Voices of the Marginalized: The Historical Roots of Anti-Arab Sentiment in Contemporary Iran

Yousef Azizi Benitorof - February 20, 2010

Yousef Azizi Benitorof

Consider this classic definition of a nation, nationality, or an ethnic group: a group of humans who share a common land, common history, language, and culture. In my opinion, "language" is the most important pillar of this collection. The six ethnic groups of Persians, Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and Turkmen are now recognized in the context of Iranian society and even internationally as the ethnic components of this society.

Of course, there are other non-Persian ethnic groups in Iran that differ somewhat from Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and Turkmen. For example, one can refer to the Gilaki people, whose language some consider a dialect of Persian while others regard it as a semi-language. Although the Lor and Bakhtiari people each speak one of the dialects of the Persian language, their culture differs from that of the Persians, and some sociologists consider them to have a distinct ethnic identity. Let us not forget that Mirza Kuchek Khan and the Jungle Movement in the early 20th century included the issue of "autonomy" for Gilan in their charter, placing special importance on the Gilaki language.

In fact, the Persian language and the Shia religion are the two main tools or arms of the ruling power in Iran for managing the affairs of the country, and of course, the "sponsor" or, better put, the lifeblood that drives these two arms is oil or oil money. This occurs at the cost of erasing the languages and religions of other ethnic and linguistic components of Iranian society.

Language is the tool of thought and the primary expression of a nation's culture. If the language of an ethnic group or nation remains stagnant and inactive, it means that the thoughts of that ethnic group have ceased to function. Language is a durable historical phenomenon and is considered the most important means of understanding and mutual comprehension. However, language is born of power and also gives rise to it.

There is a direct relationship between the extreme concentration of power in the center, namely Tehran, and the policies based on the unilingual and official status of only one language in Iran. Furthermore, linguistic, ethnic, and cultural diversity and plurality are in contradiction with extreme centralization. Currently, this fundamental contradiction exists in Iranian society. This is indeed a historical contradiction that is over eighty years old. However, we are now in an era of revolutions and democratic transformations. The vast wave of democratic aspirations has swept through Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa. From Senegal to Singapore and from Malaysia to Iraq and Afghanistan, this process is widespread, and Iran cannot remain aloof from this new wave of democracy. The current uprising of the Iranian people is proof of this.

In the face of national (ethnic) oppression and discrimination, ethnic citizenship rights are brought forth, which are part of the citizenship rights of the people of Iran. These rights encompass the balanced development of various languages based on a multilingual educational system. Of course, this can only be achieved through decentralized governance. In my opinion, under the current conditions, a federal system could take on this responsibility. This is because centralized power has always provided a suitable ground for dictatorship in Iran, and decentralization and federalism are the guarantees of democracy in the country.

It is important to note that national oppression is a "package" that includes factors such as linguistic, religious, cultural, social, and ethnic discrimination. The root of all the backwardness of non-Persian peoples lies in the linguistic backwardness of these peoples. In other words, the seed of this backwardness is sown at the age of seven for non-Persian children. A non-Persian child in the first grade of primary school is forced to learn two things: the Persian language and the Persian alphabet. However, a Persian child only learns the Persian alphabet. At this starting line of the race of life, a weight is hung around the neck of the non-Persian child that prevents them from competing with their Persian counterpart. If we disregard the exceptions among non-Persian children, the majority of average-intelligence individuals in this unequal competition will lose. This losing happens either at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end of the race.

Linguistic backwardness leads to cultural backwardness, which in turn causes social and economic backwardness.

Roots of Anti-Arab Sentiment in Contemporary Iran

Anti-Arab sentiment and, consequently, racial discrimination is one of the main factors contributing to the backwardness of millions of Arab compatriots in Iran. Currently, more than eight percent of the population in Iran speak Arabic as their mother tongue, with about six percent residing in Khuzestan and neighboring provinces, and two percent in other regions of Iran.

Anti-Arab sentiment in Iran has two historical and geographical motivations. The geographical motivations stem from the conflicts between the ruling regimes in Iran (such as the Shah's regime and the current regime) and Arab regimes in contemporary times. Here, my focus on anti-Arab sentiment does not refer to opposition to Arab regimes, which anyone may support or oppose, but rather to enmity against the Arab people (or against Arabs as Arabs). This type of enmity is a form of racism that must be fought against, just as anti-Turkish sentiment should be confronted, as both anti-Arab and anti-Turkish sentiments do not benefit national solidarity.

Historically, anti-Arab sentiment began with the Sho'oubiyya movement and Ferdowsi, persisting for two centuries; however, from the fourth century onward, humanistic feelings (in the poetry of Rumi, Hafez, Saadi, and many other poets and prose writers) and even Arab friendship (like that of Nasir Khusraw) took the place of anti-Arab sentiment in Persian literature. This situation continued for nine centuries, up until the thirteenth century AH (nineteenth century CE). This nine-century gap and the distancing from anti-Arab sentiment indicate that this racist ideology is not indigenous to Iran but rather stems from Sho'oubiyya circles or extremist nationalists.

