Ibrahim Rashidi Savalan, Political Analyst – Wednesday, November 27, 2013 - BBC Persian
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| Hasan Rouhani and Ali Younesi |
Harold Lasswell, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, distinguishes between a police state and a militarized state. He defines a police state as one in which a group of military officials, through direct intervention in domestic politics, successfully controls their powerful political opponents.
The result is a political culture among statesmen that views the use of violence as the guarantor of the state's survival. However, many question the effectiveness of such survival methods.
According to another political theorist, Tillman, while the use of force can quickly neutralize the immediate effects of a crisis, the coercive nature of peripheral political systems reflects their weakness rather than an indication of their strength.
Lasswell defines a militarized state as one in which crisis and violence management experts occupy key positions and, equipped with modern, scientific, and technological tools, show a strong preference for security solutions in dealing with internal challenges.
John Samuel Fitch, a professor at the University of Colorado, offers a similar definition of a militarized state. According to him, in a militarized state, effective power is held by a loosely organized network of “military personnel in the form of a national government” allied with civilian political elites. Thus, in Fitch’s view, the presence of security forces as part of the administrative forces is a hallmark of the militarized state.
Robert Tedgar, a professor at the University of Nevada, makes no distinction between military and civilian elites in his definition of a militarized state. He considers the inclination of statesmen (of any kind) to use security forces to resolve domestic issues as the essential characteristic.
Critics of Iran’s Rouhani Government all acknowledge the use of security figures for key positions. The military backgrounds of nearly seven of Rouhani's civilian ministers align strikingly with the definitions mentioned above.
This stands in contrast to one of Rouhani’s most famous statements during television debates, where he said, “I am not a colonel; I am a lawyer.”
People understood this statement to mean that Rouhani wanted to convey that he did not have a military mindset. They saw him as a man of change compared to other candidates and the previous administration. However, whether his militarized cabinet would be able to meet the people's demands for change remained to be seen over time.
The topic at hand in this article is the appointment of Ali Younesi, former Minister of Intelligence in the reformist government, as the President’s senior advisor on ethnic and religious minority affairs.
In an interview with Aman newspaper on October 13 this year, Younesi repeatedly and explicitly expressed his desire to employ security solutions concerning the issue of ethnic minorities.
While discussing extremist actions taken by both the majority and religious minorities, he stated that both were dangerous to national unity. He argued that the security and intelligence systems should contain these groups. For instance, he mentioned identifying and arresting a few extremist clerics as part of his record of activity and concluded by addressing the Ministry of Intelligence, saying: “It is enough for the Ministry of Intelligence to identify and announce the extremists.”
“The Ministry of Intelligence should identify those who spread division, incite discord, spread rumors, and distribute leaflets, which is what we used to do as well.”
The Rise of Militarized Governments
When a government’s capacity to meet political demands is low, while demands for participation are high, this combination produces a governing style that Samuel Huntington, in his book Political Order in Changing Societies, describes as a low-capacity militarized government.
Younesi’s statements, though scattered, convey precisely Huntington's notion of a militarized government.
Ethnic and religious minorities have numerous demands, such as the right to education in their mother tongue in schools and the alleviation of economic and social deprivation in their regions.
On the other hand, Younesi suggests a gradual approach to addressing these issues, even stating that many people oppose granting these opportunities (such as implementing neglected constitutional principles) to minorities.
Additionally, there is a high demand among ethnic groups for participation in matters like elections. As a result of these two features, the government feels obligated to adopt a security-oriented, controlled approach to diminish the sense of deprivation that has developed among minorities.
This represents the militarized approach of the government toward ethnic and religious minorities and reveals Rouhani the lawyer’s shift to a military mindset regarding ethnic demands.
A Proposal to Exit the Militarized Approach
The following sentences summarize Ali Younesi’s remarks in an interview with Arman newspaper:
"Minorities and ethnic regions have two major demands. The first is the development of ethnic and religious regions and alleviation of deprivation, and the second is that educated individuals from minorities gain access to job and social opportunities. These deprivations are not due to the actions of governments but rather result from the fact that education opportunities in Sunni and ethnic areas have been limited. As a result, with a merit-based system, they are less likely to qualify for positions and jobs."
Based on these remarks, improving the education and literacy levels of minorities and ethnic groups should be the first step toward qualifying them for roles and jobs, thereby addressing a major obstacle to development in ethnic regions through the enhancement of human and social potential.
Younesi’s comments indicate that minority and ethnic affairs need an Education Minister, not an Intelligence Minister.
However, due to the militarized and security-oriented nature of Rouhani’s government toward minority affairs, someone has been chosen for this role who can alleviate the concerns of higher authorities. Lacking experience in education, this individual is unlikely to take any steps to meet the demands of lower-level constituents.
Contrary to Younesi’s statements, simply increasing literacy in Persian alone is not the key to resolving ethnic issues. Instead, education in one’s mother tongue can address some challenges, and Younesi could consider existing research on this topic.
An example of such research is:
In 1993, Solmaz Modares conducted a study titled “Investigating the Educational Issues of Bilingual Children in East Azerbaijan.”
In this study, 12 schools in Tehran and surrounding villages and 12 schools in Tabriz and nearby villages were selected as samples. Half of the schools were boys' schools, and the other half were girls’ schools, with half located in urban areas and half in rural areas.
Modares selected ten first-grade students from each class and, after reviewing their records following the third trimester exams, administered a standardized test in all subjects, including spelling, reading comprehension, Persian reading, science, and math.
In the Persian spelling test, Azerbaijani students made an average of 7 errors, while Persian students averaged 1.5 errors. Azerbaijanis scored highest in math among all subjects, whereas Tehran students scored best in Persian reading.
Math requires more scientific skills than language skills, so Azerbaijanis faced fewer difficulties in math.
In rural areas, Persian-speaking students whose parents were illiterate scored an average of 14, while Turkish-speaking students with both parents literate averaged a score of 10.