The following text engages the debate between Emadeddin Baghi, an Iranian journalist and human rights activist, and Ruzbeh Saadati, a Turkish activist and writer from Azerbaijan. Baghi’s article, “Mother Tongue and the Problem of Racism” (Sazandegi, August 6, 2019), discussed what he called “language-based racism” in Iran, often relying on official narratives. Sa’adati responds critically, pointing out inconsistencies, selective reasoning, and the dismissal of non-Persian language rights. The exchange, including Baghi’s subsequent objections and Sa’adati’s replies, reveals broader tensions around ethnic identity, linguistic justice, and the role of public intellectuals in addressing systemic discrimination.
Language, Power, and Subjectivity: Ruzbeh Saadati’s Critique of Emadeddin Baghi
On the date of August 6, 2019, an article titled "Mother Tongue and the Problem of Racism" with the subtitle "Language-Based Racism" was published in the Sazandegi newspaper and on several websites, authored by Emadeddin Baghi. This paper will engage with it critically to unpack what follows in the next lines.
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| Ruzbeh Saadati is a Turkish activist and writer from South Azerbaijan (Iran). |
First: Baghi writes in the opening lines: “Since in various countries around the world, including the USA and India, different ethnicities and nationalities live who speak their mother tongues and are multilingual, one language is common as the official and national language.” While this claim may hold true in some cases, in several multilingual countries, multiple languages have equal official status — countries which Baghi avoids mentioning. If we are optimistic, he is simply unaware of such pluralistic language frameworks; if pessimistic, his refusal to present such models and multilingual language policies is actually a denial and deflection of the language rights of non-Persian ethnic groups in Iran. This is a worn-out tactic to discredit “us” while prettifying the examples of India and the USA. Either way, this ignorant statement undermines his credibility on Iranian linguistic and ethnic issues. Second: Regarding Article 15 of the Iranian Constitution, Baghi writes: “Although in practice, like many other principles in the chapter of the rights of the nation, it has been ignored and has given excuse to those who use it as a pretext for ethnic hatred. This biased reasoning misleads readers. He accuses those deprived of their legal linguistic rights and protesting discriminatory language policies of spreading ethnic hatred, while he remains silent about systematic linguistic discrimination, limiting himself to the vague phrase “ignored.” Here, with his flawed bias, Baghi openly sides with the perpetrators of discrimination. Third: Throughout his writing, Baghi frequently refers to government officials and uses their statements as the basis for his judgments—from the Deputy of Primary Education in the Ministry of Education to the head of the preschool assessment center in Meshginshahr—he relies on them to convince his audience that the racist “Persian-only” policy is not implemented. Meanwhile, he discredits eyewitness accounts and parents’ testimonies as unreliable! But how credible are Baghi’s references to government officials for the reader? Does he always rely on officials’ statements in unrelated ethnic issues? If we review his past works, we will see that he does not. Apparently, when it comes to ethnic rights concerning “us,” even Baghi’s principles are overshadowed. He even implicitly portrays the Ministry of Education as a supporter of mother tongue education—a body that is arguably the main tool of assimilation. Finally: Baghi writes: “Fars racism and Turk and Arab racism, etc., are two sides of the same coin, and some bring up other racisms under the pretext of fighting Fars racism.” Here, Baghi explicitly equates these groups. For most readers, “Fars racism” likely refers to a concrete force: a current that holds billions in budget, controls official positions, has organizational and media support, named and identifiable patrons, a known economic approach, historical roots, and so forth. However, Baghi offers no characteristics of the hypothetical Turk, Arab, or other racist groups and misleads the audience by calling them “two sides of the same coin.” In this geography, no clear or common understanding exists of what Baghi calls Turk or Arab racism; no manifesto, no racist party platform, no racist campaign, no identified figures theorizing racial bases, no state backing, nor history. Yet, Baghi lumps these nonexistent groups together with the existing racism and, with baseless arguments, accuses forces seeking ethnic rights of racism, thus, willingly or unwillingly, siding with the dominant groups.
Emadeddin Baghi’s Responses to My Critique of His Article “Language-based Racism”
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| Emadeddin Baghi, an Iranian journalist, human rights activist |
Dear Sir,
Since responding to every single statement is neither possible nor necessarily beneficial—especially when we are trapped within our own prejudices—and given that your piece was tagged to be shown to me, I respectfully offer the following remarks as a sample of my responses. At the same time, I thank you for the spirit of critique.
1. My article was not a formal essay; it was a response to a question.
2. Contrary to your claim that “Baghi consistently refers the reader to state officials and bases his judgments on their statements,” some of my references were to Deutsche Welle, IranWire, and even a member of the opposition. Not all references were to state officials.
3. I had asked the person posing the question to provide documentation regarding the “proficiency plan,” and they sent links containing statements by officials. Naturally, in reviewing the documents they sent, I had to refer to those statements.
