Hedayat Soltanzadeh - July 28, 2005
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| Hedayat Soltanzadeh |
In this article, Hedayat Soltanzadeh examines the connections between language politics, ideology, and national identity, focusing on their cultural, political, social, and economic implications. It analyzes how linguistic choices shape collective identities and influence power dynamics. By exploring historical narratives and cultural practices, the piece underscores the importance of language policies in the struggle for recognition and rights among ethnic minorities. Readers are invited to consider the critical role of linguistic diversity as a foundation for justice, equity, and socio-economic and political opportunity in society.
Holy Scriptures. Book of Genesis. Chapter 11. Verses 1-10
Perhaps this biblical account is one of the oldest human narratives about the relationship between language and the diversity of nations and nationalities in the scattered human societies on our planet.
The tradition of Isidore of Seville, the last Church Father and the godfather of the Catholic Church in Europe during the Middle Ages, states that after the destruction of the Tower of Babel, which the children of Noah intended to build as a monument to the unity of the people of Noah after their dispersion across the earth, it was language that created nations and nationalities in the world, not nationalities that created language.
Just as a commodity initially reveals only its consumer value to us and does not reveal the complex world that a specific commodity contains to the ordinary consumer, language, too, first presents itself as a means of communication without our realizing the broader world and its diverse essence.
If a commodity, beyond its consumer value, embodies the most complex social relationships that a closer study of it will help us understand social relations among people, and consequently the relationship between social classes, the political system governing society, and the prevailing ideologies in these social relations, then delving into the phenomenon of language and its role in society will also lead us to understand it as a phenomenon that goes beyond its role as merely a means of communication.
In contrast to the phenomenon of a commodity, whose ideological embodiment is indirectly manifested through the social relations governing it, both the phenomenon of language and its role as a means of social communication inherently carry a heavy ideological burden and are more explicitly ideological than any other social phenomenon. In other words, not only is the use of language ideological, but language itself is an ideological phenomenon. As a result, we speak of language not merely as abstract coding but from the domain of ideological saturation and a worldview.
Antonio Gramsci considered language one of the three sites of “spontaneous philosophy” and placed it in an explicit relationship with the issue of hegemony, the role of intellectuals, culture, and mass-national unity. According to him, language is a crucial component of hegemony:
“Whenever the issue of language arises in any form, it means that a series of other issues also emerge in connection with it: such as the formation and expansion of the ruling class, the need to establish a more secure and closer relationship between ruling groups and the masses— the nation, in other words, the recognition of cultural hegemony.”
From this perspective, those who believe that language is merely a means of communication, and that it is better to use a single means of communication at the national level to provide closer communication between people and to unify them, are, in fact, oversimplifying one of the most complex social phenomena.
The aim of this writing is to address aspects of the use of language, especially the use of Persian among nationalities in Iran, where Persian is not their mother tongue. Some intellectuals and politicians may perceive its compulsory use as a basis for national unity and the creation of the identity of the “nation” of Iran, that is, “one nation and one language.”
Regardless of the fact that applying the term “nation of Iran” to a multi-ethnic country that comprises different human groups with diverse ethnic roots and languages spoken is incorrect, I believe that the compulsory use of the Persian language since the time of Reza Shah has been entirely ideological and has served as a political-ideological tool in the national oppression of non-Persian nationalities in Iran. Therefore, it is overly simplistic to perceive the use of language as a one-dimensional and neutral means of communication. Furthermore, any language, even within a single nationality, is not a neutral means of communication; rather, it continuously reconstructs a relationship of power, distinction, and discrimination based on gender and class. If the use of language within a nationality is a tool for reconstructing power relations and various forms of gender and class discrimination, its application in relation to other nationalities is typically accompanied by forms of national discrimination, racism, and domination. In clearer terms, language plays a role in the redistribution of political, economic, social, and human capital power. The set of these language policies has long-term effects, both on the socio-economic status of the dominant nationality that declares its language the language of all nationalities and on the non-dominant nationalities. These impacts, overall, act against the non-dominant nationalities and create a relationship similar to that of the first world and the third world within Iran, and between the Persian nationality and other nationalities of Iran. This process, contrary to the beliefs of those who regard these policies as a means for the project of "nation-building" and a guarantee of "national unity," actually moves in the opposite direction. The national oppression, in which the compulsory use of the Persian language among non-Persian nationalities plays a key role, can have completely counterproductive results and sooner or later lead to factors contributing to the disintegration of the country.
Unity and the preservation of the Iranian people's solidarity cannot be guaranteed through the maintenance of national oppression and the imposition of one nationality's language on all other nationalities. Only the guarantee of equal rights for all citizens and nationalities and a sense of equality can keep them together as equal members within the framework of Iran.
Language and Ideology
In the realm of animal sovereignty, the rule is based on this principle:
Eat or be eaten.
But in the realm of human sovereignty:
“Define” or be “defined.”
Thomas Szasz
No social system can continue its existence without reproducing its material conditions. These material conditions are not determined at the level of factories and commercial offices but at the level of the entire society and in the totality of its relationships with each other. In fact, not only are the material conditions of a social system reproduced, but also the nature of human relationships regarding these material conditions is primarily reproduced, ensuring its continued existence.
The reproduction of the material conditions of a social system is inseparably linked to the reproduction of the thoughts and ideologies associated with it, and without that reproduction, the social system itself cannot be reproduced.
Thought and ideology are not limited to a general human perspective toward the world and nature or to having a cohesive political and philosophical framework. It is not merely our overall view of social relations, rights, religion, philosophy, art, and literature that determines this thought and ideology; rather, each of these individually and in itself constitutes an ideological phenomenon. The social being is always surrounded by ideological phenomena, which are characterized by objective external signs composed of various forms and categories, such as different word structures and modes of expression (their phonetic articulation, writing, or other forms of expression), scientific opinions, religious symbols, beliefs of individuals, artistic and literary works, etc. A symbol like a cross is not just a simple mark; it is an ideological code with specific political and social implications, embodying a series of conceivable religious, political, and social orientations. In the same way, a crown in the insignia of a political party or a swastika expresses the political and ideological orientations and specific views of that political party.
All these phenomena and symbols together create the ideological environment of humanity, which tightly encircles the individual [9].
The awareness of a group or human gathering is also expressed through this ideological environment, which has been externalized through signs, categories, and symbols [10], and it reproduces the specific social relations that are conditions for the reproduction of a social system [11].
In the process of producing and reproducing a system, the dominant tendency is always to reproduce the prevailing social relations in a broader form than before. This means that class relations, gender distinctions, and the accompanying ideology and culture are also reproduced in newer and more complex forms. Two major conditions are necessary for the realization of the process of producing and reproducing a social system: the production of the coercive apparatus that preserves these relations and the ideology that presents these relations as acceptable and desirable. Without reproducing this ideology, no coercive apparatus can endure. This is because the two are interdependent; otherwise, there exists neither a purely and absolutely coercive apparatus nor a purely and absolutely ideological one [12]. In this overall reproduction of thought and ideology, language both acts as a medium for transmitting them and operates as an independent ideological phenomenon.
Nonetheless, the reproduction of the coercive system and ideology does not occur uniformly or identically. The coercive apparatus is fundamentally reproduced in a compact and centralized manner, whereas the reproduction of the thoughts and ideologies associated with this social system is characterized by a dispersed nature, manifesting in a thousand and one social phenomena—philosophy, law, politics, science, art, literature, language, and even in the gathering and type of assembly of a particular group at a concert, among others. Therefore, thought and ideology reflect themselves in every movement and social relation, in speaking, in the manner of presenting a point, in mimetic gestures, in telling jokes, etc.
Language is not only the medium through which all ideological concepts pass, but it is also the focal point of ideology.
The echo of this ideological reproduction manifests both in institutions or structures outside of humans, such as churches, mosques, schools, and the press, and in social relations. Similarly, language not only serves as the medium for transmitting thought and ideology but also acts as an institution and an ideological structure in itself. The ideological relationship is ultimately a form of power relation, and the ideological institution is a site of power. However, the ideological institution is not limited to external entities; rather, language is the fundamental institution, center, and repository of ideology.
Therefore, language plays a key role in the reconstruction of power relations in society and does not merely facilitate communication among humans. Instead, it shapes a specific type of power relation within social interactions.
