A Critique of the Project of "Iranian Modernity" by Sayed Javad Tabatabai and His Remarks on the Turkish Language

Dr. Heydar Shadi, University of Erfurt, Germany - February 2, 2014

heydarshadi@gmail.com 

Does Javad Tabatabai's Iranian modernity project, like its European model, construct the "self" through the "othering" process?

In this article, Dr. Shadi argues that historiography is not a mere reflection of objective historical truths but a process of interpretation and reconstruction shaped by the historian's context, imagination, and collective memory. He critiques Seyyed Javad Tabatabai's approach to Iranian modernity for its exclusivism, essentialism, and static historicism, which define Iranian culture as superior while dismissing other ethnicities as historically insignificant or incapable of development. Dr. Shadi contends that Tabatabai's narrative presents a distorted view of Iranian history, ignoring the complex, composite nature of cultural influences and promoting an ideology of purity and authenticity that ultimately undermines the rich, interconnected histories of the region. He calls for a post-Iranian historiography that embraces pluralism and the dynamic interplay of diverse cultures in constructing modern identities.

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Introduction: Max Weber’s "European Rationality" and Sayed Javad Tabatabai's "Iranian Wisdom"

It is a summer afternoon, and at the Max Weber Studies Center in Erfurt, Germany (Max Weber's birthplace), a lecture titled "Max Weber's Sociology of Jainism in Light of Recent Research"[1] is being delivered. The speaker, Dr. Peter Vogel[2] from the University of London, initially discusses the ethical systems of Jainism and Christianity. He explains that in Jainism, there is no concept of God, and in its ethical system, it is not divine reward or punishment but rather individual salvation through self-discipline and spiritual growth that motivates adherence to moral principles. Max Weber considered this ethical system, in comparison to Christian ethics, "irrational" and mythical, as he believed that the assumption of a supernatural being in Christian ethics, along with divine reward and punishment, serves as an enforcement mechanism for a moral system. These kinds of differences between Christian ethics and other ethical systems were part of Max Weber's evidence and reasoning behind his hypothesis explaining the emergence of modernity in Europe. According to Max Weber, a particular type of rationality—instrumental rationality[3]—exclusively present in Europe led to the rise of modernity there. On this basis, the presence of such elements in Christian ethical systems answers the question of why modernity emerged in Europe and not in other regions.

The speaker questions the concept of "rationality" and criticizes Max Weber's judgment regarding the "rationality" or "mythical" nature of a moral system with or without a deity, viewing it more as a product of Weber's intellectual and cultural context rather than an objective matter. The lecture was a critical re-reading of Max Weber's sociology of religion and an example of the current dominant trend in cultural studies in the West, which critiques the classical Western humanities approach to modernity for being "Eurocentric." The speaker aimed to show, with this example, how the West defined itself through the "construction" of an "other." That "other," in this lecture Jainism, was defined as irrational, myth-based, and "the East" so that the West could be constructed as rational and superior. Revisiting Max Weber's sociology of religion as one of the architects of the European modernity project and showing how subjective the descriptions of "rational" and "irrational" attributed to Christianity and Jainism were, familiarizes us with the nature of such social constructs and enables their deconstruction.

This lecture reminded me of Sayed Javad Tabatabai’s project of "Iranian modernity" and his concept of "Iranian wisdom." I asked myself: What is the relationship between Tabatabai’s concept of "Iranian wisdom" and Max Weber’s "Western rationality"? Does Tabatabai, much like Weber, who spoke of an "exceptional Europe,"[4] speak of an "exceptional Iran"? Does the project of Iranian modernity, like its European model, construct the "self" through the "othering" process?

Renaissance of Iranian Wisdom, Iranian Modernity, and the Turkish Language

In an interview with the July 2013 issue of Mehrnameh, Sayed Javad Tabatabai, in response to a question regarding certain demands in Iran for the teaching of the Turkish language in schools, expressed opposition to focusing more on the Turkish language and culture while emphasizing the importance and superiority of the Persian language. His remarks about the Turkish language sparked considerable debate and controversy. The central point of Tabatabai's argument in this interview regarding the Turkish language can be summarized as follows: he stated that the Persian language and Iranian culture possess an intrinsic capability and unique richness that Turkish lacks: "The masterpiece of contemporary Azerbaijani is nothing more than 'Haydar Babaye Salâm,' and beyond that, one cannot extend that language." Based on this inherent deficiency, as well as the lack of a rich literary tradition, he criticized the idea of requesting the teaching of the Turkish language in Iran, stating, "All available Azerbaijani literary resources could be taught in two semesters at the university for Pan-Turkists."

