Shahrvand 1239, Thursday, July 23, 2009
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| Dr. Alireza Asgharzadeh |
Dr. Alireza Asgharzadeh completed his graduate studies in Political Science, Philosophy, and Sociology at the University of Toronto, and is currently teaching and conducting research in Sociology and Education at York University. In addition to other publications, he is the author of Iran and the Challenge of Diversity (published by Palgrave) and one of the co-authors of Education and Difference in Africa. He has also published numerous articles on Iran, Azerbaijan, the Middle East, social theory, sociological theories, language, pedagogy, and more in scholarly and academic journals.
Dr. Asgharzadeh is a well-known and respected figure among Azerbaijanis, and his academic views have always been enlightening and guiding. For this reason, we sat down with him to hear his thoughts on the recent protest movement in Iran and the issues surrounding it.
What is your opinion on the recent Iranian elections and their consequences?
— First of all, let me thank you and Shahrvand magazine for organizing this interview. It can be said with certainty that the recent elections and their aftermath are the most significant political event in the 30-year history of the Islamic Republic. For the first time, the rift among the leaders and founders of the regime has become unprecedentedly apparent to both Iranians and the world. The legitimacy of the entire regime—from its Supreme Leader to its various apparatuses of censorship and torture—has been called into question, even by many of its believers, companions, and insiders. At the same time, a dynamic protest movement has emerged among the youth and intellectuals, which, if successful, will aim in the medium term to strip the Supreme Leader of power, with the ultimate goal of achieving democracy and secularism.
The late Shariati once said, "Every revolution has two faces: blood and message." The movement that has formed around the election and its aftermath, while not a full-fledged revolution, has all the characteristics of a revolutionary uprising and a social movement. In fact, this uprising is a peaceful social movement with various messages. Among these messages, the discourse of "human rights" has emerged as the dominant narrative of this movement. While it seems that the general concept of "human rights" has been accepted by most of the participants and supporters of this movement, the different definitions and interpretations of this concept need to be discussed and examined.
In general, due to the deep divide that has developed in recent years between the intellectuals in the center and the large marginalized population, centralist intellectuals and their literature have stubbornly attempted to deny and conceal the multicultural, multilingual, and multinational identity of Iran's inhabitants. Despite the significant struggles that have taken place since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in regions such as Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmen Sahra, Balochistan, and Khuzestan over the past 30 years, the center and its intellectuals have not provided any notable support to the struggles of non-Persian peoples. The dominant centralist discourse, under the visible and sometimes invisible umbrella of Persian/Iranian nationalism, has reinforced and promoted monolithic thinking, and to the extent possible, it has defined and interpreted concepts such as human rights, freedom, and democracy through the narrow lens of this nationalism. This oppressive and exclusionary process has naturally led to a sense of alienation among marginalized communities toward the center. Now, in my opinion, the major challenge of the current protest movement lies in this very issue: In a multinational and multicultural society, how can we overcome this sense of alienation and mistrust and achieve the essential principle of "unity in diversity"?
Azerbaijan, particularly Tabriz, has historically either been the catalyst and leader of various movements or risen in support of movements in the center. However, in the recent movement, it has remained mostly silent. While one of the reasons could be the repression due to the presence of suppressive forces, aside from that, what message do you think this silence could convey?
— An important issue that should be considered is that the non-Persian peoples of Iran, with the valuable experience of 30 years of struggle and resistance, are no longer the same groups from the time of the February Revolution who would be bound by a few vague and ambiguous slogans and invest their efforts to realize them. They have now come forward with clear and specific demands. For example, the "Coordination Council of Azerbaijani National Activists" approached the candidates during the election campaign with the following specific demands to gauge their stance on these democratic principles:
- Official recognition of the Turkish language and education in the mother tongue;
- Establishment of a federal system, combating centralization, and forming provincial parliaments;
- Elimination of all forms of chauvinism and assimilation, and abolishment of all visible and hidden laws and directives that promote chauvinistic and discriminatory policies against the ethnic groups and nations residing in the country;
- Creating the necessary foundations for the economic development of Azerbaijan, allocating a special budget for poverty alleviation and addressing deprivation, and countering migration resulting from the past 80 years of policies;
- Recognition of political, social, and cultural activities with ethnic and national identities, and the removal of obstacles to the establishment and operation of parties, organizations, and media defending the rights of the Azerbaijani people.
