Democracy and the Right to Self-Determination

Hedayat Soltanzadeh - September 10, 2010

What is the relationship between democracy and the right to self-determination? Are democracy and the right to self-determination two entirely separate concepts, or do they have an organic relationship where one loses its meaning without the other? In a logical abstraction, these two ideas can be distinguished; however, reflection on them will reveal the profound connection between these two terms, as both concepts relate to the sovereignty of the people. The former delineates a model of political governance and the manner of administering the state, wherein the people are the primary actors in its conventional sense. It also indicates the existence of political and civil liberties and the rule of law within society. The latter emphasizes the legitimacy, authority, and sovereignty of the people and the ways this right is manifested. The exercise of people's sovereignty is impossible without their control over the political apparatus, which can only be realized through a democracy-based government. The right to self-determination essentially signifies a social unit's right to govern its social and political life. In the context of a nation within a territory, this occurs through the nation-state framework, while in a multinational territory, it is expressed through the collective participation of various groups in managing this political and social life, which practically necessitates either utilizing federative tools or splitting into separate nation-states.

The expression of the collective identity of different groups in human societies represents another aspect of democracy and the right to self-determination, both of which have historically shared a common origin. Even the idea of ownership, in its earliest historical forms, indicated not only the ownership of objects by individuals but also signified an individual's belonging to their tribe and ethnicity, reflecting their identity.

The fact that in our contemporary world, these two ideas of democracy and the right to self-determination have often strayed from their essence is another matter; however, it does not eliminate the fundamental issue—the organic relationship between democracy and the right to self-determination. If a country possesses independence but adopts political tyranny in its governance, the application of tyranny simultaneously violates both democracy and the sovereignty of the people. Just as the right to self-determination is first manifested in a nation's uprising against its oppressive government and in taking control of its own destiny. This point is significant because the right to self-determination does not merely mean reclaiming rights from a dominating nation, nor is it limited to that meaning. Rather, the possibility of democratic control by the people over the state's political apparatus is the most determining factor in identifying a nation's or people's sovereignty. This can sometimes manifest itself in the collective control of nationalities residing within a geographical unit over the political apparatus of the state and, concurrently, in the local authority of each nationality in its natural living environment. External independence or a federative system are merely forms of expressing the possibility of democratic control and do not encompass the essence and substance of the right to self-determination.

To understand this relationship, it is essential to return to the origins of the idea of democracy, its two-and-a-half-thousand-year neglect in political theory, and its revival in the age of the nation-state and the emergence of national movements at the end of the eighteenth century. Furthermore, it is necessary to examine the evolution of the idea of self-determination and its relationship with democracy.

In general, the concept of democracy has emerged in three significant phases throughout human history. The first phase can be said to be a common characteristic of all human societies, even before the theory or the very term "democracy" was introduced among them. This phase encompasses the life of societies in tribal conditions, where collective participation and decision-making in matters were the general characteristics of these societies, and democracy manifested itself as a social practice. The second phase begins with democracy in Athens, which fell into neglect after Athens's defeat in the Hellenic wars by Antipater, a Macedonian general, in 321 BC. The third phase is fundamentally linked to the revival of the idea of democracy during the French Revolution, the idea of self-determination, and the emergence of the nation-state concept. The manner in which democracy emerged in the latter two phases was necessarily accompanied by class struggles and the more complex class alignments, the emergence of new political and philosophical ideas, as well as major political and social revolutions. Understanding the resurgence of democracy in later historical periods without considering these new elements will be impossible.

Tribe: The Original Birthplace of Democracy

Historical evidence indicates that the origins of the first forms of democratic governance emerged even before ancient Greece during the era of Cleisthenes and Pericles, manifesting in all early societies. Tacitus, a Roman senator and historian in the late first century and early second century AD, writes about the governance methods of the Germanic tribes:

"In minor and trivial matters, the chieftains would consult with each other. However, in important matters, the entire community had to be consulted. In cases where the people's decision was necessary, the chieftains had to present the topic comprehensively and discuss it. Except in emergencies, tribal councils were held on specific days, usually at the sight of the crescent moon or during a full moon, which were considered the most appropriate times for discussing such matters by the tribespeople. Unlike us, who base our calculations on days, they organized their regular matters and legal agreements according to nights... If the majority of the tribe deemed it necessary, they would attend the council armed. The priests would announce silence, and it was their responsibility to maintain order in the meeting. Then the king or the chieftain, or anyone else who took the floor due to age, lineage, military renown, or eloquence would begin to speak, and it must be noted that their authority stemmed from persuasion and encouragement for decision-making, not from issuing commands. If their proposal did not convince the participants in the council, they would reject it with a muted uproar, and if it was accepted, they would strike their spears together in approval."

After explaining how the tribal council was conducted, Tacitus continues regarding the selection of kings and military commanders:

"In the selection of a king, his lineage was considered, while the merit and competence of military commanders were taken into account. Their king did not possess absolute power, nor did he have unlimited authority. Military commanders were chosen not for their authority but for their exemplary status and prominence."

Research by Lewis Morgan, an American anthropologist, sheds more light on the origins of democracy in primitive societies:

"Democracy was born among the tribe and manifested itself in the preservation of the tribes' rights to choose their leaders and heads. Mechanisms were established to prevent the abuse of power. The remnants of the tribes retained control over the selection process."

In Morgan's depiction of the democratic governance of early societies, we can clearly see the embryo of democracy and the inseparability of this idea from the early forms of people's rights to control their own destiny. Neither democracy nor the right to self-determination emerged suddenly in human history; both concepts have had their developmental origins, co-existing with humanity throughout history. People have strived in later periods to rediscover their forgotten democratic traditions and to add new dimensions to them.

Morgan writes about the role of tribal councils:

"In ancient societies of Asia, Europe, and America, the council institution within the tribe constituted a significant aspect of tribal life, from the barbaric era to civilization. The council was not only a governmental tool but also an overarching authority over the tribe, tribes, and confederations of tribes. The simplest and lowest form of the council existed within the tribe itself. The tribal council was a democratic assembly, as every man and woman member of the tribe had the right to express their views on all presented issues. The council could elect or dismiss leaders and heads, appoint guardians of faith, pardon or punish a member of the tribe who committed murder, or accept new members into the tribe. The tribal council was the embryo of a higher council within the tribe and also the embryo of the council of confederated tribes, which consisted exclusively of the leaders and representatives of the tribes."

Studying early societies reveals the existence of similar democratic institutions. With the expansion of tribes and the onset of wars, the role of military commanders shifted from being elected to hereditary, which restricted the democracy born within tribal society. Two other limiting factors were the increasing role of elders and shamans, who held a dual role of priest and healer, and the gradual concentration of the tribe's wealth in their hands, which led to the erosion of democracy in early societies.

Athens and the Second Emergence of Democracy

A similar method of democratic governance can also be observed among the tribes of ancient Greece, where the governing body was the council of chiefs, working in cooperation with the Agora or assembly of the people and the military command. The people were free, and their institutions were also democratic. Even with the change in the organization of society during the time of Cleisthenes, which I will reference, the political system of governance in Greece retained its democratic aspects. Morgan states in this regard:

"When the Athenians established a new political system based on property and land, their political system was a pure democracy. This was neither a new theory nor a creation of Athenian minds; rather, it was a system as old and familiar as their tribes. Democratic ideas had existed in the thoughts and behaviors of their ancestors for a long time, now taking on a more refined expression and, in many respects, a more perfected form of governance. The false element—namely, aristocracy—had infiltrated the system, causing many conflicts and tensions during the transitional period, and was intertwined with the military institution; however, the new democratic system led to the downfall of that institution. More successfully than the remaining Greek tribes, the Athenians logically implemented their democratic ideas into a government. This is one reason why they produced the most outstanding, enlightened, and perfect race of humanity among the human family. From the perspective of purely intellectual achievements, they still astonish humankind. This is because the ideas that had germinated in earlier tribal periods, interwoven with every cell and fabric of their brains, found fertile ground in a democratically established state. Under the invigorating vibrations of democracy, the highest growth of their intellect and thought was able to occur."

Athenian democracy, after its breakdown in early societies, was the product of prolonged social tensions and conflicts within Athenian society. As Morgan noted, the influence of aristocracy within the democratic systems of early societies and the social fragmentation within those societies played a significant role in undermining democracy. The gradual dominance of aristocracy over the community's economic resources, the increasing indebtedness of the people, and their transformation into slaves in the event of non-payment of debts intensified social and political tensions in Athens, leading to revolts among the poor and the hostage-taking of moneylenders, resulting in greater insecurity.

John Dunn states that democracy was the outcome of the struggle between wealthy landowners and impoverished families who had lost their lands or were at risk of losing them and becoming unfree laborers due to their debts. Democracy did not arise from a direct and conscious victory or an infallible victory of the poor over the wealthy; rather, it was the result of a series of political actions that transformed the social geography and institutions of Athens and granted them a political identity, leading them to manifest a political system for expressing and defending that identity.