Javad Tabatabai

This opinion can be examined from various perspectives, such as linguistics (Is it really true that the Turkish language has no potential for further expansion?), literary history (Is it really true that Turkish literary sources are "Azerbaijani" and impoverished?), ethics (Can the literary poverty of a language justify the prohibition of its formal teaching?), politics (What implications does the teaching of an official language have in the political system of Iran?), or intellectual sociology-psychology (Why does Mr. Tabatabai, whose mother tongue is Turkish, hold such views about the Turkish language?). This article serves as an introduction to analyzing this viewpoint from the perspective of cultural studies. It will primarily critique and analyze some of the epistemological and historiographical assumptions underlying this viewpoint, and although it is written in response to Tabatabai's remarks, it pertains to contemporary nationalist discourse in Iran and seeks to reevaluate some of the assumptions of this discourse.

Tabatabai's remarks regarding the Turkish language should be understood within the framework of his intellectual system or his research project titled "Iranian Modernity." The general argument of Tabatabai's research project "Iranian Modernity" can be summarized as follows: before Islam, there was an indigenous culture in Iran, which he refers to as "Iranian wisdom." This culture and Iranian wisdom underwent a "two-century silence" following the Arab invasion (as noted by Abdol Hossein Zarrin Koob), but then "phoenix-like" revived and manifested itself in the philosophy and literature of the "Golden Age of Iranian Culture," spanning from the 3rd to the 6th centuries AH. This period experienced a longer eclipse due to the dominance of the Turkic-Mongolian tribes, from the 7th century to the 13th AH—until the 19th century—which he refers to as the "Middle Ages of Iran." In his book "The Decline of Political Thought in Iran," Tabatabai states: "During this period, after a two-hundred-year silence, the Golden Age of Iranian culture began, and then, with the end of this era, especially with the Mongol invasion, centuries began that must be called the Middle Ages of Iran."

According to Mr. Tabatabai, Iranian wisdom is experiencing a new renaissance in the past century, and a necessary condition for this renaissance is a thorough study and understanding of the decline that this culture has undergone. This renaissance serves as a prelude to "Iranian modernity." Mr. Tabatabai's main mission is to study this decline to prepare the ground for the renaissance. He concludes his book The Decline of Political Thought in Iran with the statement: "The discussion of the decline of Iranian thought and the effort to elucidate its logic is the only path that will lead to the realm of renaissance—perhaps, one could say, the second renaissance—of Iran [...] This book is merely a temporary introduction to that."

Considering this perspective, we can understand why Mr. Tabatabai strongly opposes the Turkic nationalist intellectual-political movement in Iran. This Turkic movement seeks to revive the culture that, according to Mr. Tabatabai, has plunged "Iranian wisdom" into its longest eclipse. However, the question arises: what kind of "existence" does Iranian wisdom have? Is it a realistic entity, like the sun, that objectively appeared at a certain point in history, only to undergo eclipses and reappear? Or are these appearances and eclipses, along with the factors that contribute to them, constructed based on contemporary power and knowledge relations? The hypothesis of this article posits the constructed and constructive nature of these concepts. To explore this issue, it is first necessary to briefly review some recent developments in cultural studies and the humanities.