Therefore, as you can see, a new discourse has emerged or is forming among Azerbaijani activists, one that views issues from the perspective of the priorities and demands of the Azerbaijani people. It seems that the expiration date for Khomeini’s populist slogan, “All together,” without emphasis on specific demands, has passed—at least in Azerbaijan. On the other hand, the dominant centralist discourse continues to view matters through the lens of Persian/Iranian nationalism. Not only has this discourse not seen any significant change in recent years, but it has also intensified its combative and oppressive nature, something that is clearly visible both within Iran and among the Iranian diaspora abroad.**
In fact, to achieve unity and solidarity, the differences and diversities present in Iranian society must be respected. This respect needs to go beyond clichéd slogans like “We are all Iranians,” “Ferdowsi said Iran is my entire home,” “We are all equal before the law,” and so on. It must enter the realm of the ‘concrete.’ This means, for example, in the area of linguistic diversity, that issues such as the right to education in one’s mother tongue, multilingualism, and the matter of official and national languages must be accepted as integral parts of the discourse on human rights in Iran and be subject to discussion and examination.
Can today's Iranian society be compared to other societies that have transitioned from dictatorship to democracy? What do you see as the similarities and differences?
— Naturally, different societies have their own unique characteristics, and comparing various aspects of two societies is not a simple task; it requires precise scientific and sociological research. In relation to your question, one of the most appropriate societies to compare with Iran, from the perspective of political issues and the struggle for democracy and human rights, in my opinion, is apartheid-era South Africa. As you know, that society was governed by a series of clear and explicit racist laws and regulations under the title of "apartheid," which separated Black people and other "people of color" from white people and gave all the resources and advantages of society to the latter group. While racial apartheid was the defining characteristic of South African society, in the Islamic Republic of Iran, we can at least identify three types of oppressive and exclusionary systems: religious fascism, gender apartheid, and linguistic racism.
To summarize, religious fascism is enforced based on the teachings of Twelver Shia Islam and Khomeini’s theory of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Velayat-e Faqih), the doctrine that has become known as "Khomeinism." Among other forms of oppression and tyranny, Khomeinism establishes a specific version of Twelver Shia Islam as the only official religion of the country. It excludes Sunni Muslims, adherents of other religions (non-Muslims), non-believers, and secularists from equal access to social benefits and treats them as second-class citizens. This type of fascism also implements gender apartheid by controlling the rights, freedoms, and desires of women. According to this apartheid, women are relegated to the status of second-class citizens, while men enjoy all the benefits of a patriarchal society and culture. Moreover, under this apartheid, sexual minorities lose all their human and collective rights; they face the most severe and brutal forms of oppression to the point where their very existence as human beings is denied—an act that President Ahmadinejad has repeatedly carried out in front of the astonished eyes of the world.
The third branch of religious fascism in Iran is "linguistic racism," which the Islamic Republic inherited from the previous Pahlavi regime. This form of racism is rooted in a broader Aryan racism project that some Iranian intellectuals borrowed from the Orientalist and racist theories of 18th-20th century Europe. After being baptized during the Reza Shah era, they claimed to give it an "Iranian color" and institutionalized it within the administrative system of the country. In short, this type of racism legitimizes Persian as the only official language of the multilingual society of Iran and prevents the flourishing and expansion of the languages spoken by over sixty percent of the country's population, an issue known in academic literature as "linguicide." I want to emphasize that among countries in the contemporary world, Iran might be the only country where both its government and most of its intellectuals are firmly committed to this form of linguistic racism and passionately defend it.