The new democracy that was taking shape was itself the product of a political and social revolution and an ideological transformation in the eighth century BC. Almost from the beginning of the eighth century BC, population growth, trade expansion, and the onset of wars not only accelerated social fragmentation but also concentrated economic power in the hands of a small group of aristocrats. This led to various levels of political and class struggles and intra-class competition within the aristocracy itself.

Political power was traditionally concentrated in the hands of the aristocracy, which also comprised landowners and slaveholders, while the common people, known as the demos, had varying levels of wealth and social opportunities. At the top of the demos, there were those who had also gained wealth and wanted to become part of the aristocracy and share in political power. Some of the aristocrats had emerged from this layer of the demos. Although there is no precise information about the social origins of the rulers, it seems that most of them arose from this segment.

From the seventh century onward, a phenomenon known as "tyranny" emerged in Greece, which was in opposition to aristocracy. The existence of tyrants did not imply oppression and cruelty in the modern sense; in many instances, they played an important role in building and urbanizing cities and rose to power in many city-states of Greece. The emergence of tyrants can be seen as a necessary historical phase in the city-states of Greece, although this view is not universally accepted as a general law. Generally, politically and socially unstable conditions provide a suitable ground for their emergence. In some city-states, tyrants were employed as instruments against the aristocracy and oligarchs, breaking their political will; in other cases, the emergence of democracy preceded the existence of tyrants, ultimately leading to democracy as a result of the tyrants' reign, which established the dominance of aristocracy and oligarchy.

Thucydides associates the age of tyrants in history with the enrichment of a segment of the population, the growth of trade, and the emergence of a newly wealthy class, portraying tyrants as symbols of their political aspirations. The first phase of the emergence of tyrants coincided with unprecedented growth in trade and seafaring. Some tyrants had a history of piracy at sea. In this regard, they differed from landholding aristocrats whose wealth was tied to land ownership. In some cases, tyrants were supposed to ensure the preservation of power even for non-hereditary aristocrats. When there were no democratic institutions, people considered the presence of tyrants against the aristocracy to be in their best interest, using them as a battering ram against the oligarchic power. Once they achieved their goals, they discarded a weapon that had also harmed themselves.

The use of the tyrants' stronghold against the oligarchs does not necessarily imply a conscious use under the leadership of the masses and for the purpose of seizing power by themselves. The movement may have started as a rebellion, often by a portion of them against oppression and exploitation, and for years, the atmosphere of turmoil and unrest may have continued, only becoming explosive when someone took the lead who was not entirely detached from personal ambitions. Solon is an example of such a leader who believed in his role as an impartial judge in acute social struggles, while the people wanted him to take on the role of a tyrant.

Undoubtedly, Solon's rise to power and his reforms to cancel the debts of the poor, curb the unchecked land-grabbing of the oligarchs, implement legal reforms, provide employment outside of agriculture, and stabilize prices played a significant role in this regard. Solon was a prominent legislator who had a profound impact on the political and legal thought of the Athenians and sought to focus on what he considered a fundamental issue in creating a crisis in Athenian society. However, Solon failed to establish a specific political mechanism to express the democratic aspirations of the people, which is why his reforms ultimately faced failure.

According to Dorkrowa, a researcher of class struggles in ancient Greece and Rome, democracy did not emerge fully from civil society. The city-states of Greece that created democracy had to build it from the ground up. They were compelled to establish not only the necessary institutions but also to lay the groundwork for a democratic ideology.

How democracy from a tribal society was able to emerge in a new system based on land and representation of the people was realized by Cleisthenes in 507 BC. Unlike Solon, whose policies maneuvered between the aristocracy and the impoverished masses, Cleisthenes introduced the element of the masses for structural transformation in the government system. The new political system was established not on blood relations and kinship typical of tribal stages, but on local territorial units of the people.

According to Morgan, "the idea of the municipality ultimately emerged as a political unit. However, such an idea required a man with great genius and immense personal influence to give that idea a cohesive materiality. That man eventually appeared as Cleisthenes in 509 BC, who must be regarded as the first Athenian legislator and the founder of the second great scheme of human governance upon which modern civilized nations are organized."

A hundred years after Solon, Athenian society was facing a more serious crisis and chose a form of political administration called democracy. Cleisthenes addressed the root of the crisis and based the political system of Athens on foundations that were closer to semi-independent units within the republic. At the core of Cleisthenes' reforms was the replacement of kinship relations dominant in the political organization of the state. He divided Attica (which included Athens and its surrounding areas) into three major geographical regions: the coast, the city, and the inland territory, encompassing one hundred thirty-nine small districts or demes, each with defined boundaries and names, including all the people of Athens and its surroundings, that is, the demos. Each citizen was required to register personally and their property in their local deme. Registration and property in the local area represented an individual’s residence and were considered the foundational basis of citizenship. The inhabitants of each deme formed a locally organized political power with local self-governing authority, resembling the self-governing systems of towns among American migrants later on. The right to local self-governance was a vital element in the Athenian democratic system and was its distinctive feature, as the government was in the hands of the people based on local organization. What Cleisthenes did was recognize the social geography of Athens and lay the necessary institutions to resolve the crisis through a political organization that transferred political power from the aristocrats to the entirety of the people of Athens or the demos. Since this method of political administration placed sovereignty or political power in the hands of the people of Athens or the demos, which meant the non-aristocratic masses or ordinary people, it was called the government of the demos or democracy.

Athens was not a large city. With a population of just over a third of a million, half of whom were slaves and about forty thousand foreign inhabitants, the lack of political rights for women resulted in a limited scope of citizenship. Full citizenship could be said to include only a little over ten percent of the population. Moreover, due to employment or involvement in wars with foreigners or other city-states like Sparta, not all citizens could participate in all decision-making processes. Some lived in relatively distant areas and could not travel to participate in every meeting. However, whenever the citizens' assembly convened, they had the opportunity to participate, and all citizens had the right to express opinions and vote on all decisions. Occupational status, educational degree, wealth, or family background did not influence voting rights or decision-making processes. All citizens had equal and identical rights.

The Assembly of Citizens made fundamental decisions for the Athenian state and had the right to make decisions regarding war and peace, dispatch ships, and approve or reject laws. Alongside this, other institutions kept Athenian democracy alive for 130 years, placing political power in the hands of citizens as a whole. A council of five hundred prepared the agenda for each citizens' assembly. The council convened weekly and coordinated governmental affairs and issues related to foreign relations. Members of the council were selected from the 130 regional units of Athens and its surroundings based on voluntary service. One-tenth of the council members served as a permanent executive body that rotated every year. The presidency of each executive meeting was chosen by lot from among ten members for a duration of twenty-four hours, with a different individual presiding over each meeting.

Moreover, in addition to the council, popular courts were another important institution of Athenian democracy. Members of the jury in these courts were selected from among six thousand volunteers each year who had to take an official oath to uphold justice, receiving only a modest fee for their service. These courts addressed all significant disputes, and the jurors rendered their verdicts without any advice from professional lawyers. The court had the authority to hold any government official accountable, and they could risk not only their position and wealth but also their lives in the event of a conviction.

John Dunn writes that: "The immediate observation of Athenian democracy, the astonishing diffusion of power and responsibility among citizens, is not particularly difficult. What is surprising is how this stunning directness in politics in Athens, despite the intensity and permanence of personal responsibility that Athenian democracy employed, could be reconciled with the constantly changing role of its political leaders. If Pericles governed Athens as an individual in every respect, it was due to the support and consent of citizens and the active participation of citizens in politics. Even Pericles himself faced the threat of prosecution and was forced to pay a heavy fine. It was only when leaders became champions of reform in changing laws or advocating a different political line that they could face prosecution, primarily during foreign wars or competitions for military leadership and sending out fleets, that they left their mark on this change in laws. Even for this, they had to gain the approval of the general assembly of citizens... Ultimately, the election of generals had less of a democratic character."

One of the fundamental changes that Cleisthenes introduced to the social structure of Athens was the reorganization of the tribes, which had been based on four tribes, into ten tribes, not based on their kinship relations but on their places of residence. This reorganization resulted in the creation of 139 demes, each representing a defined territory. The territorial representation of tribes was a novel idea in politics, shifting the principle of representation from blood relations to territorial representation. For this reason, Cleisthenes is often called the founder of Athenian democracy. In addition to these reforms, Cleisthenes transformed some local customs into public ceremonies to bring the people of Athens closer together.

The atmosphere of social crises also creates the conditions for significant shifts and determines the course of social forces and the outlook of a political ideology. The transition to democracy in the crisis-ridden Athenian society was no exception to this general rule. Since the upper and lower classes of any stratified society, while having an overall orientation against each other, are further divided into various political and ideological spectrums, the intensification of crises within society fuels crises within political power and its internal rivalries, and also potentially creates the conditions for fragmentation or greater unity and alignment among the lower classes. The turn of elements from the upper classes toward the people and the utilization of the "mass" or "plebeian" element to push back rivals can lead to either positive or negative radical changes. In the Greece of that time, this class stratification and the entry of the masses into the political arena set the stage for the first democracy after the collapse of the democracy of early tribal societies, which faced severe criticism from Plato regarding democracy in his time.