Even the transition from one language to another occurs within the confines of that language itself [13]. For this reason, there is a constant struggle between the colloquial language of the masses, which tends to escape order and centrality, potentially evolving into another dialect or even another language, and the grammar of a language, which aims to establish order, discipline, and a uniform standard, compelling the colloquial language to conform to this centralized structure. As long as a language is alive, the centripetal forces of standardization and unification within the language, along with centrifugal processes and separatist tendencies, interact dynamically. Thus, within each language, there is a constant battleground of social and ideological conflicts. For this reason, every language should be viewed as a social formation, interacting with various forces and social classes, as well as diverse cultures.
All languages, at every moment they are expressed, do so from a specific perspective and within a particular social context, addressing a specific audience, even though this audience may be real or imagined [14]. Accordingly, there is no language in the world in which the expressed words do not reflect a specific perspective and situation, and thus, are not ideological. In reality, language is a mirror reflecting a specific state of affairs.
In any given historical moment, every generation, at any level of social affiliation, possesses its own specific language, which carries an ideological weight. Additionally, each age group uses specific vocabulary based on its social affiliation and educational level, expressing them in particular ways.
A language, while reflecting the ideological echo of its time, simultaneously coexists with the languages of different historical epochs and social-ideological periods within itself. From this perspective, every language not only has a historical location but is also an ongoing historical process in time, continually evolving as a carrier of ideology. At the same time, each language is potentially pregnant with transformation into other languages.
It is even possible that today's language differs from yesterday's, employing slogans, words, jokes, and metaphors distinct from those of the past. In this sense, each language, at a specific moment in its life, carries linguistic diversity from top to bottom [15]. Therefore, a language at any moment in its existence embodies the coexistence of social-ideological conflicts between the present and the past, between different historical eras, between various social-ideological groups in the current time, and among diverse schools and circles, each with its own specific characteristics and expressions. These multiple “languages,” within a single language, interrupt each other in various forms and manners, influence one another, and create “languages” of different social types.
These multiple “languages” manifested within a single language express a particular worldview, each defined by its own goals, interpretations, and values.
As a result, there are no “neutral” forms or words in a language, meaning there are no forms or words that belong to “no one” in this world; such statements are inherently meaningless.
Language is always and completely dominated by the intentions and dialects of various social groups and is not a neutral medium that can easily and readily become the private property of the speaker's intentions. It cannot be seized and forced to comply with a specific intention or accent. Instead, within each language, there is a crowd of diverse intentions from others [16]. The working class and the general public in England are averse to the dialect and pronunciation of the educated, aristocratic Oxford accent, which carries a form of elitist arrogance. Similarly, those who pronounce English with the accent of the upper class view the speech of the uneducated masses unfavorably. Each of these ways of speaking and accents embodies lines and themes of different values, perspectives, and life experiences. Opposition to these accents simultaneously signifies opposition to the values embedded within those accents. The intersection of different accents in a language also symbolizes the different ideologies of social classes within society.
Therefore, language is not just a system of abstract forms based solely on a set of norms [17]. It also encapsulates a specific perception of the world, which, due to the multiplicity of linguistic presences from various social groups, becomes a center of conflicting ideologies and reflects them within itself. For this reason, each language should be viewed as a turbulent world of social conflicts. The role of literature is to compel the reader to recognize various ideologies, which often contradict each other.
In all instances where a speaker utters a word, that word carries social weight and is expressed within a social relationship where the social context of the word predominates over the word itself. For example, the name "Fatemeh" in a white French family evokes nothing but the status of a "maid," thus connoting a lower social position. The Arabic word "Abd" (meaning "slave") was fundamentally used as a collective term for all black Africans, whether free or enslaved, reflecting a derogatory view of them. The interchangeable use of the words "black" and "slave" essentially reconstructs the relationship between slave owner and slave, naturalizing the enslavement of black people as an element of ideology [18].
Moreover, we cannot use any word in any situation. Instead, we have our own domains of prohibitions and permissions that reflect a social relationship [19]. The determination of the domains of prohibition and permission is established through the relationship of power and the nature of that relationship, and is not an abstract matter. Those who hold political power typically control significant portions of the economy and, more importantly, define the conditions of discourse within society. In such a situation, they establish the language, codes of behavior, and cultural frameworks of discourse. Thus, they always possess additional symbolic capital and power compared to those who are not in power.
Since all languages arise socially and society is composed of groups and social classes, the characteristic of social communication through language takes on a distorted quality rather than a direct expression of reality.
Each social group presents a distorted image of itself and others within the structure of language, similar to what occurs within the realm of ideology. The interests and desires of social groups do not necessarily reflect themselves directly; rather, this reflection is inverted and indirect, passing through the ambiguous pathway of language, which, like ideology itself, allows for various interpretations and utilizations of words. In other words, dominant social groups, by exploiting the ambiguities inherent in ideology, constantly attempt to present their specific interests as public interests [20]. Therefore, both ideology and language provide a distorted representation of reality. What appears in language as a natural intermediary in human relationships is the reality that language, through this social relationship, also reconstructs the prevailing social relations and the existing power dynamics.
Volosinov, the Russian linguist, believed that the word is the most sensitive symbol of social changes that are taking shape and have not yet taken on their final form, existing within a completely organized and defined ideological system. Nonetheless, he viewed semiology in language as aligned with ideology [21].
According to Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, a prominent theoretical philosopher and social linguist from Italy, language and economic-social domination are phenomena that are completely interrelated [22] and cannot be separated from each other [23]. For example, the choice of standard English in England was not merely a voluntary selection; it represented the dominance of certain social classes [24]. Similarly, the transformation of English or French in their colonies into administrative and educational languages served as a tool of domination and authority for these countries over their colonies, and did not simply fulfill a straightforward communicative role.
Language and Gender Ideology
The predominant language of the world is fundamentally a male language, not a female one. Perhaps the grammar of most languages and their internal structures primarily reflect this "masculine" nature of the world's languages, which are essentially founded on the supremacy and priority of men over women. As previously mentioned, the grammar of any language is responsible for establishing order and discipline within the language, countering the centrifugal forces of colloquial speech. However, this establishment of discipline and centralization occurs in a particular manner, specifically based on a hierarchy in which the male gender occupies the central position of the grammatical structure of the language. In no language does the feminine pronoun precede the masculine pronoun; the priority is always given to the masculine pronoun, which reflects male dominance in society and symbolizes it within the language [25]. If pronouns and words, as symbols, reflect the unequal social relations between men and women, this symbolization, in turn, reconstructs and ensures the continuity of male power and dominance in society. Symbols and words must be viewed as an ideological relationship and a relationship of power, not as neutral and impartial signs.
Even the language of creation in all religions is structured around the creation of man. God first creates Adam, and Eve is created afterward. There has been no female prophet or imam in history. All of God's angels in heaven, without exception, including Gabriel, Michael, and Azrael, have the attribute of being "male," which collectively forms God's bureaucratic and governing body in heaven.
Even God, who outwardly is not designated with a specific gender, is completely characterized by male attributes, which express His power and authority, or in other words, the dominance of men over women. The name of God in foreign languages is associated with terms such as Father, Lord, and King, and in Persian, Arabic, and Turkish, it is named with words like "Rahman" (Merciful), "Rahim" (Compassionate), "Qudrat" (Power), and "Qadir" (Capable), all of which are masculine attributes. The suffix "Allah," in any context involving human names such as "Izatollah" and "Nasratollah," also belongs to the male gender. In no religion is God referred to with a feminine attribute. In Greek mythology, which represents the stage of deities before the formation of monotheistic religion, Zeus, the king of gods, is still a male entity, and among the gods of Olympus, all matters of divinity associated with wrath, anger, and power are handled by male gods, such as Titans, Vulcan, and others. Only matters related to fertility or music and similar domains are entrusted to goddesses, which bear a resemblance to housekeeping and child-rearing.
As a result, the word and symbols themselves embody the relationship of gender distinction and the overarching and subordinate relationships, in other words, the hierarchical and social power relationships.
If human chromosomes cause biological differences in sex between women and men, and this cannot be considered a cause of discrimination, then gender discrimination has a completely social aspect and reflects social relationships and hierarchies. The difference between women and men, as a distinction in sex, is a natural biological difference that exists in all living beings. However, the term "gender" assigns a social role to this biological difference, transforming it into a social distinction and immediately categorizing women in a different social hierarchy [26].
French writer Simone de Beauvoir believed that one is not born a woman, but rather becomes one. The designation of "woman" for a human being essentially symbolizes her inferior and secondary position in relation to men. Therefore, the word itself reflects the unequal power relationship. This power relationship is externalized through linguistic communication and simultaneously takes on a lasting characteristic within the language itself. In other words, through linguistic communication, we create specific social roles for ourselves, expressed through existing words and deriving their meaning from the discourses in which they are used. The use of language in discourse, for example, applying the term "woman" to someone signifies determining her subordinate position relative to men, materializing the unequal power relationship between women and men and the dominance of men over women by employing two symbolic words.
