, exclusion and oppression based on sexual orientation, age, ability/disability and body-size are hardly (if ever) mentioned in literature on Iranian human rights issues. Perhaps, a main reason for this oversight could be in the ambivalence and mystification with which the body has been associated in traditional, conventional and dominant Iranian discourse. This dominant discourse has never been able to identify and articulate the body as the ultimate site not only of violations but also of rights and freedoms. In a sense, the current methodological nationalism has shifted the focus from the body and its ultimate rights to the nation-state and its nationalist discourse in such a way that any discussion of human rights has become conditional to issues around ‘national security and territorial integrity,’ the two essential principles whose perimeters are always defined by the dominant intelligentsia .

Thus, the discourse of disability and its connection with human rights has never entered the lexicon of rights and freedoms in Iran. While there is at least a hundred-year history behind the shifting and changing nature of disability in North American and European contexts, disability in Iran is still used as a main source for stand-up comedians, satirical genre and entertainment of all sorts. A glaring case in point is the extremely popular comical episodes of “Samad Agha,” whose producer, Parviz sayyad, in an interview revealed that the entire show was based on “a young man in our neighbourhood with mental and physical disabilities.”

There has been a change of sorts in recent years regarding the topic of disability and the disabled in general, particularly since the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. The disabled veterans of the eight-year war with Iraq are held in highest of esteems and are regarded as ‘the living martyrs.’ This reverence for the veterans, however, does not originate from a modern understanding of the rights of the disabled. It is deeply rooted in nationalistic ideology and defined through methodological nationalism. Treatment of the war veterans with esteem and reverence does not translate into an articulation of disability within relations of power and domination. In fact, such treatment has created a hierarchy within the disabled community. As always, missing from this discourse are the voices of the disabled to articulate their own condition and to challenge notions of normalcy, ableism, and the power-knowledge nexus.

Regarding issues around sexuality and trans-sexuality, the Islamic government allocates funding for medical/surgical expenses of transgendered individuals whishing to undergo sex-change. This act of presumed generosity, however, is not out of respect for individuals’ sexual rights and preferences. Quite to the contrary, this funding is provided to ‘cure’ the presumed ‘abnormalities,’ ‘malfunctioning,’ and ‘disease’ of certain bodies deemed curable by those in positions of power and privilege. Here too, missing are the voices of gays, lesbians, bisexual, transgendered and queer individuals and their respective communities to articulate their human rights vis-à-vis the dominant order of heteronormativity.

From physical and mental torture to various disciplinary measures, the Islamic regime exercises all forms of coercive mechanisms to police and discipline the body. It uses the body as the ultimate site of its violations. A clear manifestation of this is in the way the government defines even the size and shape of stones to be used in the punishment of stoning to death. According to Article 104 of the Islamic Republic’s Penal Code: “In stoning to death, the stones should not be so large that the person dies upon being hit by one or two of them, neither should they be so small that they cannot be called stone.” A peculiar characteristic of this kind of punishment is the extreme cruelty aiming to inflict maximum pain on the victim’s body. This kind of physical disciplining is coupled with other forms of normalizing mechanisms whose primary task is to shape the individual into what the government refers to as ‘the ideal Islamic person.’

In the Islamic Republic of Iran then, it is always the body which is the ultimate site of violations, exclusions and denials. It is the body which is denied access to resources, to rights and freedoms. When it comes to issues around sexuality, it is the sexual rights and desires of the body that are violated; when it comes to gender-based oppression, it is the body that is socially constructed and defined as gendered within relations of power and domination. And when it comes to language-based oppression, it is the language, the tongue and the means of communication of the body which is banned, mutilated and violated.

The body, however, is not an abstraction; it is not devoid of a communal dimension and social existence; nor does it exist in vacuum and outside of society. It is subject to relations of power that characterize all social formations. The body, as the ultimate site of violations, cannot be studied outside a social context, outside relations of power and domination, i.e., a host of relationships which are multi-dimensional in nature with multiple bases of origination and methods of functioning. This demands a holistic approach to understanding violations against the body, the rights of the body, and the rights of humans—human rights. It also demands an understanding of what is referred to as ‘matrix of domination.’

Matrix of domination is an approach that takes into full account issues around transsectionality, intersectionality, and the interlocking nature of systems of oppression. These systems include sites such as race/ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, language, religion, geography, citizenship, and so forth. It is then imperative to acknowledge the intersecting and interlocking nature of systems of oppression to which the body maybe subjected. I take the position that issues around human rights can be understood more richly and comprehensively by highlighting the matrix of domination and by centering the standpoints of the marginalized and the subaltern.

Regrettably, this kind of holistic approach is missing from the analyses of many Iranian scholars and intellectuals. They study the phenomenon of class detached from race/ethnicity and gender; and they analyze gender without at the same discussing how gender can be raced and classed. Clearly a lack of attention to intersecting and interlocking nature of systems of oppression is a major shortcoming in the current discourse on social justice and various social movements. If we understand the need and necessity for solidarity, we should also understand the importance of addressing diversity not only of ethnicities and languages, but also of oppressions, marginalizations and exclusions—and of how these are linked to one another.

Conclusion
Like any other environment plagued by methodological nationalism and, to use Spivak’s terminology, “national-fascism,’ in an Iranian context the need for free expression, dialogue and multi-logue cannot be overemphasized. As such, I like to conclude this speech by highlighting the importance of the need for an open and transparent conversation: One which is not afraid of speaking truth to power; which boldly interrogates antiquated and degenerative notions of ‘Aryan race,’ monolingualism, monoculturalism, heteronormativity, racism, abelism, sexism and homophobia. This requires a crossing of boundaries, not only of race, gender, class and sexuality, but also of ways of thinking and acting. This conversation should aim to replace nationalist/fascistic methodologies with contemporary understandings of human rights and freedoms. As social scientists, intellectuals, researchers and activists, we need to utilize the insights of a host of contemporary theories, methods and conceptual tools that the world is now using: anticolonial theory, postcoloniality, subalternity, critical pedagogy, studies in Orientalism, gay/lesbian/queer studies, critical disability studies, feminism and feminist theory, anti-racism discourse and praxis, theories of multicultural, multilingual, and inclusive education, critical white studies and notions of white privilege, among others. Needless to say, Iranian Diaspora and diasporic intellectuals can and should take the lead in generating this conversation and bringing it to the attention of larger and broader audiences.

Notes

Asgharzadeh, A. (2007). Iran and the Challenge of Diversity: Aryanist Racism, Islamic
Fundamentalism, and Democratic Struggles. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
See also: Asgharzadeh, A. (2008). “Secular Humanism and Education: Reimagining Democratic Possibilities in a Middle Eastern Context.” In Carr, P.R. and D.E. Lund (Eds.). Doing Democracy: Striving for Political Literacy and Social Justice. (pp. 177-194). New York: Peter Lang.
Sanasarian, E. (1983). The Women's rights movement in Iran: Mutiny, appeasement,
and repression from 1900 to Khomeini (p. 134). New York: Prager Publishers.
Hendessi, M. (1990). Armed angels: Women in Iran (p.16). London: Zed Books.

WHY DO I CARE ABOUT SOUTH AZERBAIJANIS

2010-07-27T23:21:00.000-07:00

Khadija Ismayilova

I was looking for something in my old emails and found this letter. I wrote this within a discussion in one yahoogroup. I had an argument with one person who questioned legitimacy of the South Azerbaijan Issue – she had questions if this is what they – South Azerbaijanis want? If they are really underrepresented in Iranian society, do they want schools in their language, do we help or hurt by speaking out these issues. etc.

Here is my answer.

I try to be very careful with presenting the idea of South Azerbaijani's national identity, as northern Azerbaijani.

However, my own experience helped me a lot to understand their problems.

I don’t know if you lived in Soviet Azerbaijan. I did. I was a child and when my parents were discussing which school I should go - Russian or Azerbaijani, I asked a question: Why my brother goes to the Russian school. My dad's answer was: "it will be very difficult for him to achieve a success in career if he will have Azerbaijani education".

Apparently my parents did not see any need for career growth of girls in the family so all my sisters and me were given to Azeri school.

However in Azerbaijan SSR we had a certain degree of choice. Do Iranian Azerbaijanis have this?
When I first met a person speaking about Azerbaijani's rights in Iran , my questions were very similar to yours. Do the majority care and why they just can not simply have Persian education? Why those Azerbaijanis represented in higher levels of society are happy with system and these "extremists" are not.

ELITES

I was in Iran then. It was 1992 and I saw families suffering from identity crisis. Parents were trying to speak to their children in Farsi, because children from Azerbaijani families had difficulties in school. humiliated for their accent, they could not be as successful as their Persian mates in literature, history. All my relatives were "A" students in math and physics.

So I turned back to the discussion in my family and got the whole idea.
You have to switch your identity to become successful in Iran .
That is what those in elite did.

Psychology of elites by Boal (if I am not mistaken) says that elites can not represent the nation because they lost their strings with it. As simple as that. Moreover, their success in career becomes a source for frustration in masses. They stop seeing the root of the problem; they think that they are losers. Namely the assimilated elite with switched identity is a source of frustration, because masses blame themselves in being losers. (We were not able to switch our identity, so our kid will not be lawyer or politician, engineering will be the best scenario)

MORE THAN ONE PROSPECTIVE

Again I remember discussion between me and my Russian educated cousins about national identity in Azerbaijan back in 1989. They used to start with epithets like "extremists", "nationalists" etc and end up with concerns, so what they are going to do with their Russian education in Azerbaijani Azerbaijan?