But this raises the question: why Greece? Why did the second wave of democracy emerge in Greece after the collapse of democracy in early societies? What could be the specific reasons? To answer this question, one must focus on the factors that undermined democracy during the developmental stages of tribal societies, the particular class and social struggles that occurred at a specific moment in Greek history, and the limitations of these obstructive factors throughout the entire period of Athenian democracy.

Before the end of the sixth century BCE, tyrants had almost lost their political function in the class and social relations of Greece, except in Sicily and a few cities under Persian influence. The expansion of class struggles and the intensification of conflicts within the ruling classes set the historical stage for the use of the "plebeian" in establishing new historical institutions, and Cleisthenes and the emergence of the second wave of democracy were the products of such conditions.

In times of intensified crises, dictators typically recognize no other path than repression, and it is precisely in such moments that the historical stage is set for the masses to step forward and implement fundamental changes in society. After Solon, Athens was governed by a council of four hundred. Following the overthrow of Hippias, the ruling dictator in Athens in 510 BCE, by Cleisthenes with the help of the king of Sparta, the political rivalry between him and Isagoras intensified. Since Sparta was concerned about the possibility of democratic transformation, it supported Isagoras, forcing Cleisthenes to leave Athens. Cleomenes, the king of Sparta and supporter of Isagoras, aimed to dissolve the city council, prompting the citizens of Athens to besiege the Spartan forces for three days, ultimately driving him out of Athens. Isagoras, the new dictator, escalated repression and further confiscated people's lands.

The spontaneous uprising of the people in 507 BCE against the dictator is what Josiah Ober refers to as a political revolution that paved the way for fundamental changes and made possible what had until then been impossible, citing descriptions from Herodotus and Aristotle of events during that historical period:

1. The masses (demos) took action themselves.
2. Their actions occurred in the absence of organized leadership.
3. The siege of the Spartans and Isagoras lasted for three days.
4. Their siege resulted in the surrender of the Spartans.
5. This mass movement had profound consequences for the future of Athens.

With the political revolution of 507 BCE and the entry of the masses into the political scene as a demotic act, which coincided with the return of Cleisthenes to power, deep political reforms in the structure of power and Athenian democracy became possible. In other words, classical democracy in Athens was the result and outcome of a revolution. From this perspective, Athenian democracy was, above all, a product of the mass action of citizens, which subsequently continued to sustain itself through the ongoing participation of ordinary citizens in collective decisions and actions. The establishment of democracy simultaneously led to a significant change in human epistemology, resulting in the creation of institutions that provided a fresh understanding of society and a new framework, which can be called the ideological revolution in political theory. Undoubtedly, Cleisthenes played an important role in laying the groundwork and shaping the institutions of democracy in Athens, but it was the masses that played the principal role in this dramatic change.

Some researchers have referred to the formation of civic awareness and democracy during the time of Solon as precursors to the revolution of 507 BCE and the aggression of Isagoras and Cleomenes, as well as the resistance of the city council. These precursors help understand the reasons behind the readiness of the masses in Athens to engage in collective action. However, democracy requires the release of the mass energy at a moment in time that actualizes fundamental changes and the transition toward the formation of new institutions in history, transforming the impossible into the possible and making possibilities a reality. In the history of Athenian democracy, that moment of mass energy release occurs when Cleisthenes is in exile, and the masses independently step onto the historical stage to expel the king of Sparta and his supported dictator, surrounding the Acropolis.

The revolutionary action of the masses during these democratic transformations was crucial because it was precisely in those days after the revolution that the term "democracy" first came into common use. It was due to this revolutionary action that, through changes in the vocabulary of discourse, the opening of intellectual boundaries, and changes in citizens' interactions with one another, democracy became possible.

One reason for the continuity of democracy in Greece for over one hundred thirty years was the separation of political power from the power of the wealthy, oligarchs, and landowning aristocrats. Josiah Ober writes about this separation of political power from the economically dominant classes in Athenian democracy: "In most of our pre-modern states and non-democratic societies, individuals akin to the Athenian elites have always criticized popular rule. These individuals were those who enjoyed comfort and adequate education, enabling them to engage in intellectual pursuits and aspire to join the ranks of the ruling elite. In Athenian democracy, political power was at least theoretically separated from economic power. The wealthy and educated elites of Athens did not constitute the ruling elite in the conventional sense. These elites regarded the Athenian example in this regard as exceptional. Consequently, there were those in Athens who criticized the existing political situation, but their motivation for critiquing the Athenian democratic system was that the current system deprived them of the political privileges they could have enjoyed in traditional, non-democratic regimes. Moreover, Athenian democracy was a form of government strongly oriented toward public speech and official rhetoric. Evidence of this includes democratic behavior in public assemblies, open debates, mass voting politics, and the public display of legal claims on tablets."

In the late 460s BCE, Athenian democracy took a more radical turn. Ephialtes, an Athenian politician and leader of the democratic movement, paved the way for further deepening of democracy by limiting the role of the conservative council in the city, which held oversight over administrative matters and the city’s judicial system. He established popular courts, reduced property requirements for council membership, instituted wage payments for administrative work, and provided a new definition of Athenian citizenship. However, he was soon murdered as a result of an oligarchic conspiracy, and political power was transferred to his political ally, Pericles. According to Plutarch, Pericles came from a poor family, and it was during his time that Athenian democracy experienced its Golden Age in antiquity.

All cultural, philosophical, and artistic achievements, as well as advancements in various sciences, were indebted to the existence of democracy in Athens. The exchange of ideas did not have to overcome the barrier of dictatorship. Opponents of freedom, like Plato, could easily criticize the democratic system. Such criticism was not possible in Sparta. In Athens, individuals could openly support their enemy, Sparta, while advocating for Athenian democracy was forbidden in Sparta.

What remained from the democracy of the past two thousand five hundred years later was neither the institutions of democracy nor the democratic methods of governing society. What persisted was merely a system of thought transmitted through the works of three figures: Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle, none of whom were advocates of democracy as a system of governance.

In the two thousand five hundred years following the decline of democracy in Athens, no one rose to defend it. From the fourteenth to the eighteenth century, political theory did not extend beyond the mixed government and separation of powers in the political organization of the state. Democratic theories in the eighteenth century were primarily associated with limiting absolute power rather than with the political rights of the people. Democracy and the rule of the people were considered negative and dangerous ideas. Interpretations of democracy were shaped by the perspectives of opponents like Plato, who asserted that democracy was, firstly, unsuitable for modern government because it lacks executive capability in modern states; secondly, that direct rule by the masses leads to violence, chaos, and governmental instability; and that mass governance is less capable of using power wisely. None of the theorists of modern states, from Thomas Hobbes to John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, referred to democracy as a positive term. It was only on the eve of the revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century that the idea of democracy as a system of governance was reintroduced in political theory, primarily linked to transformations in the concept of sovereignty and the proclamation of the right to self-determination and the formation of nation-states around it.

The French Revolution and the Rebirth of the Idea of Democracy

The French Revolution fundamentally changed the definition of sovereignty and democracy, creating an inseparable bond between the two concepts. A few years before the French Revolution, the idea of popular sovereignty had emerged in the "Patriot Movement in the Netherlands," particularly in their "Declaration of Leiden," and for the first time, the term democracy was voiced in the small country of Belgium around the same time. However, it was only through the French Revolution that democracy was introduced to the world as a positive system of government. The central enigma of the French Revolution lies precisely in the origins of modern democracy. Neither the leaders of the American Revolution nor those of the French Revolution had revolted for democracy. Democracy was the result of the radicalization of the revolution, the entry of the masses into the political arena, and the rise of new leaders. On the one hand, many aspects that we now associate with democracy—such as popular sovereignty, the principle of representation, citizenship, and nationality—were all collectively transformed into the notion of democracy during the French Revolution. On the other hand, all fears stemming from the heavy shadow of Athenian democracy—such as concerns over violence, instability, and threats to property and direct governance by the people—manifested in the "democratic rage" that engulfed France. All of Europe was in fear of the spreading flames of this revolution. None of the leading figures of liberalism, from Adam Smith to the founders of America like Madison and Hamilton, viewed democracy positively or considered themselves democrats, nor did they recommend governance based on democracy.

In the midst of the French Revolution, the conceptual and theoretical framework of modern democracy was constructed, accompanying a fundamental reconsideration of the idea of democracy. This fundamental reconsideration involved integrating democracy within the framework of representative government endorsed by liberalism, aligning democracy with representative governance. Throughout the eighteenth century and into the first half of the nineteenth century, liberalism not only viewed democracy negatively but also considered it an outdated and impractical political system on a larger scale, as the experience of direct democracy in history had only occurred in very small communities, which Aristotle noted could be counted in a single glance. Representative democracy, as John Dunn emphasized, altered the idea of democracy to the extent that it became unrecognizable. However, with this new formulation, democracy transformed from a disheartening defeat in history to a stable victory.