Metaphors and the use of symbolic words, which can be abundantly observed in the works of writers and the common expressions of people, reflect both the unequal sexual relationship and the unequal power in society, as well as the components that sustain and perpetuate such social relationships.
Even when European colonizers set foot in the newly discovered American continent, they employed the same prevailing mindset and ideology in their relations regarding the new lands and the indigenous peoples. The metaphor "America" symbolized a virgin woman that could be seized and possessed. Amerigo Vespucci, the Italian navigator and explorer, referred to the indigenous women of the New World as "lewd" beings waiting for white men. These metaphors were not merely words to justify and legitimize invasion and appropriation; they also reflected the world in which the European man lived and the type of relationship he had with his counterpart, the woman. Once again, these metaphors and the sexual language and inferior attitude toward women were reflected back in European society, serving as ideological tools in reconstructing the unequal sexual relationships and power in the very homeland of Europe [27].
Language is an integral part of the entire social life and is not merely a set of simple codes for communication. The language of gender itself comprises codes that help maintain and preserve the institutions of gender distinction [28].
Language and National Identity
What a bold and brave Spaniard you are,
With your language and sword you conquer.
—Calderón de la Barca [29]
Language is not merely a means for interaction among individuals, a tool for social communication, or a practical instrument for governing a state—whether a modern government or one from ancient times. It is also an instrument of power and symbolic value in society [30]. By adopting a specific language, a particular demographic group or nationality aims to announce its identity to the world and define the identity of the entire society solely through its own identity. In reality, the identity of other demographic groups or nationalities in society exists only when they do not exist.
In simpler terms, they can only “exist” as a demographic group by dissolving themselves in the language of the dominant group and erasing their own identity. It is famously said that General Custer, the racist general responsible for the massacre of large groups of Native Americans in the United States, believed that the best Native American is one who lies beneath the earth. The logic of those who declare their language as the only dominant language in society essentially and directly declares the necessity and mandate for the destruction of other languages in society.
As far as language is used merely as a communicative medium among people, one might say that no language expresses “evil intent,” and it appears to be a neutral communication medium. This is because human beings are social creatures, and without this communication, human society cannot exist. This is akin to the value of consumption in a commodity. No commodity displays the complex world hidden within it in the market for buying and selling. However, without the value of consumption in a commodity, the other aspects and hidden values in it also fail to materialize.
While language is a social medium, it also contains various symbolic values. When a demographic group declares its language as the language of the entire society, it uses it as an ideological and political engine, leveraging the communicative aspect of the language. Consequently, the use of language is always accompanied by certain intentions that are embedded within this communication medium and are an integral part of it. A simplistic view of language as merely a communicative tool among people is a common misconception, just as considering complex biological life as a single-celled organism.
To declare that a language is the official language and the language of communication for the entire society means asserting symbolic superiority—not just for that language, but for the superior identity of the demographic group or nationality whose language has been declared the official language of the country. Thus, language acts as a medium of discrimination and distinction from other nationalities, serving as a boundary for distinguishing itself from outsiders.
It is no coincidence that when a language is declared the official language of a country, the other languages commonly spoken among other nationalities within that country are also deemed foreign languages.
Historically, identity—the human mental capacity to distinguish oneself from others—has been the primary driver of human development, with language being a major factor in the distinction among human groups. That is, individual identity develops to the extent that it provides a reliable image of the “self” in contrast to the “other.”
Ethnicity is the most fundamental aspect of identity in the construction of human society, where language plays the primary and most refined role in facilitating interaction among individuals in establishing ethnic identity. At the same time, language is the most prominent factor distinguishing one ethnic group or nationality from another.
Perhaps the best evidence that language has been a fundamental component in the formation of ethnicities is the concept of "barbarian" in the ancient world. This term was a Greek invention to preserve and elevate their cultural position in contrast to non-Greeks. For the Greeks, the distinguishing criterion of Greeks from others was their language, and the term Barbaros referred to someone who did not speak Greek fluently and correctly. For this reason, all local cultures surrounding Greek territory were labeled as "barbarian languages" [31]. Only cultures that had a recognized high standard of culture and civilization, such as the Romans and Egyptians, were considered on par with the Greeks.
With the onset of the Hellenistic era in the third century BCE, a new element entered the relationship between language and ethnicity: the significance of the concept and idea of cosmopolitanism for the Greek language. Nevertheless, the idea of Hellenistic cosmopolitanism was inherently ethnic. Greek, Egyptian, Roman, Persian, and Phoenician descendants were only accepted as equal members of Greek society if they adopted Hellenistic lifestyles and expressed their thoughts and beliefs in the Greek language. In many regions where the Greeks held sway, Hellenistic cosmopolitanism revolved around the acceptance of bilingualism, where the local ethnic language served as the mother tongue, and the Greek language served as the language of a global civilization. Thus, language maintained its role in ethnic identity during this period as well [32].
In European history, there have been specific periods when language played an important role in the formation of national identities. In this regard, four distinct periods can be identified:
The transition from the ancient world to the early Middle Ages, marked by the flourishing of Irish, Anglo-Saxon, and continental German cultures.
The Middle Ages, during which regional Romance languages, Slavic languages (such as Old Bulgarian and Old Russian), and Northern European cultures (Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, and Icelandic) developed.
It can be said that from this time onward, ethnicity related to language fundamentally progressed through written language.
The age of Protestant movements in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, especially among Finns, Estonians, Sorbs, Slovenes, Latvians, and Romanians, where standard literary language served as a political weapon.
The Enlightenment era, during which the idea of language as a builder of national culture expanded, particularly in the eighteenth century, largely as a product of a type of intellectual reasoning. In fact, the ideology of national language meant harmonizing previous tendencies of ethnic identity with the political ideas of the Enlightenment and continued as a significant builder of national culture and a unique symbol of the nation-state until the period of Western European integration [34].
The Idea of a National Language and One Nation
The concept of the nation was an invention of the Enlightenment, depicting a society distinguished from others by common threads of ethnicity, shared language, and sometimes a common religion [35].
The term "nation" is derived from the Latin word natio, which was used in the late fourteenth century, mainly among students and scholars in colleges or universities in Paris. It referred to specific places and territories, and they wanted to be treated based on the familiar principles and laws of their home. Therefore, at that time, the University of Paris was divided into several nations. This same approach was later used by the University of Prague, which categorized its students into several nations.
The ideological basis for the stream of thought that created the nation, and consequently a political institution called the nation-state, was nourished primarily by two intellectual sources: the Enlightenment in France and Romanticism in Germany [36]. The fundamental claim of the French Enlightenment regarding the concept of the nation was the priority of the people and their right to sovereignty. As a result, democratizing the structure of government and administering it by the people, embodied in the nation, was the most critical element of the idea of the nation.
In contrast to the French, who had a long experience with government, the French Revolution, with the transfer of sovereignty from the king and religion to the nation, gave practical and political materiality to this ideological depiction. For German thinkers and philosophers, defining the idea and concept of German nationality, which was composed of around three hundred and fifty small and large principalities, was a significant question.
In the thoughts of Enlightenment intellectuals in the eighteenth century and even before, the mental depiction of the human community that creates the nation relied on the ethnic roots of distant pasts and the diverse origins of nobles and common people. However, following the French Revolution, especially after the Napoleonic era, the emphasis on the common culture of all social classes in the nation-state shifted. German Romanticism played an important role in this shift in emphasis. Philosophers and intellectuals such as Herder, Fichte, Lessing, Freiherr von Stein, and Klopstock stressed the continuity of the common language and the shared life of the speakers of that language within a geographical unit in distinguishing German identity as a nation [37].
Herder writes:
"Is nationality not something more precious and dearer than the speech of one's fathers? In that word lies the entire climate of thought, traditions, history, religion, and the foundations of life, as well as all the heart and soul. To deprive a nation of its language means to deprive it of its most immortal quality... The heart of every people is created with its language" [38].
As a result, German Romanticism viewed the most prominent marker of national identity as a shared language in its definition of the nation. However, until Adolf Hitler, the German people identified themselves as Germans due to their Saxon, Bavarian, Swabian, or Franconian origins, and they often understood each other through written and standard language, with no complete linguistic homogeneity existing [39].
It can be said that many of the languages that are now considered national languages in Europe did not exist in the true sense in the nineteenth century. The origins of many of these languages, like the ethnic origins of nations themselves, are lost in the mists of time, but as spoken languages, they are creations of the modern era, especially after the French Revolution.
