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| Holding a Commemoration Gathering for "Cyrus Day" |
It is clear that the attendees at what is commonly called Cyrus’s Tomb are not a homogeneous crowd. However, they can be roughly divided into several groups based on their underlying perspectives:
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The First Group: These are individuals who, by invoking vague historical arguments, attempt to legitimize their contemporary beliefs—beliefs rooted in Iranianism, Aryanist ideology, and historical nationalism. For them, referring to the supposed racial ancestor, Cyrus, provides a pretext to demean non-Persians, particularly Arabs and Turks. They claim that the power and glory of ancient Iran declined due to Arab and Turkic invasions. Yet this claim is largely a facade. Beyond belittling the “Other,” it serves two purposes for Aryanists: first, to suggest that Arabs and Turks in Iran are essentially immigrants whose original identities have been altered over time; second, to argue that these groups should return to their “authentic” identity—a pseudo-authenticity pursued through cultural homogenization, imposition of Persian monolingualism, and similar policies. This group has organizational backing as well, including monarchists and pan-Iranists.
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The Second Group: These individuals are neither grounded in historical reasoning nor interested in homogenizing ethnic groups. Their primary concern is national unity. They see figures like Cyrus as symbols that can foster a sense of consensus among all Iranians. Elements such as religion, language, or historical figures that can promote unity are celebrated and amplified. This group also includes those seeking pride and joy in a perceived glorious past as a way to soothe contemporary frustrations. They lack a coherent ideological framework. While their presence may sometimes support the narrative of Iranian nationalists, they cannot be strictly labeled as such; they are better described as “friends of Iran” in a general sense.
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The Third Group: For these participants, gatherings like this are an opportunity to signal dissent from the government. They view any available space—legal or otherwise—as a potential platform for expressing opposition, from elections to public events like Cyrus’s Tomb gatherings. This group is highly diverse: ordinary citizens with no political affiliations, outspoken opposition members from both left and right, women’s rights activists, and others all fall under this category.
It should be noted that this categorization does not cover every attendee. Some may not fit neatly into any of these groups, and some individuals may belong to multiple groups simultaneously. Nevertheless, such distinctions are useful for providing clarity and avoiding one-sided interpretations of these events.
Finally, while it is neither accurate nor fair to lump all attendees into a single category, the current form of these gatherings—based on available images and reports—ultimately strengthens the position of the first group. Even the second and third groups, intentionally or not, inadvertently support policies that aim to homogenize ethnic and linguistic-cultural groups. In essence, the policies that Reza Shah Pahlavi sought to legitimize decades later—after massacres of Turks and suppression of Kurds in the fall of 1946—through the 2,500-year celebration at Persepolis, and to present himself and his supposed ancestor as humane figures, are today tacitly endorsed at Cyrus’s Tomb, albeit without government organization.