Amir Mossadegh Katouzian - Radio Farda - November 6, 2016
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| From right: Qazi-Pour, Pezeshkian, and Karimi. |
Last Sunday, 100 members of Iran’s Parliament (Islamic Consultative Assembly) held the inaugural meeting of what they called the Caucus for Turkish-Speaking Regions. At this meeting, Masoud Pezeshkian, the deputy speaker of Parliament, was elected as the head of the caucus, while Nader Ghazipour, the representative for Urmia, and Reza Karimi, the representative for Ardabil, were elected as the caucus’s two deputy heads.
Simultaneously, Zahra Saei, the spokesperson for the caucus, announced that 25 members of Parliament are on its central council. The declared goals of the caucus include addressing the challenges of Turkish-speaking regions, achieving balanced development across the country, and fostering and strengthening national unity.
In addition to representatives from West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, Ardabil, and Zanjan provinces, the caucus includes representatives from Savojbolagh, Tehran, Shiraz, and Qom, as well as the representative for Ashtian.
What is the background for forming such a caucus? Under what circumstances can the formation of a language-focused caucus in Iran’s Parliament be seen as an opportunity, and under what circumstances as a threat?
These questions were discussed with this week’s guests on the Views program: Ghasem Shoeleh Saadi, a representative of Shiraz in the third and fourth terms of the Islamic Consultative Assembly in Tehran; Hassan Shariatmadari, a political activist and critic of the Islamic Republic based in Hamburg; and Touraj Atabaki, a senior researcher at the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam.
Mr. Shoeleh Saadi, what led 100 members of Parliament to form the Turkish-Speaking Regions Caucus?
Ghasem Shoeleh Saadi: These caucuses have existed before—for example, caucuses for Turkish-speaking regions or regions with predominantly Sunni populations. Such formations have always been present. It’s common in parliaments worldwide to have caucuses like the Greens, human rights advocates, and others. They resemble political parties but are less influential because parties function based on majority and minority dynamics in Parliament, whereas caucuses typically have smaller scopes.
This is not particularly unusual except for two reasons: first, the apparent increase in numbers makes it more prominent. Currently, the larger membership lends it greater visibility.
Second, certain events in some regions of Iran have drawn attention, such as the new policy of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran or the celebration of Cyrus the Great, which attracted a significant crowd and provoked serious reactions. For instance, the prosecutor in Shiraz announced that the organizers had been arrested, and Mr. Nouri Hamedani condemned the event, calling the participants anti-revolutionary. These coinciding events and the declaration of a caucus of approximately 100 members have amplified its significance. Nevertheless, these issues have always existed.
Mr. Shariatmadari, what needs in these regions could the formation of the Turkish-Speaking Regions Caucus with 100 members address?
Hassan Shariatmadari: As Mr. Shoeleh Saadi mentioned, this caucus was previously called the Northwest Caucus. Now, adopting an identity-based name signals a response to the demands of their constituencies while also creating new expectations.
Moreover, representatives from Turkish-speaking areas such as Qom, Tehran, and Savojbolagh are part of this group, which includes members from both the conservative and reformist camps.
Thus, constituents in these regions expect this strong caucus, with the Parliament’s deputy speaker among its members, to promote decentralization, job opportunities, wealth redistribution, and equal chances for their areas compared to the center.
Does the participation of representatives from Tehran and Qom suggest that this is a coalition of Turkish-speaking MPs rather than a caucus for regions with a majority of Turkish speakers?
This depends on their actions. If their activities merely respond to an identity-based sensitivity for electoral purposes, it will fade away quickly, as did the previous caucus, which achieved little. Conversely, if they use this as leverage with the government—for example, extracting concessions when the president nominates ministers—it could evolve into a significant force. In the absence of political parties, they could play a substantial role akin to regional parties, albeit without a formal party structure.
It is too early to judge their impact. As Mr. Shoeleh Saadi stated, the current attention is influenced by concurrent events.
Mr. Atabaki, how do you view this development? While some see the caucus as an opportunity, others fear it could set a divisive precedent. Mr. Shariatmadari mentioned leveraging demands. Could this lead to divisions?
Touraj Atabaki: The foundation of parliamentary caucuses worldwide stems from shared characteristics among their members—political, regional, or other alignments. These shared interests encourage them to unite to advocate for their causes.
However, in the case of this caucus, I find such coherence lacking. Referring to it as the “Turkish-Speaking Caucus” raises questions. In Iran, we have Turkish-speaking populations in Azerbaijan, Turkmen populations, and Qashqai Turks. How can, for example, the needs of a Qashqai farmer in Shiraz align with those in Tabriz or Khoy?
This caucus appears to reflect broad, politically and linguistically charged affiliations rather than cohesive regional interests. The question arises: what factors have highlighted these linguistic affiliations, bringing some MPs together? Are they pursuing cultural autonomy or advocating for mother-tongue education?
Mr. Shoeleh Saadi, under what conditions could this initiative promote ethnonationalism or populism? And under what conditions could it foster cultural, economic, and political development in Turkish-speaking regions?
Ghasem Shoeleh Saadi: The outcome depends on the caucus’s actions. It could become either an opportunity or a liability. For instance, while Turkish speakers in East Azerbaijan and Zanjan are predominantly Shia, Kurdish areas of West Azerbaijan include many Sunnis.
The caucus could find common ground linguistically while differing in religious matters. We must wait to see its actions to evaluate its direction.