The image of Europe during the Enlightenment concerning language is not particularly complex. A multitude of illiterate rural masses spoke various languages and dialects that had no written form, and the written language itself took different forms: court language, the language of literary and philosophical creation, languages for religious education, the language for recording property and assets, administrative language, primary education language, secondary education language, and academic language. Within the framework of a state, these languages had not yet formed a coherent whole. For example, in Protestant Germany, the language of religious education and primary education was German, while secondary education was often conducted in Latin, and the court language and literary expression were in French [40]. Many of Leibniz’s writings, the German philosopher, were in Latin and French, even though he believed that he could not imagine a better language than German for sacred writings [41].
As long as people lived in an oral world, there was no necessary relationship between the spoken language of the masses and the educated minority. Moreover, as long as specialized matters, such as the state's administrative apparatus, were in the hands of a privileged minority, none of these languages, in the strict sense of the word, were living languages. In India, the administrative language in 1830 was Persian, which the Indian people did not understand. When the English changed the administrative language in India from Persian to English, the people of India still did not understand it. Similarly, the official language in the Austrian parliament in 1850 was Latin, which had no relevance to the language of the people. Additionally, the court language in all European countries was French, which was considered a foreign language to the masses of these countries, even though French was regarded as the literary language in many of them. If illiterate people wanted to communicate with those who spoke different languages, they had to rely on individuals who were familiar with that language or educated individuals who knew a simplified and mixed version of that language [42].
The emergence of national languages in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century marked a significant political and ideological shift. The foundation and primary issue concerning standard and unified language were democratic rather than cultural. In other words, the main issue was not about establishing a means of communication between different segments of the population but rather about the relationship between the people and sovereignty. Until the French Revolution, when sovereignty belonged to the emperor and the monarchies in Europe, there was no need to establish a connection between the language of sovereignty and the people; the language of the people and the language of political authority were two foreign phenomena to each other. The national language became important when ordinary citizens and common people became a component of sovereignty. Henceforth, it became essential for the language of sovereignty and the people to be one because, according to the theory and the mental image of society in the Enlightenment thinkers, sovereignty belonged to the people, which was manifested in the nation, and the unity of sovereignty and the people in the form of the nation-state demanded a unity of its language as well. It was necessary for the masses, even if they had no participation in sovereignty, to at least understand the language of sovereignty. Therefore, in the minds of political leaders, it seemed essential to establish an organic link between the written language, which until the French Revolution had no relation to the people, and the spoken language of ordinary people. It was precisely in this context that public education for French citizens, regardless of the language spoken within France, became a vital matter. The mere transformation of language into a written medium eliminated its local and dialectal characteristics.
This issue also gained fundamental importance in America, which was the product of an era and a democratic revolution, where an immigrant had to pass an English language test to be considered an American citizen. How people read or wrote among themselves was, like religious freedom, of no concern to anyone [43].
In places where there was no dominant language, either in spoken or written form, or where the response of other nationalities was provoked, the situation was completely different. In the multilingual Habsburg Empire, the language of instruction in schools became a political issue, as was later seen in Belgium and Finland. Thus, according to the Nationality Law in Hungary of 1868, people had the right to be educated in their mother tongue in primary school and, under certain conditions, in secondary school, and they could communicate with government authorities in their mother tongue. If direct communication was not possible, they could use a translator. However, to benefit from this right, one had to belong to a recognized nationality.
The idea of a national language, which emerged among Enlightenment intellectuals, was seen as a covenant that united individuals within a nation and was defined as a "language nation." After the French Revolution, French was imposed as the exclusive language of instruction and self-awareness for all residents of France, regardless of whether they were French, Basque, Catalan, Breton, Occitan, German, or Flemish. The idea of a language nation was used as a political tool in all European countries during the nineteenth century. Greece, which after France was the first country to declare a nation-state in 1822, based its right to self-determination on the Greek language and the formation of Greek culture.
The system of one language and one nation became the dream of the nation-state, and the existence of multilingual countries like Switzerland was considered abnormal. Consequently, the issue of primary education became a political battleground, and indeed, the main arena of political conflict was there. Because in countries like the Netherlands and Denmark, until World War II, only two percent of the population aged 15-19 had access to secondary education [44]. As a result, the issue of language became a purely political matter for the political elites in the state apparatus, and the cultural aspect of language education or its communicative nature became less prominent.
In countries that were multinational but where a specific nationality held the dominant weight, language unification and aligning the single language with the dominant nationality, along with implementing the theory of one nation and one language, were often accompanied by massacres, repression, and ethnic cleansing, which was thousands of miles away from the original democratic idea that was in the minds and hearts of Enlightenment thinkers. On the eve of World War II, in a country like Poland, which is now predominantly mono-ethnic, non-Polish people constituted 30 percent of the population. The establishment of a single national language came at a heavy human cost. The Jews in that country, who spoke Yiddish, were exterminated, Germans were expelled, and Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians were separated from Poland and annexed to the Soviet Union, thus achieving the unity of the theory of one nation and one language [45].
Throughout the nineteenth century, the idea of a national language was manipulated as a political tool by political elites in nationalist competitions, with large so-called "historical" nations consolidating their states at the expense of smaller ones.
Language, inherently an ideological phenomenon, was ideologically utilized through the idealization of the theory of one nation and one language, and its instrumental use facilitated the foundation of national oppression by imposing one language against others. In this way, national oppression, hidden behind the idea of one nation and one language, also became an ideology.
Language and Political and Economic Power
Brave Nika, as you said, there must be laws to protect the body of acquired knowledge.
For example, consider one of our reserved and precise students: he has kept a small notebook filled with phrases since his first grammar lessons.
After twenty years of sewing his eyes to the lips of his teacher, he has been able to create a spiritual treasure in this trade: is it not just like a house or money, his property?
The Devil’s Shoes P. Claudel
One of the characteristics of the capitalist system is the commodification of human mental abilities and their transformation into material capital.
In this context, language plays a dual role: it acts as a medium for commodification and capital accumulation, and it also becomes a commodity itself as a part of human mental ability, thus transforming into a segment of capital.
Auguste Comte states that "language constitutes a form of wealth. A wealth that everyone can use without depleting the stockpile, a wealth that enables all members of society to benefit from it. Because all members of society, who freely participate in this public treasure, unconsciously contribute to its preservation."
In this depiction of linguistic communism, which is freely available to all and can be accessed at any time without anyone holding ownership rights to it, Comte obscures the symbolic confiscation of language in a haze of shared participation. Because language, like any capital, has its own owners and controlling boards. However, which language and which dialect within a language should represent this symbolic image of "public wealth" has been a site of political struggle, a struggle for power and political and economic dominance. The establishment of a new social and political balance after this struggle determines the "legitimacy" of the symbolic power of which language, and symbolic power is intertwined with the political and social power of specific social groups.
The official language, both in its formation and its social use, is related to the state. It is within the process of state formation that the conditions for a single language market are created, in which the official language plays a dominant role. This state language becomes compulsory in official ceremonies and places, such as schools, government offices, and political institutions. Then, the state language acquires the status of a theoretical principle against which all language-related matters are measured. This governing law of language has its judges, namely grammar specialists, and its executive agents in the form of teachers, while the "Academy" becomes the Supreme Court of language and the dictionary turns into its archive.
In Europe, during the process of nation-building, the necessity of a standard language and its imposition on its consumers arose. In pre-revolutionary France, linguistic unity began with the formation of the royal state from the 14th century onwards, and the use of local dialects, which were accompanied by some form of writing and used in local administrations, as well as literary and poetic languages (pays d’oc), gradually gave way to a language used in central regions of France (pays d’oil), especially among educated Parisian circles. The elevation of this language to official and administrative status transformed it into the written and research language of the country, relegating other languages used by the masses to so-called "rustic" (patois) languages. With the French Revolution and the declaration of the official language as the "national language" in the country, local bourgeoisie, priests, and teachers—who largely owed their positions to their command of language and expression—were given the opportunity for informal exclusive control over politics and the means to communicate with the central government. The political goal of imposing the "legitimate" language against dialects and "rustic" languages was to solidify the position of the new governance, and according to the theory of Condillac, language served as a means of distinguishing the new authority from the previous regime. Language reform, the purification of it from the words used by the previous regime, the struggle against dialects and local languages, and their prohibition, ridicule, and derision stemmed not only from a technical and administrative necessity for communication with various regions of the country but also from the essence of a symbolic struggle for power. Therefore, the symbolic term "nation" and aligning "national language" with it did not arise merely from a technical need to establish communication between government organs, authority, and the people, but also aimed to solidify the dominance of the new power.
