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| Mostafa Tajzadeh is an Iranian reformist politician |
Mostafa Tajzadeh, a leading figure of mainstream reformism in Iran, recently shared on his Telegram channel a poster commemorating the anniversary of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party. The poster’s title—“Saving Iran from Disintegration and Foreign Domination”—sets the tone. Alongside the text, it features an image of Garshasp’s statue locked in battle with Ahriman. The symbolism is clear: Ahriman stands for the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, while Garshasp appears as the savior who rescues Azerbaijan from its clutches.
The program’s line-up of speakers reinforces this framing. All three—Kaveh Bayat, Ehsan Hooshmand, and Davoud Dashtbani—are long-time advocates of centralist narratives. Their writings have consistently dismissed the rights of Iran’s ethnic groups and distorted their histories, particularly those of the Turks. In one interview, Hooshmand went so far as to deny the very existence of ethnic inequality in Iran, declaring:
“When we speak of ethnic inequality, we should mean that opportunities for the development of the talents of a particular group—for access to new opportunities, for human advancement, for the advancement of a linguistic or religious group, for access to better living facilities including educational and health resources, and for self-fulfillment—are meaningfully denied to one group compared to another. No serious study in Iran confirms such a claim.”
Hooshmand even attempted to absolve the Pahlavi regime of ethnic discrimination. Yet the historical record is clear: during the Pahlavi era, Azerbaijan—once among Iran’s most developed provinces—was transformed into one of its most deprived. Its language was banned, and its economy systematically undermined.
That such centralist figures dominate the event is hardly surprising. What is notable, however, is Tajzadeh’s endorsement of their narrative. His sympathy reveals the broader reality: Iran’s mainstream reformists remain firmly anchored in centralism. Their attachment to this stance is less about historical or racial conviction and more about political expediency.
Reformism Without Reform
Today’s reformist camp has long abandoned any substantive discourse of reform. Lacking vision, it clings to the label “reformist” as its only real asset. This appropriation has been achieved not through performance or principle but by exploiting political deadlock and presenting itself as a token opposition. In practice, reformism has devolved into a faction of power that resurfaces every few years during elections, reviving the tired binaries of bad versus worse or fear versus hope.
For this camp, monopolizing the term “reformist” is crucial. They cast themselves as the rightful custodians of reform while working to discredit other political and social forces that genuinely seek change. This explains the biases of figures like Tajzadeh. He and his allies understand that only during election seasons—through privileged media platforms at home and abroad, and with backing from institutions of power and wealth—can they revive their credibility as reformists or even as quasi-opposition.
At other times, however, their task is to delegitimize genuine movements for reform. This discrediting extends from the state’s broken promise to establish a Turkish Language Academy to the promotion of anti–Azerbaijan Democratic Party programming on Tajzadeh’s channel. Each instance widens the gulf between centralist reformists and those who truly pursue democratic change.