So as I understand, that is what makes elites to be resistant to the idea of preserving identity. That is why some assimilated Azerbaijani Turks in Iran say they don't care. and now we come to your question: whether they could be considered as representatives and why and if the other prospective should not be considered as more or even equally representative.

My understanding of human rights says the language and identity is something that comes with your family, but is a matter of choice. And my question is: whether this choice is given?

FREEDOM OF CHOICE

I think that the freedom of choice is limited if:
there are more opportunities for dominant language speakers like in Soviet Azerbaijan
and off course there is no freedom of choice if:
* there are no schools in Azerbaijani like in Iran
* people teaching Azerbaijani in their houses, reading Azerbaijani books are jailed (I have examined court documents and can prove this)
* people are sentenced for panturkism (while panturkism as a crime is not defined in the Criminal Code of IRI)
* people get extra prison term for refusing to speak Farsi in the court (while according to law he has to be provided with translator)
etc.

HOW MANY?

How many people do care about identity? Good question.
Let's go back to 1945-46 or as late as May 2006. Even after major crackdown in May 2006 intimidated and harassed Azerbaijanis do not give up.
February 22 after the large wave of arrests in all Azerbaijani cities, there was a rally in Tebriz and guess what they were demanding? Schools in Azerbaijani. The main slogan was:
"Turk dilinde medrese olmalidir her kese".
I have seen those videos and let me say numbers are impressive and I have no doubt saying that these people have more rights to be considered as representatives of nation than handful of those who do not even call themselves Azerbaijanis (turks)and represent Iranian elite with its fascism-smelling Aryanism.

Pan Iranian nationalism has become a state policy starting from 1925 when Pehlevis put the end to a thousand years long Turkic dominance in this area.

PRISONS FOR IDENTITY FIGHTERS

Imposing an identity is not an easy job, and Iranian government deals with this uneasy task.
All Azerbaijani classes in schools, opened after Shariatmadari revolt, were closed.
Journalist from Iran - Human Rights Watch award winner Insafali Hedayat says there are 35 official and twice more unofficial prisons in Azerbaijani cities of Iran.

Hedayat is federalist. His career language is Farsi. He says unofficial prisons are for politicals, most of whom are identity demanders.

There are some newspapers and even TV and radios, opponents argue. Yes there are. Because you can not impose your Aryanism and anti-Azerbaijani ideas in the language that MAJORITY in Azerbaijani regions (especially in rural areas) do not speak.

I was involved in one frequency mapping project and was a witness of the fact that all transmitters of Sahar TV with its anti-Azerbaijani propaganda are tuned for airing in Azerbaijan Republic . And off course, the criticism of Azerbaijani government is aimed at convincing Azerbaijanis that independence did not serve to the best of Northern brothers.
Newspapers in Azerbaijani are using words "Northern Iran " when they write about Azerbaijan Republic .

AND THEN IT GOES BACK…

One of my Persian colleagues was unhappy with "panturkists/nationalists" in Iranian Azerbaijan. "I went to Tabriz and they did not speak to me in Persian" he said. "If they will have schools in Azerbaijani they will not study Persian at all", he said.
Poor guy, he could not buy food in Tabriz market.

Well, I felt sorry for the guy. But Tabriz merchants did to him what the governments of Iran have been doing to them since 1925. The government has deprived them of choice, so merchants in Tabriz did to the guy.

IF THEY WOULD HAVE CHOICE

But what if they would have choice?
may be as in my family, they would have girls studying in Azerbaijani and boys in Persian?
May be they would have chosen to study in any other language: Kurdish, English, Russian, French, Amharic?

But that would be their choice and I strongly believe that loyalty to any language is strictly directed by market rules. If there is more information available in Persian, I am sure, that Azerbaijanis will learn Persian, may be not as the first language but the second one. That is what the freedom of choice is about. And those who are under arrest in Iran or harassed for their cultural rights activity want this freedom of choice.

WHO ARE THE ADVOCATES?

Speaking of "who advocates for what":

First of all I did not understand the confusion of terms Azeri - Northern Azeri and South Azeri in your message. To my opinion no matter North or South, Azeris are Azeris and they do care about each other's problems. North Azerbaijanis care about cultural rights of Southern Azerbaijanis and Southern Azerbaijanis care about Karabakh.)

I am in contact with Iranian Azerbaijanis every day because I write about their rights. I do it because I do care. I do it because I understand. I do it because I am journalist and they are part of my audience.
I do care not only because I am Azerbaijani. When I speak about it to my American colleagues, they care too.

TOO MANY TO BE EXCEPTIONS

I was lucky to open my eyes to the problem and look for where the roots are. I was able to understand, because I am one of them. I was able to understand because we in the North have passed through this.

I was lucky to meet dozens of people who were able to explain me their personal tragedies, laying out the overall picture of cultural oppression.

I am not one of those who like to speak about victimization of nation. I concentrate on human stories, but there are too many of them.

I would not call it cultural genocide because this word irritates me. But I am definitely able to see the trends and this looks like chauvinism big time.

Sorry for this long answer, just thought that I need to write it

Iran's A Multi-Cultural and Multi-Ethnic Society

2010-07-02T19:51:00.000-07:00

Iran is a multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual country. Persians (Farsis), Azerbaijanis (Azerbaijani Turks), Kurds, Arabs, Loris, Beluchies and Turkomans have lived in Iran for thousands of years. Until the 1920s, they all retained and promoted their unique culture, history and language, without harming each other's identities. However, the inception of the Pahlavi dynasty's supremacist policy in the 20s has endangered this semi-harmonious way of life.

With his alleged national unity policy, Reza Shah Pahlavi designed a plan, forcing all non-Persians to sacrifice their ethnic identity and language, in order to fulfill his vision of purely Persian Iran. Unfortunately, his successors, including the Islamic Republic, followed and perfected his inhumane conduct. Subsequent results have been brutal against all persons not of Persian descent. Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Loris, Beluchis, Arabs and Turkomans have been under tremendous Persianization. Iran's reformist leader, President Khatami, deceived the global community with his talk of "dialogue between civilizations," meanwhile suppressing the people of Iran by ignoring Human Rights in general and Azerbaijani Turks in particular. However the reaction of World Human Rights’ organizations to this assimilation and rather cultural genocide has been very slow and ineffective due to lack of objective information from South Azerbaijan (Iran).

More than 25 million Azerbaijanis are on the verge of losing their language and rich cultural heritage, which they have preserved for thousands of years. They are paying heavy tolls to obtain Iran's purported "national unity." This “national unity” with “Islamic” and fanatically supported theocratic government is determined to annihilate Azerbaijani national and ethnic identity, the Iranian government has participated in forced assimilation and other methods of Persianization to create a monolingual "national unity." We would like to briefly highlight some of them:

Policy on Language

The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran in the article 15 claims: "The state and common language and script of Iran is Persian. Documents. Correspondence, official texts and text books shall be in this language and script. However, the use of local and ethnic language in the press and for the mass media and the teaching of their literature shall be allowed, besides the Persian language."

The Constitution Revolution in 1905-1911, the Democratic movement in 1945-46 and subsequent agreement by the Iranian government to guarantee ethnic rights as well as the constitution of Islamic Republic have for some degree taken ethnic grievances into consideration. However, the Iranian governments have all been against honoring their promises and the constitution.

The Iranian government has banned the Azerbaijani Turkish language in schools. Education is available only in the Persian language. Many first grade school children struggle to understand school books written in Persian. Those children unaccustomed to Persian suffer high drop out rates. To prevent this, some parents teach their children Persian as their primary language, rather than their native Azerbaijani Turkish. Said Persian instruction usually comes at the expense of children's mastery of Azerbaijani Turkish, thus children are encouraged to replace Persian with their mother tongue for social and job advancement.

Television and radio broadcasts help to propagate the hybridized Azerbaijani Turkish, considered a local language. So-called "local languages," however, are rarely used and thus marginalized, with Persian predominating Iranian media. Azerbaijani Turkish ,in fact, has no place Islamic Republic’s midia.

Discrimination operates in other ways, as well. In cities like Tabriz, where Azerbaijanis comprise more than 99% of the population, the judiciary and government systems still must operate solely in Persian. Incredulously, proceedings for a lawsuit comprised of a Azerbaijani plaintiff and an Azerbaijani defendant in a Azerbaijani city, with an Azerbaijani judge, prosecutor and defense lawyer, must be conducted in, not Azerbaijani Turkish, but Persian.

The Iranian government's destruction of language is one part of the multi-pronged attack to eliminate Azerbaijani ethnic identity. If this policy persists, Azerbaijani identity is doomed to perish.