In Iran, the coup led by Reza Khan and the declaration of Persian as the official and only language of instruction in the country followed a different narrative but operated under a similar logic. The transformation of Persian into the official and educational language of the country did not stem from a cultural and administrative need for communication among the various segments of the population but pursued a political goal of a significant shift in power. Unlike France and other European countries, where the primary role of the educational language was to stabilize the political power of new social classes in society, thus aligning the educational language with the nation-state to a certain extent, Reza Khan mainly suppressed progressive and democratic forces in the country. Furthermore, in contrast to France and several other European countries, where the national language was associated with the rise of new social classes within the abstract concept of "nation," Reza Khan's coup represented a shift in nationalities within political power, and for this reason, the symbolic language that proliferated with Reza Khan's ascent to political power in Iran was heavily imbued with racism against non-Persian nationalities.
The establishment of an academy by Faroughi, the purification of Persian from "foreign" languages such as Turkish and Arabic, and the renaming of places that were not in Persian were all symbolic struggles for power by the coup to consolidate itself. At the same time, the unfamiliarity of a significant portion of non-Persian nationalities practically granted unchallenged authority to Persian speakers in Reza Khan’s administration and subsequent governments.
The political dominance of Turks until Reza Khan and the administration of bureaucracy by Persians had inadvertently created a form of political balance in favor of all nationalities throughout the country. It can be said that Reza Khan’s coup destroyed this balance and transformed it into the unilateral dominance of one nationality.
The shift in political power had serious economic repercussions for non-Persian nationalities in Iran. This encompassed both material and human capital, which requires independent research by economic specialists in this field. However, the concentration of nearly ninety percent of the country’s skilled workforce in central provinces and the allocation of investments to predominantly Persian-speaking regions demonstrates how language is not merely a technical and communicative factor but is intertwined with political dominance, the unequal distribution of political power in the country, and the economic control that arises from it. Language must be viewed as both capital and a factor of capital and power.
The Politics of a Nation and a Language in Iran
The theory of one language and one nation was neither an intellectual invention of Reza Shah nor merely the creation of Iranian right-wing intellectuals. As mentioned, its theoretical foundations were laid in Europe, where European countries were the first experimental workshops for it. The idea of the nation-state, which was a twin concept to nationality in Europe, was also accompanied by the harmonization of nationality with language, especially in German Romanticism, which considered language the most prominent manifestation of nationality.
Nevertheless, the coup d'état of Reza Khan Mir Panj and the beginning of the Pahlavi dynasty must be regarded as a fundamental turning point regarding the national issue in Iran, or more precisely, the national oppression in Iran.
Here, several essential differences must be noted between the so-called "nation-building project" of Reza Khan and its theoretical birthplace in Europe.
In Europe, particularly among the Enlightenment intellectuals and the pioneers of the French Revolution, the idea of the nation was associated with democratism and the transfer of sovereignty from the king to the people. In contrast, the Reza Khan project began with the seizure of sovereignty from the people and the transfer of power to Reza Shah's dictatorship.
Unlike the Constitutional Revolution period, where the term "Iranian nation" was used with some conceptual flexibility and the Romanticism of the Constitutional period revolved around the idea that Iranians are a nation speaking different languages, its fundamental desires were aligned with the Enlightenment ideals of democratizing the government and subjugating the king to the will of the people, with the National Assembly as a representation of that will within the political structure of the country and the establishment of the rule of law. Conversely, Reza Khan's mission was based on establishing absolute monarchy and eradicating political freedoms and suppressing even the most basic forms of democracy.
Unlike Europe, where the formation of the nation-state, at least until the revolutions of 1848, relied on the coalition of the most progressive forces in society, the Reza Khan model was built on the unification of the most reactionary forces in society.
Reza Khan's "nation-building" project excluded the nation itself from the political sphere and incorporated only the Persian elites supporting the dictatorship and aligned elements from other nationalities. At the same time, it began with national oppression and the attempt to erase the national identity of other ethnic groups.
While the brotherhood of nations, equality, and freedom were fundamental slogans of the French Revolution—the primary origins of the nation theory and nation-building project—the so-called nation-building project of Reza Khan was grounded in Aryan racism and positioned against other nationalities in Iran, opposing any form of equality and freedom.
The theory of "linguistic nationalism," primarily—not exclusively—propounded by German Romanticism, identifies language as the main characteristic of nationality, yet it was based on a single language with different dialects. Even the Greeks, who based their national identity on the Greek language, spoke a language that was predominantly the language of the majority. Likewise, although only two percent of people spoke the current Italian language at the time of Italy's independence, they spoke fourteen Italian dialects rather than fourteen different languages【52】. This contrasts sharply with a multilingual and multiethnic country like Iran, where Persian was the only official language and the language of the Persian nationality, not the language of the majority of the people. Similarly, in India, Persian was the official language, considered foreign by the Indian populace, just as Latin had a similar role in Germany and Austria, despite the general population's unfamiliarity with it. Consequently, Reza Khan's nation-building project should be viewed as a project of national oppression and racism rather than true nation-building, which inevitably poisons the social psychology of the Persian nationality itself. It can be argued that a significant portion of the political literature in the country has been shaped along these lines and continues to this day.
The philosophy of national education in Europe aimed to connect the spoken language of the masses with the written language, due to the necessity of involving the masses in politics and the need for unity between the governing language and the people. In contrast, national education in Iran has always distanced itself from such obligations.
It must be said that the concept of one nation and one language in Iran did not fall from a blue sky; various intellectual factions in Iran played a role in laying the ideological foundation for it. Some Turkish intellectuals, such as Ahmad Kasravi and Aref Qazvini, joined this melancholic Romanticism of one nation and one language and practically distanced themselves from the democratic ideas of the Constitutional Revolution, which had given them their names and fame【53】. Kasravi attempted to prove to the people of Azerbaijan that they were not Turks and that their language was not Turkish【54】.
Even progressive intellectuals who carried socialist ideas, such as Amin Rasulzadeh Tabrizi, initially emphasized the idea of a unified Iran and the integration of all these nationalities into a single national entity【55】.
In a multiethnic country, the idea of one nation and one language has serious implications for other nationalities as well as for the nationality that symbolizes and politically embodies all the nationalities defined within it. Such a definition inherently implies the exclusion of other nationalities that can no longer find a place within that framework. The transformation from multiple to one, even if not through physical elimination, is intrinsically linked to the denial of their political, historical, and cultural identity. To justify this, an ideological structure must be constructed.
Significant changes within ideological frameworks and shifts in prevailing thought and ideology require a major political event and a decisive political turnaround. This political shift in Iran following the Constitutional Revolution occurred with Reza Khan's coup d'état and the initiation of a new policy regarding nationalities.
There is no doubt that the new political transformation should not be assessed solely through the lens of internal factors in the country, although the domestic context was a primary background for the influence of external factors. The Russian Revolution and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire had entirely reshaped the political landscape in the region, and it seems unlikely that Reza Khan's coup could have succeeded without these regional transformations. The political bloc in power, primarily comprised of Turks, had been significantly influenced by the Russian Tsarist regime, which made it more vulnerable with the change in the political balance in the region. The time had come to exploit this change in arrangement, necessitating a transformation in the national bloc in power. This not only elevated the Persians, who had played a significant role in the country’s bureaucracy for centuries and represented an important demographic weight, to decision-making power within the political structure but also opened up more political space for the British Empire, which found more reliable allies among Persian politicians. Therefore, it was essential to significantly weaken the influence of all other nationalities, especially the Turks, who traditionally had notable commercial and cultural ties with neighboring ethnicities to the north and with Turks in the west of the country. As a result, Reza Khan's coup essentially represented a change in the national composition of power. This point is best expressed by the statement of Mohammad Ali Furughi, the prime minister and the main ideologue of the Reza Khan regime:
“We did not overthrow Ahmad Shah because we dislike monarchy. We deposed him because the Qajars are of Turkish descent... Our goal in deposing Ahmad Shah was not to establish a republican system... Our aim was to replace the arrogant Qajars with the noble and pure Persian Pahlavi dynasty”【56】.
Reza Khan had no familiarity with history, nor did he have knowledge of the Achaemenid and Sassanian eras or the Persian Empire, which he became enamored with for its past grandeur. This type of oral history was fed into his mind by Ardshir J., known as Ardshir Reporter, to prepare him mentally for the coup. Ardshir Reporter's will serves as the detached reason behind Reza Khan and the principal architect of the coup in Esfand 1299, who was an agent of British intelligence services【57】.