Post-Western Historiography, "Provincializing" Europe, and Multiple Modernities

The "Iranian modernity" project, conceived as a modernity with indigenous roots and, in some interpretations, somewhat different from European-Western modernity, relates to those historical and cultural studies that have revisited the classical understanding of modernity and modernization since the 1970s. In the classical understanding, for example in the sociology of Max Weber, modernity was generally regarded as a European phenomenon associated with certain characteristics of Western society and individuals, such as instrumental and goal-oriented rationality. Accordingly, the modernization of non-Western societies—if anyone believed that they could become modern—was largely seen as imitation and following the Western model. In other words, modernization was equated with "Westernization." This perspective on modernization was criticized from the beginning, both in the West and in peripheral countries, including Iran. However, since the 1970s, this reevaluation has become more widespread in academic fields, leading to a scientific reconsideration of classical theories of modernity, which questioned certain characteristics of these theories, including Eurocentrism. Critics emphasized both the plurality of modernity sources and the diversity in its expansion and realization, leading to discussions of "multiple modernities" or "alternative modernities." Shmuel Eisenstadt is one of the earliest and most renowned representatives of the critique of Eurocentrism in the classical conception of modernity. According to Eisenstadt, modernity takes on specific forms and characteristics in each region through interaction with indigenous resources (history, culture, religion, etc.). Thus, instead of using the singular term "modernity," which is generally understood to mean its Western interpretation, we should speak of "multiple modernities." Some authors use the term "alternative" instead of "multiple" to emphasize the differences between non-Western modernities and the Western model.

The possibility of discussing multiple (alternative, indigenous) modernities arose when classical modern historiography, which was Eurocentric, came under scrutiny. In modern classical European historiography, Europe was seen as the center, and the history of other nations was considered a prelude to it. In this historiography, based on the model of "ancient, medieval, and modern," everything that occurred from, for instance, the fourth to the fourteenth centuries was deemed medieval and, therefore, superstitious and unimportant. The West extended this perception of its history to the history of the world. Consequently, all philosophy, science, and literature developed during the height of Islamic civilization were preemptively regarded as "medieval" and thus insignificant. Due to Europe's hegemonic position, this view was also imposed on non-European nations. Muslims, for instance, viewed their history and culture through the lens of European Orientalism and found it lacking in serious value, which has been referred to as "deep Orientalism" in peripheral countries. Thus, perspectives, even in peripheral countries, were more focused on Europe than on their own histories.

As mentioned, this historiography has been seriously challenged in recent decades. It has been accused of essentialism and exclusivism: a narrative that constructs the "self" by creating the "other" through addition and omission. Accordingly, what is referred to as the "West" is a historical narrative and a social construct rather than an objective and factual history. Edward Said's theory of "Orientalism" has been a significant work in this discourse, arguing through post-structuralist theories, especially Foucault's concepts of power-knowledge and discourse, that the "East," as the "other," was constructed by the discourse of Orientalism to define its own superiority. Thus, in post-colonial studies, discussions of "decolonizing history" emerged, meaning that just as Europe physically occupied and colonized the world, it also occupied history and wrote the history of the world from its own perspective or centricity. Therefore, to free history from European (mental) colonization, it is necessary to change the perspective on history and rewrite it. Chakrabarty's book titled Provincializing Europe effectively conveys this meaning and transformation; if Europe has previously been considered the center and capital of the world, it is now time to believe in a "multipolar" world and understand Europe as one of the provinces of the global community. The Iranian modernity project of Mr. Seyyed Javad Tabatabai emerged under the influence of these developments in Western academia and in light of the critique of Eurocentric historiography. In the introduction to his book The Tabriz School, he refers to some of these critiques, including Jacques Le Goff's views on the inaccuracy of applying European historical periods—ancient, medieval, and modern—to cultures outside of Europe.

From Historiography to the Hermeneutics of History: History as Text

In the previous section, it was explained that the "plural" conception of modernity arose from a reevaluation of the concept of history and Eurocentric historiography. This section addresses the epistemological roots of new and plural historiography. The departure from Eurocentric historiography was made possible by fundamental transformations in epistemology and hermeneutics. In postmodern epistemology, previous notions of understanding and reading as achieving meaning and truth independent of the human mind have been challenged. In this paradigm, the traditional and modern concept of truth as a state independent of the mind and external to it has been set aside. In postmodern philosophy, truth is more something that is "constructed" by the human mind rather than a condition that is "discovered" by humans. Furthermore, there is not a singular truth but multiple truths, as the "contexts" that construct these truths are diverse. In the traditional and modern model, the human mind, as Richard Rorty puts it, resembles a mirror reflecting external realities. The task of humans is to maintain this mirror, the mind, so that external reality is accurately and clearly reflected rather than distorted or skewed. The work of Aristotelian logic is essentially to polish this mirror and prevent stains (fallacies) that might cause the images in the mind's mirror to be distorted or misrepresented. Although this notion of knowledge was questioned and reevaluated in modern philosophy, particularly in Kant's critique of pure reason, truth was still considered a matter of discovery rather than construction. While this text does not allow for a deeper discussion of these transformations in epistemology, it may be possible to continue this paradigmatic shift in understanding as an introduction to understanding new historiography from a hermeneutic perspective.