Policy on History

Azerbaijani Turks have been living in the Iranian plateau for thousands of years. Their history dates back to 5,000.BC . Their contributions to humanity include the creation of peaceful civilizations and the invention of the first alphabet, cuneiform, and written laws. Persian tribes migrated to the southeast and central Iranian lateau some 2700 years ago. Before Persian entry existed the Sumerian, Ilamaite, Assyrian and Mead civilizations, among others. Their histories should not be excluded from Iranian history lessons in schools, but, as it is, Iranian schoolchildren are taught to believe the birth of the Iranian people comes with the arrival of the Persian tribes. This revisionist history alleges that Azerbaijanis were actually Iranian Aryans forced to change their language, upon the arrival and subsequent rule of the Mongolians 800 years ago. Stemming from this distorted history is the argument that Azerbaijanis should forget their language, that is, the language of foreign invaders, and accept Persian as their true and original language. Moving Westward, Mongolians first had to conquer predominantly Persian areas, before occupying Azerbaijan. Mongolians had no impetus or wherewithal to arbitrate which portion of the Iranian plateau's inhabitants should accept their language and which portions should be left untouched.

Contrary to the claims of the Persianization policymakers, Azerbaijanis, like the Persians, Arabs and Kurds, had their own distinct language, culture and governing bodies well before the arrival of the Mongolians. Iranian children's history books should reflect all ethnic groups' historical roots, rather than the Persian-only revisionism. Policymakers bend history to create the allusion of inclusiveness to fool Azerbaijanis into thinking they are a people without history.

Policy on Historical Monuments and Geographical Toponyms

The Iranian government has attempted to destroy monuments not serving their assimilation policy or has left them to be destroyed naturally. Furthermore, they have changed or distorted geographical names, in efforts to eliminate Azerbaijani Turkish names in Azerbaijan. Iran has not tried to preserve any historical monuments, deliberately destroying some. Recently, the Iranian government bulldozed a vast expanse of the 700-year-old Erk Castle in Tabriz, leaving on the central grounds in tact. Bulldozing was said to make room for Friday prayers.

In further attempts to erase Azerbaijani culture, the Iranian government has repeatedly fractured Azerbaijan into increasingly smaller administrative territories and eliminated the name "Azerbaijan" from most of the aforementioned areas. Over the last 60 years, parts of Azerbaijan have been divided into five Azerbaijani-controlled areas, with some outlying areas partitioned to other non-Azerbaijani governingbodies. Portions of the once-Azerbaijani territory have since been redistricted into the provinces of Gilan, Merkezi Tehran, Qazvin and Kurdistan. Of the five Azerbaijani-controlled regions, three, Zanjan, Hamadan and Ardabil, no longer retain the name Azerbaijan.

Within these provinces, names of geographical sites and cities have been altered, translated into Persian or reassigned derogatory names. In either case, actions have been made to remove all original Azerbaijani meaning and historical references.

Sample of Names translated to Persian

A river formerly known as Aji Chay is now known as Telkhiyye Rood
A river formerly known as Qara Su is now known as Siyah Rood
A region formerly known as Qara Dagh is now known as Siyah Kooh or
Arasbaran
A mountain Formerly known as Goy Dagh is now known as Kuh Sabz
A district formerly known as Devechi in now known as Shotorban
A city formerly known as Qoshachay is now known as Mianduab

Sample of Names Misrepresented (to make it look as if it is Persian)

A mountain formerly known as Savalan is now known as Sebelan
A region formerly known as Serderi is now known as Serdrud
A district formerly known as Yam is now known as Peyam
A mineral Fountain formerly known as Erkoyun is now known as Erkevan

Sample of Some Assigned Derogatory Names

An area formerly known as Akhma Qaya is now known as Ahmeghiyyeh
"Akhma Qya" in Azerbaijani Turkish means "giant rocks on the move" while "Ahmeghiyyeh" in Persian refers to "stupidity, land of stupid people"

An area formerly known as Sari Qaya is now known as Sareghiyyeh
Sari Qaya in Azerbaijani means "Yellow Ston or Yellow Rock" while "Sareghiyyeh" in Persian refers to a "place of thieves and robbers"

Sample of Names simply replaced

A city formerly known as Savuc Bulaq is now known as Mehabad
A city formerly known as Sulduz is now known as Neghedeh
A town formerly known as Tufarqan is now known as Azer Shehr

Policy on Economy and Migration

In comparison to Persian areas, Azerbaijani-inhabited regions have been purposely underdeveloped. Most heavy industry is concentrated in central Iran, chiefly occupied by Persians. The government has fostered a better climate for investment in central Iran. Most Azerbaijani businessmen flee to central Iran, seeking better returns on their investments. In turn, Azerbaijanis in increasing numbers relocate to central Iran to find work. Having migrated to primarily Persian areas, Azerbaijanis appropriate Persian language and culture. Already, more than ten million Azerbaijanis live in central Iran, with most unable to speak Azerbaijani Turkish. The Iranian government uses the economic situation to promote its agenda of Persianization.

Policy on Original Azerbaijani names

The Iranian government Prevents Azerbaijani parents from naming their newborns with meaningful Azerbaijani names. Said parents are often asked to translate their favorite Azerbaijani names into Persian . Difficult to translate names are asked to be replaced with a "common Iranian name" Birth certificates are given to infants with a government approved name only.

Sample Azerbaijani names that must be translated before issued a birth certificate

Aynaz (Azerbaijani) to Mehnaz (Persian)
Gozel (Azerbaijani) to Ziba (Persian)
Deniz (Azerbaijani) to Derya (Persian)
Azerbaijani names such as, Sevda, Sevgi, Aygun, Altan, Turkan, Yashil,
Gungor, Tomriz, Sevil, Chichek, Qaflan, .. are not allowed while all
last names have been Persianized.

Political Parties and Associations

Every attempt in rallying against injustices towards ethnic rights have been denied. All political parties and associations must be nationwide, approved and licensed by the government. Political associations concentrating on ethnic issues are shut down immediately. Groups or individuals defending ethnic rights are arrested and either charged with "spying for foreign countries" and executed or imprisoned and tortured. Parliamentary representations are under strict scrutiny. Any candidate campaigning on human and ethnic rights is disqualified and arrested immediately. Numerous petitions to Iranian authorities by Azerbaijanis( i.e. academicians, university students and journalists) to lift the ban on Azerbaijani language have been ignored.

Conclusion

Iran is a multiethnic, multi-culture and multilingual country and signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted and proclaimed by United Nations General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) December 10, 1948. Iranian governments have been engaged in destruction of ethnic identities and forced assimilation of more than 30 million Azerbaijani Turks. While most articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including articles, 1, 2, 19, 20-1, 21-3, 26,3, 27-1, have continuously been violated by Iranian governments, the victimized Azerbaijanis are looking for help from the same universal body, the United Nations, that adopted and proclaimed these resolutions.

On December 18, 1992, The UN General Assembly (A/RES/47/135) reaffirms that on of the main purposes of the United Nations, "Declaration on the Rights of the Persons Belonging to the National or Ethnic, Religion and Linguistic Minorities," as proclaimed in the charter of the United Nations, is to achieve international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. Article 1, 2 and 4 of said resolution declares:

Article 1

1. States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity.

2. States shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those ends.

Article 2

1. Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic
minorities (hereinafter referred to as persons belonging to minorities) have the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference or any
form of discrimination.

2. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life.

3. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effectively in decisions on the national and, where appropriate, regional level concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live, in a manner not incompatible with national legislation.

4. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to establish and maintain their own associations.

5. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to establish and maintain, without any discrimination, free and peaceful contacts with other members of their group and with persons belonging to other minorities, as well as contacts across frontiers with citizens of other States to whom they are related by national or
ethnic, religious or linguistic ties.

Article 4.4

4. States should, where appropriate, take measures in the field of education, in order to encourage knowledge of the history, traditions, language and culture of the minorities existing within their territory. Persons belonging to minorities should have adequate opportunities to gain knowledge of the society as a whole.

ADAPP's Press Release: CRNI AWARDS IRANIAN HATE CARTOON

2010-06-28T17:11:00.000-07:00

CARTOONISTS RIGHTS NETWORK INTERNATIONAL AWARDS THE HATRED PROPAGANDA BY THE IRANIAN REGIME

We at ADAPP are deeply disappointed and saddened by CRNI’s decision to present the 2010 Award for Courage in Editorial Cartooning to Mana Neyestani’s 2006 cartoon that promotes hatred-propaganda and dehumanizes Azerbaijani-Turks in Iran.

ADAPP has consistently stated that “in Iran, it does not require much courage to insult and humiliate minorities! Millions of minorities in Iran are denied their basic rights and…depicted as inferior by the state-sponsored propaganda. The real act of courage would be demanding the government to provide basic language and cultural rights to the Iranian ethnic minorities...” This so-called “award of courage” comes at a time when Azerbaijanis in Iran are heavily engaged in an anti-racist struggle for restoration of its human rights and dignity.

“Cockroaches are not sexy,” remarked CRNI board member Nikahang Kowsar, who accepted the award for Neyestani. ADAPP agrees, but notes that such allowances have instigated atrocities world over. In February 2006, Hamshahri, an Iranian State-owned newspaper, announced the International Holocaust Cartoon Contest—making a mockery of a horrific episode in our human history. Months later, May 2006, another State-owned newspaper, Iran-Daily, published a cartoon depicting Azerbaijanis as cockroaches—same language used by Rwandan Genocidaires. Finally, in August 2006 the world witnessed a culmination of incendiary actions with the aforementioned Holocaust Contest. ADAPP wants the international community to understand that Neyestani’s “cockroaches” cartoon is an existing literature of racism and hatred serving to reinforce the victimization and marginalization of Azerbaijanis in Iran. It is in the same vein of activities pre-Holocaust and Rwandan genocides that led to millions of deaths. In response to the cartoon, hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis peacefully condemned Neyestani’s employer, Islamic Republic News Agency, in street demonstrations. Unfortunately, government response was violent, killing and wounding several, while arresting hundreds. In a weak attempt to quell the growing disapproval of said cartoon, they jailed Neyestani.