In contemporary Iranian history, anti-Arab sentiment and revivalism began with Prince Jalal al-Din Mirza, son of Fath Ali Shah Qajar. He was the first to emphasize the revival of ancient Persian culture and writing in the mid-nineteenth century due to the encouragement of Persian expatriates in India. Jalal al-Din Mirza has a book titled "Letter of Khusrawan," in which he outlines his views. Other like-minded individuals include Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzadeh and Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani.

They were influenced by the ideas of European nationalist and racist thinkers. At that time, there were also liberal democratic and Marxist schools in Europe, which nationalist compatriots ignored. The fascist and inhumane proposal to change the demographic makeup of Khuzestan and marginalize Arabs in the province, although it led to peaceful demonstrations by the Arab masses of Ahvaz in Farvardin 1384 (April 2005) and the killing of dozens by the police, has its roots in the thoughts of individuals like Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani. Reza Beigdelu writes in his book "Revivalism in Contemporary Iranian History" that "among the other works of Aqa Khan is a treatise called 'The Treatise on the Development of Khuzestan,' in which he suggests that Persian expatriates in India should buy part of the fertile lands of Khuzestan from the Iranian government and return to Iran, building a city along the Karun River similar to Karachi and Mumbai, rich and abundant in Iranian spirit. This treatise went to India and was accepted by the Persians there, and in pursuit of this goal, the Persians negotiated with the Iranian court, but Nasir al-Din Shah refused this deal, and no results were obtained from this effort." Reza Beigdelu cites this from Yahya Dowlatabadi's book "Hayat Yahya, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, Attar and Ferdows Publishing, Tehran 1371 (1992), p. 160).

Of course, this plan was practically implemented in the Kian Pars region during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi with the help of Zoroastrians from Yazd.

Undoubtedly, contemporary Persian literature has played an important role in shaping anti-other and especially anti-Arab sentiments. Writers and theorists such as Mahmoud Afshar, Ahmad Kasravi, Pour Davood, Malek al-Shu'ara Bahar, Abd al-Hossein Zarrin Koub, and even critics like Jamalzadeh, Sadegh Hedayat, Akhavan Sales, and others have contributed to the formation of narrow-minded nationalist thoughts that discriminate against others and establish the current defective nation-state. These ideas form the current discourse filled with hatred and contempt toward Iranian Arab and Turk compatriots. I do not deny the literary creativity of some of these figures, but the harms of creativity tainted by racism and anti-Arab sentiment far outweigh its benefits.

Here, it should be noted that the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran mentions Arabic as the second language; however, the current regime not only pays little attention to the rights of the Arab people in Khuzestan but also continually seeks to erase their national (ethnic), linguistic, and cultural identity. Suppression, torture, and imprisonment of Arab cultural and ethnic activists have become commonplace.

Arabic was taught both during the Shah's regime and during the Islamic Republic in high school—albeit for different motivations. The Pahlavi regime implemented this for nationalistic reasons and to understand classical Persian literature, while the current regime does so to promote a religious discourse—not out of concern for the Arab people of Khuzestan. These people have received nothing but racism and oppression from both regimes.

Over the past eight decades, between 1.5 to 2 million Arabs in Khuzestan have lost their mother tongue due to policies of "Persianization" (assimilation), which signifies a demographic decline and constitutes a form of cultural cleansing.

Additionally, we must consider the immigrant settlements, some of which, like Yazdno and Isfahan-e-No, were built during the previous Shah's regime, while others, such as Shirin Shahr and Ramin Shahr and dozens of other settlements, were constructed during the Islamic Republic.

Furthermore, in the 1940s, a plan was executed to transfer Arab teachers and employees from Arab-populated regions to non-Arab areas, resulting in hundreds being forcibly uprooted from their homes and relocated to Persian-populated regions like Dezful and Behbahan. One of the leaders of the extreme nationalists proposed a similar plan to President Khatami early in his presidency, which included Arabs and Turks.

The illiteracy rate among Arab men and women and the dropout rate of Arab students represent a significant proportion, which is rare across Iran. According to government statistics, Khuzestan is one of the most educationally backward provinces in the country.

Moreover, every year, the government sends three to four million of its supporters under the title of "Norooz Caravan of Light" to cities, villages, and border areas of Khuzestan at its own expense and via bus. The expenses for food, clothing, and transportation for these individuals are entirely covered by the government. This act, accompanied by a kind of soil worship and sanctification of war sites, has specific political targets that target the Arab locals.

Before the fall of the last Arab ruler of the province, Sheikh Khaz'al, in 1925, there were several Arabic schools in Ahvaz and Mohammara (current Khorramshahr), the most notable of which was the Chasbiyeh School in Ahvaz, which was converted into Shahpour High School during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi.

Although the oil from Khuzestan constitutes 80 percent of Iran's revenue, the Arab people of this region do not benefit from this oil and suffer from both cultural poverty and severe economic deprivation. Recent photographs released by the Mehr News Agency depict a level of poverty among these people that is scarcely seen even in Africa.

Given all of this, the issue of the Arabs of Khuzestan is now one of existence or non-existence, of being or not being.