In classical hermeneutics, it was believed that the reader "discovers" the meaning intended by the author, which is carried by the text. However, in new hermeneutics, "reading" is a phenomenon and process that is deeper and more complex than discovering the author's intent or the "single" meaning hidden within the text. Reading is a process and phenomenon that involves the author, the text, and the reader. The reader not only discovers the meaning intended by the author but may also extract meanings from the text that the author did not intend. In "reading," the reader's desires, wishes, and imaginations also enter the text. This is why it is said that every reading is also a "rewriting," and the reader of any text is simultaneously its author. The various interpretations of religion that emerged in Iran in the 1970s were inspired by these theories. Reader-centered reading can be seen in the thoughts of Gadamer, Roland Barthes, and Derrida. Barthes' famous theory of the "death of the author" is also related to this, as reading and understanding are issues that transcend and are independent of the author's intent, and each reading is, in fact, accompanied by the death of the author.

Now, if we consider intertextual hermeneutics and extend reader-centered hermeneutics to non-textual matters, understanding history as a text allows us to assert that every historiography is not an objective discovery and narration of the course of history but rather a re-creation of that history. Historical events are like words in a text, where the narrator emphasizes certain words that resonate with their own framework and mental world, while some words go unnoticed, and others are understood differently from what the author intended. The role of imagination and the process of inclusion and exclusion in historical reading is greater because historical words have never reached us in an organized manner, like a book. In recent decades, historiography has been regarded more as "creation" and "imagination" than as the discovery and analysis of historical realities. The historical text, as Hayden White, a significant theorist of historiography, suggests, is a "narrative"; every history, like literature, is the creation of a narrative and does not differ much from a literary text. White's perspective is considered a turning point in historiography. Benedict Anderson's view, which sees the nation as a product of imagination in his book Imagined Communities, can also be interpreted from this angle. Historical events are, in a sense, silent, and it is the historian who gives them meaning through their interpretation and narrative, and in subsequent references to this written history, history is "reconstructed." This reconstruction is, in fact, a re-creation of history that is more faithful to the "map" of the reference point—their wishes, desires, hopes, and fears—than to the actual historical events. Another theory that aids in understanding this project of some Iranian nationalist intellectuals is "collective memory." In addition to individual memory, we also have collective memories. Collective memory, for instance, the collective memory of Iranian identity, is always in the process of actively reconstructing its status; some elements are removed, some are highlighted, and some are temporarily set aside. In this process, a nation is formed. A historian or interpreter of history, as a manager of the "collective memory" of a group, architects and reconstructs the collective memory, or "national consciousness," by removing certain elements of this memory and adding others to it—though one might say that in many cases, they fundamentally create and invent it. The role of memory and imagination in "creating" a collective identity is something that cannot be ignored in contemporary historiography and cultural studies. The constructed or social construction of nationality or identity is understood in this sense.

