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Masoud Pezeshkian was elected as the head of the “Faction of Turkish Regions” in the Iranian Parliament. |
Several weeks have passed since the formation of the Faction of Turkish Regions in the Iranian parliament (Majles), yet we still witness statements from both its supporters and opponents. Although considering the nature of the ruling system and the trajectory of development over the past forty years makes it unlikely that such a faction could be truly effective—and its future function appears quite limited—it nevertheless seems that any speculation about its practical role must be postponed to the near future. Still, perhaps mentioning a few points about the faction would not be without value.
1. In general, opponents of the formation of such a faction can be divided into two groups. The first includes those within the current ruling system who, from their own perspective, present their views in order to strengthen the regime. Conservative and reformist opponents of the faction fall into this category. The second consists of various groups that oppose the Islamic Republic itself—monarchists and leftist opponents of the faction are among them. The common ground of both groups in their opposition to the Faction of Turkish Regions is their reference to concepts such as ethnonationalism, separatism, Pan-Turkism, and the preservation of Iran’s territorial integrity. In reality, we are witnessing a wide overlap on this matter. This overlap includes both defenders and opponents of the current regime, as well as different factions that are often at odds with one another. In other words, whether in the clash between reformists and conservatives, or in the struggle between monarchists and Iranianist leftists, there exists a shared understanding and discursive commitment among these seemingly diverse opponents of the faction.
This solidarity explicitly shows that the central concern of all these groups is to prevent the official recognition of “Turkish” identity and its expression within official institutions. Their commitment to preserving the idea of “Iran” and “Iranian-ness” manifests itself in their opposition to the Faction of Turkish Regions. Naturally, this century-old and narrow-minded idea of Iranian-ness—rooted in deep hostility toward diversity and totalitarian impulses, and supported by such advocates of homogenization—not only rejects the recognition of Turkish identity but refuses to recognize any non-Persian identities in any form. Even if such recognition is tightly controlled within the power structure, as in the case of the Faction of Turkish Regions, Iranianists insist, through pressure and media campaigns, on depriving Turks of even this limited and symbolic recognition—the only immediate (and likely only future) function of the faction.
2. On the other side of this matter stand the supporters, most of whom see the formation of such a faction as a useful step toward fulfilling the long-neglected rights of Turks. Yet, the more significant issue lies not in the positions of these supporters, but in the reactions of some of them to the statements of the opponents. When analyzing the faction and its surrounding debates, two undeniable points emerge.
First, the Iranian parliament is the product of supervised elections, and undoubtedly its members are aligned with the regime and, in one way or another, defenders of the status quo. The faction in question is no exception. Second, although some opponents have simultaneously criticized both the faction itself and its member representatives, the vast majority of criticisms are directed at the very subject of the faction.
Nevertheless, certain responses to these criticisms have not been in defense of the faction’s subject matter, but rather framed as support for the representatives themselves. At best, both the representatives and the faction’s purpose have been defended together. The widespread adoption of such positions not only damages the credibility of the current rights movement but could also lead to other harms and disasters. It implicitly or explicitly suggests that parliamentary representatives are to be considered as representatives of the movement or as part of it.
This would mean that the representation and leadership of a movement resisting the regime’s homogenizing policies would be assumed by elements of the regime itself, with figures like [Nader] Qazipour and [Masoud] Pezeshkian being portrayed as symbols of this movement. Even if such a disaster seems unlikely, at the very least we may witness the emergence of a parallel current to the movement—a current from within the ruling system, equipped with resources of wealth, power, and media, which would naturally enhance its influence and reach.
Portraying the faction’s representatives as if they were Turkish nationalists or identity activists is, in reality, a false image presented by some supporters of the faction in their confrontation with its opponents—even if it was not their own intended image. It is an image drawn at the cost of obscuring years of struggle against the regime’s homogenizing policies, replacing the “representatives of movements” with the “representatives of rulers.”