Now, after this very brief comparison between Iran and apartheid-era South Africa, let’s return to that part of your question: Is it possible to transition from dictatorship and religious fascism to democracy in Iran? In my opinion, just as this became possible in South Africa, it is also achievable in Iran, provided that we learn from the struggles of the South African people and others and adopt the progressive democratic and human rights discourses of the contemporary world as our model. The people of South Africa succeeded against the apartheid system because they:
- Were willing to pay the heavy price for the struggle for democracy and freedom;
- Managed to formulate and present an alternative discourse based on universal human rights and freedoms in opposition to the fascistic apartheid discourse;
- Successfully realized the principle of "unity in diversity" within their society through open-mindedness and tolerance;
- Widely garnered global support for their democratic, anti-racist, and anti-fascist struggle.
Without a doubt, the chances of success for the current protest movement in Iran will have a direct correlation with the achievement of these and other similar goals.
The issue of global solidarity with the people of Iran is becoming increasingly widespread today. To what extent can this affect the solidarity of different nationalities within Iran?
Free-thinking individuals express solidarity with the movement of the Iranian people based on democratic and human rights standards. They see that this movement is distanced from regressive tendencies such as religious fundamentalism, intense Iranian/Persian nationalism, sexual chauvinism, and Aryan racism, which is why they support it. To garner more global support, it is essential to strengthen the democratic/human rights discourse of this movement and bring it to the forefront of global attention. The rights of nationalities, women, workers, students, and ethnic, sexual, and religious minorities must be an inseparable part of the democratic discourse of this movement. On the other hand, activists and representatives of non-Persian nationalities in the Iranian diaspora must convey to the world that Iran is not synonymous with Persia and urge the world's freedom-loving individuals to pressure both the Islamic Republic and Iranian/Persian nationalism to respect the human rights of non-Persian peoples. Overall, a human rights discourse in Iran must reflect the multi-national, multi-cultural, multi-linguistic, and multi-religious essence of Iranian society; otherwise, such a discourse will not deserve to be called democratic.
If marginalized groups see that centralists and their expatriate supporters have distanced themselves from monotone and nationalist ideologies and respect the human rights of non-Persians, they will naturally become more optimistic toward the center and facilitate a democratic solidarity in the struggle for freedom.
What is the relationship among various Iranian nationalities in non-Persian regions, and have they reacted uniformly in support of the Tehran movement?
Marginalized nationalities have a colonial relationship with the center and the ruling nationality. In other words, they are victims of what sociological theories refer to as "internal colonization." The manifestations of this colonization are evident in the economic, political, linguistic, cultural, and educational lives of Arab, Kurdish, Turkish, Baluch, and Turkmen peoples. I believe one reason these nationalities have not been able to participate alongside the center in the anti-authoritarian movement is due to their colonial status. For years, these communities have been under a kind of hidden military occupation. During the recent elections, we repeatedly heard from the leaders of the Islamic Republic that the issue of nationalities is considered a security issue in the Republic and is unrelated to human rights or political matters. Well, what does this statement mean? Does it not imply that the ruling authority views these communities as foreign, other, non-Iranian, and as enemies? Therefore, the fate of these "colonies" is determined not by the Islamic Republic's parliament, nor by the executive branch and the extensive government offices, but rather by the regime's "intelligence agents."
Nonetheless, despite these colonial conditions, these nationalities continue to struggle. Just take a look at the headlines about executions and prisoners in recent days, and you will see that these nationalities are present in the scene. Their relationship with each other is informed by their awareness of the similar oppression they all face: national oppression and a colonial position. This "shared pain" of double oppression imposed on them brings them closer together. They understand this dual oppression well, while the central discourse shows minimal regard for this "shared pain" of non-Persian peoples. For the Tehran movement to garner support from these communities, it must demonstrate that it understands their pain and considers it part of its own suffering. Otherwise, widespread solidarity and "unity in diversity" will face fundamental challenges.
Recently, the Congress of Federal Nationalities of Iran issued a statement condemning any form of violence and urging its supporters abroad to accompany the people's freedom movement, as well as asking the men and women of nationalities within Iran not to leave Tehran alone. What is your opinion on this statement?