The Emergence, Eclipse, and Renaissance of Iranian Rationalism as Historical Narrative and Social Construct

According to this hermeneutic understanding of history, history—such as the history of Iran—is no longer a singular situation in the past that is "recorded" by the historian, such as Juvayni, and then "discovered" by a later reader, such as Seyyed Javad Tabatabai. Instead, it consists of narratives that are "interpreted" and "constructed" by historians and later readers. These narratives and constructs are generally created based on the context of the narrative. The social conditions of the narrator, their psychological and social needs, as well as their hopes and despairs typically shape that narrative. An author's interpretation of a historical situation is, to some extent, a tableau that reflects the narrator's desires, hopes, and wishes. What occurs in Mr. Tabatabai's narrative is that he, like any other historian, constructs a narrative of Iranian history by omitting certain elements and adding others, subsequently presenting it as a "single" historical "truth," which serves as the foundation for a socio-political-intellectual project, namely "Iranian Modernity." Knowledge and understanding are constructed discursively and dialogically rather than discovered. By applying hermeneutics to historiography, one can say that what is introduced as history in historiographies is actually the "reading" of the historian or any other reader of that history, such as Mr. Tabatabai. In the realist conception of historiography, it seems that historians discover and transmit historical events and realities; thus, Mr. Tabatabai "discovers" the "culture and rationalism of Iranian thought" in ancient Iran or the "golden age of Iranian culture," and analyzes its decline after the Arab conquests and the invasions by Turkic-Mongolian forces to prepare the ground for the renaissance of that Iranian rationalism. This entire theory assumes that his historiography "discovers" the historical "realities," such as the emergence and eclipse of Iranian rationalism.

When Seyyed Javad Tabatabai speaks of the spirit of Iranian rationalism in his works and searches for the "Phoenix" of Iran in the works of medieval thinkers—who rises from the ashes of the Arab invasions—he is also constructing, and this does not necessarily stem from historical realities. This is because we do not have access to raw history. History is always rewritten and even re-created, rather than discovered as an external matter and an objective narrative. In other words, history is a "narrative" (Hayden White), and a nation is an imagined entity (Benedict Anderson). According to the theory of collective memory, in every process of forming national consciousness, certain elements are omitted while others are added. These omissions and additions are always based on certain imaginations, which are products of individual and collective psychological-social needs, desires, and wishes. This is what is meant when it is said that history is not merely transmitted but is created and constructed. So far, these constructions have presented themselves as objective and realist. Mr. Tabatabai's project of modernity, as its name suggests, still relies on modern historiography—historiography that has been critically scrutinized in recent decades. Certain characteristics of modernist historiography, such as originality, beginnings, purity, and essence, are now critiqued as myths of modernity. Emphasis is now placed on the composite, relational, translational, and constructive nature of identities. Currently, many research projects are re-examining many of these "historical narratives" that were constructed during the modern period. The University of Cologne had a series of lectures in the summer term of 2013 titled "Alienation: Perspectives on the Other," which revisits and deconstructs modern Europe's "othering." In one of these lectures, titled "The Archaeology of Greece: An Archaeology of the Other?", the speaker demonstrated how "Greece" was constructed in recent centuries as a model of democratic and rational Europe through archaeological studies.

The Project of Iranian Modernity and Its Historiography Features

The project of "Iranian Modernity" proposed by Mr. Seyyed Javad Tabatabai and other intellectuals such as Abbas Milani and Mohammad Tavakoli-Targhi represents a revision of the classical understanding of modernity and Eurocentric historiography, aiming to reinterpret Iranian history for an "Iranian Modernity." This effort is undoubtedly understandable and commendable. Non-European intellectuals—including Chinese, Indian, Turkish, Iranian, Arab, Mexican thinkers, and others—enhance the potential for the flourishing of peripheral countries by critically rereading Western modernity and reclaiming their own history and resources. Without indigenous readings of history and culture, achieving sustainable growth and development will be challenging.

A critique that can be directed at the theorists of Iranian modernity, specifically Mr. Tabatabai, is the repetition of incorrect tactics such as exclusivism, essentialism, and purity in regional historiography. Below, I briefly outline some of these tactics:

A. Exclusivism and Perception of Self as Center and Unique Position: If classical European modern historiography in the 18th and 19th centuries defined all non-European histories and cultures in the shadow of its own history and considered non-European peoples as lacking their own history and culture, the theorists of Iranian modernity similarly define Iran as the center and foundation of regional history and culture. From their perspective, the other nations of the region are not only seen as lacking history, culture, and literature but also defined as invaders and disruptors of this culture; invaders who caused the two-century eclipse (Arabs) and the thousand-year medieval period (Turks) of "Iranian intellect." While European colonial historiography created a global center-periphery model, Iranian modernity theorists construct a regional center-periphery model by centering and emphasizing Persian within Iranian modernity. Just as Hegel considered the Prussian society to be the place for the realization and expansion of the "absolute spirit," for Tabatabai, Iranian intellect is the essence of the region's culture and knowledge, with present-day Iran as the place for its renaissance— a place that must be protected from the taint of impure Arabic and Turkish elements. If Mr. Tabatabai has gained the opportunity to speak of "Iranian modernity" today, it is thanks to the transition from essentialist and exclusivist historiography, and it is no longer possible to construct an exclusivist historical narrative on an Iranian scale.

B. Essentialist Othering: Just as Western modernity engaged in a kind of essentialism that led to the "othering" of non-European societies, defining them as inherently uncivilized and cultureless, Iranian modernity employs the same strategy. For instance, Mr. Tabatabai claims that the Turkish language lacks literature and states, "The entirety of Azerbaijani literature can be taught to pan-Turkists in two terms," asserting that the Turkish language is "inherently" incapable of flourishing, claiming, "The masterpiece of the current Azerbaijani language is Haidar Babaye Salām, and no further expansion can be achieved in that language." This statement should be examined linguistically, but besides the numerous classical works in Turkish, the fact that this language currently serves as a medium of flourishing literary and intellectual creativity in Turkey, including winning a Nobel Prize in literature, suffices to refute Mr. Tabatabai's view. Interestingly, Mr. Tabatabai makes no reference to Turkey in his discussions to justify his perspective.

C. Static Historicism: Mr. Tabatabai's view of culture and historiography is static. This static view leads to the notion that, because the Turkish language, for instance, presumably lacks a rich literature, it will remain that way (descriptive), and worse, it ought to remain that way (prescriptive). He argues that because the Persian language and culture were strong and expansive at a certain historical juncture and played a crucial role in the flourishing of civilization, that reality must be sustained. He derives prescriptive conclusions for the present and future from a historical "fact," claiming that this language and culture—and what he calls "Iranian intellect"—should be preserved while denying peripheral languages and cultures the opportunity for development. However, a historical fact need not remain unchanged forever. Latin once spread from Europe to Asia, just as Persian, according to Mr. Tabatabai's assertions, spread from Asia to the borders of Europe. Each language experiences periods of flourishing. If Mr. Tabatabai's reasoning holds for the disregard of the Turkish language due to its lesser richness compared to Persian, then the arguments of those in the 15th and 16th centuries in Europe opposing attention to indigenous non-Latin languages such as English, French, German, etc., would also have been valid. Mr. Tabatabai’s reasoning resembles that of someone in the 15th or 16th century who, as local languages gradually replaced Latin in Europe, would argue that due to the richness of Latin literature, exclusive support should be given to Latin, neglecting languages like English and German. A German in the 16th century might have argued, "What is the German language that we should abandon the rich Latin for it?" From our historical perspective, we can easily judge that argument and be grateful that the arguments of that "pan-Latinist" did not gain widespread support; otherwise, we would not have the rich literatures of English, German, French, etc. today. If we apply Mr. Tabatabai's logic, it could be said that all German literature in the 15th century could be taught in not two terms, but in two weeks, to 15th-century "pan-Germanists," and the German language could not be expanded beyond "Akerman the Bohemian." Latin has retreated into history, while English, German, French, and other languages have become the vehicles for some of the most beautiful literary and philosophical creations in human history, including Hegel's philosophy, to whom Mr. Tabatabai claims to owe a debt. By abandoning Latin, Germans distanced themselves from Augustine and Aquinas; however, this deprivation facilitated the birth and flourishing of Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger. Mr. Tabatabai may think that in order to nurture and develop modernity in the region, it is necessary to preserve Persian as the vehicle of this modernity, believing he is doing something good for this land and, in a sense, "othering" for lofty goals. However, he may want to reconsider this point and, taking into account the multiplicity and dynamism of the historical processes of languages, cultures, and nations, ponder that this spiteful "othering" may not only fail to contribute to the flourishing of the culture and modernity of the region but also obstruct the development and blossoming of the cultures and nations in the area.