As previously mentioned, the reproduction of state violence is always carried out in a centralized manner, whereas the reproduction of ideology has a dispersed nature. The coup of Reza Khan was an example of the concentrated reproduction of this force of violence in a new power equation. The ideological reproduction that accompanied it is, firstly, not as swift as the reproduction of violence; secondly, its components may emerge at different times or be connected at different times, resulting in all components of the ideology not being created simultaneously; and thirdly, elements of that ideology may also be reproduced across different social strata, even among its opponents, thus spreading throughout society. This sometimes explains and reveals the alignment of regime opponents with it at certain moments in history, as they rise to support it through a sense of ideological affinity with the authority in certain areas, or despite open opposition to it, they maintain commonalities with it. Even today, various groups, social layers, and political parties that oppose the existing regime are not only not opposed to it in all areas, but also have significant ideological commonalities in certain domains.
There is no doubt that every political regime has a solid core of its institutions and ideological supporters. However, it is not limited to that. Sometimes, elements of the same ideology are present among its opponents as well. This was true for Reza Khan. As a result, the ideological organization of the Reza Khan regime is not limited to Reza Khan himself and his solid ideological core, such as Furughi and Mahmoud Afshar and others like them. Others were also involved. Others are still part of it today. If Reza Khan or Mohammad Reza Shah engaged in the violent suppression of nationalities, individuals like Sadegh Hedayat, despite opposing the royal apparatus, and despite having a sensitive and human spirit, did not hold a good view of non-Persian nationalities, and overall held a racially prejudiced perspective, sharing ideological commonalities with that political system in this regard.
With the establishment of the Pahlavi rule, the slogans of the Constitutional Revolution era, stating that we are a nation that speaks different languages, were replaced by a new theory entering the political and ideological domain in Iran, which posited that we are a nation with one language. Since Iran was composed of more than one nationality and one language, implementing this theory entailed physical suppression, political repression, and, most importantly, the promotion of a necessarily racist political ideology against other nationalities on one hand, and the elevation and ideological praise of the Persian nationality on the other. The first step was a redefinition of "the nation of Iran" and its language. The nation of Iran was no longer to be depicted as "one nation with different languages" but rather as a portrayal of the Persian nation, with the Persian language identified as the language that had preserved the identity of this nation over thousands of years. The other nationalities in Iran were reduced to the level of ethnicities. From this point onward, all nationalities would be referred to as ethnic minorities. For instance, the Turks, who had been a dominant political force for a significant part of this history, suddenly became an ethnic minority. It is noteworthy that in modern history, due to the centralized nature of state power, a small minority can maintain power for a certain period of time; however, in pre-capitalist state forms, demographic numbers play a decisive role, and the longer rule of the Turks in Iran illustrates the absurdity of the characterization of them as an "ethnic minority" by Reza Khan's ideologues. Even Khaje Nasir al-Mulk, in his "Siyasatnameh," refers to the foundation of governance in Iran based on "the Papa-khāh" (i.e., the Turks) as the decision-making political power and "Dastārbandān" (the bureaucratic cadre). The issue remains in expressing the historical identity of "the nation of Iran" through the Persian language.
There is no doubt that after gradually shedding its Arabic shell, which was the dominant language, Persian emerged as the administrative language in Iran from the third century Hijri (Islamic calendar), and successive regimes utilized it as a communication tool for the bureaucracy.
The Latin language in Europe served the same role for many European countries for centuries, in addition to being the language of religious texts for all Europeans, a role that Arabic had played and continues to play in Iran. Persian classical literature gradually began to take shape from this time onwards. However, it remained within a small circle, as the majority of Persian speakers, due to widespread illiteracy and the extensive overlap of Arabic vocabulary, were not familiar with the language cited by Reza Khan's ideologues in later periods; they could neither read it nor access it. Even today, it is common for Persian-speaking masses to find that ninety percent of teachers of Persian language and literature, even after completing university education, are not well-acquainted with "Kalila wa Dimna," "Tarikh-e Vasaaf," "Hafez," or "Ferdowsi," nor do they have a serious familiarity with the foundations of classical literature. It might be worth mentioning that the "Shahnameh" of Ferdowsi was first published in 1871 during the reign of Louis Bonaparte and in a print run of a thousand copies, corrected and printed in Paris by the Frenchman Jules Mohl. The "Divan" of Hafez was also collected for the first time from scattered handwritten versions by Mohammad Golendam and published in India by the British colonial administration to familiarize people with Eastern languages, and even then in a very limited number. Its first printing in Iran was done by Rahim Khalkhali, which became the reference point for various Hafez scholars. Therefore, if we speak of oral language in Iranian history, it should be noted that all nationalities have had their oral languages. If we refer to classical literature, it is clear that only a very thin layer of society, mainly a very small part of the Persian-speaking bureaucracy and aristocracy, could make use of it at best. Just as in Europe, French for a long time was the language of the court and the language of the aristocracy and ruling classes, which had no relation to the language of the masses in those countries. Can anyone claim that because French was the language of the aristocracy and literature in Europe, English and German should be considered dialects, or that the identity of the English and German people can be justified under the shadow of “the lofty roof of French poetry” imposed upon them?
The glorification of “the glorious past of Iran's history” and the idealization of the Achaemenid and Sasanian eras, claiming that the Persian language formed the national identity of Iranians throughout history, was not merely a praise of the past but the beginning of an ideological assault to establish the hegemony of the Persian-speaking nationality and to transform myth into reality, and the fading memory of legends and myths into the future identity of all nationalities. This invocation of mythical spirits was part of the ongoing political and ideological struggle. The assertion that the Turks were not Turks, or that they spoke Persian or were Persian, was, in fact, the transformation of a historical fantasy into a reality in the present, and the insinuation that the real future belongs to the Persian language and that the Turks must rediscover their Persian identity and return to it.
Mahmoud Afshar, one of the promoters of the Aryan race theory during Reza Khan's era, writes:
“In Iran, our national unity relies on racial unity, shared religion, social life, and a history of several thousand years.
The Ottoman claim that half of Iran is Turkish or the Arab claims that parts of Iran are ‘Arab’ are entirely baseless and unfounded. It is clear that the country of Iran was inhabited by the Iranian race before the Arab invasion and the Mongol incursions, and the Turks, who are of the yellow race, and the Arabs, who are of the Semitic race, only intermixed with the indigenous Aryan population and did not become their representatives. If in certain areas like Azerbaijan and parts of the Persian Gulf coast, the Turkish and Arabic languages have become the languages of the people, this is entirely incidental, and the origin and cause of this are completely clear.”
Mahmoud Afshar, expressing concern, continues:
“Although the nationality of Iran is defined by its glorious history of several thousand years and the distinguished Aryan race, it can be said that our national unity is incomplete due to the linguistic differences among the Turkish speakers of Azerbaijan, the Arabic speakers of Khuzestan, and the Persian speakers of other provinces... It is uncertain how long the common religion will be a strong factor in our national unity... The people of Ganja and Badkubeh and the southern part of the Caucasus, who are Shiite but Turkish-speaking, chose to align their sentiments and inclinations with us rather than the Ottomans, meaning that the language factor took precedence over the religion factor.”
He continues:
"Take any European geographical map and look at the section on ethnicities; this truth will become clear to you as the sun shines [and] is not hidden from anyone that the Turkish and Arabic languages have been imposed on these regions and are incidental, not natural. It is indeed a strange excuse for nation-building that the Turanians claim that because our bloodthirsty ancestors, such as Genghis Khan, Timur, the Seljuks, etc., invaded your land several centuries ago, after centuries of destruction, killing, and looting, they imposed their language on you. Now you must abandon your Iranian brothers, who are national, indigenous, religious, moral, and historical, and join us... Our Azerbaijani compatriots are disgusted by this Turanian language, namely Turkish, which has been imposed on them by the Chinggisids and other plunderers of this land."
Mahmoud Afshar then adds that we should not only share in the optimism that “the people of Azerbaijan are not Turks and the people of the Arabian part of Iran are not Arabs,” but we must also “have sharp, logical words, spirited newspapers, skillful diplomacy, and a keen spearhead” and propose a series of so-called very moral and patriotic actions regarding these compatriots, which I will summarize below:
Complete promotion of the Persian language and literature and the history of Iran throughout the country, especially in Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Khuzestan, and Sistan and Baluchestan, and the Turkmen regions. Encourage local Persian-language newspapers and magazines, prepare inexpensive and simple books and pamphlets in Persian for those areas (and sell Persian newspapers cheaper than in Persian regions, sending very patriotic officials to their educational departments).
