Yashar Gulshen - March 17, 2013
The Iranian Left claims to defend the right to self-determination of peoples, and on this basis, it considers itself democratic. While this claim might be true for some Azerbaijani Leftist activists before the 1979 Revolution, what has unfolded after the fall of the Pahlavi regime, particularly in regard to the Azerbaijani national movement, contradicts the Iranian Left's claim.
A. The Azerbaijani National Movement and Its Struggle on Two Fronts
Until its recent resurgence, the Azerbaijani national movement's primary issue was with Iranian-Persian nationalists, such as the Pahlavi loyalists and the nationalists of the National Front, who, both directly and through individuals who would say, "I am Azerbaijani, but I consider myself Iranian first," or "My mother tongue is Azerbaijani, but I don’t identify as Turkish," would engage in discrediting, devaluing, and physically suppressing the Turks in Iran. The religious community generally showed no interest in these issues and, in order to expand their influence among Turks—who were an influential group in the religious sphere—presented themselves as part of the Islamic Ummah and avoided getting involved with the racist ideas of Pan-Iranism. On the other hand, in the Leftist circles among Azerbaijani activists, the issue of Azerbaijan and the rights of oppressed peoples in Iran had a special and positive place under the banner of the right to self-determination. Even though Azerbaijani Leftists, after the fall of the nationalist government and the reoccupation of South Azerbaijan by the central army in 1946, focused all their energy on fighting the Pahlavi regime and fought under a single, unified banner without prioritizing national demands, they justified this by saying that the root of all forms of national oppression in Iran lay with the Pahlavi regime and that after its fall, the national issue in Iran would find its democratic solution.
However, the 1979 Revolution, along with all the changes it brought, uncovered many contradictions and exposed the emptiness of many claims. Following the Revolution, the religious regime, which had previously been indifferent to the national issue in Iran, adopted the racist policies and national discrimination of the Pahlavi era, and after settling scores with its Turkish adversaries in the region, continued the mono-ethnic, mono-cultural system. Ironically, in this process, it also managed to garner the support of the Iranian Left. Meanwhile, as the new regime increasingly became an Islamic-Persian regime through the continuation of Pahlavi-era Aryan policies, the Iranian opposition restricted its struggle to the religious aspect and either ignored or openly endorsed the racist aspects. Thus, national liberation movements, which during the Pahlavi era saw hope for resolving national oppression alongside the so-called national forces, gradually came to the conclusion that the mono-ethnic, mono-cultural, and racist policies of the Pahlavi era had no place in the context of the deep contradictions between the new Islamic regime and its non-religious opponents. In this way, after the 1979 Revolution, the national fighters in Iran found themselves trapped between the Islamic-Persian regime and the centralist, Persian-dominated opposition, facing increasing pressure.
Factors Leading to the Growth of the National Struggle in South Azerbaijan
Nevertheless, much has changed in recent years. Today, after thirty-four years since the 1979 Revolution, the social and political scene in Iran and the balance of power in the international arena have undergone significant transformations. The crisis within the regime and the increasing contradictions between the people and the government have reached a critical juncture, making the issue of national struggle in Iran more urgent than ever. It is now clear that no future for Iran can be imagined without resolving this issue. Among the key factors that have made the national question in Iran a pressing issue is the political change in the world, especially in Iran's neighborhood. The impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on the growth of national struggles in South Azerbaijan is undeniably significant. On the one hand, many Turks who had previously feared that supporting national demands in South Azerbaijan might lead them to align with Soviet Azerbaijan's policies and fall into the communist camp are now free from that concern. On the other hand, with the expansion of satellite communications, the internet, and social networks, the Turks in Iran can now easily compare their social and economic conditions with their counterparts in the independent northern part and become aware of their legitimate human and national rights, which are under relentless suppression by the ruling system in Iran. This engagement is also reflected in the attitude of human rights circles in the West toward South Azerbaijan, which has in turn benefited the national struggle among non-Persian ethnic groups in Iran, particularly the Turks.