Another change involved a transformation in the value associated with democracy and the presentation of a positive concept of it. This new definition of democracy and the change in its value emerged during the French Revolution, through the contributions of two significant political actors: Thomas Paine and Maximilien Robespierre, who imbued democracy with a new meaning. Both simultaneously provided a new interpretation of democracy. Without a doubt, Robespierre’s role is more prominent because Thomas Paine’s intellectual evolution gradually unfolded throughout the French Revolution, shifting from support for a constitutional monarchy to becoming a radical republican, although Robespierre himself held similar views in the years leading up to the revolution.

To understand this new interpretation of democracy, it must be situated within the broader framework of the French Revolution and the internal dynamics of its transformation, especially considering the prevailing attitudes towards democracy in the eighteenth century, where the idea of democracy was initially absent from revolutionary discourse. The early years of the French Revolution (1789-1791) reflected the ideology of European liberalism, which favored a constitutional monarchy and political freedom but supported unequal electoral rights for election to the legislature and holding government positions. In contrast, the European radicalism that prominently manifested in France defended universal suffrage, republicanism, and the enactment of laws to improve the economic and social conditions of the lower classes. Marquis de Lafayette and his "Patriot Party," which held the majority in the National Assembly during the early years of the revolution, passed laws that limited the political rights of the people based on their tax payments, effectively restricting political rights to those with economic ownership. The tax payment criterion that Lafayette's supporters pushed through the assembly divided the populace into two categories: active and passive citizens. Active citizens enjoyed full rights, while passive citizens had limited political rights. Robespierre's vehement opposition to this restriction of rights and the division of citizens into active and passive categories ultimately failed against the Lafayette majority in the National Assembly.

Sieyes, whose pamphlet "What is the Third Estate?" became the most important propaganda work of the revolution, argued under the influence of Adam Smith that only citizens contributing to the national economy should participate in the political life of the country. Non-productive citizens should be supported but should not have the right to participate in legislation. In June and July of 1791, just after the king's flight to Varennes, Sieyes published an article in the most prominent Paris newspaper of the time, opposing those who defended the republic against the monarchy.

Despite his support for constitutional monarchy, Cies introduced a new revision in the theory of sovereignty, stating that sovereignty resides not in the king but in the nation. He argued that the nation has two ways to participate in the exercise of power: direct participation in a democratic regime or delegating the exercise of power to its representatives. The second solution is an Enlightenment solution and suitable for modern states because representatives understand the will of the people better than the people themselves. His interpretation of the idea of representation was more compatible with Adam Smith's theory of division of labor. The second solution, that is, direct government by the people, Cies believed, was nothing more than raw and outdated democracy.

Cies was not in favor of overthrowing the king, but the importance of his revision of the theory of sovereignty was that it unwittingly undermined the foundations of the monarchy in France. In his theory, the king was merely the representative of the nation. Transforming sovereignty into representation did not yet mean democracy, but it was a step toward it. This linking of sovereignty, the nation, and representation was a mission that history had entrusted to Robespierre.

The existence of different ideological polarizations within the framework of the French Revolution demonstrated the functioning of rival ideologies in a convergent process, not to mention the polarizations and ideologies opposing them. The dynamism of the revolutionary movement inevitably created shifts in the alignments and rival ideologies. The capacity and potential for advancing each ideology were necessarily determined by the movement of the depths of society.

The radicals of Paris rightly believed that the electoral laws of both England and France were undemocratic. However, the real struggle for democracy did not begin in the Constituent Assembly but in the new institutions of the municipalities of Paris, the Commune, and the neighborhoods, where individuals like Candeze and Brissot sought to establish a democratic municipality.

The supporters of Lafayette opposed the abolition of the monarchy and also hindered any democratic transformation. The tension between the supporters of constitutional monarchy and the radicals advocating for a republic reached a new critical point on July 17, 1791, when Lafayette's soldiers fired upon the peaceful gathering of republicans. A temporary calm was established, but the radicals in the assembly accused the majority, led by Lafayette, of becoming counter-revolutionaries.

Albert Soboul, a historian of the French Revolution, writes: "From the beginning of the revolution, Robespierre steadfastly adhered to the principle that nobility and wealth should not be the criteria for the ability, dignity, and rights of a citizen. His voice was always raised against any oppressive actions against the people, and this characteristic of his continued from the beginning until the time of his assassination. For this reason, Robespierre remained an unwavering defender of democracy from the beginning of the revolution in 1789 until his death. He was not satisfied merely with defending the revolution against the privileged classes and demanding the freedom of Jews and black slaves in the colonies. In an assembly composed of wealthy bourgeois and essentially affluent individuals who harbored more suspicion of ordinary people than of the nobility, and who conditioned the voting rights of the common people on tax payment, Robespierre never allowed himself any doubts in opposing such conditions of property for the right to freedom. This issue made him an enemy of the monarchy as well as an enemy of any changes in the principle of equality in the Constitution of 1789."

In defining democracy, Robespierre stated that democracy is not a government where people constantly gather to manage their affairs. Such a government merely returns people to despotism, and historically, there has never been a direct government. Thus, he dismissed the historical definitions of democracy and said, "Democracy is a state in which the people, governing themselves, guided by laws that are the product of their own work, carry out everything that they can appropriately accomplish through representatives who are unable to do so themselves. Therefore, for your political behavior, you must pursue the principles of democratic governance. However, to lay the foundations of democratic government among yourselves and strengthen it, to achieve the peaceful sovereignty of laws, we must end the war for freedom against despotism and safely navigate through the storms of revolution. The spirit of revolutionary governance must be accompanied by the universal principles of democracy. Yet France is the first country in the world to establish true democracy by equating all men"l 5, 1791, during a discussion about the law regarding equality in inheritance, Robespierre stated, "Extreme inequality regarding wealth destroys political equality and freedom. Therefore, it can be concluded from this principle that the law must always aim to reduce these inequalities, which turn some people into instruments of their pride, desires, and crimes. If all your laws and institutions do not seek to eliminate this extreme inequality in wealth, you have essentially done nothing for the public welfare" .

Like obespierre believed that wealth inequality could render human political rights meaningless, asserting that both nature and property are the sources of these inequalities. Consequently, he believed that property is an evil but a necessary evil. Although it cannot be eliminated, it can be controlled. Therefore, property, as an institution and a social relationship, must be guaranteed by law for its survival, yet it cannot be exempt from any form of control. In fact, the logic and evolutionary course of events led Robespierre to become an increasingly strong defender and champion of political and social democracy.

On August 10, 1792, parts of the National Guard revolted and, alongside the sans-culottes and federalists from cities like Marseille and Rouen, attacked the royal palace in the Tuileries Gardens. Only the Swiss Guard of the monarchy resisted; during this assault, two-thirds of its nine hundred members and three hundred sans-culottes and ninety supporters of the federalists were killed in one day, but the outcome was a decisive victory for the rebel guard and the sans-culottes. The Assembly was compelled to accept the abolition of the monarchy and the demands of Robespierre and the sans-culottes for new elections to the Assembly by universal suffrage for all men.

This time, the elections had to encompass a broader Paris Commune, replacing the previous municipality under bourgeois control. Additionally, the National Guard and police would be under their control, with individuals chosen from among the "passive" citizens . The outcome of th uprising was the transformation of passive citizens lacking political rights into active or complete citizens.

In the spring of 1793, the French Revolution faced a profound crisis. The feudal aristocracy intensified its attacks against the republic both domestically and abroad, and a significant part of the bourgeoisie had turned against the revolution . For Robespierre, it was clever that victory was impossible without the people. At the same time, Saint-Just, Robespierre's close friend, proclaimed that the republic was built by destroying anti-republican institutions and advocated for the confiscation of the properties of the aristocracy. On June 2, 1793, amid the uprising that expelled the Girondins from the Convention, Robespierre wrote, "The internal danger originates from the bourgeoisie, and to defeat the bourgeoisie, we must unite with the people" . Since the country faced a series of i external wars, the only chance of victory lay in making the sans-culottes feel that the battle was their own. This was a perspective shared by some of the bourgeoisie, leading them to decide to continue the struggle. For this reason, on June 27, Robespierre was called to the "Committee of Public Safety." The framework of the new policy was based on an alliance of the middle bourgeoisie, lower classes, Jacobins, and sans-culottes. For various reasons, Robespierre was seen as a symbol of this new policy, and under his leadership, the masses were to be incited. However, the Jacobin dictatorship needed to impose order and discipline on the sans-culottes and the masses. The task of the revolutionary government, now headed by Robespierre, faced two sets of issues: reconciling the political activities of the sans-culottes with the needs of the Jacobin dictatorship on one hand and reconciling the social demands of the sans-culottes with the requirements of the bourgeoisie, which effectively held control of affairs, on the other hand. In reality, Robespierre was caught between the contradictions of the people's classes and the classes of the privileged society .