4. I did not intend to name overt groups that, in Khuzestan, Balochistan, Kurdistan, and Azerbaijan, explicitly and officially advocate for secession, often follow an armed struggle strategy, and receive billions in funding and organizational support from Saudi Arabia, the U.S., Israel, Baku, etc. Instead, I referred to them under the general heading of Persian, Turkish, Arab, Baloch, and Kurdish racism and labeled all of them as contrary to human rights.
Yet it seems you do not follow the positions and websites of these groups or watch their public conferences in the U.S., nor have you conducted even a basic internet search to see how openly they speak of dividing Iran. You, however, focus on just one side, stating:
“For most readers, the Persian racism Baghi mentions will have a concrete referent: a movement with billions in funding, official posts, media and organizational support, named figures backing it, a clear economic agenda, and well-established historical roots. The author, however, offers no such specifics about the supposedly racist Turk, Arab, etc., groups, misleading the reader by calling them the ‘other side of the coin.’”
Interestingly, I treated all sides equally and never specified who receives billions or who is backed by which foreign power—but you first amplify one side (Persian racism, which has shaped your lens) by listing its funding and institutional support, and then you claim, “Baghi does not provide specifics about the supposedly racist Turk, Arab, etc., groups.” And by your logic, this makes them the dominant party?
I believe our fundamental difference is this:
In my view, Persian, Arab, Turk, and Baloch racists—regardless of their billion-dollar budgets and organizational backing—are all anti-human rights actors. I believe they are the ones who sacrifice the legitimate demands of oppressed ethnic groups and provide the so-called “Persian racists” with excuses to deny ethnic rights.
You, on the other hand, because of your opposition to the regime, see only one side. You not only fail to acknowledge the real-world existence of the others—ignoring their many public conferences—but even consider them hypothetical.
5. You quote my statement:
“Since in many countries around the world—including the U.S. and India—various ethnic and national groups live and speak their mother tongues and are multilingual, a single language is established as the official and national language.”
You then critique it by saying:
“While this may be true in some cases, in other multilingual countries, several languages share equal official status—countries which Baghi deliberately avoids naming. If we’re being charitable, perhaps he’s unaware of such models altogether. But if we’re being cynical, his refusal to mention pluralistic linguistic policies is a way of deflecting and denying the language rights of Iran’s non-Persian ethnic groups—a tired tactic masked by selective references to India and the U.S.”
What’s interesting is that you, who insist on placing people and ideas within predefined “you’re either with us or against us” frameworks, criticize me for not listing other countries—but then you yourself refrain from naming them. When, as an ethnic advocate, you withhold names at the very point you call others out for doing so, what kind of expectations can you realistically have from others?
6. You argue that since Baghi merely mentions the neglect of Article 15 of the Constitution in his piece, he therefore stands explicitly alongside those responsible for discrimination.
Please reconsider your reasoning. Unfortunately, this is a common tactic: label someone as being part of the “dominant side” and conveniently bypass actual argumentation. But how much credibility does this have among reasonable people? Especially in the case of someone whose record is quite clear.
Although the respected critic says, “If we flip through Baghi’s track record…”—my record is one of the most accessible: 35 years of articles and books, with many of them containing my own harshest critiques. Perhaps if you had thoroughly reviewed it, you might have reconsidered such a claim. With all due respect, my record is at least more transparent than yours—or that of many others.
This method is reminiscent of how the government behaves: anyone they want to discredit, they link to foreign powers. It seems, in many ways, two opposing sides can be two sides of the same coin.
Thanks again for your critique, and best wishes in prioritizing humanity—beyond ethnicity, race, language, or religion—in both belief and practice.
Emadeddin Baghi
A Response to Emadeddin Baghi’s Objections Ruzbeh Sa'adati
The following eight points are my responses to the objections and remarks made by Emadeddin Baghi in reaction to my initial critique. Part one addresses deliberate or unintended misreadings of my criticism, while part two focuses on Baghi’s biases. But first, a necessary preface: much of this debate is futile, since, in many cases, the participants engage in commentary without paying due attention to the text itself—relying instead on prejudices and extra-textual assumptions. In this particular case, I will try—so far as possible—to highlight these oversights and prejudgments in Baghi’s responses.
1st Point
Baghi writes:
“Contrary to your claim that ‘Baghi, throughout his text, refers readers to government officials and bases his judgment on their statements,’ some of my references were to Deutsche Welle, IranWire, and even to an opposition figure—not all were to state authorities.”
I never claimed that all of Baghi’s references were to state officials. The wording I used is quite clear: “throughout his text.” For example, while Baghi refers to media like Deutsche Welle in regard to the “no-accent condition for teachers,” all his claims concerning the Persian Proficiency Plan (#بسندگی_فارسی) are based on the statements of government officials. My critique was specifically focused on Baghi’s denial of the plan’s implementation—not on the no-accent condition for teachers.
2nd Point
Baghi writes:
“I asked the questioner for sources on the Persian proficiency plan, and they sent links that included official statements. I had no choice but to reference them when analyzing the materials provided.”