The Iranian Left’s Approach Compared to Other Iranian Opposition Movements
As mentioned earlier, the Iranian Left, in contradiction to its claim of respecting the right to self-determination for non-Persian peoples in Iran, has, in practice, aligned itself with other opposition groups in Iran. Now, with the rise of national movements and the global attention to the national question in Iran, it is effectively following a line of opposition to national movements. The only difference between the Iranian Left’s approach and that of other groups, such as the remnants of the Pahlavi monarchy and the racist Pan-Iranist nationalists, is that the Iranian Left disguises its position as supporting and sympathizing with the national movements of non-Persian peoples, while also defining its mission as guarding against the "deviation" of these movements toward "ethnocentrism," Pan-Turkism, Pan-Arabism, and "separatism."
Before analyzing a concrete example of this masked policy, it is worth noting a general characteristic of the Iranian Left.
B. The Iranian Left and the Issue of Producing Thought
If the rise of classical and scientific leftist thought in Europe in the 19th century was a result of the Industrial Revolution and the emergence of the industrial working class, the Iranian Left was born out of the ideals of egalitarian individuals who, in order to improve the living conditions of the oppressed in Iran and to combat despotic and semi-feudal regimes, brought the socialist ideas of 19th-century Europe along with their adapted version of those ideas for the semi-industrial and semi-feudal conditions of early 20th-century Russia to Iran. These ideas, which were initially introduced to Iran through Azerbaijani revolutionaries, primarily influenced by the struggles of oil industry workers in northern Azerbaijan, left an imprint on the late Qajar period and had a significant impact on the Constitutional Revolution. However, they were unable to independently implement the ideas based on the productive relations of industrial European countries in a society like Iran, which was filled with national, social, and religious contradictions.
If we exclude the period of the National Azerbaijani Government in 1944-1945, which was a shining example of the alignment of egalitarian thought with the specific conditions of Azerbaijan at that time, we see that the Iranian Left, until the collapse of the Soviet Union, was plagued by blindly following ideas that were not compatible with the conditions of Iran. This resulted in nothing but a disaster, with the energy and sacrifices of generations dedicated to leftist ideals being wasted, without playing any significant role in Iran's political scene.
The Regional Context of Leftist Thought Worldwide
In contrast to the situation in Iran, wherever leftist thought emerged in the world, it inevitably adapted to the context of that particular region. Russian communists, after blending European industrial theories with Russia's specific conditions, implemented them in the form of Leninism. Similarly, in China, Marxist ideas took a local form in the shape of Maoism, which was then applied in the Chinese Revolution. In Latin American countries, a different form of leftist thought emerged in the shape of guerrilla struggles, achieving varying degrees of success depending on the specific time and country. Even in some Arab countries, different forms of leftist thought emerged at various times, under different names. In modern, industrial Western Europe after the German Revolution, leftist thought, except for pre-World War II Greece and Spain, took the form of syndicalist movements and parliamentary parties.
Here, I am not concerned with the glorification or condemnation of leftist thought itself or its specific form in other parts of the world. Rather, I wish to highlight the essential difference in the approach of the Iranian Left compared to the Left in other regions. While Russian communists adapted Marxist thought to the conditions of late Tsarist Russia and carried out the October Revolution, the Iranian Left, aligned with the Soviet Union through the Tudeh Party, confined its work to blindly following Soviet policies. Similarly, when part of the Iranian Left, for specific reasons, became disillusioned with Soviet dominance and turned toward China, it suddenly replaced its allegiance to the Soviet model with an adherence to China's policies. Similarly, Albanian supporters of Enver Hoxha and the followers of Latin American guerrilla movements, who emerged in the Iranian political scene during the Pahlavi period, brought more modern forms of the Tudeh Party's and its successor revolutionary organization’s methods into the fray.