The Jacobins and sans-culottes imposed nationad revolutionary defense from outside on the Convention. The sans-culottes represented the living spirit of the people and brought the revolutionary masses to the forefront for the bourgeoisie, which, without them, could not have toppled the old political system. Their social status made them opponents of both the feudal aristocracy and the large commercial bourgeoisie in the pre-revolutionary period, and within the revolution, they formed a radical current rooted in their past ruin before the revolution. The food crisis during the revolution mobilized the sans-culottes with the same intensity against the feudal aristocracy. They had a different organizational style from the Jacobins, such as "mass associations" and "brotherhood associations," which dominated neighborhoods and public assemblies in Paris. Their organizations were entirely different from the Jacobin club, and the sans-culottes rarely participated in Jacobin assemblies.

The Jacobins' political ideal was a form of direct democracy that significantly differed from the liberal ideal of democracy held by the middle bourgeoisie during the French Revolution, which is why both the Jacobins and Robespierre opposed it, especially in the face of the threats against the republic .

Until the Crisis of Ventôse [59], when the supporters of Jacques Hébert sought to incite a new rebellion to further radicalize the revolution, Robespierre had managed to maintain a kind of balance within this very fragile coalition in the revolutionary government. The trial and execution of his supporters in March 1794 exacerbated the crisis and contributed to the disintegration of the coalition, distancing the sans-culottes from the revolution, even though they themselves had not faced direct repression. The distancing of the sans-culottes from the revolution also made the revolutionary government vulnerable. When the revolution lost its vital force, Saint-Just wrote that the revolution had been frozen [61]. The Thermidorian reaction was indeed born out of the repression of Ventôse and the distancing of the sans-culottes.

There is no doubt that a significant portion of the radical excesses during the French Revolution is associated with Robespierre, which led to a negative portrayal of the importance of democracy in the French Revolution. However, as John Dunn wrote, it was Robespierre who more than anyone else revitalized democracy as a focal point of political belonging. He was the first modern statesman to openly and positively defend democracy. The significance of Robespierre lies in the words he spoke in his speeches and the proposals associated with his thoughts and actions. What matters for us is not Robespierre himself, but the ideas that his language articulated.

It was Robespierre who made democracy the fundamental goal of the revolution—a name and aim that had lost trust and faith for two thousand five hundred years. Robespierre's speech on the goals of the revolution and what the nature of the French government should be, delivered on 5 Germinal 1794, was perhaps the boldest defense of the necessity of a democratic government since Pericles' funeral oration for the fallen in the Peloponnesian War two thousand five hundred years ago, which Palmer, an American historian, refers to as a decisive moment in democracy or a "locus classicus" of democracy [62].

Jules Michelet, a historian of the French Revolution in the nineteenth century, recounts the following passage:

"A few days after Thermidor, a man who is still alive and was a ten-year-old boy at that time went to the theater with his parents. After the performance, he was amazed to see a row of very beautiful carriages. He had never seen anything like this before. Men in formal attire and hats addressed the spectators leaving the theater, saying, 'Sir, would you like to get into the carriage?' The boy did not fully understand the meaning of these new words and asked what 'Sir' meant. He was told that after Robespierre's death, many things had changed!" [63]

The Right to Self-Determination and the Political and Legal Legacy of the "Westphalian Treaty"

The right to self-determination is inextricably linked with the theory of sovereignty. The theory of sovereignty was not a new idea in political theory. Since the time of Aristotle and Roman law, the question of who should hold the primary power has been a subject of legal philosophy. From the early eleventh century to the era of religious reform in Europe, which shaped the main lines of the modern state, and after the Thirty Years' War between Protestants and Catholics, and the Eighty Years' War between the Netherlands and Spain, which resulted in the church's defeat in its right to intervene against states, the Westphalian Treaty of 1648 transformed the sovereignty rights of royal dynasties within defined borders into a part of international law. Article eight of the Westphalian Treaty, under the title "Rights of the Imperial States," laid the foundations for the political systems that would later be called imperial states, and states that did not participate in drafting the treaty were also obliged to ensure and observe it. This was the beginning of the transition from state-religion to the divine right of kings to rule, and in its evolution, at another stage, to the nation-state by the end of the eighteenth century. The Westphalian Treaty recognized the absolute authority of the king and his judicial competence within defined borders, as well as his external independence in international relations [64]. The conceptual framework of the treaty, while reflecting changing political and social conditions, was influenced by the legal philosophy of Hugo Grotius [65], a Dutch philosopher, and his work titled "The Law of War and Peace" [66], which actually represented the ideological basis of the Westphalian Treaty and the changing world. The importance of this writing lay not only in it being the only legal text of its time. Roman law had long constituted an important part of international treaties in seventeenth and eighteenth-century Europe. The significance of Hugo Grotius's writings was in providing a clear response to the pressing issues of his time.

In fact, the Westphalian Treaty transformed Christian Europe into a Europe of a collection of independent states based on limited power over territory. The recognition of the diversity of Christian branches was accompanied by a change in the relationship between religion and the state, meaning that not only did religion come under the authority of the state, but also, contrary to the feudal system that relied on decentralization of power and acceptance of the local feudal authorities, there was a tendency toward centralization of the state, accompanied by the concentration of power in the king (ruler) and the theory of its indivisibility. Political theory also turned to the theoretical justification of this changed situation. Within these defined borders, the focus was on the principle that sovereignty is indivisible and that the king embodies it. From Jean Bodin in France to Thomas Hobbes in England, emphasis was placed on the principle of indivisibility of sovereignty.

The French Revolution did not change the principle of indivisibility of sovereignty within defined borders or the principle of the relationship between sovereignty and territory; rather, it transformed the question of to whom power belonged, recognizing sovereignty not as belonging to the king or the heavenly kingdom but to the people. This, in itself, was an ideological and political revolution. It is important to note that the Westphalian Treaty had a more flexible approach regarding the possibility of changing borders. This treaty spoke of the indivisible sovereignty of the king's authority and his priority over the church within defined borders [67], rather than the perpetual stability of borders, as seen in the changes in the borders between France and Spain. The subsequent course of history after Westphalia to the present also reflects this.

At the same time, the French Revolution, with the acceptance of the principle of the right to self-determination, meaning the principle of a nation’s sovereignty over its own fate, which it recognized in the democratic control of the nation over the political apparatus, introduced a competing idea in political theory into international relations and then into international law. The institutions formed in the international arena, including the "League of Nations" after World War I and the "United Nations" after World War II, have necessarily incorporated these two competing and conflicting theories within their frameworks.

The theory of the principle of indivisibility of sovereignty, linking it with states, has introduced an undemocratic legacy into international law and international institutions that has had an undemocratic impact on the functioning of these institutions and the participating states. This is because these states, ostensibly representing a singular entity within these institutions, do not align with the reality of diversity within these societies. As Harold Laski, a prominent British thinker, writes, if the internal history of states is examined, the singular assumption of representation and the goal and efforts of that singularity will be nullified. The origins of liberal statehood, despite efforts to present society as a unified whole and to equate it with sovereignty and the state, clearly reveal this reality through the long history of conflict between the state and the church, unions, capital, voluntary organizations, or civil society with the state, demonstrating that the myth of popular sovereignty cannot act as a veil over such diversity and lack of unity in a society [68].

In Laski's view, the theory of sovereignty and its unification with the state presents an understanding that justifies a particular vision of the liberal system and confines diverse populations into a single container, ultimately limiting the horizon of democratic thought. First, states represent the interests of elites within their societies, which differ from the desires and public interests of the people; second, by speaking of public interests and representing them, they conceal their special relationship with capital. Therefore, international democracy will remain practically impossible as long as states, as symbols of sovereignty, are the only participants in these institutions.

Since governance is a necessity, the theory of sovereignty must extend beyond the limited scope of "who" and "under what conditions" should govern. The governmental theory, since the era of religious reforms to the present day, has often defended order against freedom and obedience against revolution.

The legacy of Westphalia adds a new undemocratic factor in multi-ethnic societies like Iran. Political governance over the past century has denied the national, linguistic, and religious diversity of its majority population and has taken steps toward the annihilation of their identity and linguistic and cultural genocide, attempting to fit them into a singular "one language and one nation." The advancement of such a project, regardless of its impracticality, has always required a sharp spearhead.

In light of the above, the theory of the right to self-determination has always lived with duality and legal contradictions within international institutions and covenants, coexisting with the Westphalian legacy. Such legal contradictions and duality in the principles governing the "League of Nations" after World War I, as well as in the formation and principles of the "United Nations" and in human rights covenants, can be clearly observed.

International diplomacy has often supported either the Westphalian legacy or the right to self-determination based on the interests of dominant powers throughout different historical periods, without adhering to a uniform standard, even at a single time and universally in all cases. Therefore, reliance on the right to self-determination, from the perspective of the interests of great powers, would not hold a single meaning for Azerbaijanis wanting to separate from the Soviet Union, or for Azerbaijanis and other nationalities in Iran. It is the reliance on the inner strength of nationalities in Iran and their greater cooperation and solidarity that will help advance the democratic rights of the people and support democracy.