Acknowledging respect for freedom of speech, ADAPP questions if CRNI understands the gravity of honoring such a cartoon. ADAPP questions what CRNI—with its supporting organizations, Open Society and UNESCO—is honoring. Kowsar’s remarks are an attempt to downplay a grievous issue plaguing the Iranian society.

In awarding Neyestani this award, CRNI clearly contradicts its goal “that someone with a pen and a piece of paper can level the playing field for disenfranchised or bullied.” This award emboldens hate-literature users to marginalize vulnerable groups as “subhumans.”

Contact Information:
Association for the Defence of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran (ADAPP)
Fakhteh Zamani
Executive Director
Vancouver, Canada

For further information, please contact: info.adapp@gmail.com

ADAPP's Letter: CRNI AWARDS IRANIAN HATE CARTOON

2010-06-28T17:05:00.000-07:00

Dr. Robert Russell
Executive Director
Cartoonists Rights Network International

RE: CARTOONISTS RIGHTS NETWORK INTERNATIONAL AWARDS THE HATRED PROPAGANDA BY THE IRANIAN REGIME

Dear Dr. Russell,

Like millions of other Azerbaijanis throughout the world, we were shocked to learn of your organization’s decision to award Mr. Mana Neyestani for his racist and degrading work against Azerbaijani-Turks in Iran. Your so-called “award of courage” for Neyestani comes at a time when our community is heavily engaged in an anti-racist struggle for restoration of its human rights and dignity. According to ADAPP, this CRNI award endorses and supports the hatred propaganda promulgated by the Iranian regime towards millions of Iranian minorities.

In February 2006, Hamshahri, an Iranian State-owned newspaper, announced the International Holocaust Cartoon Contest—making a mockery of a horrific episode in our human history. Months later, May 2006, another State-owned newspaper, Iran-Daily, published a cartoon depicting Azerbaijanis as cockroaches—same language used by Rwandan Genocidaires. The cartoon encouraged Iranian children to use violence against ‘cockroaches’ [Azerbaijanis] and exterminate them as they cannot speak ‘human’ [Farsi] language. Remember this was the same tactic used by the Hitler’s Nazi regime. As the largest minority group in Iran, Azerbaijanis have been discriminated against based on their ethnicity, language, and culture for many decades and portrayed as inferior by a propaganda often organized and supported by the ruling Iranian regimes.

Finally, in August 2006 the world witnessed a culmination of incendiary actions with aforementioned Holocaust Contest. ADAPP wants the international community to understand that Neyestani’s “cockroaches” cartoon is rooted in an existing literature of racism and hatred. It serves to dehumanize Azerbaijanis, insult their identity, wound their dignity and further segregate them—a popular tactic used by many other authoritarian regimes over the human history to discriminate, ethnically cleanse, and even eradiate certain ethnicities, groups and communities. In response to this cartoon, hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis took to the streets, peacefully, condemning the government-run newspaper’s racist publication. However, government forces fired on peaceful demonstrators. Amnesty International documents that "hundreds, if not thousands, were arrested and scores reportedly killed by the security forces” as a result.

You may not be aware, Dr. Russell, but the Iranian regime has total control over the media. ADAPP knows that publicizing a two-page cartoon in the state-run newspaper against one of the most disadvantaged groups in society was not, and cannot, be considered an act of heroism. ADAPP has consistently made clear that “representatives of the dominant Persian culture, especially a state run newspaper in Iran...[do] not require much courage to insult and humiliate minorities! Millions of minorities in Iran are denied their basic rights and are being depicted as inferior by the state sponsored propaganda. The real act of courage would be demanding the government to provide basic language and cultural rights to the Iranian ethnic minorities, granted by the constitution of the country.” Being a representative of the dominant Persian group, your fellow board member, Nikahang Kowsar understands this reference. ADAPP seeks only to promote injustice and this award is such.

By presenting the award for courage to Mana Neyestani for publishing the aforementioned cartoon, CRNI severely undermines efforts by the international community, human rights, and civil society organizations to promote the rights of minorities in Iran. Your organization also empowers those who misuse freedom of speech to promote racism, ethnic hatred, and intolerance. There is no doubt that this award will serve to embolden those who use hate literature to stigmatize and marginalize, rendering helpless groups and communities as “subhumans.”

ADAPP does support freedom of expression, however, dissemination of hate literature, and promotion of racism against vulnerable members of (any) society is not in line with principles of free speech. The United States First Amendment was actually created to protect minorities, like the Azerbaijanis, from such threats that undermine the integrity of freedom of expression. ADAPP demands that CRNI reconsider its decision and withdraw its 2010 Award for Courage in Editorial Cartooning to Mr. Neyestani. In doing so, CRNI will demonstrate its commitment to promoting peace, respect, and tolerance, and will renounce its support to those who preach ethnic hatred to achieve political objectives.

Yours sincerely,

Fakhteh Luna Zamani
Chief Executive Officer
Association for the Defence of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran (ADAPP)
Vancouver, Canada

How democracy can be the solution to Iran’s ethnic problems?

2010-06-28T10:15:00.000-07:00

Honorable members of the Italian Parliament and senate

Ladies and gentlemen

On behalf of the Federal-Democratic Movement of Azerbaijan and as a member of Congress of Nationalities for a Federal Iran , I wish to express my appreciations to UNPO which gives us an opportunity to highlight and discuss the obstacles preventing the transition of the Iranian society to a democratic system. In my speech, I will point out the main reasons behind these obstacles and our strategies to overcome them.

The most obvious reason for the lack of democracy in Iran is the rule of an authoritarian religious dictatorship in the country. For more than 30 years, the country has been governed by so-called theocratic leaders. In Iran, the state is said to be governed by divine guidance or by officials who are regarded as divinely guided.

Theocracy is the backbone of the ruling system in Iran, therefore the state not only prevents any attempt towards progress and innovation, but also it forbids the freedom of thought, conscience, expression, opinion and above all, is against everything democracy depends on.

The constitution of the Islamic republic of Iran mandates that the official religion of Iran is Islam with clear preference given to the shi’a. By this means it has annihilated the solidarity of Iranians. It rejects the equal civil rights of the Iranians clearly and classifies them as first and second class citizens. This constitution denies non Farsi nationalities, Sunni Muslims, women and religious minorities.

The second major indication for the lack of democracy is the absence of the non Persian Iranians from political landscape of the country. For instance, although Iranian Turks are the largest nation in Iran, they are not involved in political power.

The Islamic republic of Iran has continued to practice the Pahlavi tradition of assimilating non Farsi nationalities that by the beginning of the twentieth century through a long-lasting political plan had forbidden the using of their language and the practice of their cultural tradition. The oppressive Islamic regime not only continued, but strengthened the assimilation policies of the shah. The intention was to curtail and weaken the development of the non Farsi nationalities and marginalize their role in Iranian society.

Denying non-Farsi nationalities the right to use their mother tongue in education has not only guaranteed the monopolization of power, knowledge and domination by the ruling authorities, it has also caused the restriction of the ability of critical and analytical thinking, discussing, questioning and interrogation. Paulo Freire, an acclaimed Brazilian educator and influential theorist of critical pedagogy, has called this procedure the” violation of the structure of thinking”.

The economic development of non Farsi regions in Iran have also been negatively influenced by this policy .For example the rate of investment in Kerman province has been about 300 times more than in Azerbaijan.

Before the Islamic revolution in 1979 South Azerbaijan was the second-highest industrially developed province in the country. A few years later, it dropped to 17th place.

South Azerbaijan is the founder of the modern educational system and schooling in the country. The second university in Iran as well as the first newspaper was also initially originated in that province. However, at the moment the rate of the literacy has dropped to 20th place.

Another crucial obstacle that prevents any democratic change in Iran is the repression of the women’s rights in the country. Since the establishment of the Islamic republic there exists a sexual apartheid in Iran. The constitution of the Islamic republic of Iran considers the women as the second class citizens. Additionally after the establishment of Islamic Republic in January 1979, some restrictions such as the enforcement of compulsory Hijab and the exclusion of women from employment of certain occupations, for example working as judges, were imposed on them.

And now what are our strategies:

1-In our opinion to change the Iranian regime to a laic and democratic system it is crucial that the women movement, nationalities, the labor movement and the freedom movement cooperate together.

2- We are opposed the military invasion of external forces and believe that these kinds of foreign interventions only strengthen the power of the ruling authorities in using them as excuses for suppressing the opposition. The security and military regime would use them to consolidate its reign and further destroy the critical opponents.

3- We agree with the sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council and the newly suggested ones by European Foreign Ministers. We believe that the sanctions could be an effective tool to put severe pressure on the Islamic republic.

However, the sanctions should be directed directly against the Iranian government and should not harm the innocent public.

