Babak Bakhtavar: Some Politicians in Iran's Islamic Republic Still Value Their Turkish Identity

Alirza Quluncu, Voice of America, September 09, 2017

Babak Bakhtavar

Babak Bakhtavar highlights the longstanding sensitivity of Iranian governments toward Turkish identity and name, dating back to the Pahlavi era. In an interview with Voice of America, the London-based activist analyzed the Islamic Republic’s approach to Iran’s three border provinces where Turkish identity is strongest. He also discussed the fate of the Turkish Regions Faction and the diminishing influence of Turkish politicians in President Hassan Rouhani’s new cabinet.


According to Bakhtavar, the declining presence of Turkish politicians in the new cabinet and the exclusion of any politicians from Azerbaijan’s three border provinces is a direct result of the rising anti-Turkish policies in Iran over the past decade—policies also pursued by Hassan Rouhani.

“In the last ten years, Persian nationalism and anti-Turkish policies have gained dominance, both within the Iranian government and among Persian opposition groups abroad. Rouhani is not separate from this trend—he is part of it. His new policies are not coincidental.

Even in previous governments, Turkish ministers were mostly assimilated figures who either followed Persian nationalism or aligned themselves with the policies of the Islamic Republic,” Bakhtavar stated.

However, he pointed out that some politicians from these regions, despite being part of the system, occasionally create difficulties for the Iranian government. In this context, he cited the activities of Akbar Alami, a former member of parliament from Tabriz.

“When we look at past years, some MPs from Azerbaijan—such as Akbar Alami and, currently, Nader Ghazipour—have sometimes raised national issues, causing trouble for the government,” said Bakhtavar.

The Significance of Raising National Issues in Iranian Politics

Bakhtavar emphasized the importance of Iranian officials bringing up national demands and facts:

“The statements of these politicians remain factual due to their presence within the system. For example, when Iran’s former foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, was on an official visit to Turkey, he stated that 40% of Iran’s population is Turkish. This was a [statistical] fact coming from an Iranian official.”

The Importance of Iran’s Three Border Provinces (West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, and Ardabil)

Drawing attention to historical movements led by figures like Sattar Khan, Khyabani, and Pishevari, Bakhtavar underscored the significance of these provinces in modern history.

“From a historical perspective, Turkish identity, culture, and political structures have been strong in these regions… The government feels most pressured by these areas. Reactions to insults against Turks, for example, began in Tabriz, Urmia, and Ardabil on May 22, 2006, before spreading elsewhere.

Politicians running for parliamentary or city council elections from these regions are also compelled to address national demands because, since the 1990s, this discourse has become dominant in these provinces. However, in Khorasan or among the Qashqais, it is not as strong. In Zanjan, it is somewhat stronger, but not as much as in the three border provinces,” Bakhtavar explained.

He added that this trend is not necessarily tied to the personal beliefs of figures like Akbar Alami or Nader Ghazipour.

“Ghazipour is a disciple of the Supreme Leader (Vali-e-Faqih) and was involved in the Iran-Iraq War. The issue is that anyone seeking votes from these regions must engage with this discourse to some extent,” he added.

Contradictory Statements on the Turkish Regions Faction and Sensitivity Toward the "Turkish" Name

Bakhtavar also shared his thoughts with Voice of America on recent contradictory statements regarding the Turkish Regions Faction and the sensitivity surrounding the name “Turkish” in the Iranian Parliament.

He attributed these contradictions to differing perspectives among MPs within the faction on national issues.

“Of course, there are people within the government who identify as Turkish while simultaneously wanting to be politicians in the Islamic Republic. They see no contradiction in this.

For instance, Nader Ghazipour or the former governor of Salmas—who removed Ferdowsi’s statue from a city square—are examples of such individuals,” he noted.

Bakhtavar was referring to an incident where the statue of Ferdowsi, a central figure in Persian nationalism, was removed from a square in Salmas. The statue was later reinstalled, and according to local journalists, the governor was dismissed from his position following the incident.

Bakhtavar also pointed out that some politicians, such as Masoud Pezeshkian, do not place much emphasis on national identity issues:

“For Masoud Pezeshkian, whether it is called the Turkish Faction or the Northwestern Provinces Faction may not make much of a difference,” he added.



Link to the original interview in Turkish on the Azerbaijani section of Voice of America:
Babək Bəxtavər: İslam Respublikasında siyasətçi olub amma türklüyünə önəm verənlər də var