The Challenge of Democracy in Iran

The establishment of democracy in Iran faces a serious ideological and political problem that is closely intertwined. The ideology of a single nation and a single language, originating from European Romanticism in the early nineteenth century, found ground among some intellectuals in Iran after the Constitutional Revolution. However, following the coup d'état of Reza Shah in March 1921, it became the governing structure of political power in Iran. This policy continued with great intensity during the entire period of the Pahlavi coup governments, leading to disastrous political, economic, social, and cultural consequences.

The ideologues of the Pahlavi monarchy and a significant portion of Persian intellectuals actively participated in constructing the ideology of a single language and a single nation, both in rewriting history and in the field of literature. To the extent that culture and literature in Iran, willingly or unwillingly, have borne the burden of racial dominance and the political and cultural supremacy of one nation over others for the past century, discussing any form of national rights is considered separatism. There is no doubt that the government, as the most organized institution of society, especially in the absence of or systematic suppression of any political parties and freedom of thought, has been the main architect of this process.

The transition from the classical dictatorship of the Pahlavis to the totalitarian dictatorship of the Islamic Republic has added a new ideological characteristic to the policy of a single nation and a single language. Thus, the issue of establishing democracy in Iran faces a fundamental structural barrier, and unless efforts for democracy are accompanied by the removal of these structural obstacles, the horizon for a democratic political system in Iran will face serious difficulties, potentially shaping the fate of the multi-ethnic country of Iran in a different direction.

In general, the framework of this difficulty in establishing democracy in Iran can be outlined as follows: Various nationalities live in a geography called Iran. This complex and diverse demographic composition has no reflection in the political organization of the ruling state. A government that speaks on behalf of all is indifferent to the presence of this "all" in the political and administrative organization of the state in Iran. The ruling government of Iran is based on four principles: mono-ethnic, mono-linguistic, mono-gender, and mono-religious, where the Persian nationality, Persian language, male gender, and Twelver Shia Islam dominate. This implies the exclusion of non-Persians, non-Shiites, and women from the political system of the country, as well as the elimination and destruction of non-Persian cultures and languages from the educational system and public culture in Iran. The nature of such a government is inherently a multi-dimensional apartheid state, whose impacts and signs, as well as its disastrous consequences, can be observed in the social and political life of the inhabitants of this geography.

To determine the dominance of a nationality, one must see what its signs are. From the state’s administrative organization to the judicial system, the formulation of laws, the military and security institutions, elementary and secondary education, universities, and news media, everything is solely in Persian. Meanwhile, the Persian nationality itself is a minority population like all other nationalities in Iran. This dominance is primarily maintained and preserved through the use of coercive power. As long as this sick and abnormal structure, which is based on a mono-national, mono-linguistic, mono-religious, and mono-gender governance, is not transformed, one can say that democracy in Iran will not have its true meaning. Transitioning from totalitarian dictatorship to another form of government that does not aim to change this undemocratic structure will pose an insurmountable challenge to the establishment of democracy in Iran, perpetuating political and social tensions and conflicts, which will jeopardize the possibility of peaceful coexistence among nationalities.

1. The name "Iran" refers to a political geography in a region of the Middle East, the borders of which, like many countries that have emerged from the era of empires and feudal systems, have not remained fixed. Just as many countries from such historical periods have either ceased to exist or changed shape, with their current borders differing from those of earlier eras, Iran is not exempt from this phenomenon. Who can today claim that the borders of Germany and France are the same as during the reign of Louis XIV and Napoleon, or that Turkey has the same borders as its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire? Or that Ctesiphon, the capital of the Sasanian era Persians, is still called "Iran" today, and its inhabitants speak sweet Persian? The definition of nationality does not necessarily begin with the definition of geographical borders, as the concept of nationality is fundamentally a human concept and begins with the definition of a social group with its own language, ethnicity, and history. If geography indicated nationality, then the people of Babylon in Iraq would today have to be considered part of the "Iranian nation." Or the residents of the Republic of Azerbaijan would have to identify themselves as Iranians or speak Persian! However, today, they neither consider themselves Iranian nor speak Persian. In countries where ethnic, linguistic, and geographical bases align, nationality and geography are often used interchangeably, with nationality being considered first and foremost, rather than geography. However, in countries where multiple nationalities coexist within a single geographical unit, this definition no longer holds, and one cannot claim that Belgium or Canada corresponds to a specific nationality. This is why inferring a single nationality from a geographical name like Iran is a fallacious and erroneous conclusion. Nations are born from history and are products of the passage of time, continuing to exist. But states and their geographical borders change or may completely disappear. A nation cannot be eradicated in a month or a year, but the largest empires may collapse and vanish within a few months. This itself demonstrates the incorrectness of generalizing a geographical area to a nationality. The German state has always regarded parts of its population, which were annexed to Poland after World War II, as part of the German nation, and the division of Germany into two states after the war did not imply the existence of two nations, even though they lived under two distinct political systems in separate geographical locations. This is equally true for us Azerbaijanis and other nationalities today.

2. It may be claimed that we are all Iranians and that we all constitute the "Iranian nation." However, it should be noted that such a definition arises solely from politicians and Persian intellectuals, as well as elements and layers drawn from other nationalities within the Persian-dominated system of the country. Non-Persian nationalities, which constitute the majority of the population residing in Iran, do not have such a definition of the "Iranian nation," nor do they accept such a definition of their identity. This identity is one that the single-nationality political system governing Iran has sought to impose on non-Persian nationalities over the past century and has failed to do so. If all the nationalities living in Iran identified themselves with the identity of the "Iranian nation" rather than as Turks, Kurds, Persians, Arabs, Turkmens, and Baluchs, then so many national uprisings for their political and cultural rights would not have occurred in the past century. Over this century, the blood of thousands has been shed for the simple reason that they identified as Turks, Kurds, Arabs, etc., and defended their rights. This is not a misunderstanding but rather indicates a fundamental issue in Iranian society that any person who views democracy and freedom from a human perspective, rather than a geographical one, must seriously consider.

Here, the distinction between the individual and the system must be noted. Many emphasize that Turks share power and have significant economic weight. Therefore, they have no issues. Such a perspective overlooks the distinction between the individual and the system because the dominant identity in the system is fundamentally represented by Persians, and no Turk, regardless of how high they may rise in any position, represents their collective identity. Rather, they are individuals subsumed within the identity of the dominant political system that I have referenced above.

One of the arguments made by Persian intellectuals in referring to non-Persian nationalities as "ethnic groups" is that Persians do not define themselves as a nation but rather see themselves as part of the "Iranian nation." It should be noted that a dominant nation usually does not define itself clearly as a nation; otherwise, it would confront the counter-definitions of the nationalities it dominates, and they would quickly define their own identities in response. To avoid this, a dominant nationality is compelled to define itself in a specific way rather than providing any definition of itself. It does this in two ways: first, by denying the independent identity of the nationalities it dominates, and second, by projecting its identity onto the entire political geography of the country, where the language, administrative organization, military, security services, and legal system of the country entirely reflect its identity. Based on this, the ruling political power and a significant portion of Persian intellectuals name everyone as the "Iranian nation" and advocate the theory of "territorial integrity" because it serves to maintain their dominance over all nationalities. It is not coincidental that any demands for rights from other nationalities are portrayed as separatism since respecting their democratic rights would mean a disintegration of the power of the dominant nationality.

Therefore, democracy in Iran faces the challenge of denying the democratic rights of nationalities and its mono-national structure. Furthermore, the mono-linguistic, mono-gendered, and mono-religious structure imposes a debilitating structure that brings various forms of oppression and eradicates the concept of equal citizenship among residents under the umbrella of political dominance in Iran. The theory of territorial integrity and the "Iranian nation" practically serve various forms of oppression and the denial of citizenship rights and democracy.

3. Every political struggle takes place within a specific social context, where different social forces, demands, interests, and political ideologies are positioned alongside and, at the same time, in opposition to one another. This is also true for democracy and the right to self-determination. Since both democracy and the right to self-determination are ideological covers in which differing political and social demands and interests conceal their internal contradictions while being aligned in certain respects, it is essential to place both in a broader social context and then analyze and assess their functions. Therefore, reducing them to a few simplistic formulas hinders the observation of the overall picture of their alignments and contradictions with one another.

In my opinion, the struggle for democracy operates at different levels and layers. In a general categorization, there is a public struggle against the ruling religious totalitarian system. However, this public movement is broken down into a colorful spectrum within itself. When we speak of a public movement against the totalitarian regime, it means that each of these forces has a certain degree of alignment with one another. The demands and interests of parts of this movement against the religious totalitarian government, or the so-called "opposition," at certain points, align with the very forces that uphold this system. This shared alignment is highlighted in two domains: the right to self-determination or the observance of the democratic rights of nationalities and the class issue. For some sections of these forces participating in this public movement, having a secular government and a parliament is the ultimate destination, and they see democracy solely in that. Beyond secularism, which has an ideological opposition to the religious government, in the two key issues of democracy, namely the rights of nationalities and the enormous class divide that exists in society, meaning the miserable life of the majority of the people, there is little difference between the Islamic Republic and some segments of the "opposition," and the "position" and "opposition" align with one another. Democracy in Iran requires steps beyond that.