4- In our opinion one of the main reasons of the longevity of the dictatorship in Iran has been the focus of all political power in Tehran. Therefore, we support a decentralization of the system where power and influence would be divided among the provinces. We believe that a federal system would restrict and eventually undermine Tehran’s monopoly on power.

We suggest the ethnic (national) federalism for Iran.

The federal republic of Iran ought to be established by the voluntary unity of Iranian nationalities and ethnic groups. It ought to be based on a democratic and national federal system and with two Houses of parliament. This ethnic federalism would be totally appropriate to Iranian national and linguistic reality.
5- We believe that only that constitution is able to unite the people living in the political geography of Iran that guarantees laicism, equal rights for all citizens and accepts the multinationality of Iran and the language of all the nationalities that live in this country and replaces the present political structure with ethnic federalism.

Dr. Sedigheh Adalati

2010

Azerbaijanis in Iran: Consequences of persecution and discrimination

2010-05-31T11:42:00.000-07:00

by Ben Madadi

Among nationalist Azerbaijani circles of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Iranian Azerbaijan it is believed that the population of Iran's Azerbaijanis is around 30 million or even greater. That would make some 42% of Iran's population. It is of course a gross exaggeration that serves no purpose, even the purpose it has been promoted for; to make Iranian Azerbaijanis feel they are powerful so they can rise, or resist, against their unfair conditions. However it more likely serves the purposes of the opponents of Azerbaijan as a whole because of simply giving exactly the same false sense of power, which creates an atmosphere of complacency among Iranian Azerbaijanis rather than a sense of dissociation from the Iranian regime and its policies.

Azerbaijani nationalists are probably simply unaware rather than intentionally making up hugely exaggerated numbers. Azerbaijanis, those who consider themselves to be Azerbaijanis (that is the definition, but those whose one or both parents are Azerbaijanis but do not consider themselves to be Azerbaijanis ARE NOT Azerbaijanis, PERIOD), are almost all the inhabitants of the provinces of East Azerbaijan, Ardebil and Zanjan. And some 60% or so of the population of West Azerbaijan are probably Azerbaijani Turks, the rest being mostly Kurds. Then there are the provinces of Gilan, Qazvin, Tehran, Hamedan, Markazi and Kurdistan where the Azerbaijani population probably totals some 20% of the whole. Tehran's Azerbaijani population may also be around 20% but if we take into account the parentage and ancestry of Tehran's population, more than 30% of them must be originally from Azerbaijan.

However areas where Azerbaijanis are in the minority they are in a disproportionate cultural disadvantage compared to the Fars (ethnic Persian) population, due to state policies of Persian/Fars chauvinism and assimilation, and their children are very likely to adopt a Persian culture and ideology rather than preferring marginalisation as being part of an ethnic minority. This in time reduces, and has already reduced, the Azerbaijani population of Iran in areas where they have become minorities. So, the trend is, and has been for decades, against the Azerbaijanis and their proportion of Iran's population is on a steep decline. The proportion may have been some 30% during the rule of the Qajar (who had migrated from Ganja in present-day Republic of Azerbaijan to Mazandaran while keeping their Azerbaijani identity alive) who were Azerbaijani Turks (and considered themselves to be) and it can easily be 20% now, and falling.

So, how did this happen that such a powerful nation (if we may call them so), the Azerbaijanis, became such an insignificant one, under the pressure of almost disappearing in time? One third of the Azerbaijanis were lost to the Russians, now freed, and the remaining two-thirds are in the state of an identity-theft long in the process of completion.

It is astonishing that modern Iran, where currently almost everything is supposed to be Fars (or Persian) and any talk of anything but Persian culture, language, and traditions is either banned or seen as taboo, has been built, protected and cherished mostly by Azerbaijanis, not Persians. Persians (ethnic Fars) have usually been silent participants in the making of events in a brutal world of the years 1100 to 1900, ruled by Turks, mostly Azerbaijani Turks. Modern Persian nationalism that took over Iran almost eight decades ago by Reza Pahlavi's coup has re-written Iran's entire history, manipulated everything and given an extremely elusive image of a nation (supposedly a united Iranian nation) in which Aryan/Persian RACE has been the cause of any good, and everything else has been irrelevant or evil! This policy and ideology has been pretty much exactly copied by the clerical regime that currently rules Iran.

Manipulating history in third-world countries where there is little sense of reality, but more of conspiracy, is nothing abnormal. People have got used to conspiracies so much even natural news or events are almost always interpreted as conspiracies.

The Persian Empire, or what is known in the region as Iran, disappeared after the invasion of the Muslim Arabs, until the Safavid, Azerbaijani Turks from Azerbaijan proper (the Iranian part), re-established it over pretty much the same area the historical Persian Empire had lied. The Safavid preserved their Azerbaijani identity for a very long time, though as it is well known, the Azerbaijani Qizilbash, who brought them to power and protected Iran against its enemies, were unhappy about the Fars (Persians) participating in the leadership after the capital had moved to Isfahan, a non-Azerbaijani city, and feuds broke out. Feuds that have probably always existed though Azerbaijani and Fars, fearing the numerous Ottoman Turks, united under the Iranian flag in order to protect their SHIA religion and dominion. There was no talk or idea about Iranians being Persians, Aryans, or anything alike.

It was the Azerbaijanis, the Safavid family and the Qizilbash, who for almost two centuries protected Iran, built its capital in central Iran, Isfahan, and gave Iran its most beautiful city to this date. The only non-Azerbaijani (or non-Turk) Iranian rulers have been the Zand who were not able to take northern Iran and only ruled southern and central Iran, who were mostly Fars populated. And the Zand state fell by the Qajar onslaught, who were again, as mentioned earlier, Azerbaijani Turks themselves.

Neither the Fars nor the Turk of Iran, take pride in the Qajar family, for one reason or another, or maybe just luck. Their rule has been associated with loss of huge territories, and some Iranian pride, to some of the world's powerful empires othe time, more specifically the British and the Russians. Nevertheless the Qajar kept most of Iran together, built Iran's current capital city, Tehran, and just like the Safavid, considered both Fars, Turk, and other Shia citizens as being Iranians (they did discriminate against the Kurds). Both the Safavid and the Qajar protected and cherished Persian (Fars) literature and more often wrote in Farsi rather than in their own language (even the Ottoman Turks usually wrote in Farsi rather than Ottoman Turkish, especially their poetry), simply because they considered Farsi to be more beautiful, in a literary sense, which can hardly be denied.

I have no wish to insult the Iranian Fars (Persians), or to try to diminish their significance or importance, in making the modern Iran, however it is a very well known fact that it was not just the ruling families of Iran but also most of the fighting forces (the army) who were Azerbaijanis. Those folks built the modern Iran and protected it against outsiders.

And the same Azerbaijanis have, for several decades, lost the country they so heavily participated to build to some Nazi-nostalgic Aryan/Persian extremist nationalists! Ever since the non-Azerbaijani (so they considered themselves to be, although they had partial Azerbaijani genes, from their mothers) Pahlavi took over, to this date, Azerbaijanis have become ETHNIC MINORITIES, who don't even have ethnic minority rights. Their existence is more like a nonsense to what is preferred to be an ARYAN/PERSIAN state. They are treated like undesirable, but tolerated (as long as they behave) guests in the country they mostly built.

Well, it is true that they got pretty much, very badly, screwed, and they know and accept it. As they say, shit happens! The post-Pahlavi time has even tried, and mostly succeeded, to erase the true identity of the Azerbaijanis by giving them a new name, Azeris, or Azaris; something that my parents, when heard, thought I was speaking a foreign language. Using Azerbaijani language has been banned, and acknowledging being Azerbaijani, or Azerbaijani Turk, can end you up in prison, tortured or killed.

Many Azerbaijani-rights activists have indeed been killed, hanged, tortured, disappeared and at least intimidated. Little is known about them and most Iranian human-rights activists have ignored the faith of the Azerbaijanis who have been killed by Iranian regimes. Many Azerbaijanis have been forced to flee their country for simply acknowledging their existence and true identity. Iran's so-called ISLAMIC regime has even aided and is still aiding Christian Armenia, while Armenia has occupied 20% of the Republic of Azerbaijan!!

Azerbaijani presence among the Iranian politicians may be presented as extraordinary and significant by giving the example of the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, though he does not speak Azerbaijani as his langauge at home, or almost anywhere else (though he can, at least to some degree) and does not consider himself to be Azerbaijani, even if both, or one of, his parents seem to have been originally from Khamene (in Iranian Azerbaijan) who migrated to Khorasan. The fact of the matter is that Azerbaijanis have largely been distanced from Iranian politics in the past 80 years or so and their presence has not been proportionate to their percentage of the population.

And the results have been obvious. Iranian Azerbaijan, for the past decades, has received the least investments and development funds from the Pahlavi, or Islamic, regimes, and as the result Azerbaijanis have largely moved to Tehran and other non-Azerbaijani cities for search of better lives. Almost all Azerbaijani families in Iranian Azerbaijan have at least about 1/4 of their relatives in Tehran, Karaj and other non-Azerbaijani cities.

