Linguistic, Cultural, Political, and Economic Repression Under the Pahlavi Regime
In Azerbaijan, the Turkish language faced systemic suppression, banned from schools, government offices, and media outlets. This strict language policy left Turkish speakers without newspapers or magazines in their own language, as all Turkish-language publications were prohibited. Students were forced to speak Persian in schools, facing fines or even corporal punishment if they used their mother tongue.
This suppression was part of a broader state-led effort to assimilate Azerbaijanis into Persian culture. Government-sponsored propaganda portrayed Turks as barbarians, and Turks who aspired to rise within the state hierarchy were compelled to deny their ethnic background. To further discourage cultural and economic independence, Tehran blocked investments in Azerbaijan by creating bureaucratic barriers to establishing local industries. Even when rare permissions were granted, financial support from banks remained elusive, forcing thousands of Azerbaijanis to migrate to Persian-majority cities to secure a livelihood.
The economic situation in Azerbaijan remained dire. "In contrast to the majority of people who lived in abject poverty, there was a relatively small class of rich landowners and merchants" (Fatemi, p. 79). People in Azerbaijan struggled to secure basic necessities, with food and other essentials in short supply. Living costs in Azerbaijan were disproportionately high compared to other regions, with rampant discrimination affecting access to basic goods. The inequities became so stark that residents questioned why, "while the sugar ration in the capital is 1.5 kilos per month, the ration for Azerbaijanis is no more than 400 grams—and that not per month but per season" (Atabaki, p. 86). Political corruption and exploitative landowners held sway over local governance, using the gendarmerie to oppress and control the peasantry rather than address their needs. Officials sent from Tehran treated Azerbaijani cities like Tabriz and Reza’iyeh (Urmu) as temporary profit centers. "Officials from the south find Tabriz and Reza’iyeh nothing more than dull villages where they can make money and get back to Tehran, or anywhere down south" (Atabaki, p. 86).
In this hostile environment, Azerbaijani workers had no rights. The government banned unions, eliminating any hope of organized labor movements. Freedom of speech was non-existent; the central government tightly controlled the press and radio. "Azerbaijan was a microcosm of the conditions existing in Iran" (Fatemi, p. 79).
Given these conditions, the desire for revolution was widespread in Azerbaijan, where socio-economic factors had created a fertile ground for change. Yet many Persian scholars and their Western counterparts dismissed these socio-economic factors, labeling the Azerbaijani movement as merely a Soviet-sponsored ploy. Persian liberal-minded scholars often championed internationalism when discussing oppressed peoples abroad but set aside this principle when addressing Azerbaijanis. As a result, an underlying prejudice emerged. This attitude was vividly reflected in the so-called progressive Persian media’s reaction to the formation of the Azerbaijani Democratic Government.
An excerpt from Iran-e Ma (Our Iran) captures this sentiment:
“In the view of our writers, it is perfectly obvious that the local language of Azerbaijan deserves respect. However, in our opinion, the local language of Azerbaijan can definitely not be the national language of our Azerbaijani fellow countrymen because we do not consider the people of Azerbaijan to be a nation separate from our other fellow countrymen and ourselves” (Atabaki, p. 104).
The Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan (1945-1946)
On September 3, 1945, the Azerbaijan Democratic Party (ADP) was founded in Tabriz. "Two days later, the Azerbaijan Province Committee of the Iran People's Party (Tudeh) merged with it" (Nissman, p. 33). Aware of Tehran's desire to suppress the revolution in Tabriz, the Central Committee of the ADP called on the people to take up arms to defend their government on November 9, 1945. Shortly afterward, the party began forming volunteer paramilitary units called "Fedayi." On November 23, 1945, the ADP’s Central Committee issued a proclamation stating its goal: the complete autonomy of Azerbaijan (Lencezowski, p. 288). On December 12, the Provincial National Assembly was formally inaugurated, composed of 101 deputies (Lencezowski, p. 289). On its first day in power, the National Parliament of Azerbaijan in Tabriz challenged the Shah's puppet government in Tehran by declaring the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan and establishing a government under the premiership of Mir Cefer Pisheveri to safeguard Azerbaijan’s autonomy.
The government declared that it had no intention of seceding from Iran. Unlike Soviet Azerbaijan, it did not pursue a large-scale nationalization program; private property was respected. A people’s army was formed from the local militia, and Turkish became the official language of the state. The government announced plans to distribute government-owned land to peasants, as well as land owned by reactionary landlords who collaborated with the enemy and fled the country. Universal suffrage was instituted. Within a short period, schools were established, Tabriz opened its first medical school, roads were repaired, and an eight-hour workday was introduced. In just one year, the democratic government of Azerbaijan had achieved more progress for the region than Riza Khan had in the previous 20 years of his reign.
The Azerbaijani crisis was the first issue brought before the Security Council on January 19, 1946. "Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh, head of the Iranian delegation to the General Assembly and the Iranian Ambassador to England, was instructed by Hakimi to refer Iran's complaint to the Security Council" (Fatami, p. 96). Tehran was deeply concerned about Soviet political support for Azerbaijan’s autonomous government.