Political movements among ethnicities are also not exempt from this one-sided view regarding the right to self-determination and democracy. The disagreement over independence and federalism is merely a simplification of the issue. The essence of the right to self-determination manifests in the people's ability to control their political system, and this is inseparable from achieving equality of rights and meeting the social demands of various segments of the population.

For a significant part of the forces participating in the national movements, the political and social rights of women—half of any society within each ethnicity—are fundamentally irrelevant, and the issues of class and the lives of the majority of society practically bypass the basic rights of this claimed "nation," as if the nation consists of Martians rather than human beings living within the same national society who lack their basic rights. Each national community in Iran suffers significantly from class oppression and gender inequality. In these two issues, it can be clearly observed that there is not a considerable difference between the activists in the national movements and the ruling regime. For these activists, independence or federalism is seen as the endpoint of their aspirations and acts as a remedy for their problems. A democratic movement among ethnicities that does not address the rights of women and reduce class inequalities and the rights of the working class will lack democratic depth. Furthermore, it must explicitly defend a secular government.

The democratic movement among ethnicities, besides having a mass character in its identity-seeking and rights-demanding nature that originates from the depths of these communities, is often lagging behind in terms of legal demands compared to the national government in Azerbaijan from 60 years ago. If I were to compare it with the first historical model from 220 years ago in the French Revolution, I would say that it has an astronomical distance from that history. If we do not recognize our weaknesses, we will face a serious barrier in advancing democracy.

What conclusion can we draw?

The right to self-determination has always been intertwined with democracy, even when its name has not yet been on people's lips. Furthermore, democracy, as history attests, has been born from revolutions and has been shaped by them. Contrary to the beliefs of those who think that revolutions have given nothing to the people, it must be stated that these revolutions have broken the will and resistance of anti-democratic classes and forces, paving the way for freedom and democracy, even though they have also been accompanied by contradictions and dark chapters. Moreover, not every revolution has always been a forward movement in history. Therefore, each revolution should be judged within its specific context, as revolutions have never been a uniform process free from counter-revolutionary elements within themselves and have always been in active interaction with counter-revolutions, something we witnessed with Khomeini's dominance during the February Revolution. Because no one can predetermine the shape of major transformations, the dynamism of change is influenced by various factors, including how political power interacts with the political and social demands of the people, how it treats opposing forces and political parties in society, and how it aligns its structures with social and economic changes in a community. Governments that are incapable of changing their structures practically open the gates of hell upon themselves, no matter how much propaganda has been directed against that.

To achieve the right to self-determination, one must defend democracy. The two concepts are inseparable. However, as I pointed out, for democracy to realize itself, it must transform various forms of "particularisms" and reflect the diverse identities within its demographic composition. To transition to such a structure, it is not sufficient merely to move beyond the existing Islamic totalitarian government. While this is a necessary step, having a democratic political structure must also involve moving beyond a mono-national structure, ultimately calling for a federative government.

Moving away from a mono-national government does not mean fostering an anti-racial psychology. We cannot confront the logic governing the existing mono-national political power using the same logic. In all countries, even in those where the demographic composition consists solely of a single national unit, rulers are typically comprised of a small elite, and not all people of that country are in power. Therefore, it is a mistake to not distinguish between the government and the people, taking a stance against an entire nationality. Such an approach leads us toward a blind and racist struggle. The enemy of an oppressed nationality resides within the ruling political power, among the complicit intellectuals, and among the self-serving individuals of the oppressed nation. This is a general rule in any form of national oppression, and we must look critically at the manner of democratic struggle against national oppression. It should not be forgotten that the number of collaborators with the Nazi regime in occupied France was not fewer than the members of the Resistance. This is also true today in Iran concerning the oppressed nations and the ruling political system. Slogans that target the entirety of a nation inherently carry a racist burden and inevitably harm the democratic struggle. Such movements express an instinctive behavior rather than a conscious struggle for democracy and for the enjoyment of a democratic national right.

The democratic movement for national rights must view national rights and its identity with a broader mental horizon. The nation itself is a metaphor for the different sexual and class identities within it and conceals other forms of social and economic discrimination. The democratic movement for national rights will lose its democratic character if it remains indifferent to other dimensions of democracy. If we do not have a clear picture of the elements constituting democracy and our envisioned state, if we do not strive to eliminate gender inequalities, and if we do not reduce the deep class divide, our efforts for national rights will be confined to a small sphere. The future political system must be the product of a logical inference from a broader understanding of democracy and the social practice striving for it.

Contrary to the views of some, democracy is not the product of a balance of power and tolerance for dissenting opinions, nor is it simply liberalism. The balance of power results from a political and social struggle, whether in a positive or negative direction. After any kind of brutal repression in a society, a form of balance is established, which is a new balance within the framework of oppression. It is naïve to call these repressive balances democracy. Historically, liberalism has not fought for democracy but has sought to eliminate privileges for certain classes of the privileged elite and clergy, and to limit government intervention against property. This is different from democracy and the struggle for the rights of the people. Democracy is also a product of the people's struggle and emerges after a serious fight, establishing a new balance that forces opposing forces against freedom of expression and opinion to tolerate them. Before the balance of power can explain the reason for this tolerance, political and social struggle is the cause and explanation of it.

Furthermore, liberalism has not historically been synonymous with democracy. For a long time, liberalism opposed democracy, equating it with violence and mob rule, and whenever the demand for democracy encroached upon the realm of property, it suppressed it with military power. Liberalism only became willing to use the name of democracy when democracy underwent two major changes within itself: first, a departure from the idea of government by the people to a symbolic government by the people in the form of representative governance, which allowed those with economic power and their ideological apparatus to manipulate public opinion and turn representatives into "elites in control." Second, it distanced democracy from approaching the realm of property. After this, liberals were willing to call themselves democrats and refer to elite governance as democracy. From then on, liberalism was able to reconcile with democracy, erasing the boundary between the two within the realm of political power.

In this historical journey, democracy has succeeded in one aspect: preserving its name as an idea and transforming it into a banner for struggle, especially in societies where harsh and autocratic governments have darkened people's lives. Today, the degree of democratic governance is largely measured by the extent to which people can control the political apparatus and express their voices in government, as well as by the freedoms of opinion and political parties, and the rule of law.

For democracy to establish itself and to break the will of anti-democratic political power and its supporting forces in Iran, there is no path other than a political revolution and a series of social, economic, and cultural reforms through the downfall of the Islamic Republic. To achieve this goal, we must defend the rights of women, the rights of workers, and public freedoms, hand in hand with other nationalities.

We must also clearly understand that Azerbaijanis will not achieve the right to self-determination and democracy under the rule of a Turkish dictator. As the late Sheikh Mohammad Khiyabani said, when a dictator is above us, what difference does it make where he comes from or what language he speaks? We must stand firm and unwavering against any form of tyranny, defending freedom and democracy and the equal rights of all human beings at various levels.

It should not be forgotten that tyranny breeds corrupt spirits in society, and only those who have crossed the borders of immorality and disrespect for their own humanity can justify dictatorship on various pretexts. Those who expect democracy from the actors of dictatorship and look to them for change are themselves turned into instruments for the survival of dictatorship in another form, subject to that historical irony of Obaid Zakani, who wants to announce the cat's becoming a monk and ascetic! Let us be the guardians of the moral courage of figures like Sattar Khan, Khiyabani, Pishavari, and all those free spirits who did not bow in obedience to tyranny.


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[1] Marx: Grundrisse. Penguin Books. London. 1991. PP. 492-493
[2] P. J. Rhodes. Athenian Democracy after 403 B.C. The Classical Journal, Vol. 75, No. 4 (Apr. - May, 1980), pp. 305-323

[3] Regarding the historical classification of democracy into three stages, refer to:
John Dunn: Setting The People Free. The History of Democracy. The Atlantic Books. London. 2005. PP. 13-23
[4] Tacitus, Germany and Agricola (Oxford trans). pp. 16-17. Quoted in: J. L. Gillin: The Origin of Democracy. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 24, No. 6 (May, 1919), pp. 704-714 Published by: The University of Chicago Press.
And also: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/tacitus1.html
[5] Tacitus: ibid. p. 11
[6] Gens
[7] Gillin: The Origin of Democracy. Ibid
[8] Lewis Henry Morgan: The Ancient Society. Chap. 3. PP. 84-85. Ibid. Published in 1907 by Henry Holt and Company. New York
Also: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/morgan-lewis/ancient-society/
[9] Gillin: Ibid
[10] Cleisthenes
[11] Ibid. P. 270
[12] Review: The Class Struggle in Ancient Greece Author(s): Robert Browning Reviewed work(s): The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests by G. E. M. de Ste. Croix Source: Past & Present, No. 100 (Aug., 1983), pp. 147-156
[13] John Dunn. Ibid. P. 32
[14] Ian Morris: The Eighth-Century Revolution. Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics. Version 10. December 2005