In Iran's intoxicated and manipulated spheres of talk or even academia, belonging to a nation or group is linked to the ugliest and most disputed word of all, the RACE, while true belonging to a group or nation is about choice, not race, especially when it is a collective identity. After-all Iranians, Turks (Middle-Eastern type, not central Asian type), Europeans, Arabs etc are all Caucasians, scientifically speaking. There is no Aryan RACE, except within the intoxicated minds of post-Pahlavi, still dreaming, nationalist Iranians, and Afghans. And some neo-Nazis, pardon me forgetting! I think they have formed virtual, Internet, clubs where they regularly discuss.

Where is this process going to reach and what is to do with it? The wrongs that have been done to nations within countries, Kurds in Turkey and Iran, Azerbaijani Turks in Iran, and other smaller nations, are burdens on the preferred nations on whose names they are done. Persians in Iran on whose name the Azerbaijanis and others have been pressured and discriminated against are not entirely guilty because the acts have been done by authoritarian regimes, not democratic ones. However there are many extremists out there and the Internet is full of them who for the mere expression of being an Azerbaijani will accuse you of pan-Turkism, Turanism, treachery and so on.

There is indeed a significant proportion of the population of Fars/Persian in Iran who do support Iranian policies of national persecution and discrimination. Maybe they are sincere in their pursuit of what they have been taught at home and school. While pan-Turkism (whatever that may be) is the worst of any possible and imaginable word, pan-Fars-ism (whatever that may be too) is considered sacred and noble! While Turan-ism is the most evil of all evils, Iran-ism is the greatest of the great, especially when it is written Arian-ism.

Playing with words in order to placate and intimidate is nothing new. Those who give these apparently horrifying titles shall read some history, without the usual Persian/Iranian interpretations, and understand that maybe it was the same 'torke khar' (who are indeed 'khar' because they have proved to like giving rides) that saved Iran from the some perceived Turanism or pan-Turkism. Could they imagine their Aryan folks having fought against the Ottoman Turks? There are some Aryan/Persian folks left outside the Iran that Azerbaijanis have mostly built, and they are called Afghans and Tajiks! Their Aryan/Persian glory is exported to the outside world every single day, after having been processed in Pakistan, sometimes labelled as Heroin, other times as Cocaine, Crack and so on. Not that there is anything wrong about being a Fars/Aryan/Persian, but there is no disputing realities.

Iran was not supposed to be a country of the Persian, or the Aryan, nation, because the Persians are just about half of the population, or maybe less, and there is neither an Aryan nation or an Aryan race to build a country upon. But it could be just like any country, a union of peoples or nations, where there is no preferred one, and each nation within the country can decide about their own affairs in case they wish to. Breaking up countries is too costly and not worth any attempt, but discriminatory policies of authoritarian regimes are creating the right atmosphere that over time lead to social discontent that can overflow and cause serious problems at any moment. And the preferred nation, Fars in Iran's case, may be seen as the guilty silent participant of a huge injustice for many generations.

The intention of this article is nothing but to point to a problem that exists, and many people may not be aware of it. The current regime of Iran does not care about human rights whether the human-being is Fars, Turk, Kurd or whoever. So there can be no talk about human rights while there is nothing even distantly similar to human rights in an Iran in which, just like the Middle Ages, individuals are hanged in public so the leaders can be feared.

Ethnic Iranian Azeris and the cartoon crisis

2010-05-19T10:55:00.000-07:00

Interview with Fakhteh Zamani, Chief Executive Officer and founder of the Association for the Defence of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran (ADAPP).

WHY “SOUTH AZERBAIJAN” MATTER

2010-05-03T20:03:00.000-07:00

Saleh Kamrani

This article is a general review of the recent developments concerning the legitimacy of the Iraniangovernment, nuclear proliferation in the international context and human rights violations. Politics, economics, geography and demography of Azerbaijan and particularly the region commonly referred to as ‘South Azerbaijan’ within the Islamic Republic of Iran, are analyzed through a historical perspective. The role of South Azerbaijan in promoting human rights, democracy, and peace and in mitigating regional and international tensions are studied.

Iran is a country of special geostrategic significance due to its central location in Eurasia, the cradle of tension and crises. Iran has large deposits of natural resources, access to the Caspian Sea in the north and the Persian Gulf in the south, a considerable population, a consumption economy, and is ruled by theocracy; for these reasons and more, Iran is defined as a center of domestic and international conflicts and tensions.

The new Iran formed through a set of events such as Reza Khan’s coup at the beginning of the 20th century, the abolition of Ahmad Shah Qajar’s constitutional monarchy, annulment of the reforms of the constitutional revolution of memalik-i mahruse (semi-federalism), establishment of non-pluralism, dynasty, radicalism and chauvinism. Upon coming to power of the current theocratic government,for the first 15 years a legitimacy constructed on religion continued. In these years, ongoing wars and other problems were experienced. The first rupture occurred during the cease-fire between Iraq and Iran and led to a reconstruction policy. After the collapse of communism, which signified an end to the polarized world, accelerated globalization, as well as the spread of universal values and increased interaction between Iranians and the international community, the power and legitimacy of the state was put into question. Further conflicts became visible as reformists became powerful albeit defeated in the elections. The struggle at the time of the presidential elections was apparent not only to Iranians but to the whole world. In this regard, the presidential election of July 2009 was especially significant.

The high ranking representatives of the government sided with Ahmadinejad during the elections of 2009. The incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, along with the leaders of the Iranian political establishment, the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, the conservative Mohsen Rezai, the reformist cleric Mehdi Kerrubi, reformist Mir-Hossein Musavi and Ali Akbar Hashemi Refsanjani − known as a centrist and pragmatic conservative member of the Assembly of Religious Experts, “deliberative body of Mujtahids,” and the Expediency Discernment Council. This political context led to a huge crisis in the social, political, economic environment of Iran. The results of this conflict brought negative consequences for Iranians, the region and the world. In this context South Azerbaijan,1 as an important but unknown player, could become central for the region, if not the international community.

The Role of South Azerbaijan and the Position in the Recent Developments in Iran

Iranian Azerbaijan, also known as “South Azerbaijan”, is the most fundamental region in Iranian. It is located in Northwest Iran and can be geographically located in the region spanning from Iraq to Dagestan. To the north, the region touches the borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Southern Caucasia. Throughout history, this region has hosted Aq Qoyunlu, Qara Qoyunlu, the Safavid dynasty, Afsharid dynasty and the Qajar dynasty, nations and dynasties that for the most part ruled Iran. The recent history of Iran shows that the region of Iranian Azerbaijan served as the hub of ideas and was central to the developments in the world due to its proximity to big empires such as the Ottomans and the Russians, and of course, to Europe. Moreover, this region was also economically competitive with its flourishing businesses, agricultural sector and industry. The basic ideas and aims of the Constitutional Revolution were shaped in South Azerbaijan, at the beginning of the 20th century. In many ways, South Azerbaijan contributed to the new social and political life in Iran and has helped to transform Iran into a modern country. In other words, the biggest supporter for modernity in Iran has been the region of Azerbaijan. The geographic advantage of Iranian Azerbaijan and its demographic and historical context have designated the region as an important national political player. Within this role the rule of law, modernity, democracy and other universal values were prioritized. Unfortunately, Reza’s Khan’s coups and the despotic monarchy pushed Iran into a vicious circle of despotism and poverty. South Azerbaijan has been transformed from being a dominant region with basic rights and freedoms into a region without rights and powers, and faced systematic and multidimensional exploitation, assimilation policies and racism. Violations of human rights in South Azerbaijan by the central government have damaged the region economically, politically and socially.

The Islamic Revolution, with its hard line Shiite and Aria and exploitation in association with Persians, has further damaged Iranian Azerbaijan.We can say that South Azerbaijan’s situation to some extent resembles South Africa’s apartheid regime or the Shiites’ situation under Saddam rule in Iraq. After the cease fire between Iran and Iraq and the beginning of reconstruction of the country, the exploitation of South Azerbaijan continued.
In order regain their basic rights, Iranian Azerbaijan’s people have collectivized their struggles within the framework of the Azerbaijan National Democratic Movement. The institutionalization of new values by South Azerbaijanis has resulted in the strengthening of the civil society. as they have participated in reformist movements. Unfortunately, the people of South Azerbaijan did not benefit from participating in the reformist government for almost eight years. Consequently, hopes for regaining autonomy and basic human rights diminished. The destruction and suppression of the South Azerbaijani identity under Ahmedinejad was also reflected in the media. As a result of these policies, one of the biggest demonstrations ever witnessed by the Iranian Republic took place. Although peaceful, the protests were violently suppressed by the government, which eventually led to the arrest, torture and murder of thousands. Even so called reformists, human rights defenders and activists did not protest against these inhuman actions. Instead, they have left South Azerbaijan’s people on their own. These developments have created an insurmountable divide between the people of South Azerbaijan and the rest of Iran.
The people in the region today have two basic strategies for struggle, which also shape the policies of the South Azerbaijan Democratic National Movement: One branch wants freedom and rights for all of Iran while the other branch argues for the granting of further rights for the Turkic people in the country, such as the Qasqai, Khorasan, and the Turkmen Sahra. However, all these struggles were ignored because of media censorship and the restrictions on the use of the Turkic mother tongue. Despite all of these difficulties and the ongoing violence, people have continued their democratic struggle during the presidential election of 2009. The votes for Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Kerrubi have successfully polarized the Iranian society and created a new opportunity for discrediting the government policies. Despite the continuing distaste of South Azerbaijan’s people for the current situation, they have not engaged in the street protests after the election in 2009.
The Iranian government has not only created problems within the country but also internationally by pursuing nuclear proliferation, and ignoring international law and recommendations of the United Nations. The bad image of Iran in the world has had a negative effect on the country’s economy and security. The best way to overcome this situation would be domestic development and struggle. The Green Revolution, which could have accomplished thischange, could not go beyond the borders of North Tehran and the gates of Tehran University, as well as some cities with a Persian majority. The limits of national struggle clearly depict the still existing public support for the current government. If the international community realizes that movements such as the Green Revolution and the Persian centralists seriously struggle for change, then support –in spiritual and material form– could accelerate Iran’s transformation. However Iran’s military capabilities should not be underestimated for they could be used against protestors and the community in South Azerbaijan.