If those links only contained official statements, on what basis does Baghi dismiss the testimonies of parents and eyewitnesses to the implementation of the Persian Proficiency Plan as unreliable?
In fact, this comment confirms my critique: Baghi’s judgment in this matter rests exclusively on state narratives, as he denies the plan's implementation. Yet only a few lines earlier, he had claimed to rely on non-state sources—revealing a blatant inconsistency.
3rd Point
Baghi engages in labeling:
He writes to me:
“You, because you are opposed to the government…”
I do not know what exactly Baghi means by “opposed to the government,” but such a label can carry significant legal consequences. I won’t speculate whether this labeling constitutes a form of security coding, but for someone who claims moral authority, this kind of extratextual labeling is truly disappointing.
4th Point
Baghi writes:
“Even though the critic says ‘If Baghi’s record is reviewed…’ perhaps if you had flipped through my full track record, you would’ve hesitated to make such a claim—because, if I may say so, my record is at least clearer than yours or many others’.”
I have to ask: did Baghi actually read my critique?
In the original piece I wrote:
“Would Baghi, with such generosity, rely on official statements in all human rights cases? If we flip through his record, we’d see that he hasn’t always done so.”
That is: in the past, unlike his handling of the Persian Proficiency issue, he did not rely solely on state narratives.
I then wrote:
“It seems that when it comes to our ethnic rights, even the core principles of people like Baghi shift.”
So, far from ignoring his past, I explicitly acknowledged his prior commitment to principled human rights work—my point was that those principles seem absent now. But Baghi, rather than reading the text carefully, casts me into the dark.
5th Point
Baghi writes:
“I did not want to name certain well-known groups in Khuzestan, Balochistan, Kurdistan, and Azerbaijan that explicitly advocate for secession and often use armed struggle, with billions in funding and organizational backing from Saudi Arabia, the U.S., Israel, Baku, etc. I referred to all under the broad label of racism—Persian, Turkish, Arab, Baloch, Kurdish—and considered them anti-human rights.”
I believe this statement from Baghi speaks volumes: he directly equates secessionism, armed struggle, and similar acts with racism.
Frankly, this is absurd. It’s far too late in the day to be confusing these concepts. Secessionism is simply a political vision for an alternative form of governance; it has no inherent link to racism. But when argumentation is inverted, secessionism gets twisted into racial supremacy.
As for the claim about armed struggle, Baghi cannot provide a single instance of such activity within the civil Turkish movement in Iran.
Demonizing the “Other” using simplistic accusations and stoking foreign-threat hysteria—often channeled through the state apparatus—is precisely the method of authoritarian regimes. Baghi, despite his self-image as a dissident, unconsciously slips into this exact pattern.
My original critique pointed out that in this geography, there is no clear, shared understanding of what Baghi refers to as “Turkish or Arab racism.”
If Baghi insists on tracking and analyzing “racism” through the lens of possible separatist groups, that's his prerogative—but it’s not the crux of my argument.
6th Point
Baghi writes:
“Why did you yourself not name those multilingual countries [where multiple official languages exist]? As an ethnic minority, if you withhold such names when they’re necessary, how can you expect others to provide them?”
Perhaps Baghi has a bit of a point here.
Still, one must note that we are tired—tired of stating the obvious, tired of constant denial, tired of being labeled. Those who still insist on calling us “Azeri” instead of “Turk” will likely say, “Which part of you resembles those countries?” even if we do list multilingual models.
By now, such basic issues should already be resolved for anyone making pronouncements about language policy.
7th Point
Baghi writes:
“You claim that because I merely refer to the ‘neglect’ of Article 15, I stand alongside the agents of discrimination. Please review your reasoning.”
I have. And here's what’s been conveniently omitted:
Yes—someone who both
reduces the systemic and blatant discrimination in question to mere “neglect of the law,”
and accuses those who protest the deprivation of their legal linguistic rights of ethnic hatred,
has undeniably aligned themselves with the perpetrators of that discrimination.
Whitewashing discrimination and distorting the public’s understanding of it is, in itself, a form of complicity.
8th Point – One of Baghi’s most peculiar arguments:
He writes:
“I believe that Persian, Arab, Turk, and Baloch racists—all of whom have billion-dollar budgets and organizational backing—are anti-human rights actors. These are the people who sacrifice the just demands of oppressed ethnic groups and give Persian racists the excuse to violate ethnic rights.”
The simplified version of this logic is:
You are to blame for your own oppression; don’t give them excuses.
By this logic, if two or three anonymous individuals—who may or may not be racists or separatists—do something questionable somewhere, then children here should be denied education in their mother tongue. Because those few individuals gave someone else an excuse.
Where, then, do the concepts of state responsibility, citizenship rights, or legal justice fit in Baghi’s framework?
To me, it’s unclear. Once again, he invokes a hypothetical foreign actor to redirect attention away from actual discrimination and shift the blame elsewhere.
Source: Ruzbeh Saadati’s Telegram page