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Ali Younesi, Special Aide to the President of Iran on Ethnic and Religious Minorities Affairs, in an interview with Ghanoon newspaper, while referring to the “multi-ethnic nature of Iranian society, not the Iranian nation,” stated that “Lors, Kurds, and others are not separate ethnic groups, and the Azeri, Kurdish, Mazani, and other languages are dialects of Persian.” In another part of his remarks, Younesi, rejecting the Turkish identity of Azerbaijanis, said: “A distinction must be made between Turks and Azeris. Azeris have both the Persian language and Persian ancestry.” In reaction to these statements, 50 members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament) wrote a letter to the president, asking him to respond to Ali Younesi’s remarks. |
Following the publication of an interview with Ali Younesi – special aide to the president on minority and ethnic affairs – in the Ghanoon newspaper, in which the identity of the Turks was explicitly denied, a group of reformists in Azerbaijan issued a letter addressed to “Seyyed Mohammad Khatami” and “Hassan Rouhani,” expressing concern over the alienation of the Azerbaijani people from reformism. This letter contains points that can help us understand the foundations of this political current in Azerbaijan.
First: The letter addresses Seyyed Mohammad Khatami before Hassan Rouhani. Including the name of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, someone whose Turk-deprecating jokes are not yet forgotten and for which he never apologized, and appealing to him regarding the crisis of reformism in Azerbaijan, if not a deliberate insult to the Turks, is likely nothing more than an attempt to embellish the text and satisfy a sense of pseudo-oppositional posture.
Second: Although the other addressee of the letter is the president himself—the highest executive authority in the country—the signatories once again refrain from making explicit demands for the realization of ethnic rights and merely settle for “an explicit and firm emphasis on civil rights, especially the right to education in the mother tongue.” In their view, the president’s emphasis on ethnic rights is sufficient to strengthen reformism’s social base in Azerbaijan, and their realization is unnecessary!
Third: The signatories of the letter describe “accepting diversity and plurality in ideological, political, religious, cultural-linguistic domains, recognizing them, and avoiding homogenization” as one of the essential features of the reformist movement. From where such a lofty principle is appropriated to reformism is one matter. Even assuming the existence of such a movement, this claim is inserted into the text with such insistence and cunning that, by attributing this supposed principle to the governments they support, it exonerates them from implementing inequality and homogenization. Yet the current linguistic situation has shown no difference between reformist and conservative governments. The robe of recognition and flourishing has always draped the Persian language, while isolation and regression have been the share of the Turkish language. Architects of homogenization, such as Seyyed Javad Tabatabai, have been praised by the president, and those who deny us have been appointed as special aides responsible for minority affairs.
Fourth: Throughout the letter, the explicit denial of the identity and language of the Turks is brazenly attributed to “the ignorance of officials,” “the imprudence of authorities,” or “clumsy remarks.” In this way, they attempt to hide the reality of Turkophobia, centralism, and homogenization behind these worn-out expressions. If Ali Younesi is ignorant, imprudent, and inexperienced in minority affairs, why did the government—whose campaign slogan was “prudence”—appoint him as special aide for minorities and ethnic groups? The signatories’ evasions go so far that, to absolve their own political identity, they even avoid labeling the deniers of Turkish identity as “reformists” or “moderates,” instead calling them “individuals affiliated with reformists and moderates” or “suspicious groups.” If one is committed to whitewashing and conspiracy delusions, then Ali Younesi must be Ahmadinejad’s special aide, not Rouhani’s!
Fifth: In one part of the letter, the signatories speak of a gap between “regional activists” and reformists. The use of the label “regional activists” is an explicit sign of conservatism and political totalitarianism. Such a baseless title clearly shows that reformism, despite all its showroom gestures, still refrains from recognizing “Turkish activists.” And here, the contradictory essence of the letter is revealed. When they intend to discredit and deny us, they resort to labels like “pan-Turkist,” “separatist,” or “ethnicist.” But when they seek superficial trust-building, they brazenly call us by trivial and degrading terms devoid of any identity—regional activists!
Finally: The logic governing the letter is explicitly instrumental and opportunistic, not normative and value-driven. That is, even if we assume the signatories are genuinely concerned for the Turks, in reality they are worried about their own political loss in Azerbaijan, not the identity and ethnic rights of the Azerbaijani people. In fact, if they did not foresee such a loss in the near future, even such a weak and stuttering defense of Turkish rights would hold no significance for them. This, perhaps, is the most essential point in the letter—one that reveals the hidden side of reformism: a logic that is highly instrumental, opportunistic, self-serving, and devoid of principles, values, and political ethics.