 |
| Arif Keskin |
Arif Keskin emphasizes that the recent Nagorno-Karabakh war concluded in a way that was largely detrimental to Iran, which is why Iran is dissatisfied with the ceasefire agreement. Speaking to Voice of America, the political expert explains that the war not only reduced the Iranian state's influence in the region but also dealt a significant blow to Iranian nationalism domestically.
He also highlights that the change in the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh represents a loss for the Islamic Republic of Iran:
“Additionally, the thesis Iran upheld since the 1990s has been defeated. Since 1994, Iran particularly wanted the status quo to persist, hoping that over time Armenia would prevail. However, the new Azerbaijan-Armenia war and this agreement significantly altered the status quo, which poses a serious problem for Iran.”
Keskin draws attention to Turkey’s role, stating: “Turkey is entering the Caucasus. The Turkish military is coming to Karabakh and establishing a presence in Azerbaijan. Looking at the post-Soviet period, Iran and Turkey have been rivals in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and that rivalry persists today. Iran did not want Turkey to strengthen its presence in the Caucasus and Azerbaijan. Iran’s policy had been shaped around weakening Turkey’s influence in these regions. Turkey’s strong entry into Azerbaijan is something Iran did not desire.”
Keskin also notes that Iran’s relations with Armenia and Russia have weakened:
“Iran’s relationships with Armenia and Russia have visibly deteriorated over this issue. It has become clear that Russia perhaps values Turkey more than it values Iran. Russia does not even want Iran involved in the region. Despite Iran’s extensive support for Armenia, it ultimately did not achieve its desired outcomes from Armenia.”
The political expert assesses that Azerbaijan’s full control over its border with Iran is a significant factor for the future of Azerbaijan-Iran relations:
“134 kilometers of the Azerbaijan-Iran border was under occupation. These were the first areas to be liberated during the recent operations. Azerbaijan’s territorial expansion and recovery of its occupied lands will undoubtedly impact Azerbaijan-Iran relations. For example, the presence of the Khudaferin Bridge on this border and its symbolic significance make this a crucial frontier,” Keskin explains.
According to Keskin, the creation of a corridor between Nakhchivan and mainland Azerbaijan, as stipulated in the agreement, will reduce Iran’s transit significance:
“Another critical issue is the corridor between Nakhchivan and Zangilan. This corridor will significantly affect Azerbaijan-Iran relations and decrease Iran’s importance in Azerbaijan’s eyes. Currently, Nakhchivan has no land connection to the rest of Azerbaijan and is more reliant on Iran. Azerbaijan depends on Iran to send gas and other supplies to Nakhchivan. If this corridor opens, Azerbaijan’s reliance on Iran will decrease. Additionally, thousands of Turkish freight trucks pass through Iranian territory each year en route to Central Asia and other regions. Turkey might start using this new corridor through Azerbaijan to reach Central Asia, which would replace Iran as the traditional transit route. It is evident that a transit rivalry between Iran and Azerbaijan will emerge from this new arrangement.”
Keskin adds that while Azerbaijan’s reliance on Iran may decrease, this does not mean Azerbaijan has no need to maintain good relations with Iran.
“Azerbaijan will still need good relations with Iran, but this need is not the same as it was before the Second Karabakh War. Many things have changed, and these changes will give Azerbaijan a stronger position, more influence, and greater capacity to assert itself in disputes with Iran,” he explains.
Keskin also believes that Azerbaijan’s recovery of its territories has undermined the propaganda Iran has pursued in Southern Azerbaijan since the 1990s:
“Iran used to claim that Azerbaijan was too weak to protect its own lands. It would argue that Azerbaijan could not offer anything to the people because it couldn’t even defend itself. But what has become clear now? Azerbaijan is strong enough to protect its lands. It has gained respect in the international community and become a source of pride. This has boosted the confidence of people in Southern Azerbaijan and Iran’s Turks as well. The strengthening of Azerbaijan-Turkey relations and Turkey’s unconditional support for Azerbaijan have also positively affected the Turks in Iran and Southern Azerbaijan, alleviating many of their concerns,” Keskin asserts.
According to Keskin, the failure of Iran’s propaganda regarding the Republic of Azerbaijan is also a significant defeat for Iranian nationalism:
“The narrative Iran propagated—that Azerbaijan is a state incapable of defending its territories—had deeply influenced public perception. After the war, this propaganda has been rendered ineffective, and Iran has suffered a substantial defeat in this regard. The pan-Iranist view that relied on hostility toward Azerbaijan and Turks has now been discredited. Today, we see that anti-Iran sentiment has grown in Northern Azerbaijan and Turkey. All of this stems from Iran’s nationalist policies, and this nationalist approach has now failed,” Keskin concludes.
Link to the original interview in Turkish on the Azerbaijani section of Voice of America:
“Qarabağ müharibəsi bölgədə İranın nüfuzunu, daxildə isə İran millətçiliyini itkiyə uğratdı”