It is a cognitive error to believe that a historical situation should persist (value-based) or will persist (existentially non-value-based). History is dynamic and "potential." Just as Latin once left the scene with all its ancient history and literary richness, allowing for the birth and growth of numerous European languages from German to French and English, Persian may also experience such a shift. Latin withdrew from Europe, and the retreat of Persian as a dominant literary language—not exclusive—of the region can also be observed from the second half of the second millennium CE. This retreat began first from the Ottoman Empire, then from the Indian subcontinent, as well as the Caucasus and Central Asia. Now this retreat continues; time is pregnant with the birth of the Pashtun nation, and Persian, as the official exclusive language, is also retreating from Afghanistan, suggesting that this retreat is now reaching the borders of Iran, with Persian on the verge of retreating from Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Baluchistan, and so on. One might say that Persian is gradually returning to its natural borders. The role of Persian intellectuals in this period is not to resist the flourishing of other cultures in the region but to accompany the national awareness of Persian in this "return" to natural borders and to attempt to alleviate the pain of this contraction.

Mr. Tabatabai's historiography has another aspect, which is the conditioning of any transformation and development on history. It seems that because a certain ethnicity, such as Arabs or Turks, did not have an empire in the first millennium BC or AD, they are deemed to lack the right and possibility for development and transformation. In their discussions, they frequently assert that since Turkey or Azerbaijan lacks an independent history (!!), they have a fabricated identity. In this regard, the example of Europe may be enlightening, as this reasoning could lead to the conclusion that many European nations possess a fabricated identity. According to this logic, Germany, for instance, which does not have a long cultural history and attained its independence from Latin through the elevation of its local language to a formal status during the Renaissance, is said to have a fabricated identity. If we translate this Iranian historicism into the European context, it would imply that an Italian might now look down on a German for lacking a glorious ancient past, something that would be perceived more as a joke. Mr. Tabatabai and Iranian nationalism, which often employ such antiquarian reasoning, have actually built their foundations on such shaky grounds.

Purity and Authenticity Ideology

Classical historiography is also purity-oriented and speaks of itself as something pure and devoid of foreign elements. In this perspective, the mixed and composite nature of a culture is ignored. This historiography, after introducing the "other" ethnic group as inherently devoid of culture and civilization, disregards the contributions and roles of other ethnicities in the formation of culture and appropriates them to the advantage of the dominant ethnicity. Thus, for Mr. Tabatabai, Islamic civilization is presented as the product of Iranian intellect. However, what he refers to as "Iranian intellect" from the works of Farabi, Ibn Sina, Khajeh Nasir al-Din Tusi, and Nizam al-Mulk is a blend of Greek, Arabic, Indian, Iranian, and Turkish cultures, which themselves are, in turn, a legacy of previous Middle Eastern civilizations such as Sumerian, Babylonian, Assyrian, Semitic, etc. One must ask whether political thought during the golden age of Iranian culture was more influenced by Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics or by the Letter of Tansar. Traditional historiography generally makes claims of authenticity, purity, and originality. Mr. Tabatabai's "Iranian intellect" is claimed to be fundamentally Iranian, while non-Iranian elements are defined not as contributors but as destructive and corrupting influences.

Conclusion: Post-Iranian Historiography, the "Municipalization" of "Iranian City," and Diverse Modernities in the Region

The project of "Iranian Modernity" seeks to utilize a re-examination of the classical conception of modernity and post-Western historiography, which has become the dominant paradigm in cultural studies in recent decades. It aims to facilitate the flourishing of a local "Iranian" identity free from the heavy shadow of Eurocentrism. However, it neglects the principles of this new paradigm, including its diverse, contingent, and composite nature, and continues to construct an exclusive, purity-oriented, and essentialist "Iran/Persian-centered" historiography, which began in the late 19th century, especially during the Pahlavi regime. The "Iranian Modernity" project is, in fact, marked by an internal inconsistency; it defines itself against the West based on later theories in cultural studies as a form of indigenous modernity, yet it continues to operate vis-à-vis neighboring nations according to 19th-century, specifically essentialist and exclusionary theories. If the pluralism of modernity at a global level is commendable, it must also be upheld at a regional level. Iranian-Persian modernity, as well as its historical constituents such as "Iranian intellect," can be constructed, but this "construction" must avoid the essentialist, exclusivist, and authenticity-oriented myths employed in European modernity. Just as Chakrabarty speaks of the de-Eurocentrization of history and the "municipalization" of the "European Empire" at a global level, we must also discuss the de-Persianization of history and the municipalization of "Iranian City" and the "Iranian Empire" at a regional level.


