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| Bulut Alemdar |
In an interview with Voice of America, political activist Bulut Alemdar evaluates the recent appointments of governors in Iranian Azerbaijan, saying, “I believe the recent appointments are similar to those made after the fall of the Azerbaijani National Government in 1946. Such appointments usually happen after a revolution or a coup.”
Bulut Alamdar points out that Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, through Ebrahim Raisi, has started new adjustments in the country's internal and foreign policies.
“The Azerbaijani region has always been important in the eyes of the state. It is the route to Europe, it borders Azerbaijan (Republic) and Turkey, and due to ethnic issues in our region, they pay more attention to the appointments here. The appointed governors and deputy governors are careful about which city they are from, what ethnic, sectarian, and ideological background they have. Looking at it, Ebrahim Raisi is pursuing one model policy in Western Azerbaijan, a different one in Eastern Azerbaijan, and another different one in Ardabil,” says the political activist.
He adds, “After the unsuccessful policies during Hassan Rouhani's era, now, with the new appointments, they want to achieve success. This is aimed at both foreign countries and at reducing, restricting, and controlling the political and cultural activities of people in the region.”
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| Seyyid Hamid Amili, Abidin Khorrami, and Mohammad Sadegh Mohtamidian. |
Ebrahim Raisi appointed General Abidin Khorrami, a commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah), as governor of East Azerbaijan; Seyyid Hamid Amili, a member of the ultra-conservative Amili family, as governor of Ardabil; and conservative politician Mohammad Sadegh Mohtamidian, originally from Kermanshah, as governor of West Azerbaijan.
According to Alamdar, the new appointments differ significantly from previous ones in terms of the criteria used:
“In previous periods, the usual tradition was that, when selecting a governor or a regional head, someone who had worked in various departments within that region would gradually rise to the position of governor. Or they would bring in someone who had studied urban planning, worked in urban affairs, or had experience in municipal work. They presented them to the population as capable of doing these jobs.”
Alamdar compares the recent appointments to those made after the fall of the Azerbaijani National Government in 1946:
“I believe the recent appointments are similar to those after the Pishveri period. Especially in recent years, there has been a rise in national identity and national spirit in the population, particularly due to the protests in the Azerbaijani region, as well as the issues related to Turkey and Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The demand for national rights is high. This is why appointing someone from the Revolutionary Guard, particularly General Abidin Khorrami, who was involved in organizing militia groups for terrorist groups in Syria, as governor shows that new policies are being introduced. Such appointments usually happen after a revolution or a coup.”
East Azerbaijan Province
Alamdar further explains, “When someone like Abidin Khorrami is appointed as governor, he does not come alone. He has a network. When these individuals are placed in key positions within the East Azerbaijan governorship, they have two goals: First, to militarize people from our region through various means, such as money, salaries, and deception, and use them to destabilize other countries. The second issue is that this person has a military mindset. According to this mindset, ‘those who are from us are with us, and those who are not are enemies who should be eliminated.’ This view sees opposition groups as ones that must be suppressed in the harshest way.”
Alamdar predicts that, after these appointments, the pressure on Turkish activists, particularly in Tabriz, will increase:
“Over the last 15 years, Tabriz has witnessed the most street protests in Iran. Tabriz has been one of the most active cities against the government. For this reason, I think we will see Turkish activists face more pressure from Sepah’s security department.”
Ardabil Province
Ebrahim Raisi’s appointment of Seyyid Hamid Amili as governor of Ardabil is notable because he is a prominent cleric and the relative of Seyyid Hasan Amili, a representative of the Supreme Leader in the Ardabil province. Seyyid Hasan Amili is especially known for his statements against the Republic of Azerbaijan and Turkey. He claims that he did not interfere in his relative's appointment as governor.
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| Seyyed Ali Khamenei's representative in Ardabil province, Seyyed Hasan Amili. |
“Seyyid Hasan Amili had previously protested against the governors of Ardabil. He even once said that if this governor does not do a certain task, he would lock the governor's office door in the morning and throw him out. The appointment of his relative as governor means that all the state employees in the province are essentially being consolidated into a single entity. By handing over Ardabil to a radical Shiite group in such a way, especially in a region that borders the Republic of Azerbaijan and has open doors, we can see that they are trying to direct the people towards more sectarian Shia ideology against Azerbaijan,” Alamdar states.
West Azerbaijan Province
Mohammad Sadegh Mohtamidian, a conservative politician from Kermanshah, has replaced Mohammad Mehdi Shahriyari, who was originally from North Khorasan, as governor of West Azerbaijan. Many public activists, including Turkish activists and some local politicians, are protesting the appointment of someone who is not from the region as governor of West Azerbaijan. The state agency IRNA introduced Mohtamidian as an "ethnic and regional issues researcher and expert."
According to Alamdar, “The important issue in West Azerbaijan is that it shares a border with Turkey, and the region is mostly populated by Turks, but also home to other ethnic groups like Kurds, Assyrians, and Christians. The Islamic Republic has tried to distance Urmia and West Azerbaijan's economic flow from Turkey and bring it closer to the local administration of Northern Iraq (Kurdistan). We see this in the regional politics. The second issue is that the new governor is from a region where Shiite ideology is strong. There are Sunnis in West Azerbaijan, including Sunni Turks. I think their protests will be more harshly suppressed. If the governor were a local person, the local population would be more tolerant. They could approach the Shiite-Sunni issue in a more friendly way. But I think this person’s arrival will have a negative impact on the Sunni population in that region. They say he is an expert in ethnic studies, but we have never seen any writings, interviews, books, or journals by this person. If something like this exists, it means he worked in the intelligence system and submitted his research to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence (Ettelaat).”
Link to the original interview in Turkish on the Azerbaijani section of Voice of America:
“İran Azərbaycanındakı yeni vali təyinatları bir inqilab və ya çevirilişdən sonrakı təyinatlar kimidir”