The Iranian Left After the Collapse of the Soviet Union
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the transformations that took place in China following Mao's death, and the scandals surrounding Eastern European totalitarian regimes, along with the grim and criminal examples of North Korea and Cambodia, the Iranian Left, having lost its models, fell into a state of confusion. Living under the shadow of the "big brother" (whether in terms of ideology, action, or both), when that shadow was lifted, it might have opened a new chapter of rethinking, innovation, and creativity for many survivors. Unfortunately, for the Iranian Left, it has led to a tragic state of confusion and desperation.
While European leftists have formed social-democratic parties (under whatever name), and Latin American leftists have combined democracy with mobilizing the poor, the Iranian Left still seeks to find a guiding figure among others. And if it cannot find this figure in foreign circles or if this desired figure, such as the president of Iran, is less appealing, it may well turn toward Pan-Iranianist groups, which remain a constant fixture in Iranian politics, and present the Left in the framework of Pan-Iranism and the "Iranian nation."
To explore the Iranian Left's predicament regarding the national question in Iran, I refer to an article on the Akhbar-e-Rooz website, which is the organ of a significant generation of guerrilla fighters from the Pahlavi period. All quotes within quotation marks are taken from the Akhbar-e-Rooz article.
C. On the Warning from Akhbar-e-Rooz Regarding Confronting the People of Iran
The Akhbar-e-Rooz website wrote important points in its editorial dated March 10, 2013, which could be key to understanding the Iranian Left's perspective on the national issue in Iran.
The Pretext for Akhbar-e-Rooz's Warning
The pretext for the article titled "Akhbar-e-Rooz's Warning Regarding Confronting the People of Iran" is that, in demonstrations held in Brussels against the widespread executions in Khuzestan, some speakers reportedly emphasized "the unity of non-Persian nations in confronting the reckless policies of the central Iranian government."
Akhbar-e-Rooz asks, "Why should 'Persians' be excluded in the struggle against the reckless policies of the central Iranian government? This 'unity' against everyone except the 'Persians' can only be logical and reasonable if 'Persians' are seen as allies and accomplices of the Iranian government, and the unity is against the 'Persians'."
I highlight these two quotes to show how the writer at the beginning of the article has attempted to strip the national oppression issue in Iran of its substance and meaning, while simultaneously discrediting the struggles of non-Persian nations that fight against racism and colonial relationships.
Non-Persian Nations Do Not Share Common Interests with the Persian Nation in the Struggle Against National Oppression
The fact that Akhbar-e-Rooz implies that Persians have shared interests with non-Persian nations in the struggle for their national rights, which the article refers to as the "confrontation with the reckless policies of the central Iranian government," is, at first glance, astonishing for the reader. Does the writer of Akhbar-e-Rooz really not understand that the Persian nation does not face language bans, is not displaced due to special economic pressures, does not have its lake intentionally dried up, does not have its water sent to central areas for development, does not have its earthquake victims buried alive, and does not see its teachers imprisoned, tortured, or executed merely for asking to study in their native language? The issue is not whether the Persian nation is the direct perpetrator of this oppression, but rather that, whether willingly or unwillingly, the Persian nation benefits from this national oppression. As a result, it does not share common interests with the oppressed nations in this area. If Lake Urmia is drying up, billions of dollars are being spent to redirect water from the Caspian Sea to the desert regions inhabited by Persians. If an Arab in Khuzestan is dying of thirst, the water from Khuzestan is used to develop regions like Yazd and Isfahan. Therefore, the notion that Persians and non-Persians are in the same trench in the struggle for national rights is a falsehood.