Construct railways and connect all parts of the country with one another, so that through increased intermingling among various Iranian tribes, complete unity can be achieved.
Relocate some tribes from Azerbaijan and Khuzestan to the interior of Iran and bring Persian-speaking tribes from the interior to these regions, establishing schools and ensuring conditions for intermingling.
Create new administrative divisions and eliminate the names of Azerbaijan, Khorasan, Kerman, Arabia, etc.
Change the Turkish and Arabic names given to regions, villages, mountains, and rivers of Iran by the Turkish invaders and foreign plunderers to Persian names, and eradicate all such foreign influences.
The use of foreign languages [specifically Turkish and Arabic, etc.] should be officially prohibited for Iranian subjects in courts, schools, government offices, and the army...
In another piece titled "The Nationality of the Persians," which shares a name with a writing from one of the Parsis of India, Mahmoud Afshar again denies the Arab identity of Arabs and the Turkish identity of Turks in Iran: “In this province (i.e., Khuzestan), which was once one of the centers of civilization in Iran, due to its proximity to Arab-speaking regions and the sheltering of migrating Arab tribes, a number of residents speak Arabic. The Arabs have used this issue as an excuse to claim that this piece of Iran is Arab and call it ‘Arabistan of Iran’—just as the Turks also, with a fallacy, claim that Azerbaijan is Turkish!”
In the first issue of the magazine “Ayandeh,” which served as the propaganda organ for Reza Khan's racial ideology against non-Persian nationalities, similar propaganda against Kurds and Turkmen is presented along with similar solutions:
“For several years, the murmur of Kurdish independence has arisen, and some Ottoman Kurds dance to its tune... We must remind our authorities that our domestic policy should be such that gradually, but as soon as possible, the Kurds of Iran, who are of Iranian descent and whose language is also one of the Iranian tongues, blend and merge with other Iranians, so that no distinction remains. The definitive solution is the establishment of schools in those areas, the promotion of the Persian language, teaching the history of Iran, and generating a sense of Iranian identity among the residents, and finally constructing a railway from the central parts of the country to those areas to create more social and economic connections between Kurds and Persian speakers. Whenever this matter, namely the ‘Persianization’ of the Kurds of Iran, is achieved, it will not harm us if one day Ottoman Kurdistan becomes independent and there exists a small Iranian nation-state between us and the Turkish government.”
It must be said that the history of all empires and dynasties is based on invasion, conquest, pillaging, and subjugating the peoples of conquered lands. There has never been a conquered land that was conquered spontaneously; rather, it was invaded, and every conquest and expansion has been accompanied by murder, slaughter, and barbarism. This applies to the Persian and Sasanian empires as well as the Aryan race. However, the unilateral evocation of the “pure Aryan spirits” and the mention of the atrocities of the founders of non-Aryan empires, none of which had relevance to living alongside different nationalities in today’s world and within a democratic system, served to justify the application of national oppression and the denial of their fundamental and natural rights.
These symbolizations were not merely arbitrary interpretations of the past but served a vile policy in the present that targeted non-Persian nationalities and effectively portrayed them as potential enemies. The attacks on Genghis Khan and the Mongols were not just about beating dead historical figures or expressing disdain for harsh faces in history; rather, it was a form of symbolization for present use and the external objectification of this symbol in the face of the Turk and the Turkish language, and on a broader scale, against all non-Persian nationalities to justify the acts of violence by Reza Khan's coup regime against these nationalities. At the same time, this symbolization aimed to create a specific type of identity while negating the identities of others. This identity-making viewed the identity of all Iranians solely in the historical form of the Persian nationality and its language and deemed it necessary to use “spirited press, skillful diplomacy, and sharp spears” to eliminate the identities of other nationalities. This identity-making was inherently racist, dividing nationalities in Iran into the native nation and the non-native nationalities.
Racist ideology often appeals to the regressive instincts of individuals to incite racial hatred, false pride, and a sense of humiliation against other nationalities. The perspective of Reza Khan's intellectuals towards nationalities was not free from this spirit of racism. However, the racist ideology, which carried the burden of national oppression, was not limited to the rigid core of Reza Khan's propagandists.
Racist ideology did not merely manifest itself in the racial theories of Reza Khan’s intellectual supporters and policymakers but also played a significant role in the poetry and literature that laid the groundwork for such ideology. With the advent of storytelling in Iran, Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh, one of its early founders, began to inject racist thinking and deny the identities of others into the new Iranian storytelling. In "Farsi Shekar Ast," Jamalzadeh states that although Azerbaijanis speak Turkish, they are not considered Turks; they are Azerbaijanis, “or a special form of Persian that has later been understood as a gift from Istanbul.” The Azerbaijani character in "Farsi Shekar Ast" does not speak Turkish, but rather expresses Persian with a Turkish accent, effectively negating his Turkish identity! Another character in the same story is an Arab whose speech is incomprehensible and is described as speaking the language of spirits. According to Jamalzadeh, all Iranians speak Persian, which is mixed with some Turkish and Kurdish words, and anyone who does not speak Persian is not Iranianne could say that Sadegh Hedayat, the most prominent storyteller of that period, was also among the most racist. His anti-religious sentiment, particularly towards Islam, which he views as a manifestation and cause of Iran's backwardness, leads him to adopt a racist mentality against Arabs. At the same time, Hedayat's nationalism is rooted in the worship of the Aryan race, and Iran and Iranians only hold meaning for him in the face of the Aryan race. This mindset pushes Hedayat towards a racist spirit not only against Arabs but also against Jews and Turks. Nonetheless, the sharp edge of his racism is directed against Arabs. He writes in "Saye-ye Mongol":
"On the day the Mongol came, the day that this bloodthirsty race invaded their land (i.e., the Arabs), this unclean, despicable race, enemy of civilization and freedom, with crooked eyes that had perfected the art of torture to its utmost subtlety and in their base, short, and crude thoughts, with their unrefined bodies, had nothing in mind except for destruction, burning, and looting. At that time, they realized that the Mongol was the enemy of all living beings, the enemy of life, and the enemy of humanity" . Indeh Begur," he repeats the same theme through one of the characters in the story, who expresses Hedayat's own state of mind and intent to commit suicide:
"If I were dead, I would be taken to the hands of unkempt Arabs, and I would die again. I am disgusted by their appearance." Again, in "Talab-e Amurzi":
"The ragged Arabs, with foolish faces and all sorts of cunning looks, wandering with turbans, beards, and henna-dyed nails, with shaved heads, reciting their rosaries, walking in their sandals and cloaks, spoke Persian or babbled in Turkish, or their Arabic came out like a groan from deep within their throats, echoing in the air. Arab women with grimy, tattooed faces, hollow eyes, had hoops passing through their nostrils. One of them shoved her black breast halfway into the mouth of the dirty child she was holding" .
Also"Isfahan, Half the World":
"The cleric said, 'Tomorrow morning when you go out the gate, grab the first person you see by the collar and don't let go; he will give you money.' The man went out early in the morning and saw a strange, ugly Arab resembling a Mongolian demon approaching from afar. He went forward and greeted the Arab. The Arab took him into a cave, where he found two people chained up and human bones scattered around. He realized that the Arab was a cannibal... He tried to escape, but the Arab grabbed his wrist" .
Hedayat's depiction of a Jew named Molla Isaq in "Dash Akol" is no less disparaging than his descriptions of Arabs. In contrast, Hedayat has a tone of admiration for the "Aryan race." In the introduction he wrote for "The Songs of Khayyam," he presents Khayyam and his quatrains as a "rebellion of the Aryan spirit against Semitic beliefs." The notion that Khayyam's materialism or secularism is directed against the Semitic race reflects Hedayat's mindset more than it does Khayyam's. Khayyam expresses a material worldview rather than a racial perspective, thus sharing a serious resemblance with free thinkers like Zakariya Razi and Obaid Zakani rather than with narrow-minded racism. Hedayat also writes in "Parvin, Daughter of Sasan":
"The Iranian race does not perish. We are the same as those who endured the invasions of the Greeks and the Parthians for many years. In the end, we stood tall... let alone these wild, barefoot Arabs who possess nothing of their own, except a long tongue and a sword." In the final scene, Parvin, an Aryan girl, kills herself with a dagger so as not to fall into the hands of the "lizard-eating Arab."
The worship of the Aryan race, which represents another facet and affirmative form of racism, sometimes takes on a pathological shape, manifesting in the notion that "art belongs to Iranians and no one else":
"What is known in Europe as Indian, Mongolian, and Arab industry, especially among Arabs who have run barefoot after lizards, could not have had the thought of industry penetrate their heads, and what is attributed to them belongs to other nations, just as today Arab architecture is a ridiculous imitation of Persian architecture."