The Role of South Azerbaijan in Balancing and Arranging International and Domestic Relations
South Azerbaijan, in the eyes of the Iranians and the world, has proven its commitment to democracy and liberty through the Constitutional Revolution as well as other movements. South Azerbaijan constitutes a major part of Iran’s population and is influential in the Turkic world. South Azerbaijan shares a common language, history and culture with the peoples of the Caucasus, the Balkans, Central Asia and Middle East and has good relations with the non-Turkic people of Iran. If the international community would focus on South Azerbaijan and support it effectively, this could bring basic developments and changes in Iran. It would then be possible to bring to change the current situation to a more prosperous, just and democratic South Azerbaijan as well as the whole of Iran. The damages caused by the government of the Islamic Republic may be reversed if enough attention is paid by the international community.
Conclusion
Iran is located in the center of major conflicts accompanied by its centralist, theocratic and racist structure. The struggle against this structure has led to domestic unrest and terrorism, as well as ever-increasing fundamentalism. South Azerbaijan, as an important and highly populated region, has been denied basic rights and has not received sufficient support from the international community. For Iran’s transformation to be aided, a new approach to South Azerbaijan is needed. In order to tackle despotism, racism, terror and the threat of weapons of mass destruction, the international community and South Azerbaijan need to be in close interaction and develop mutual confidence.
………………………………………….
*Saleh Kamrani is a human rights activist in Iran.
1) The term “South Azerbaijan” is used at the author’s discretion

The Issue of Azerbaijani Turks in Iran

2010-04-24T10:57:00.000-07:00

M. Reza Kheshti

Historical Aspect

Historically the existing people of Azerbaijan are the extension of the Asiatic People, which moved to the current geographic plateau possibly more than ten thousand years ago. According to the French Historian Peter Amier, we can observe the foot print of those people in human history in the form of the Elamid Dynasty, which ruled the Iranian Plateau, with today’s terminology, for 2800 years (since 3500 +/– B.C.) utilizing the Agglutinative Language. The Elamid is not the only ones that ruled the region. There were other dynasties such as: Kas’sies, Hur’ries, Orarturs, Qut’ties, Lolobies, Qarqars, Kaspies (Caspians), and more recent Man’nas, and Medes are the “Ancestor-Predecessors” of Azerbaijanis.

After the arrival of Indo-European speaking groups of people on the plateau, and after the defeat of the first Persian Dynasty of Archiamids by Alexander the Great, the Satrap, or governor of Azerbaijan, Atropakan, negotiated a peace treaty with Alexander, which guaranteed the Independence of the land to the north and south of the Arax River.

The ruling of the land was continued by Achkadids with Agglutinative language group for almost 450+/- years, and Sasanids, until the fall of the dynasty through the intervention of Islam. The ruling of Islam continued for 250+/– years, and then for a short period of time the land was ruled by Sef’farids and Samanids, an Indo-European speaking group of people. Prior to the English-led coupe made on behalf of the Persians in the early 1920s, which contributed to the fall of the last “Qajar Dynasty”, Qeznevids and the dynasties after them ruled the land as Agglutinative-speaking peoples for more than a thousand years.

In the 20th century the Pahlavi Dynasty was brought to power, by the means of coup, in order to implement the Great Brittan’s colonialist doctrine for better control and advancement of the land and region in the future, utilizing the slogan of “One Nation, One Race, and One Language”. Since then cultural assimilation policies have been imposed on the five major non Persian ethnic group of the region: Arabs, Azerbaijanis, Baluchies, Kurds, and Turkmen. Following the Pahlavi’s foot print, the Islamic Republic of Iran, IRI, rubber-stamped the same policy which was imposed by predecessor. The era after coup is called “The Period of Persianization.”

The period of Persianization in the last 100+/– years after the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911 in general, and after the 1920’s coup, more specifically has had major impacts:
1 – The Loss of Land and Territory;
2 – Economic Deprivation;
3 – Denial of Human and Social Rights;
4 – The Denial of Turkic History through the Imposition of Persian Nationalism.

1-The Loss of Land and Territory
Historically the land of Azerbaijan has been shrunk to its current size through the creation of provinces known as:

Zenjan Province, Qezvin Province, Hemedan Province, Arak Province, Gilan Province, Merkezi (Central) Province, and recently Erdebil province.

This geographic renaming has reduced Azerbaijan to two provinces-- Eastern and Western--which in reality is only 40% of the total land historically understood to be Azerbaijan. Additionally the names of mountains, rivers, towns and cities have been changed to Farsi as another way of approaching Persianization. The samples are as follow:

A- Cities and Towns (Urmia to Rezaiyeh, Soyuq Bulaq to Mahabad, Selmas to Shahpur, Qara Bulaq to Siyah Cheshmeh, Qosha Chay to Miyandoab, Dehkharqan to Azershehr, Sayinqala To Shahindej, Sulduz to Neqedeh, Khiyav to Meshkinshehr, Khana to Piranshahr),

B- Mountains (Qara Daq to Eresbaran, Savalan to Sebelan),

C- Rivers (Aji Chay to Telkherud, Akhma Qaya to Ahmeqiyeh, Jighati To Siminehrud, Petovi To Zerrinehrud).

It is worth noting that during the course of the history of Iran, it has never been considered one country; instead it was consisted as seven countries, administered and called as “Unified Countries”, Memaleke Mehruseh, which they had their own independence, including: Arabistan, Azerbaijan, Baluchistan, Farsistan (Persian territory), Khorasan, Kurdistan, and Tabaristan (included Turkmen Territory). For the fist time the name of “Iran” is used after the coup, in the term of “Kingship of Iran”, in relation with Aryan Race”, which resemble the Baluchies, Kurds, and Persians.

2-Economic Deprivation
Neither the Pahlavi regime nor the IRI have invested in Azerbaijan’s economic progress. Instead Azerbaijani investors were encouraged to move their capital, factories, production, plants, etc. to the Persian core of the country, in order to receive tax breaks, credit, and discounts. This has resulted in a high percentage of unemployment in Azerbaijan and the migration of thousands people in search of jobs. This migration has reduced the population of Azerbaijan, brought other ethnicities such as Kurds to Azerbaijan, and has reduced the Azerbaijani ratio in their geographic homeland. Although an agriculturally rich land, most of the peasants and farmers go elsewhere in search of job, in result, melting in the cultural pot of “Persianisim” by intermingling in the Persian oriented society, receiving education in forced Persian language, and inter marriage with them. Most of the villages are vacant, and remaining inhabitants are elderly.

3-Denial of Human and Social Rights
Both regimes were and are signatures of the “Declaration of Human Rights” yet both denied these rights to ethnic groups. For example: people were denied an education in their native language, denied the right to name newborns in Azerbaijani, denied media in the Azerbaijani language, denial of self governing of their own land, Etc.

4-Denial of the History
Since1920s’, Persian Historians have been trying to deny the history of the people who inhabited the land for years prior to their arrival in 900 B.C. The calendar of the country is based on the first Persian kingship, denying 4000-5000 years of indigenous history. Ethnically, Persians constitute somewhere between 25%-30% of the population—a minority which unjustly rules a 70%-75% non-Persian majority. Including the Turks of Khorasan, Kerman, Fars Provinces, and city of Tehran (the most populated Azerbaijani city in the world), one can easily say that Azerbaijanis are the most populous ethnic group calculated at somewhere in vicinity of 50%, according to the UN report on Human Rights in 2002.

Conclusion
With analysis of contemporary history of Iran, we can easily detect the “Persian Chauvinism” as a factor of deferment, deprivation, impoverishment of non Persian ethnics including South Azerbaijanis.

The prescription of “Federalism” is obsolete in Iranian case. The two big factors of: “to be raised, educated, and developed in democratic and secular society”, and “all ethnics cooperate in approach of same goal” are the prerequisite for establishment of a “Federative state”, and neither one of those factors are exist in Iran, since the country was ruled by dictatorial regimes in recent hundred years of modern history, and the ruling ethnic, Persians, is not willing to loose or share the power, which they gained thru coup with the help of England, with other ethnics.

“The Right to Self Determination” is the only democratic solution for such multi ethnic society. This Right has been spelled out in “Declaration of Human Rights”, and has been practiced in the case of “peacefully separation” of Czech and Slovakia, and in the case of “peacefully annexation” of two Germanys. If the South Azerbaijanis come to such conclusion for their own “Self Determination”, any disruption in secession process will be on burden of ruling ethnic, The Persians.