It is said that when the late Pishavari was asked about the reasons for the failure of the 21st of Azar movement in Azerbaijan, he cited one of the greatest reasons as the inability of this movement to convey its democratic and justice-oriented message to other parts of Iran. In Pishavari's view, this movement failed because it could not rally other regions of Iran around it. I believe that we are currently witnessing the opposite of this in the recent protest movement. This movement seems to be trapped in a centralized discourse and appears unable to project its message to other areas. Interestingly, Mr. Ahmadinejad has recently emphasized that "Iran is not just Tehran!" This is probably the most accurate statement he has made. What's interesting is that the late Pishavari also approached this subject from another angle. While Ahmadinejad's intent is populist, marginalized communities have concrete expectations and interpretations of this expression. They want to see a reflection of this statement in budget allocations for peripheral areas, as well as in the economic, cultural, educational, and linguistic flourishing of non-Persian peoples. In other words, you cannot claim that "Iran is not just Tehran" while imposing the language of Tehran on non-Persian marginalized communities, who make up more than sixty percent of the country's population.
Therefore, to overcome the ruling religious fascism, Tehran needs the periphery, just as the periphery needs Tehran. To achieve this goal, we need a discourse that enables the vital principle of "unity in diversity" within the diverse and pluralistic society of Iran. I believe that the establishment of the "Congress of Federal Nationalities of Iran" has been a significant step in this direction, namely towards a transition from a fascistic monologue to a pluralistic polyphony. Unfortunately, Tehran still does not hear the voice of this pluralism. This vital principle of solidarity and the concept of "unity in diversity" face a fundamental challenge. When Tehran does not acknowledge the essence of diversity, the principle of plurality, and plurality itself, how can we expect non-Persian peoples to unite with a hubristic, self-centered, exclusionary, and racist center? This is the fundamental question, and it is up to the intellectuals of the dominant nationality to address it.
How do you evaluate the role of women and youth in the recent movement from a sociological perspective?
From a sociological standpoint, to measure the level of social development and public justice in a society, one must examine how that society addresses the diversities and differences within it. In traditional sociology, the main indicators of social differences were assessed based on three domains: class, ethnicity/race, and gender. In contemporary sociology, the domains of diversity and difference, in addition to these three fundamental areas, also include age, disability (ability/disability), sexual identity, language, religion, culture, place of birth, citizenship status, and other indicators. Therefore, alongside the gender indicator, the age indicator (and age group) is also a crucial component in assessing social development within a society. As you know, Iran has one of the youngest populations in the Middle East. This youthful population, by its nature, has needs and demands that must be met, which the Islamic Republic regime, due to its reactionary and medieval nature, is incapable of addressing.
Thus, it is not surprising that 27-year-old Neda Agha-Soltan was spontaneously and automatically accepted as a symbol of this anti-dictatorship movement upon her martyrdom. She represents both the women's movement and the youth movement simultaneously. Neda and the "Nedas" of this movement reflect a will oriented toward life, youth, vitality, dynamism, and growth, whereas the regime of velayat-e faqih symbolizes a culture of torture, stoning, mourning, gerontocracy, and death. It is no wonder that these two differing orientations toward life are positioned against each other at this particular moment.
In my opinion, the prominent participation of women and youth in this protest movement is the element that makes the nature of this movement appear democratic and progressive. However, this democratic nature must be reflected in the movement's discourse; as the late Shariati said, it must be reflected in the message of the movement. We should witness the reflection of the demands of women, youth, nationalities, workers, and religious, sexual, and ethnic minorities in the discourse of this movement from now on. In this regard, progressive activists and intellectuals in the Iranian diaspora, who are familiar with contemporary progressive thoughts and discourses, can offer the most support to this nascent movement. Typically, in such situations, conservative—and sometimes reactionary and opportunistic—elements come forward with the slogan, "Now is not the time for these discussions." These same elements used this regressive slogan against the "Civil Rights Movement" in America and its leadership by Dr. Martin Luther King. In response to this faction, Dr. King stated: "The time is now, and the place is right here. My friends, we are confronted with the fact that tomorrow is today. We are faced with the inescapable urgency of now."
Thank you for this interview.
Link to the original text in Farsi: https://shahrvand.com/archives/3859