The Envisioned Future of the Turkish Social Movement in Iran

 Saeed Matinpour – July 4, 2006

Saeed Matinpour

After years of cultural and student-driven activism, the national awakening of Turks in Iran has finally manifested as a social movement. The emergence of this movement is directly and fundamentally rooted in the historical context of Turkish identity literature and the cultural and social activities of Turkish activists in various cities across Azerbaijan and other Turkish-speaking regions of Iran.

Over the past two decades, the Turkish national movement in Iran has consistently maintained its distance from purely political rhetoric and ideological conflicts, focusing instead on highlighting Turkish identity in Iran within a modern framework. This approach was vividly displayed during street protests. Despite the heightened emotions of the public and a surge in national rhetoric during the protests of last June, none of the demonstrations targeted the core structure of the Iranian government. Instead, slogans and speeches called for a reformation of national perceptions. This perspective was also evident in practice; wherever police and government officials did not react aggressively or suspicious actors did not intervene, no violence erupted. However, as soon as the street protests subsided, a crackdown on Azerbaijani civil activists began, even targeting some who had not participated in the demonstrations. Hundreds were arrested or had their detentions extended. Today, nearly two months after the protests began, dozens remain imprisoned, and arrests have not ceased, now encompassing cultural activists as well. The arrests of Hassan Rashedi and Reza Abbasi are among such cases.

Such actions prompt observers to question the government's motives. Why have those who played a significant role in ensuring the protests remained peaceful become targets of government attacks? Several possible answers can be hypothesized:

  1. The government aims to further provoke activists to assess the movement’s full potential, thereby better positioning itself to curb its growth or eliminate it entirely in the future.
  2. The government intends to suppress those it perceives as key figures in the movement, stripping it of its intellectual leaders and taking control.

If either of these assumptions is accurate, it becomes clear that the government’s intent in both scenarios is to suppress and eliminate the movement. In practice, anyone who has been socially active in the Azerbaijani civil movement in recent years faces some form of threat or restriction. The government views any action taken toward identity, language and ethnic rights goals with suspicion, promptly summoning or interrogating the individuals involved.

But will suppression succeed, and is the government even capable of true suppression? The government’s crackdown may extend to arresting and detaining activists, but due to the lack of any large, centralized organization within the movement, it will never be able to inflict decisive blows on the Azerbaijani national movement—or, more precisely, the Turkish resistance social movement. Like any movement, the Turkish movement has first introduced the nation to a new perspective, addressing long-overlooked issues and explaining the root causes of many problems. In such a scenario, the movement's driving force is the people and their ideology. It is evident that if the government deepens its repressive actions, it will inevitably have to act like colonial powers—something practically impossible, at least in the historical lands of Azerbaijan.

Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the movement follows a peaceful and civic path, consistently adhering to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran as its ultimate charter. Thus, any government project aimed at provoking activists to adopt non-civic radicalism is doomed to fail. The discourse of the Turkish national movement is such that it never permits its members to engage in non-civic activities. This is particularly true today, as a significant majority of Turks have become members or supporters of the movement and can easily organize for civic resistance when necessary.

If the government continues its radicalism, the only likely outcome for the Turkish movement will be complete disillusionment with the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. When the time comes to act, the people will effortlessly transfer power to whoever they choose.


Original Text in Farsi.