Ehsan Abedi – Radio Zamaneh - February 12, 2012
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| Ahwazi writer Yousef Azizi Benitorof. |
Human Rights Watch has reported the arrest of 65 individuals in Khuzestan Province for allegedly boycotting elections. The report also mentions the deaths of two detainees in prison and raises concerns about the health and safety of the remaining detainees.
But which political groups do these detainees belong to? What are their demands? And why do they lean toward boycotting elections?
Yousef Azizi Benitorof, a writer and political activist residing in the UK, answers these questions. In this interview, he attempts to provide a picture of the lives of Khuzestan’s predominantly Arab population, explaining the reasons for their dissatisfaction and the broader grievances of Iran’s non-Persian ethnic groups.
The widespread arrest of political activists in Khuzestan Province has been one of the recent events highlighted by Persian-language media. According to these reports, the arrested activists are accused of encouraging people to boycott the upcoming elections. However, it remains unclear which political group these activists belong to. Are they part of the Green Movement, or do they represent another political current?
Their aim to boycott elections may resemble that of the Green Movement, but the movement advocating for election boycotts within Khuzestan’s Arab community has no organizational ties to the Green Movement. In fact, the issues driving them to take this action are somewhat distinct from those of the Green Movement. Their boycott can be seen as a response to the specific oppression faced by Khuzestan’s Arab community and the inefficacy of their representatives in past parliamentary sessions.
However, since Iran’s judiciary has recently declared election boycotts a criminal act—an unprecedented move globally—it has provided an excuse for the arrest, harassment, and torture of Arab political activists. If this so-called “crime” is sometimes overlooked in Tehran or handled with less severity, it is met with double the punishment in non-Persian regions, where security officials have complete autonomy in implementing crackdowns.
Were the Recently Arrested Individuals Exclusively Arabs from Khuzestan?
Yes, at least 65 young Arabs were in detention as of two or three days before the release of Human Rights Watch’s statement. Two of them have died under torture: Nasser Albushokah Darvishan, who was killed in a secret prison in Ahvaz, and Mohammad Kaabi, who died in Shush prison.
Has This Information Been Confirmed by Official Sources?
Yes, photographs of these victims have been published, and Human Rights Watch has access to these images. Furthermore, the Ahwaz Human Rights Organization, based in the United States, has addressed this issue in a statement, confirming the reports. While the death toll may be higher, these killings have occurred only in recent days. Mr. Albushokah Darvishan was killed on January 30, and Mr. Mohammad Kaabi on February 2.
In March of last year, another Arab human rights activist, Reza Maqamsi, was killed under torture in Dezful prison. Similarly, in September, a young Arab named Hamed Asakreh was deliberately run over and killed by a military vehicle, in an incident resembling what occurred in Tehran during the Ashura protests. While the Tehran incident received widespread attention, the one in Khuzestan was largely ignored due to the metaphorical “wall” built around the province to suppress news from leaking out.
The authorities want to portray Khuzestan as a calm and stable region, given its strategic and geopolitical significance and its role as a major source of Iran’s wealth.
You might wonder why the regime treats Iranian Arabs in this manner. In response, I would say that if political activists in Tehran are suppressed, it is due to political animosity. However, the suppression of Arab activists stems not only from political animosity but also from racial hostility, resulting in double the pressure and harassment. For instance, over the past year, four Arabs have been killed.
Do Arabs in Khuzestan Face Greater Restrictions Than Other Residents?
Yes. They are denied education in their mother tongue in schools and cannot speak Arabic in court. As many are not fluent in Persian, this often leads to their rights being violated.
Approximately five million Arabs live in southern and southwestern Iran, but there are no newspapers for them, and publishing literary, social, or historical books in Arabic is fraught with obstacles.
Historically, until the early 20th century, Khuzestan was ruled by an Arab leader, Sheikh Khazal, and enjoyed political autonomy similar to what the Kurdistan Region of Iraq experiences today.
As a result of losing their political power, cultural rights, and economic opportunities, Khuzestan’s Arabs feel deeply marginalized. Despite living in an oil-rich region, many of them reside in slums such as Halabi Abad, Hasir Abad, and Gavamish Abad.
Is There a Rise in Separatist Tendencies Among Khuzestan’s Arabs?
Such tendencies exist, but there is no concrete measure to assess their extent, such as through surveys.
Ultimately, the greatest “separatist” is the central government in Tehran, which deprives these people of their cultural, social, and political rights while keeping them in poverty. Khuzestan’s Arabs live atop vast oil reserves, yet instead of reaping the benefits, their cities and villages grow increasingly impoverished as oil revenues fill the pockets of Revolutionary Guard commanders and clerics in power. So, the greatest separatist is Mr. Khamenei, who, despite being aware of the depth of poverty and deprivation among the Arabs of Khuzestan, continues to treat everything as a security issue and orders their suppression.
If the rights of Arabs were respected and discrimination were eliminated, would these separatist tendencies also disappear?
Citizens must be satisfied. A person can only consider a place their homeland when their citizenship rights are upheld there.
If the rights of these people are fully respected, and they are treated as first-class citizens—not third-class citizens—then, under such equality, there would be no motivation for separating from the country.
These tendencies are now not only emerging among Arabs but are also prevalent among other ethnic groups. This is a reaction to the oppression faced by these ethnicities. In Kurdistan, we have groups like PJAK that advocate for the separation of Iranian Kurdistan and its unification with other parts of Kurdistan in neighboring countries.