It’s worth noting that, per Iran’s constitution, each MP is responsible for the entire country, not just their constituency. For example, an MP from Urmia should also care about issues in Bandar Abbas or Mashhad.
Mr. Shariatmadari, what signs could indicate whether the caucus is steering toward productive institutional demands or toward divisive tendencies?
Hassan Shariatmadari: As Mr. Atabaki correctly points out, this caucus lacks homogeneity. Nevertheless, these efforts represent underdeveloped attempts at forming political parties in a system that suppresses party formation—even among its staunchest supporters.
This heterogeneity is evident across the board. For instance, the “Hope Caucus” and the conservative camp both face similar disorganization. The responsibility lies primarily with a system that stifles genuine political party development.
This chaos stems from the general disorder in the country. If they can operate according to a plan, as stated in their charter, which I have read and outlines efforts toward balanced development across the nation, striving for equitable distribution of wealth and power nationwide, then their actions could strengthen national unity through equalizing job opportunities, balanced budget allocation, and the like. However, if they fall into a trap—though I don't think there’s any pessimistic indication of separatist tendencies—they may inadvertently feed accusations and escalate an artificial Turk-Persian divide. This would mark the beginning of their failure, despite the initial artificial excitement, which will quickly dissipate.
Mr. Atabaki, the Turkish-speaking parliamentary faction has now been established and isn’t going away. Under what conditions can it best fulfill the goals it has announced?
Touraj Atabaki: They need to examine their shared grounds thoroughly. These representatives need to understand why they felt the need to unite and what their common objectives are. What demands are they putting forward that align with the needs of their electoral regions? If they simply form a completely incoherent group of MPs with differing or even contradictory political orientations, unified only by their shared language or ethnic background, they won’t achieve much.
The decentralized governance model, which many in Iran believe is the best system for a country with such diverse regions and long-accumulated demands, allows grassroots issues to be raised. Representatives can use these issues as a basis for proposing developmental, economic, and political initiatives. The focus should be on the historical and ongoing demands of the constituencies they represent.
Mr. Sha'leh Sa'di, what impact can a language-based faction have on highlighting regional and identity-based similarities and differences within the parliament?
Ghasem Sha'leh Sa'di: First of all, the Iranian Constitution recognizes certain rights for ethnic and religious minorities, which, over the past three decades, have often not been upheld. Recently, President Rouhani acknowledged these issues, which marked a step toward fulfilling these constitutional rights. His advisor, Mr. Yunesi, himself a cleric and former Intelligence Minister, also issued a warning that this situation needs to end and that what the Constitution recognizes for these minorities must be implemented.
If we look at it more broadly, these minorities, both religious and ethnic, have suffered dual marginalization and have legitimate demands. The government seems to be paying attention, and they are receiving positive responses. Perhaps seeing this as an opportune moment, they decided to form this faction to amplify their demands and secure benefits for their constituencies.
Overall, I view this move positively—provided they avoid overreaching. Given that the Constitution recognizes minority rights and that a representative serves the entire country and not just their constituency, maintaining this balance would make their work constructive.
Mr. Shariatmadari, those advocating for cultural unity within ethnic diversity argue that granting identity-based rights could lead to complications and an undesirable outcome. How can we strike a balance where ethnic groups don’t feel deprived, but granting rights doesn’t worry those who see Iran as a unified entity?
Hassan Shariatmadari: I don’t find the term "granting rights" appropriate. If it’s a right, it must be upheld, and if it’s not, it shouldn’t be granted. Linguistic justice is a form of justice widely recognized globally. Denying a child their mother tongue, which the Constitution allows for, is not granting a privilege but infringing upon citizens’ rights. No justification, including territorial integrity, permits trampling on the rights of a country's citizens.
The debate isn’t just about teaching a mother tongue; there’s also talk of teaching in the mother tongue. This would mean schools or universities offering instruction in local languages, while maintaining a national standard or a local lingua franca. We need a national language, not just an official one. Many countries successfully offer education in multiple languages within a unified geographic area.
In a region like the Middle East, already rife with reasons for division, fostering trust and a shared social capital is the only way to keep the nation united. I believe Azerbaijani Turks, for instance, have demonstrated their loyalty in this regard. It’s unfounded to worry that allowing education in their language would diminish their sense of Iranian identity. Most Azerbaijani Turks see themselves as co-owners of Iran, not as tenants.
Mr. Atabaki, what lessons can a language-based faction in Iran’s parliament draw from historical nations like China, India, Egypt, and Iran itself, which have preserved their national identity while embracing ethnic and linguistic diversity?
Touraj Atabaki: We have a national language, Persian, spoken by all people living in this land, alongside their local and ethnic languages. This balance is a cornerstone of modernity—individual autonomy and freedoms, including the freedom to speak one's own language. Successful countries with ethnic and religious diversity ensure that people can practice their faiths freely and use their local dialects or languages without restriction.
On the flip side, unsuccessful examples include countries that ignored ethnic and religious diversity, leading to significant social crises. We needn’t look far—Turkey, for instance, referred to Kurds as "mountain Turks" and denied their ethnic identity for years. They weren’t allowed to speak their language or maintain their culture in daily life, leading to extreme political movements and a decades-long war that caused deep societal divisions.
In conclusion, respect for diversity while maintaining unity ensures success. Ignoring this reality leads to conflict and instability.
The link to the original article in Farsi on Radio Farda:
فراکسیون مناطق ترکنشین در مجلس ایران؛ پیشزمینهها و چشمانداز