Unfortunately, the racist mindset prevailing in Iranian literature, which had its roots in the past but primarily targeted foreign occupation, not only dominated after the reign of Reza Shah but was also used as a political-ideological tool against Arab compatriots in Iran. The prevailing racial ideology in Persian literature led writers like Hedayat to overlook the role of the Arabic language and culture in transmitting Greek philosophy and valuable works of Roman civilization to Europe and subsequently to the entire world, laying the groundwork for the Renaissance. It was the Arabic culture and language that opened the doors to philosophy and familiarity with the civilization and history of the West for the Persian language. Throughout the Middle Ages, it was this Arabic culture and language that carried the weight of human thought and culture and transmitted it to other nations of the world. In this regard, no language of that historical period can be compared with the Arabic language.
The psychology of racism, which promotes a sense of hatred towards foreigners, sees foreigners as all non-Persian nationalities. This mindset encompasses a large wave of writers, most of whom were opposed to the despotic royal apparatus. However, their commonalities in opposing non-Persian nationalities in Iran, in the context of their racist perceptions of the relationships among nationalities in Iran and their racial worship, applying the term "Iranian" only to those who are Persians, positioned them ideologically in an alliance with Reza Khan's despotism. Consequently, a significant part of the ideological structure of Reza Khan's and Mohammad Reza Shah's despotism was produced and disseminated by their opponents, rather than by their direct supporters. This means that the dispersed reproduction of ideology occurs beyond the apparatus of violence and political power and is also reproduced among its opponents. This, in turn, facilitates the reproduction of the apparatus of violence in a renewed form of despotism, since every political system feeds off an ideological fabric. As long as an anti-democratic attitude exists in various realms of thought, including towards nationalities, the reproduction of a non-democratic and despotic political system is the closest conceivable assumption, even if the ruling political apparatus is overthrown in some way.
The overthrow of the monarchy was a more concentrated and violent reproduction of the apparatus of violence. The Islamic Republic has been, in every respect, a more brutal despotism than the monarchy. However, a significant portion of the regime's opponents, despite their animosity towards it, share serious ideological commonalities with each other.
The nature of the dispersed reproduction of ideology connects disparate social forces in specific domains and gives a specific crystallization of ideology in that particular area, which is usually enduring. Despite a change in the governing system, this crystallized ideology can be utilized by the new power as one of the two pillars of the reproduced system of violence. In Iranian society and similar communities, this thought regarding national issues, particularly language as a fundamental component, has crystallized into an ideological construct where the assertion of minority rights is immediately interpreted as secession. This ideological charter unites different and sometimes contradictory social spectra.
The asynchronous reproduction of ideology also precisely connects asynchronously political regimes in the same areas.
It is precisely in this context that, despite the overthrow of the monarchy, the Islamic Republic becomes the heir to Reza Khan's policies regarding the language issue and the national question, sometimes pursuing Reza Khan's policies even more brutally or continuing to promote racist ideology.
The asynchronicity and dispersed nature of the reproduction of elements of ideology in many areas, including the national issue, where language is a fundamental component, brings many opponents of the Islamic Republic, who outwardly claim to advocate democracy and oppose despotism, into a shared and sometimes unintentional ideological closeness with the Islamic Republic and the thought system of Reza Khan's despotism.
The Necessity of Reevaluating Language and National Issues
Although the collapse of the Soviet Union and its ideological system, along with the process of globalization, have accelerated a new wave of national issues emerging in politics, we have, in many ways, distanced ourselves from the essence of the nation-state era and the theory of one nation and one language. The issues of language and nationality require serious reevaluation from multiple perspectives. This is because national issues and their twin, language, serve as explosive dynamics in any multi-national society, especially in third-world countries, where political operators typically have little more than "scandalous press, sophisticated diplomacy, and sharp bayonets" in their political thinking. In today's world, this approach does not provide a solution for national issues or language matters. Additionally, the dominance of one ethnic-linguistic group in a multi-national country cannot be regarded as the basis for national unity. Such a perspective fosters an environment ripe for conflicts and a perpetual, blind animosity among all parties.
The revival of national and ethnic identities by those nationalities within society that have been overlooked in the nation-state structure is part of modernity. It seeks to end the dark aspects of the nation-state that rest upon the political and cultural dominance of one nationality while denying the rights of and marginalizing others. In this regard, we should view the process of national issues returning to the political stage as a demand for the expansion of democracy within society and a rationalization of state structures. Both the concepts of nationality and citizenship are, in themselves, abstract ideas that pass through the social and ethnic realities of civil society.
In today’s world, apart from three countries—Bangladesh, Portugal, and Iceland—all countries are, to varying degrees, multi-national, and in most of them, the issues of language, nationality, and minority rights are raised in some form. The matters of nationality and minority are somewhat distinct from one another. For example, a Spaniard or a Mexican is part of their respective nationalities within their own countries, but in a foreign country, such as France or the United States, they are considered an ethnic minority.
If national issues have once again returned to the global political stage, the nation-state is under serious pressure from both below—from its subsets, such as nationalities and various forms of ethnic and cultural minorities—and from above, by transnational entities and various international conventions, limiting its sovereignty. Consequently, one cannot approach nationality and language issues with the same romanticism of one nation and one language.
Even in countries like the United States, where immigrants learned English voluntarily without direct political pressure and where the concept of nationality did not exist in the same sense, the issue of bilingual education in schools has received political attention since the Johnson administration, especially after a significant wave of immigration from Latin America in the 1960s.
Over the past eighty years, nationalities have continued to exist despite physical and cultural repression. The policy of one nation, one language—under the banner of the Persian nation and the Persian language—has failed and requires a democratic response; otherwise, it will lead the country toward a form of Balkanization and ethnic conflicts. The national issue is a legitimate and smoldering fire that is now rising to the surface in various national contexts. The experience of countries like Spain, which transitioned from Franco's dictatorship to political democracy, may serve as instructive examples showing that a common language does not necessarily create a nation. Acknowledging the national and linguistic rights of the Catalans and Basques, who were once labeled separatists, has demonstrated that it is possible to live as a nationality within a state without forming an independent government. Furthermore, their struggle for national rights has been one of the building blocks of democracy and has led Spain toward a form of federalism, with language forming the core of their identity.
The issues of language and nationality demand a new democratic perspective. As Manuel Castells has stated:
“From the United States to sub-Saharan African countries, ethnicity is the basis of social differentiation and social recognition, as well as social discrimination. Ethnicity has also been the foundation of the struggle for social justice: such as the uprising of the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico, in 1994.”
We live in a time when the Persian language, through mass media, along with other languages, is under significant pressure. English has become the primary language of communication among various nations and will inevitably have an impact on it. On the other hand, advancements in technology and new media capabilities provide other nationalities in Iran with the opportunity to utilize these resources and emphasize their identity more.
Once, Ernest Renan divided nations into two categories: “instinctive nations,” which emerged based on shared race, blood ties, religion, and language, and “rational nations.” He claimed, "I only know one rational nation, and that is Switzerland," which he regarded as a precursor to modern Europe.
Contemporary Europe, which is the primary origin of the theories of nationality, self-determination, and the nation-state, has distanced itself more than any other region in the world from the model of instinctive nations. Factors such as race, ethnic basis, or language are no longer the unifying elements. What was once considered unusual—that the sovereignty of a specific nationality cannot necessarily define the state—has now become a common norm. European countries, by clustering into a larger political unit known as the European Union, are losing many characteristics of their nation-state. The defining feature of this political union is neither language nor nationality, while each member retains its own cultural, national, and linguistic identities.
Although Europe has not yet formed a single state, it possesses many attributes of a state, even stronger than those present during the early days of the post-independence United States. Perhaps one day, a European identity will evolve into a collective, even national identity for all Europeans. This is what Ernest Renan referred to as a "rational nation."
It is important to note that Europeans, unlike Americans before the War of Independence, have never lived under a single governmental umbrella. However, in multi-national countries such as Iran, Spain, and many others, the long history of coexistence within a single state can act as an accelerant for rationalizing governmental organization. All nationalities can live together within one state without losing their national, linguistic, and cultural identities or needing to establish independent governments, nor having the state defined solely by one specific nationality. In this case, the concept of a "rational nation" in Iran would also gain meaning.
Will the political activists in Iran, especially the democratic forces within society, possess the necessary political wisdom to learn from the historical paths taken by others and guide Iran toward a truly democratic society, forming a "rational nation" rather than an "instinctive" and ethnic one?
References and Thematic Index