The Struggle of Non-Persian Nations Is Not Against the Persian Nation
Another surprising point is that while the writer marginalizes the fact that the Persian nation benefits from the oppression of non-Persian nations, they also accuse the non-Persian nations of directing their struggle against the Persian nation. The author of these statements, knowingly or unknowingly, is pursuing the very policy they accuse others of: putting non-Persian and Persian nations in direct confrontation. A fair observer would acknowledge that the struggle of non-Persian nations, while it may not have shared interests with the Persian nation, does not necessarily mean that their struggle is against the Persian people themselves. What this difference really reflects is the different areas of struggle and priorities. Of course, if the Persian nation aggressively defends the interests it gains from national oppression over other nations, the issue may take on a different form. However, what has been observed so far is that in none of the serious revolutionary platforms or slogans of non-Persian nations has there been a call to fight against a specific nation, but rather a call to end national oppression and change the racist system. If, in the view of Iranian Leftists, the struggle to dismantle the unjust ruling system means confronting the nations, then, following this logic, the struggles for women's rights to eliminate gender oppression should also be interpreted as women fighting men and creating a confrontation between men and women. Such an interpretation might be welcomed by anti-women religious or traditional circles, but it is truly astonishing to hear such an argument from a left-wing media outlet.
The question posed by Akhbar-e-Rooz in the above quote—"Why should they be excluded in the struggle against the reckless policies of the central Iranian government?"—is also surprising from another perspective. Has there ever been an instance where "Persians" have taken independent action to fight for the removal of national oppression? If such an instance exists, what could the notion of "exclusion" even mean?
Comparison with Intellectuals from Other Countries in Similar Situations
It may seem strange and hard to believe for Iranian democrats, but in many countries, there are various organizations and individuals who, while being part of the ruling nation, base their programs and actions on defending the oppressed nations of the same country. In Israel, there are numerous Jewish human rights groups that dedicate themselves to defending the rights of Palestinians and fighting against settlement-building in Arab territories. In our neighboring Turkey, there are multiple Turkish human rights figures whose work is exclusively focused on defending the rights of the Kurds, and they even defend prisoners belonging to groups involved in armed struggles—many of them imprisoned for their defense of such rights. A recent example of this is Ismail Beşikçi in Turkey, and more recently, Akram Elisli in Northern Azerbaijan. In comparison, the Iranian intellectual cannot even imagine taking action for the elimination of discrimination against non-Persian nations—such as for the diversion of Khuzestan's water to the central region at the cost of drying up Khuzestan. Where is the Iranian political organization that has independently launched a campaign against the official, exclusive use of the Persian language? The centralist Persian intellectual, who considers themselves Iranian, is exempt from such concerns, and at best, expects non-Persian nations to join in under the banner of so-called "unified Iranian organizations," where these "ethnic groups and residents of peripheral regions" will join the fight solely for the overthrow of a racist regime and the establishment of a similar regime in its place.
Akhbar-e-Rooz's Misinterpretation of the Reality of National Oppression in Iran
In this very article from Akhbar-e-Rooz, the writer discusses the reality of national oppression in Iran using the common rhetoric of Pan-Iranism, framing it as discrimination against "ethnic groups." After stamping the undeniable "reality of the Iranian nation" on the reader, claiming that "the inhabitants of Iran are interconnected in hundreds of visible and hidden ways, and 'the Iranian nation' is an undeniable reality," the writer generously promises to "support the resolution of the country's issues, including the elimination of discrimination against ethnic groups and residents of peripheral regions."
This final quote—leaving aside the core content of the article—shows the writer's attitude towards the issue of nationalities. While they believe in the Iranian nation as a whole (and not the various nations or ethnic groups within Iran), they still refer to non-Persian nations in a derogatory manner, as "ethnic groups and residents of peripheral regions."