[15] This can be clearly seen in one of Hesiod's poems, who himself was from the landed aristocracy that had been exiled and whose estates had been confiscated, where he calls for revenge and the drinking of the blood of those who have taken his lands. Refer to:
G. E. M. De Ste. Croix: The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World. Published by Gerald Duckworth. Third Edition. 1997. PP. 278-279
[16] Ibid. P. 280

[17] Refer to the explanation of this term:
http://www.yourdiscovery.com/greece/politics/the_tyrants/index.shtml

According to Hal Draper in "The Theory of Revolution by Karl Marx," Marx was influenced by this phenomenon in Greece and Rome, where leaders were elected for a short period. Refer to Volume III of that work.
[18] Dean Hammer. Plebiscitary Politics in Archaic Greece. Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Vol. 54, No. 2 (2005), pp. 107-131 Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
[19] Percy Ure: The Origin of the Tyrannis. The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 26 (1906), pp. 131-142 Published by: The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies.
[20] Ibid
[21] Gustavo Goltz: La Cité Grecque - Le Développement Des Institutions. Ibid.
[22] K. H. Waters: Solon's 'Price-Equalisation'. The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 80 (1960), pp. 181-190
[23] Ibid
[24] Ibid
J. A. R. Munro: The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Apr., 1939), pp. 84-97. Published by: Cambridge University Press.
[25] Morgan. Ibid. P. 270

[26] Trittyes, or kinship relations based on tribal affiliation, was the main basis for power distribution before Cleisthenes. By substituting representation organized by geographic location instead of blood and kinship representation, Cleisthenes not only undermined the power of his political rivals but also established a new political institution that had no precedent until that time.
[27] Donald W. Bradeen: The Trittyes in Cleisthenes' Reforms. Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol. 86 (1955), pp. 22-30. Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
[28] John Dunn. Ibid. P. 36
[29] Ibid. P. 37
[30] James H. Oliver: Reforms of Cleisthenes. Source: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Oct., 1960), pp. 503-507 Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag.

Also, regarding Cleisthenes' use of sports for political purposes, refer to:
Malcolm F. McGregor. Cleisthenes of Sicyon and the Pan-Hellenic Festivals: Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol. 72 (1941), pp. 266-287. Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

[31] I said: Democracy, because of its excess in that which it considers the most precious gifts, leads to destruction.
He asked, "What is that thing?"
I said: Freedom! In a society governed by democracy, people regard freedom as the highest value and say that the only society in which free men can live is this society!... If, in a society that is thirsty for freedom, unworthy cups appear and drink pure freedom to the point of intoxication, such a society accuses and punishes any authority that does not bow to its whims with oligarchic thoughts... This excessive freedom also finds its way into the family, and even animals do not obey anyone's command!... Foreigners consider themselves equal to citizens, and citizens consider themselves equal to foreigners...
I said: The manifestations of freedom do not end here, but also bring about trivial consequences... But the freedom of that day reaches its highest point when slaves and purchased maidservants are regarded as equal to their masters and ladies! I almost forgot that there would also be complete freedom and equality between women and men!
Plato: Republic. Volume II of Plato's Works. Translated by Mohammad Hasan Lotfi. Sections 562-563. Pages 1120-122.
[32] Hippias
[33] Isagoras:
[30] Josiah Ober. Revolution Matters: Democracy as Demotic Action (A Response to Kurt A. Raaflaub). In: Democracy 2500? Questions and Challenges. Edited by Josiah Ober and Ian Morris and Kurt A. Raaflaub. Archaeological Institute of America Colloquia and Conference Papers, No. 2, 1997
[35] Ibid
[36] Dean Hammer: Plebiscitary Politics in Archaic Greece. Source: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Vol. 54, No. 2 (2005), pp. 107-131 Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag.
[37] Josiah Ober: Political Dissent in Democratic Athens. Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule. Princeton University Press, New Jersey. 1998. P. 39
[38] Ephialtes
[39] Raphael Sealey: The Entry of Pericles into History. Hermes, Vol. 84, No. 2 (1956), pp. 234-247 Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
[40] Ibid. Footnote 49
[41] Peter Botticelli: The Dutch Patriot Movement of the 1780s: The Revolution That Failed. http://www.loyno.edu/~history/journal/1986-7/botticelli.htm
[42] John Dunn. Ibid. P. 88
[43] Christopher Hobson: Revolution, Representation and the Foundations of Modern Democracy. European Journal of Political Theory 2008; 7; 449
[44] Ibid

[45] Thomas Paine wrote his book "Rights of Man" in two stages, in response to Edmund Burke's reactionary views against the French Revolution. [45] The first part, like the Revolution itself, reflects English liberal thought and is fundamentally aligned with the ideas of Sieyès, the key figure and theorist of the first stage of the Revolution, and General Lafayette. [45] It mainly reflects the opinions of Thomas Jefferson, who believed that the French Revolution would take a middle path between the American and English Revolutions. [45] In the first section of his work, Paine is, in some respects, even close to Edmund Burke, a staunch opponent of the French Revolution, even though the book is written in critique of Burke's views. [45] However, in the second part of the book, which was written after some time, a serious ideological shift in his thought can be observed, reflecting the transformation of the French Revolution and the movement from constitutional monarchy to modern republicanism.
Gary Kates: From Liberalism to Radicalism: Tom Paine's Rights of Man. Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1989), pp. 569-587 Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press.

[46] Robespierre also believed four years before the Revolution that monarchy was not incompatible with republics, and the boundaries between monarchy and republic were not clearly delineated for him. [46] He sometimes referred to the monarchy in England as a republic rather than a monarchy, as he labeled the role of the monarchy there similar to a rubber stamp. [46] It was during the years of the Revolution that Robespierre fully leaned towards radical republicanism.
See: Alfred Cobban: The Aspects of French Revolution. Granada Publishing. London. 1971 P.144.
[46] Gary Kates. Ibid
[47] Ibid
[48] Condorcet. Brissot.
[49] A. Soboul: Robespierre and the Popular Movement of 1793-4. Past & Present, No. 5 (May, 1954), pp. 54-70 Published by: Oxford University Press.
[50] Robespierre, "On Political Morality". http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/413/
[51] Ibid

[52] During the French Revolution, the nobility wore a specific type of skirt, and "sans-culottes" referred to those who did not wear noble skirts. [52] The sans-culottes, in terms of social status, often consisted of peasants, artisans, and poor shopkeepers who were not well off. [52] They represented the radical anti-aristocratic and anti-bourgeois sentiments in the French Revolution.
[53] D.G.Wright: Revolution and Terror in France 1789-95. Second Edition. Longman. UK. 1990. PP.44-45

[54] English newspapers incited public opinion against the proclaimed French Republic, stating that "the Republic is the enemy of all governments, and therefore all governments have a vested interest in its destruction." [54] They portrayed the Jacobins as cannibals. [54] The European counter-revolution against the French Republic took on a revolutionary tone and, in their Brunswick Manifesto, called upon the European aristocracy to unite against the revolutionary government of France and restore Louis XVI to the throne, reinstating "his divine rights," demanding that the leaders of the revolution be executed, and bloodbaths be initiated.
See: Marc Bouloiseau: The Jacobin Republic: 1792-1794. Cambridge University Press. 1983. P.22
[55] Saint Just
[56] A. Soboul. Ibid
[57] Ibid
[58] Ibid

[59] "Ventose" corresponds to February in the revolutionary calendar.
[60] Jaques Hébert was a radical, anti-religious figure and also the editor of the newspaper "Le Père Duchesne" during the French Revolution.
[61] Ibid
[62] Locus classicus, in: R.R. Palmer: The Age of Democratic Revolution: the Challenge. P.16. Princeton University Press.
[63] A. Soboul. Ibid
[64] Wyndham A. Bewes: Gathered Notes on the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. Transactions of the Grotius Society, Vol. 19, Problems of Peace and War, Papers Read before the Society in the Year 1933 (1933), pp. 61-73 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law.
[65] Hugo Grotius.
[66] De Jure Belli et

[67] This change in the relationship between the church and the subordination of church power to secular power can be observed in the parliamentary decrees of France. [67] In other countries, such as England, the king stood above the church. [67] In 1731, the French parliament enacted the principles known as "Gallican Principles," which stated that:

1. The king's power is absolute and independent of any authority.
2. The laws of religion and regulations that the church has the right to impose cannot be legitimate unless they take the form of a royal edict.
3. The authority to send forces to control subjects is solely within the king's jurisdiction.
4. The clergy and priests of the church are accountable to the king and must answer to him.
   See: Alfred Coban: Aspects of the French Revolution. Granada Publishing. London 1971. P.72.
   [68] Jeanne Morefield: States Are Not Peoples: Harold Laski on Unsettling Sovereignty. Rediscovering Democracy. Political Research Quarterly, Vol.58, No.4 (Dec. 2005). PP. 695-669 University of Utah.
   [69] Ibid

[70] Even in the realm of political freedoms within society, the most prominent representative of liberal democracy, John Stuart Mill, stated that his notion of freedom meant freedom for Europeans, and others should be happy that the Germans or the East India Company govern them.

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