Footnotes

[1]  "Max Webers Soziologie des Jainismus im Licht der neueren Forschung" (20.07.2013)

[2] Peter Fögel

[3] Zweckrational, instrumental reason / action

[4] Europa als Sonderfall

[5]  برای برخی از مقالات و نقدها به "پرونده ای درباده انکار تاریخ" در سایت آنلام مراجعه شود.

[6]  گفتگو با سیدجواد طباطبایی: تسویه حساب با چریک ها

[7]  زوال اندیشه سیاسی ایران: گفتار در مبانی نظری انحطاط ایران، تهران، ۱۳۸۹، ص ۱۲۲ .

[8] همان، ص ۳۷۸.

[9]  Post-western hisoriography

[10] Provincializing Europe

[11] در این زمینه به کارهای مهرزاد بروجردی، عباس میلانی، و محمد توکلی-طرقی مراجعه شود

 Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1996); Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi. Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and historiography (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001)

 ;عباس میلانی،  تجدد و تجدد ستیزی در ایران. تهران: نشر اختران، ۱۳۸۷- چاپ هفتم، چاپ اول ۱۳۷۸

[12] این بازنگری، ابعاد دیگر روایت کلاسیک از مدرنیته از جمله سکولاریسم، فردگرایی و عقلگرایی را نیز شامل می شود. پتر برگر، چارلز تیلور، هابرماس، و کازانووا ا برخی از نویسندگانی هستند که سکولاریسم و فردگرایی مدرنیته را مورد بازنگری قرار داده اند. به عنوان مثال رجوع شود به

Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (New York: Anchor Books, 1967); Jose Casanova, Public religions in the modern world (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); Jürgen Habermas, “Secularism's Crisis of Faith: Notes on Post-Secular Society.” New Perspectives Quarterly, 25, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 17- 29; Judith Butler, Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor and Cornel West, The Power of Religion in Public Sphere (New York: Colombia University Press, 2011).

[13]  Multiple Modernities

[14]  Alternative Modernities

[15]  Shumel Eisenstadt (ed.) Multiple Modernities (Daedalus, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2000).

[16]  Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar (ed.) Alternative Modernities (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).

[17] Sheldon Pollock. "Deep Orientalism? Notes on Sanskrit and Power beyond the Raj." in Carol Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer (eds.), Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament (Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), pp. 76-133.

[18] Decolonization of history

[19] Dipesh Chakrabaty. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

[20]  سید جواد طباطبائی. مکتب تبریز و مبانی تجددخواهی، تبریز: انتشارات ستوده، ۱۳۸۴، ص

[21]  Richard Rorty. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

[22]  Hayden White.  Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1973).

[23]  Benedict Anderson. Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (London: Verso, 1991).

[24]  Maurice Halbwachs. On collective memory (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1992); Jan Assmann. Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen (C. H. Beck, München 1992).

[25] Projection

[26] "ققنوس فرهنگ و تمدن ایرانشهری، پیش از آنکه خواب عدم آن را سرگردان کند، سر از خاکستر خود برداشت." (گفتار در مبانی نظری انحطاط ایران: زوال اندیشه سیاسی در ایران، تهران، ۱۳۸۹، ص ۳۶۸)

[27] Hybridity

[28] Relational

[29] Translational

[30] Constructive

[31]  Fremdheit – Perspektiven auf das Andere, (21.07.2013)

[32]  Griechische Archäologie. Eine Archäologie des Fremden?

[33] Abbas Milani. Lost Wisdom: Rethinking Persian Modernity in Iran (Mage Publisher, 2004).

[34]  Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi. Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and historiography (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

[35]  Der Ackermann aus Böhmen (ca. 1400)

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