We are witnessing the rise of separatist tendencies in Azerbaijan, and the same is evident in Baluchistan. So, this is not exclusive to Arabs but a reaction by all non-Persian ethnic groups to the oppression of the Iranian government.
Currently, two types of oppression are prevalent in Iran. One is the oppression that affects all citizens, and the other is specific to non-Persian ethnic groups.
To address these issues, on one hand, general citizenship rights must be upheld so that all Iranians can enjoy democracy, freedom of thought, political freedom, and religious freedom. On the other hand, specific citizenship rights must be observed, tailored to ethnic groups and other minorities. In other words, equal rights must be granted to these ethnicities, bringing them on par with the dominant ethnicity.
In my opinion, inequality in citizenship rights in Iranian society begins with the Constitution. When the Constitution declares Shia Islam as the official religion of the country, non-Shia citizens are inevitably relegated to second-class status. Whereas, given that the majority of the country is Muslim, it would suffice to declare Islam as the official religion, encompassing both Shia and Sunni beliefs.
Similarly, when Persian is chosen as the official language, other ethnic groups, such as Arabs, Kurds, and Azerbaijanis, are accorded less importance. However, there is a solution to this issue as well. The languages of non-Persian ethnic groups could at least be recognized as official languages in their respective regions—for example, Arabic in Khuzestan, Kurdish in Kurdistan and Kurdish-majority areas, Azerbaijani in Azerbaijan, and so on—while Persian remains the lingua franca among Iranian citizens.
This is the only way to guarantee equality in citizenship rights, and through this approach, wealth and power can be distributed among the various ethnic groups of Iran to ensure the country’s unity. The current system does not fit Iranian society. Iran is a multi-religious and multi-ethnic society. It possesses cultural, linguistic, and religious pluralism, which necessitates its own unique political system.
From my perspective, this system could be a federal one that establishes equality among all Iranians, whether Persian, Kurdish, Arab, or others. Until this linguistic, cultural, and ethnic diversity is formally acknowledged and respected, Iran will not find peace.
My next question relates to the Green Movement, a movement aimed at achieving democracy and restoring citizenship rights. To what extent do you think non-Persian ethnic groups, particularly the Arab community in Khuzestan, believed in this movement and felt solidarity with it?
During the reformist period, I was in Iran and personally made significant efforts to work with reformists to implement even the minimal rights of ethnic groups emphasized in Iran’s Constitution. However, the reformists, just as they showed weakness in other areas and yielded to extremists, also failed to demonstrate determination in this regard.
The least they could have done was implement Article 15 of the Constitution, which paves the way for teaching the languages of ethnic groups in their elementary schools. Together with Kurdish, Azerbaijani, and other ethnic intellectuals, we held meetings with them multiple times—whether at the Ministry of Interior, the Research Center of the Parliament, or universities—but our discussions yielded no results. Mr. Khatami, just as he repeatedly retreated in the face of Mr. Khamenei and the hardliners, showed weakness again this time.
As a result, non-Persian ethnic groups became distrustful of the reformists. Their movements even turned radical. From the early 2000s until just two years ago when Rigi was captured, Baluchistan was engulfed in fire, bloodshed, and violence.
Between 2005 and 2007, there were several bombings in Khuzestan. In Kurdistan, clashes between some radical groups and government forces continued up to recent days—all of which indicate the disillusionment of non-Persian ethnic groups with the reformists. However, if you ask for my opinion, I would say that the Green Movement is part of Iran's democracy movement, though the programs of Messrs. Karroubi and Mousavi do not address all the issues of non-Persian ethnic groups.
Still, I must acknowledge that, in my view, Mr. Karroubi's programs in this regard were much better than Mr. Mousavi's. But since the movements of non-Persian ethnic groups had become radicalized, even these programs could not resolve the issues. Of course, by radicalization, I do not mean separatism or the pursuit of independence.
Until a few years ago, these movements were merely demanding the implementation of the Constitution concerning non-Persian ethnic groups. But now, they are talking about a federal system—myself included, as I prefer that all these provinces remain part of Iran. We have repeatedly called on Messrs. Mousavi and Karroubi through various media to raise their programs to the level of the expectations of non-Persian political forces, which is to endorse federalism. Yet, we received no response.
Therefore, we now have two categories within Iran’s democracy movement. One consists of the Greens, who are limited to Tehran and a few other Persian-majority cities like Isfahan and Shiraz. The other includes the non-Persian ethnic groups. After the election, we observed that the Green Movement did not extend beyond these cities to places like Tabriz, Ahvaz, Sanandaj, or Mahabad. Therefore, we need to find a way to align these two movements.
If the Green Movement leaders more explicitly support the non-Persian ethnic groups, could the two movements then come together?
They have supported and even proposed programs—especially Mr. Karroubi’s, which mentions local parliaments as well as teaching ethnic languages in schools.
But the ideal scenario is for them to accept a decentralized system, embodied in a federal framework. Today, 120 countries worldwide are governed federally, including Canada, the United States, Germany, Switzerland, Russia, Argentina, India, Iraq, the UAE, and more.
We see that this system has even proven effective in monolingual countries like Germany and the United States, let alone multilingual ones. Therefore, the two currents shaping Iran’s democracy movement must engage in dialogue and bring their perspectives closer together. Otherwise, neither the Green Movement nor the movement of non-Persian ethnic groups will succeed.
The link to the original article in Farsi on Radio Zamaneh:
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