The attempt of IRI to have an access to Atomic Energy would be disastrous for non-Persians ethnics in Iran. Ruling ethnic had enough tools to suppress and humiliate other ethnics, and undeniably this one would be above all. Instead of Uranium, IRI should implement their own Constitution and respect to their own signature on Declaration of Human Rights, let the people practice the freedom in the full extend, whether or not they want to stay in the union or peacefully leave it.

Statement by A Group of Azeri Activists & Intellectuals Concerning the Green Movement

2010-04-18T13:07:00.000-07:00

Our Standards Concerning the Democracy-Seeking Process and the Green Movement

February 21, 2010

Eight months have passed since the start of the anti-dictatorial movement in Iran. This movement, which began by protesting the results of the presidential election, now promises fundamental changes in our society's political life by giving voice to demands for democracy and freedom...

Although this new, rising movement has been able to take advantage of means such as the Internet and satellites...to introduce itself to the world at large, it has not been able to establish itself as a nationwide movement inside Iran. Thus, so far, the burden of this movement has fallen on the backs of the urban middle class in Central Iran. Its geographical scope has been limited to Tehran and, at most, several other cities. The meaningful silence of Azerbaijan (which is famed for being the vanguard in important political developments in modern Iranian history) is a clear example of this.

The following has to be pointed out: The low level of national consciousness and the superficial understanding of the concepts of freedom and democracy among activists in prior nationwide movements made it possible to create a simple unity of the people. This time, however, the intensification of discriminatory policies, the effects of ethnic oppression on the economic face of Azerbaijan, and the passage of two decades since the new national democratic movement of Azerbaijan have greatly increased the level of consciousness. So much so that any coordination or new unity is conditionally based upon the satisfaction of the minimum demands of the people of Azerbaijan and the preservation of and respect for their independent national actions.

During the past few months, we have seen statements from leaders, intellectuals, and political organizations in defense of the [Green] Movement. All of these statements share the call for democracy, human rights, secularism, free elections, free speech, a free press, free flow of information, and nonviolence...

However, we cannot speak of democracy without specifying its form in Iran's multiethnic society. We cannot speak of free speech while we remain silent about the freedom to speak one's language (which is the prerequisite for any freedom of speech), or while we occasionally make use of a literature promoting ancient [Persia] and totalitarianism, a literature rooted in tendencies opposed to human rights and democracy. [The above] constitute some of the defects and contradictions that will ultimately lead to a rash government and limit the benefits of a temporary democracy to Central Iran.

Therefore, while we welcome this valuable movement toward democracy, we the undersigned declare that in our opinion, the political future of the country will have a proper basis for growth and sustainable development if the following principles and issues are enforced and safeguarded. If the leaders of organizations and parties that support democracy pay attention to the following standards, we have no doubt that the basis for greater coordination and harmony among the people can be created.

1. Amending or rewriting the constitution based on the recognition of the collective and individual rights of the Turks and other nationalities.

2. Guaranteeing the sustainability of democracy in Azerbaijan and other national entities through the formation and defense of state legislatures, civil society institutions, workers' unions, a free press, and state-based parties.

3. Recognizing the Turkish language through the use of the mother tongue as the language of instruction at schools and universities, and the dedication of a nationwide radio and television network to this language...

4. Guaranteeing equal rights to women in all arenas, and recognizing independent women's organizations in Azerbaijan and other national entities.

5. Condemning all expressions of inhumane violence, whether contempt, discrimination, or torture (physical or emotional). Abolishing prison sentences for dissidents, participants in civil society, and political activists and promoters of all creeds.* Categorically abolishing the death penalty.

6. Safeguarding the participation of Iranian nationalities in the central government, commensurate with their population size.

7. Cultural detoxification via the correction of textbooks and programs on the Voice and Face of Iran [Iran's radio and television network] that currently promote the superiority of a particular ethnic group and religion over others.

8. Recognition of freedom of thought and religion. Safeguarding equal rights for religious minorities and recognizing their independent organizations in the national entities.

9. Amending all laws that are contrary to the content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, its conventions, and supplements.

10. Decentralization and the abolition of all symbols of discrimination. The creation of equal economic, social, cultural, and political conditions through allowing the people of Azerbaijan and other national entities to manage their own affairs.

*Based on Daryoush Ashouri's suggestion, I have translated fa'alin-e aqidati as "promoters of all creeds."

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/04/azeris-the-green-movement.html

Where are you from?

2010-04-01T09:54:00.000-07:00

Faranak Farid

Is ethnicity important in women’s struggle for their rights, at all?

Studying English in middle school, this question seemed an exciting one. It made me imagine myself abroad and answer it proudly. But, this innocent imagination was shattered. Yes, I grew up as a woman facing the reality of much discrimination. Discriminations that kill you & re-kill you, shape you & reshape you, frame you & reframe you to the point that you don’t know who you are.

Being a woman from the Middle East simply signifies some facts of gender inequality. Hearing the name of Iran may remind one, of significant roles of brave women in struggle to improve the society and elevate women’s status in the public and private lives. You might have heard of the growing movement of women in such a society with anti-women or male-dominated attitudes, traditions, written-unwritten rules & rights. But this is not the whole story! The name of a country may indicate some things explicitly, while many other things remain uncovered or implicit.

In order to understand the role of ethnicity as an added burden in women’s struggle for their rights, one needs to look at the whole picture.

In Iran , a multi cultural, multi ethnicity, multi religious and multi language country, with a population of more than 70 million, is estimated that 65% of those are ethnics which have been dominated by the culture, religion and language of a minority. This policy was initiated from 85 years ago by Pahlavi Dynasty, and continues.

Azerbaijanis as nearly one-third of the country’s population , along with the other ethnicities such as Kurds, Arabs, Lurs, Baluchies, Mazandaranies & Gilakies, Turkmans, & the tribes like Bakhtiyries and Qashqaies have been deprived from their economic, social and cultural rights, as well as their civil and political rights & been marginalized.

These ethnic groups do not even have a right of education in their mother tongues. There is only one formal language _Farsi (Persian)_ in this country. Due to not having this primary right, women of ethnic groups have the least representation, or they give up their mother tongue in order not to face more discrimination.

With this background, it is obvious that women face complicated challenges to their human rights, both as members of marginalized ethnic groups and as women in a predominantly patriarchal society.

Gender inequality in this circumstances has further limited women`s access to political, economical, social, civil, legal & media resources.

For example, gender inequality such as lack of divorce right for women has contributed to the rise in numbers of women who kill their husbands and end up in my city's women prison. Khadije, is one of these women. After killing her husband she has become psychotic, believing that her husband is still alive. In the prison, she furiously repeats that, “this time I will get a divorce!”

Added to gender inequality, poverty, living in rural areas and being a part of suppressed ethnic group, has created more and more barriers for women.

As in the case of Raheleh from rural Azerbaijan who was forced to marry at the age of 14, many women face different forms of violence such as beating and rape by their husbands, and other bestial behaviors. Such violent treatments turned Raheleh into a murderer who was executed after imprisonment. She was told by her assigned lawyer to defend herself, while she didn't even know what "defense" meant in Farsi language.

Sharing the problems of the whole society, ethnic groups have experienced more regressive and oppressive trends. Of course, based on the rate of the regress of some of the ethnics, situation becomes worse. Among religious minorities, for instance, religious difference is an additional basis of discrimination and deprivation.

The conflicts brought about by all these unfairness, injustice & deep-rooted discrimination, result in higher violence against women in conflict zones.

Suicide rate among women is four and a half times higher than men in Iran, ranking third in the world. However, the self immolation, worst kind of suicide, is highest among ethnic groups, such as Kurds and Lurs, as well as honor-killings that are usually left with no penalty. Also female genital mutilation is a less-known problematic issue in some regions of Iran.

As reported by women activists, some of the specific issues facing women in the poor and underdeveloped province of Sistan-Baluchistan include: forcing girls to early marriage to old men for money; marriages with no registration in register offices; addiction …and so on. In this region, like in Khuzestan , Arab areas, generally poorhygiene and shortage of fresh water are among major actual problems.

Migration has been high in all marginalized parts _specifically among men with all its consequences for women and the family.

The ever-increasing gap between the center of the country (the capital city, the greater Tehran, with its 15 million population) and provinces has caused many tensions and misunderstandings.
Race, ethnicity, gender, language, culture, social class, religion, geographic areas of inhabitant, disability,… are among the factors that produce multiple discrimination. Most of our women are facing almost all of them at the same time & in this complicated situation they lose their self-confidence and feel overwhelmed.

The ethnic groups are not only repressed by the holders of power but also their problems are not put into consideration by even most of the intellectuals.

In brief, the ethnict’s issue needs an urgent attention both at national and international levels.
Women’s rights activists in these provinces are simply labeled as "political activists" and "separatists" on one hand. On the other, these women within their ethnic movements are marginalized from decision-making roles by some of their supremacist men.

But, despite all these, Azerbaijani women activists along with other women activist from all other parts of the country are determined to vindicate their human rights. Also during the past 15 years_ like before_ they have tried to use any chance and seek new opportunities to drive the women’s movement ahead and also express themselves especially via reading and writing in their mother tongue; and participating in all aspects of social life and, practice women’s rights as well as other human rights in order not to give any of them up.

Thank you