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| Calligraphy on the exterior of Ferdowsi’s mausoleum. Photo by Preethi Nallu. |
There is a fundamental question whose answer can render the contours of our nationalism more tangible: why does our nationalism regard the concept of the “Iranian nation” as inadequate and confused, and why is it suspicious of the very formation of such a concept? Answering this question requires a twofold inquiry. The first side concerns the approach of centralists—those who strive to preserve and expand this term. The second side concerns “marginal nationalism,” which, in opposition to centralism, seeks to conceptualize and offer a distinct definition of nationhood.
“Centralist nationalism” adopts a clear and straightforward stance toward the concept of “nationhood.” In its view, “Iranian nationality” is a collective identity that is explicitly historical, uniform, and immutable, sustained through the Persian language and the “Iranshahr” culture. For this camp, the national essence of the “Iranian person” is upheld by a set of symbols belonging to the dominant group, and because these symbols are deemed historical in nature, their collective manifestation—“Iranian nationality”—is also interpreted as a historical entity. That is, “Iranian nationality,” being formed through such raw materials as the Persian language, Aryan descent, and the myth of ancient Iran, inevitably becomes a primordial-historical community. Thus, in the eyes of centralists, this identity and all its mechanisms are by no means subject to alteration, revision, or redefinition. From this perspective, “being Iranian” is treated as an inherent identity—akin to being human, male, or female (in the biological sense). It is a nakedly ethnic-ancestral approach that, by fabricating a past and linking the present “Iranian person” to it, seeks to make “being Iranian” mirror the image of “being Persian.”
The Persian language is the primary instrument of this camp, enclosing both the boundaries of Iranian nationhood and the territorial limits of Iran. Through the dominance of this language, the distinctions of non-Persians—those on the margins—are blurred. Hence, any challenge to its hegemony is interpreted as a threat to territorial integrity. For this reason, all those devoted to their mother tongue and unwilling to accept the exclusive official status of Persian are branded as separatists and suppressed. This deprivation of security and imposition of restrictions on Turks, in the name of national identity and “Iranianness,” results in nothing but the confrontation of Turkish identity with the dominant Persian (Iranian) identity. In this confrontation, the apparatus of power sides with the dominant identity and takes a stand against Turkish nationalism.
To some strands of Turkish nationalists, the formation of an “Iranian identity” may seem impossible—not because the architects of this identity have embedded discriminatory content into it, but because, in their view, nation and nationality are not fluid concepts. Their understanding might resemble that of the centralists: Turkish identity, too, is regarded as primordial-historical and ethnic-ancestral. The difference is that while centralists, supported by state power and discriminatory laws, seek to homogenize distinct identities, this hypothetical strand of Turkish nationalists insists on sharpening distinctions and drawing ethnic-ancestral boundaries. In any case, this strand cannot be the main subject of the present essay: first, due to doubts about the actual existence of such a current, and second, due to its theoretical similarity with centralism. The aim here is rather to outline a form of nationalism that, alongside situating our identity vis-à-vis “Iranian nationality,” is both grounded in the realities of the contemporary era and does not undermine the legitimacy of Turkish nationalist demands—a form free of collective-ancestral theories.
There is a challenge: is the coexistence of two distinct identities within a single national unit possible? Is there an inherent contradiction in such coexistence? In Iran’s case, is this coexistence conceivable, for instance, between Turks and Persians? And can the “Iranian nation” as a multi-ethnic nation be imagined at all?
As mentioned earlier, “essentialist nationalism” has a definitive answer to these questions: such coexistence is inherently conflict-ridden and, in fact, impossible. Depending on their identity affiliation, “essentialists” propose different solutions: if they belong to the dominant group, they see the assimilation of Turks and their dissolution as the only way forward—as is evident today. If they belong to the subordinated group, they call for solidifying ethnic-ancestral boundaries. Since both outlooks are premised on collective descent, both risk deep racial tensions.
Different answers, however, also exist. Under present circumstances, Turkish nationalism clearly does not regard “Iranian nationality” as the outcome of all identities present in Iran. In other words, it explicitly refuses to recognize the idea of “Iran” with its current cultural-linguistic, political, and economic characteristics. This refusal is mostly the result of structural deficiencies rather than essentialist notions of identity. In fact, this form of nationalism offers positive answers to the above questions: yes, the coexistence of two distinct identities within a single national unit is possible. Nor is there necessarily an eternal rift between layered identities. For example, just as Irish-Americans, African-Americans, French-Algerians, French-Tunisians, and many others with dual identities in the United States and France coexist peacefully—without assuming that all group identities must be identical, and without necessarily demanding political autonomy—so too can such coexistence be conceivable for Iranian Turks, Baluchs, Persians, and others. One must keep in mind that this idea is only viable if it entails equal opportunities and full citizenship rights for all inhabitants.
Yet, as long as systemic discrimination disrupts the communal life of Turks, reducing them to second- or third-class citizens, subjecting them to racial injustice and linguistic chauvinism, and as long as education in their mother tongue is prohibited, Turkish nationalism will not recognize the idea of Iran and its associated nationality. Accordingly, our nationalism will not be ethnic-ancestral but civic-territorial. Still, it is important to note that even if all forms of discrimination were abolished, the demand for political autonomy could still arise. Guaranteeing equal opportunities and citizenship rights does not justify denying political agency, though it might reduce the likelihood of such demands. Nations are communities formed around collective beliefs, and equality of opportunity and realization of citizenship rights do not necessarily generate such beliefs. Autonomy and political separation will always remain conceivable options in ethnic and national disputes.