Tehran’s inability to suppress Azerbaijan eventually led it to begin negotiations with Tabriz. It also employed diplomatic and economic tactics to dismantle the government in Tabriz. As many dictators do in times of weakness, Tehran partially conceded to Azerbaijani demands by signing a 15-point agreement in June 1946, which recognized some of Azerbaijan’s requests. To appease Russia, Tehran agreed to joint oil exploration in the northern provinces and, using diplomatic pressure supported by the U.S. and the U.K., pressured the Soviets to withdraw their forces. Finally, on March 24, 1946, the Soviet forces began their evacuation from Azerbaijan, completing the withdrawal by May 9, 1946.
Finally, with military aid from the U.S. and the U.K. and having secured approval from Moscow, Tehran launched a three-pronged attack on Azerbaijan. On December 12, 1946, the autonomous government fell. On their way in, the Iranian army committed terrible atrocities. Turkish textbooks were burned, and according to some accounts, over 50,000 people were killed.
The West's Approach
The West maintained a hostile stance toward the Azerbaijani government, employing all possible means to undermine it. Western political scientists, often viewing events through the lens of superpower rivalry, took a similarly negative view on the matter. Ignoring the socio-political realities within Azerbaijan, Western governments, media outlets, political scientists, and historians levied unfounded allegations against the Azerbaijani democratic government. Statements such as those made by George Lenczowski in his book Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1949 are typical of much Western scholarship:
a) The Democratic Party of Azerbaijan was nothing more than the Tudeh Party under a different name. "In the meantime Tudeh (The Communist Party of Iran) assumed a new name in the Azerbaijan province. It became known as the Democratic Party" (Lenczowski, p. 287).
b) The government was anti-democratic. Western governments and media sought to delegitimize the party by portraying it as undemocratic. This portrayal can be observed in their reactions to elections held by the National Government for the National Parliament: "These elections were carried out in an atmosphere of terror and intimidation and in their own crude way followed Soviet patterns. The Democratic Party was the only one presenting candidates. No organized opposition existed. The nationalist press, and even mail from other parts of Iran, was barred from entry into Azerbaijan or, in some cases, was burned outright by Soviet censors" (Lenczowski, p. 289).
c) The Democratic Party had no social base and was simply a puppet of the Soviets. "The state was a police state. Most of the cabinet members were imported from Russia" (Lenczowski, p. 290). To support his argument, Lenczowski recounts the story of Colonel William T. Sexton, the American military attaché in Tehran who wanted to assess the situation firsthand but was denied permission to enter Azerbaijan. "The Azerbaijani people's army, or the partisans, fedailar, were infiltrated by hundreds of Soviet agents from the Caucasus and largely composed of Armenians or Iranian ‘immigrants’ (Mohajirs) who had returned from the Soviet Union to their native country in 1936" (Lenczowski, p. 290).
From these statements, it is clear that Lenczowski, along with many Western governments, was determined to argue that the Autonomous Government had no national support, that Azerbaijanis were not in favor of autonomy, and that autonomy was promoted solely by Soviet agents and outsiders.
The Azerbaijani Government and the Kurds
Initially, the Azerbaijani Government was not supportive of an autonomous Kurdish state. As Bagirov, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, told a Kurdish delegation in Baku, "There was no need," he declared, "for the Kurds to hurry in forming their own state" (Eagleton, p. 44). Bagirov believed that Kurdish aspirations could be realized within Azerbaijani autonomy. However, the Kurdish delegation rejected this idea, insisting on establishing their own state. The Baku government understood that a Kurdish state was unlikely to gain recognition from the British and Turks and was also mindful of its own long-term vision for a unified Azerbaijan. This outlook led Baku to feel a closer affinity toward its kin to the south of the Araz River than to the Kurds.
On January 22, 1946, the Kurds declared their own state in the city of Soguqbulaq (now Mahabad). However, territorial disputes between Azerbaijan and Kurdistan soon arose, threatening the stability of both governments. To address these issues, and despite Kurdish objections, a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was signed on April 23, 1946, in Tabriz, facilitated by Soviet intermediaries. Kurdish support for Azerbaijan was largely tactical. Recognizing the close ties between Tabriz and Baku, as well as Baku’s strong connections with Moscow, the Kurds viewed their support of Tabriz as a way to secure military, economic, and diplomatic aid from Moscow in return.
Conclusion
The achievements of the Azerbaijani government during its one-year tenure profoundly impacted the people's sense of identity, fostering a greater awareness of their unique nationality. However, the fate of this government was ultimately shaped by the rivalry among major powers, rendering it the first victim of the Cold War. Without support from the United States, Britain, and Russia, Tehran would not have dared to attack Azerbaijan. The West's backing of the Shah’s regime was primarily motivated by economic interests, with ideological battles serving merely as reflections of competition over natural resources. The history of the Azerbaijani government illustrates a complex struggle for autonomy and identity amid language and cultural oppression, economic exploitation, and political repression by the Iranian state. The establishment of the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan in 1945 marked a significant yet brief period of self-determination, ultimately quashed by external pressures and internal divisions. Nevertheless, the conditions of ethnic, linguistic, and cultural marginalization, along with political oppression against Azerbaijan, continue to inspire aspirations for sovereignty and self-determination.
Bibliography
Atabaki, Touraj. Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth-Century Iran. British Academic, 1993.
Eagleton, William Jr. The Kurdish Republic of 1946. Oxford University Press, 1963.
Asgharzadeh, Alireza. "Remembering the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic." Qurtulush Magazine, 1997.
Fatemi, Faramarz S. The U.S.S.R. in Iran. London: Thomas Yoseloff Ltd., 1960.
Lenczowski, George. Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1949. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1949.