Ethnic Inequality and Civil Resistance: The Azerbaijan Movement's Fight for Recognition

March 10, 2008
Alireza Sarrafi
On the afternoon of Thursday, March 8, 2008, at the invitation of the Office for Strengthening Unity (Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat), Alireza Sarrafi participated in a panel discussion titled “Movements and Civil Institutions” and delivered a speech to students and other attendees on the subject of ethnic (national) discrimination policies and the Azerbaijan movement. In this panel, alongside Mr. Sarrafi, Mrs. Parvin Ardalan, winner of the Olof Palme Award, and Mr. Abdolreza Tajik from the Journalists' Community also participated.

Below is the text of Mr. Sarrafi’s speech:

In the Name of God, and Greetings to Dear Students and Professors,

The main goal of my speech is to provide a general introduction to the Azerbaijan movement. Of course, presenting an extensive social movement in a short time to those who have only fragmentary (and possibly unrealistic) information about it is not an easy task.

Therefore, I have applied a particular approach and will begin my speech at a point that marks the first phase of your understanding of this movement—namely, the most recent visible manifestations of it in the streets and alleys. Then, I will discuss the demands of the movement and subsequently elaborate on the concrete reasons behind the issue, using examples. Naturally, in this context, I do not intend to provide any analysis or in-depth study but rather will share information about the specifics of the movement.

Over the last two decades, the Azerbaijan national movement has been the largest movement in the country. This movement has demonstrated a high mobilization capacity. For instance, I will refer to several major instances as indicators of its significance and size:

  1. Mass protests and uprisings in 25 cities in Azerbaijan in May 2006, in protest against policies of national discrimination and humiliation (which were reflected in the official Iranian newspaper in the form of a cartoon). In these uprisings, which spread across Azerbaijan over the course of a week, according to various reports, between 10 and 20 people lost their lives due to “accidental” shootings by law enforcement, and many others (often reported as over 3,000 people) were arrested. Some of those arrested were released after weeks and months in detention, under bail. After the early years following the revolution, no protests of such scale and intensity had taken place in the country for a quarter of a century.

  2. However, these massive protests were not without cause. A week before them, there was a powerful wave of student strikes and sit-ins across all universities in Azerbaijan and some universities in Tehran during the last week of May 2006. This was the first and so far the only unified student movement in post-revolutionary Iran, in which over 100,000 Azerbaijani students marched together with unified slogans and demands, paving the way for the June uprisings.

  3. These protests were a continuation of many small and large protests that had taken place for years, especially since 1982, in a progressively accelerating rhythm. Notably, these protests were held in Tabriz and other cities in Azerbaijan, particularly on the anniversaries of the Constitutional Revolution and the martyrdom of Sattar Khan and Bagher Khan, as well as on International Mother Language Day, which, since 2003, has been marked regularly in Tabriz and some other cities in Azerbaijan through various events.

  4. It is worth noting that the first major protest associated with this movement took place on May 9, 1995, at Tabriz University, when students organized a large protest against the state-run television and, in an orderly fashion, marched out of the university toward one of the city's densely populated areas. This protest led to the provincial governor being summoned to the university, offering an apology, and the authorities eventually backing down. This event was unique in its own right and was the first large student protest after years of stagnation in the student movement across the country.

  5. Since 1978, the symbolic ceremonies at Babak Castle have been held annually, attended by hundreds of thousands of people. According to Iran's state radio and television, the first event saw 300,000 people in attendance. Over the years, this figure has steadily increased, with the mobilization of a massive number of people annually, coming from a radius of 700 km, being accommodated for an entire day and night in a non-residential area without urban services. During the event, numerous speeches, poetry recitals, dances, music, and theater performances take place, all without any significant disorder. This reflects the high mobilization power of the movement, as well as its cultural and civic character.

It should be noted that in recent years, this event has been suspended due to military occupation and complete security measures in the area.

And more...

It seems that the examples given clearly illustrate the importance and magnitude of this movement in comparison to other contemporary social movements. It should be emphasized that this movement has so far exclusively utilized civil methods and has been free from any form of violence.

How do Azerbaijani activists perceive the policies of the Iranian government?

The majority of activists in the movement believe that:

  1. The economic policies of the central government in allocating resources and national budget are highly discriminatory, leading to economic stagnation in the region.

