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| A student demonstration took place in Tabriz on May 22, 2006, in protest of the 'cockroach' cartoon published in an Iranian state newspaper. |
Introduction:
Crane Brinton, in his analysis of the classical revolutions of England, America, France, and Russia, uses the model of "fever" to explain the commonalities among all four revolutions. When we apply this same model to an Eastern classical revolution, it seems that another influential parameter must be added to the model, namely foreign intervention. This element was not considered by Brinton in the case of the four Western revolutions due to its absence or censorship. Interestingly, when Brinton finds that his model does not fit the behavior of certain revolutionaries, he resorts to literary elements and mysticism. For example, in reference to a phase of the English Revolution not becoming radicalized, he describes it as "a land of classical political restraint."
Perhaps, in an Eastern revolution, the primary factor is indeed foreign intervention, and we cannot analyze it solely through the lens of Brinton's model.
Three Events, Three Misconceptions:
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The Qaradağ Earthquake
An earthquake occurs in Qaradağ. In the early hours, it seems nothing special has happened. For someone who is merely a passive recipient of domestic media, everything seems calm and under control. He remembers the Bam earthquake (perhaps, had he also remembered the earthquake in Ardabil). And in his view, if the disaster is on a similar scale or close to it, the domestic media will surely reflect it with similar dimensions. A few hours later, Facebook pages start becoming active, and for someone who views the world solely through the lens of these pages, the Qaradağ earthquake appears far more significant than what actually occurred.
The analysis by the opposition news network, after witnessing the flow of Azerbaijani people's humanitarian aid and the activation of ethnic divisions, is even more interesting. After a lengthy introduction, criticizing the ruling conservative faction and stating that activists from all over Iran, especially from the center, have come to help the victims, they ultimately attribute it to the dynamics of civil society, which they claim was formed by the reformists at a particular point in time. -
Lake Urmia
A lake in Azerbaijan dries up, and the consequences affect the region's ecosystem severely. Protests emerge in several Azerbaijani cities, and there is intense unrest in other cities in Azerbaijan. Campaigns are created to protest the government's inaction, and petitions are signed in this regard. Some attribute the cause to the current government, while others blame the dam projects of previous governments.
The opposition, in a rather cunning manner, ignores the protesters' slogans and demands. After inviting several environmental experts, they present the cause of the lake's drying up as poor management by the authorities, while portraying the protests as a result of the Azerbaijani people's deep connection to nature. -
Stadiums of Azerbaijan
A football team qualifies for the Premier League. I won't delve into the reasons behind their qualification or the amateur analyses surrounding it. What matters is the reality that is present and echoes in the stadiums. Many are arrested at the stadiums, and the domestic media passes by the incidents indifferently. The team should not convey any special differences to the audience, and we won’t hear the fans' chants on television.
The sports section of the opposition makes the issue "more sporty." They describe Azerbaijanis as lovers of sports and use the names of several prominent Turkish athletes to support this conclusion.
Just as Brinton's conceptual model has shortcomings when analyzing Eastern revolutions (due to the lack of an essential parameter), the analytical frameworks of all three of the above events are incomplete and ineffective. In all three events, the most influential factor—the Azerbaijani national movement—is deliberately ignored. Perhaps these three brief examples and the shared approach of the two currents toward us are the main reason this article belongs to a tradition of structuralism. The judgment, therefore, will not be based on a single, center-focused current, but on the totality of the structure. Hence, two general structures have been considered in this regard: the "text" includes all the conservative, reformist, center-aligned opposition, and center-aligned feminism with the overarching narrative of Iranian identity and a dogmatic central discourse. The "margin," however, has a civil-national discourse focused on eliminating discrimination, aimed at breaking the overarching narrative of the "text."
(Of course, the framework of the marginal discourse is still in development, and as Habermas said, until this discourse is fully formed, the interaction between the "text" and the "margin" will remain an instrumental one, not a communicative one.)
Although there are instances where the active currents within the "text" have clashed with one another (for example, regarding religious issues, where center-aligned currents have sharply diverged), this friction does not signal a change in their discourse concerning the margin.
The prevailing discourse in present-day Iran is that of the "text," and elections are a political behavior promoted and publicized by the "text." The output of this behavior is the reproduction of the elements of the same discourse in different forms. The difference will not be in the approach to the margin, but merely in how it is managed. When the reformists gained executive power, we witnessed the publication of many newspapers. Civil society was strengthened, etc. For many, these developments promised a better society. They were unaware that the civil society that emerged during this period was not independent but was dependent on the ruling government, a government that channeled its textual discourse through it. When the government changed, the civil society of that period also vanished. The next government had its own civil society, but this was not made up of newspapers or NGOs; it was of a different nature. The reproduction of the overarching narrative of Iranian identity, this time, resonated not in newspapers but in religious gatherings, in a special way. And in both governments, the margin became more marginal.
This presidential election season brings some interesting points. Some candidates mention the rights of minorities. This time, our analyst seems to lose his ability to discern. It becomes unclear why he insists on judging one of the candidates as separate and outside the structure of the "text." Perhaps in his view, the margin's discourse is dependent on the text's discourse for its dynamism. What he fails to realize is that if the margin had depended on the text, we would not have been here long ago.
حاشیه حاشیه تر می شود
Original Persian Article:
https://web.archive.org/web/20140731031105/http://ruzbeh-s.blogfa.com/post-21.aspx