Paper Rights for Ethnic Groups

Farnoush Amirshahi - Radio Farda - December 23, 2016

Hassan Rouhani, the President of Iran, signed and issued the Charter of Citizens' Rights on December 19.

The eyes of special guests dressed in traditional, ethnic, and religious attire were fixed, like everyone else’s, on Hassan Rouhani’s hands as he calmly and with a faint smile signed the Charter of Citizens' Rights.

They watched his pen move across the intricately designed paper with hope, as at least six of the charter’s 120 articles addressed the rights of ethnic and religious minorities.

For instance, Article 10 prohibits “insult, humiliation, or incitement of hatred against ethnic groups, followers of religions and sects, and various social and political groups.” In other sections, the right to “intercultural communication,” regardless of ethnic or religious differences, as well as the right to “learn, use, and teach local languages and dialects,” is granted to citizens.

Nevertheless, all attendees at the unveiling ceremony of the charter, which took over three years to draft, were aware that the document lacked enforceable guarantees. As noted at the end of the text, a special assistant is tasked with “proposing plans and policies for its full implementation.”

Beyond the charter, the relationship between the Islamic Republic and ethnic and religious minorities has always been fraught with ups and downs.

Although numerous articles of the Constitution guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms for all Iranian citizens, regardless of ethnic, racial, linguistic, or even religious affiliations, Article 13 explicitly recognizes only three religious minorities—Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians.

Furthermore, Article 12 of the Constitution declares Twelver Shia Islam as the official state religion, effectively barring adherents of other sects from holding high-ranking positions in the government.

In addition, Article 67, concerning the oath of office taken by representatives at the opening of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament), stipulates that representatives of religious minorities must swear their oath on their own sacred books.

To all this must be added employment regulations, which require being Muslim or adhering to one of the officially recognized religions as a prerequisite for certain jobs.

Not long ago, Molavi Abdolhamid, a Sunni Friday prayer leader, revealed that in some government offices located in Sunni-majority regions, only 15 to 19 out of 300 to 400 employees are Sunni.

The situation for Baha’is is even more dire. This group is not recognized by the Islamic Republic in any way and faces intense persecution, including being barred not only from employment but also from access to higher education.

In addition to religion, ethnic and linguistic minorities in Iran—including Kurds, Turks, Arabs, Baluchis, Lors, and Turkmens—face various legal and customary restrictions. Even official statistics on the composition and population of these minorities are unavailable.

Moreover, institutions tasked with preserving and documenting linguistic diversity and cultural heritage were dissolved during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency and have never been reinstated.

These restrictions and discriminations have fueled a growing set of demands from ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities. Human rights organizations and activists consistently criticize the discrimination these groups face, pointing out that the Islamic Republic often adopts security and militarized approaches in dealing with minorities, especially in border regions, out of fear of undermining central authority.

Despite such pressures, the demand for minority rights has become increasingly prominent in recent years. It has even been a topic in electoral campaigns, and during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency, a special assistant for minority affairs was appointed. The Tenth Parliament also addressed this issue more significantly than its predecessors.

A Common Language, a Different Outlook

While reactions to the formation of the Turkish-language parliamentary faction in the Tenth Parliament were still ongoing, news emerged that Kurdish-speaking MPs were also planning to form a similar faction.

The stated purpose of both factions is to address the issues and challenges faced by Turks and Kurds.

This move sparked widespread debate. Opponents argue that it threatens national unity, emphasizing that MPs represent all voters, not just specific ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups. They worry such factions might divert representatives’ focus from broader national issues.

Supporters, however, contend that there are no separatist agendas involved and that the factions aim solely to advocate for the rights of Turkish- and Kurdish-speaking citizens.

The ultimate formation of these factions depends on the Parliament’s governing board, but the concerns of security institutions and political groups are evident. Some have even likened these factions to “ethnic faction-building” and an effort to turn Iran into “Iranistan.”

These groups argue that, given the region’s and world’s current crises—ISIS activities, Saudi interventions, and recent efforts to infiltrate Iran’s borders via Kurdistan and Azerbaijan—maintaining unity and acting prudently is more crucial than ever.

Nevertheless, the past actions of MPs involved in such factions show that they rarely act against the wishes of security institutions.

Moreover, linguistic minority MPs are themselves individuals closely aligned with the regime, having passed the vetting process of the Guardian Council and security agencies to gain entry to Parliament.

Ethnic and minority MPs often face high expectations from their constituents. The establishment of Turkish and Kurdish factions may further raise such expectations. However, these factions lack the capacity or motivation to pursue substantial demands beyond cultural preservation, the right to mother-tongue education, or occasionally writing letters to Iran’s Supreme Leader and government heads to address certain discriminations. This is especially true given that MPs must consider the risk of disqualification by the Guardian Council for future parliamentary elections.

The positive aspect of these factions, in the absence of strong, functional political parties, is their potential to serve as bargaining forces—though this is no easy task. These MPs, despite sharing a common language, often differ in political outlooks and ethnic or religious backgrounds.

What is clear is that neither the Turkish and Kurdish factions in Parliament nor the Rouhani administration’s Charter of Citizens' Rights has the authority or capacity to address the numerous demands of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities.

These citizens face a long journey toward achieving their goals. Small steps, such as Kurdish representatives wearing traditional attire in Parliament, raising and reiterating ethnic issues, and emphasizing their rights, may help somewhat reduce feelings of discrimination and dissatisfaction. However, these measures are insufficient as effective solutions for defending the rights and dignity of minorities.


The opinions expressed in this article represent the author’s views and do not necessarily reflect those of Radio Farda.


The link to the original article in Farsi on Radio Farda:
حقوق کاغذی برای قومیت‌ها