The Half-Hearted Defense of National Demands in Iran by Iranian Intellectuals
Iranian intellectuals not only lack a genuine desire to defend national demands unconditionally, such as the rights of Arab, Turk, Kurdish, and Baluchi prisoners, but even when they mention national oppression or the rights of non-Persian nations in a half-hearted, peripheral, or humble way, they simultaneously declare that they are "deeply defenders of Iran's unity and against its disintegration." In doing so, they criticize the extremists of ethnic nationalism, Pan-Turkism, the crimes of nationalist extremists, the exploitation of global powers, and the Islamic regime’s divisive tactics among Iranians. They warn against the confrontation of Persians with Turks, Kurds, and others and denounce separatism to such an extent that readers are left wondering what, after all these conditions, accusations, and slanders, remains worthy of defense.
How One of the Few Persian-Language Media Outlets Defends National Rights in Iran
What is particularly thought-provoking is that this so-called half-hearted defense comes from a publication that claims to be “one of the few Persian-language media outlets that has consistently defended national rights in Iran, demanded the cessation of national-ethnic oppression in the country, and has provided a platform for everyone fighting against ‘national oppression’.”
Whether this claim is true or not is irrelevant. In fact, assuming that this outlet is sincere in its claim only deepens the tragedy. When this "few" media outlet defines consistent defense of national rights with phrases like “the Iranian nation is an undeniable reality,” and instead of defending the oppressed, it questions why they are demanding their violated rights, while at the same time criticizing those who protest by stating, “Our protest against these extreme ethnic nationalists is that they divide and value humans not for their humanity but for the language they speak, or their ethnicity and tribe,” and when it expresses concern that “the greatest harm of this ethnic-nationalist policy is that it seeks to sow division among the people of Iran,” and when it issues a decree that “extreme ethnic nationalists want to incite Arabs against Persians, and Turks against Kurds,” it becomes easy to imagine how the other Iranian circles, unlike this "few" media outlet, treat the issue of national rights in Iran.
The Double Standard of Iranian Intellectuals
In my view, it is more beneficial for the national struggles of non-Persian peoples when certain groups openly show their true nature without claiming to be consistent defenders of national rights and clearly position themselves in the struggle. This is more helpful than those who claim to be consistent defenders of national rights but, in practice, deceive the oppressed by covering their eyes with dust. Experience shows that Iranian intellectuals are not only not defenders of national demands, but they also do not have any organization or person whose sole task is to defend the elimination of national oppression, like in many other countries. Moreover, they position themselves on the side of the very front that non-Persian nations are fighting against. Even when they claim, like the example of Akhbar Rooz, to be among the few media outlets persistently defending these demands, the result of their efforts is a combination of accusations and labeling of non-Persian civil activists, followed by a final, condescending ultimatum that “the establishment of democracy in the country is the greatest chance and the only democratic solution to the national issue in Iran,” with the defense limited to the hope that “in a democratic Iran, any decision made by the people of the national regions, if approved by the elected bodies of all Iranians, should be respected.”
The Iranian Theory of the Necessity of Obtaining Approval from Both Sides in National Oppression
Thus, with this warning, everything becomes clear: at best, if non-Persian nations want their national rights, they must struggle alongside "the Iranian nation" until democracy is established. After that, in this idealized "utopia," perhaps something will be granted to the non-Persian nations, if approved by the assemblies of all Iranians.
This is yet another example of how Iranian leftists, with this very reasoning, can consider themselves at the forefront of all theorists of thought. According to this reasoning, the basic rights of the oppressed can depend on the approval of those who benefit from the perpetuation of that oppression. Based on this reasoning, all historical colonizers can justify the silencing of the voices of liberation in their colonies, wrapping it in a democratic package, and likewise, they can promise Afghan women that if the Loya Jirga (a gathering of Afghan men) approves, the right to education for girls will be respected. Similarly, employers' unions could be promised that if the employers agree, the right to form unions will be respected. However, the reality is that in today's world, the process does not follow the path that Iranian leftist intellectuals imagine. If the work followed their theory, no colony would have gained independence, new countries like Kosovo wouldn't have been born, and referendums for independence in places like Quebec and Scotland wouldn't have happened, and workers, women, and many ethnic and gender minorities wouldn't have acquired their rights.