  2. The geographic potential of Azerbaijan and its historical importance in trade and industry have not been utilized, and there is no structured policy for developing exports, building new roads, or establishing free trade and industrial zones. Consequently, the share of smuggling in the border economy of Azerbaijan has risen significantly in comparison to other regions since the revolution.

  3. The backward education system in Iran has contributed to a drop in academic performance in Azerbaijan, exacerbating illiteracy and educational deficiencies in the region.

  4. The appointment of non-local officials who are unfamiliar with the region's issues by central authorities has led to poor management at the regional level.

  5. The central government not only provides no assistance for the preservation and development of Azerbaijan’s literature, language, and culture, but through both explicit and covert policies, it actively seeks to eliminate them, subjecting those who seek to preserve the region's national (ethnic) identity to legal prosecution under the accusation of pan-Turkism.

...and more.

Perhaps it would be easy to list dozens of similar cases, but given the limited time frame, I will stop at these few key points. However, a question might arise for some of you:

  • Why do Azerbaijanis feel discriminated against? Why has this mentality emerged among them, and is it merely a product of imagination or misunderstandings, or does it have a real basis in the tangible realities of society?

I will now present several examples to demonstrate that this mentality is grounded in the concrete realities of the society:

  1. In Azerbaijan, there is a significant educational decline. If we consider that Azerbaijanis were the first to establish schools in Iran by their own initiative, it would be expected that their literacy rate would not be lower than that of provinces where schools were established 30 or 40 years later. However, currently, the literacy rate in Azerbaijan is lower than in Semnan, Yazd, Kerman, Qom, and other provinces. Comparing these conditions shows that regions where education is in the mother tongue perform better academically, despite historical delays. Notably, the Azerbaijani provinces (East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Ardabil, and Zanjan, where the majority of people speak Turkish) have experienced a significant drop in literacy rankings from the first to the twentieth in the last 40 years. This disparity highlights how ongoing ethnic and cultural discrimination has created social class disparities.

  2. As an indicator of the lack of state investment in Azerbaijan, during the eight years of President Rafsanjani’s administration, the volume of public investment in the mines of Kerman province was 300 times higher than in the same sector in the four Azerbaijani provinces.

  3. Another sign of the compounded issue of unemployment and economic discrimination is migration. The population of the four Azerbaijani provinces was 15.1% of Iran's total population in 1956, but this proportion has dropped to 12.74% in recent years, with East Azerbaijan consistently being the highest source of migration in the country.

  4. In 1956, 10% of the population in Tehran was registered as being from East Azerbaijan, despite the fact that other Turkish-speaking regions like West Azerbaijan, Zanjan, and Hamadan had three times the population of East Azerbaijan. This shows the costs of the state's policy to "empty" Azerbaijan and shift its population to Tehran, changing their identity characteristics.

  5. Many Turkish-speaking migrants in Persian-speaking central regions face humiliation, economic pressures, and are assimilated into the Persian-speaking majority, losing touch with their cultural identity.

  6. Living standards in Azerbaijan are low, with urban household income in Azerbaijan provinces being about 15% lower than the national average.

  7. Industrial development in the four Azerbaijani provinces is 46% below the national average.

  8. From 1899 to 1925, eight modern factories were established in Iran, five of which were in Tabriz. However, by 1986, Azerbaijan’s industrial employment had dropped to seventh place in the country.

  9. Azerbaijan’s historical monuments have been neglected, and there are no long-term plans for preserving historical sites or promoting tourism.

  10. The bureaucratic centralization in Iran has led to the disproportionate growth of the capital while weakening Azerbaijan. Tabriz, once considered the second-largest city in Iran, has fallen to fourth place and may soon be surpassed by cities like Shiraz, Karaj, and Qom.

I believe these points, along with many other statistics across various social, economic, and cultural sectors, reflect the policies of the central government that have systematically undermined Azerbaijan’s development.

Finally, I would like to ask a question to those who claim to advocate for human rights on a national scale:

Aren’t linguistic and ethnic minority rights part of human rights? Why have the relevant United Nations conventions on these issues been ignored or circumvented? How can we overlook the rights of minorities by selectively applying human rights laws, while disregarding the rights of the majority population of this country? Those who claim to defend freedom of speech should answer how they will achieve this right for millions of their fellow citizens without ensuring linguistic freedom, the very foundation of that speech.


Link to the original speech in Farsi